The Qaddafi regime today is widely seen as a former rogue state attempting to come in from the cold. It appears in the best interests of the U.S. government to encourage and promote this metamorphosis. A number of articles have appeared over the last two years making the case for rehabilitation; those arguments will not be repeated here.1 Assuming a Libya-U.S. rapprochement would be a positive development, the unanswered question is how best to achieve this result. A performance based roadmap offering incremental incentives in a step-by-step approach is the most promising option. It would build support in both countries for a gradual resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations. It would also demonstrate to other rogue states and the world that peaceful options to violent regime change exist, given modified policy behavior.
BILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME
The bilateral sanctions regime imposed by the United States on Libya beginning in the mid-1970s is a multifaceted, interwoven and overlapping bundle of executive orders and congressionally mandated rules and regulations. A performance-based roadmap requires that clear, concrete steps – not simply commitments or promises – on one side be rewarded by agreed-upon, reciprocal steps on the other. Given the intricate and involved nature of the bilateral sanctions, the starting point in constructing the roadmap is to review the central provisions of the sanctions regime.
Benevolently neutral toward the Qaddafi regime in its early years, the United States government first signaled its official concern with Libyan policies in early 1973, when it failed to appoint a successor to Ambassador Joseph Palmer, who had resigned in late 1972. Following delivery of eight of sixteen C-130 military transport planes ordered by the Libyan monarchy, Washington in 1973 blocked delivery of the remaining eight planes, even though Libya had already paid for them. It also elected not to sell Libya additional military weapons and related equipment that could enhance Libyan military capabilities. By mid-1976, the Ford administration was suggesting publicly that Libya was supporting international terrorism, and a January 1977 Department of Defense report labeled Libya the fourth leading enemy of the United States. The Carter administration reinforced the largely ad hoc U.S. sanctions regime in place in May 1978, when it banned the export of all military equipment to Libya, including aircraft and selected agricultural and electronic equipment.2
The United States designated Libya a state sponsor of terrorism in September 1979 under the provisions of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (PL 96-72), which established the State Department’s list of countries found to be supporting acts of international terrorism. Companion legislation, specifically Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629), prohibits the export of any munitions item to a country on the terrorism list. The same section also outlaws credits, guarantees or other financial assistance to countries on the list. On the other hand, the Arms Export Control Act provides for a waiver if the president deems an export in the national interest.3
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 later added a relevant provision to the original Arms Export Control Act. Under the provisions of Section 40A, no defense articles or services can be sold or licensed for export to a foreign country that the president has determined, and congress has certified, is not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Again, the president may waive this prohibition if he determines a transaction is important to the national interests of the United States. Consequently, Libya could be removed from the state-sponsors-of-terrorism list but still be barred from purchasing arms as long as it remains on the list of those not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.4
In December 1979, an unruly mob of Libyan citizens, demonstrating in support of Iranian militants holding American hostages in Tehran, sacked and burned the U.S. embassy in Tripoli. Two months later, in February 1980, Chargé d’Affaires William L. Eagleton, Jr., a noted Arabist and later ambassador to Syria, closed the embassy on the grounds the United States could no longer accept the guarantees of the Qaddafi regime regarding the future safety of American diplomats. Over a year later, the Reagan administration, in May 1981, ordered Libya to close the Libyan people’s bureau (embassy) in Washington and to remove its staff from the country.5
Thereafter, the Reagan administration systematically increased diplomatic, military and economic pressure on Libya. In 1982, Washington embargoed U.S. imports of Libyan crude oil and restricted U.S. exports to Libya of oil-and-gas industry technology, together with related items that might have military application. The embargo on Libyan crude oil sparked little informed comment at the time; however, it marked the end of both a policy and a policy process, the separation of American commercial and political policies toward Libya, pursued by successive administrations after 1969. In November 1985, the Reagan administration extended the embargo to include U.S. imports of refined petroleum products from Libya.6
On January 7, 1986, President Reagan in Executive Order 12543 found the policies and actions of the Libyan government to constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat” and declared a national emergency to deal with it. Executive Order 12543 prohibits a wide range of trade and other transactions, including “the import into the United States of any goods or services of Libyan origin, other than publications and materials imported for news publications or news broadcast dissemination,” and “the export to Libya of any goods, technology or services from the United States, except publications and donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for medical purposes.” It also prohibits transactions by U.S. persons relating to transportation to or from Libya, the grant or extension of credits or loans by any U.S. person to Libya, and any transaction by a U.S. person relating to travel by U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens to Libya. A clarification issued in early February 1986 permitted U.S. oil companies operating in Libya to continue to do so temporarily to avoid any breach of contract with or expropriation by Libya and to avoid handing Libya a financial windfall. Because it severely restricted public and private intercourse between Libya and the United States, Executive Order 12543 was a major contributor to the current state of ignorance about Libya in the United States.7 Executive Order 12543 was later modified in April 1999 to allow U.S. firms to apply to the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, for specific licenses to sell food and medical items to Libya as well as Iran and Sudan.8
In Executive Order 12544, the Reagan administration on January 8, 1986, extended the bilateral sanctions regime, blocking
all property and interests in property of the Government of Libya, its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Libya that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of U.S. persons, including overseas branches of U.S. persons.9
On June 30, 1986, only ten weeks after the United States bombed selected targets around Benghazi and Tripoli, the Reagan administration ordered all American oil companies to leave Libya. At the same time, it authorized them to enter into standstill agreements in which the subsidiaries of third countries would operate their holdings in Libya. Even though the original standstill agreements expired on June 30, 1989, the Qaddafi regime has continued to honor them.10
In the area of foreign-assistance appropriations, a ban on direct assistance to Libya has been included in every foreign-aid appropriation since fiscal year 1988, and there is no provision for a presidential waiver. Since 1990, the appropriation has specified that the ban on direct assistance also applies to direct loans, credits, insurance and Export-Import guarantees. A ban on indirect assistance to Libya has been included in every foreign aid appropriation since fiscal year 1989. The indirect assistance covered by the ban includes U.S. contributions to multilateral development banks or international organizations that provide loans or work in Libya. In the case of indirect assistance, there is a provision for a presidential waiver on the grounds of national interest. The countries targeted in the case of both direct and indirect assistance are those on the State Department’s list of countries found to be supporting acts of international terrorism, even though there is no official requirement for such correspondence.11
President Clinton on August 5, 1996, signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA, 104-172) which describes Libya as a “threat to international peace and security that endangers the national security and foreign-policy interests of the United States.” Specifically, it cites Libya’s failure to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 731, 748 and 883; support for international terrorism; and efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. ILSA calls on the president to impose sanctions if a person has exported, transferred or otherwise provided to Libya any prohibited goods, services, technology or other items. In the case of investments, ILSA set the trigger for sanctions for Libya at $40 million, while the trigger for Iran was scheduled from the outset to drop from $40 million to $20 million after a 12month grace period. ILSA also gives the president the power to terminate the sanctions if he certifies to congress that Libya has fulfilled the requirement of resolutions 731, 748 and 883.12
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 contains a number of provisions, in addition to Section 40A discussed earlier, that apply to countries on the terrorism list. Section 221 enables victims of an act of terrorism to sue a country alleged to have provided material support for a terrorist group or act although it provides no mechanism for collection of such judgments. Section 321 authorizes penalties against U.S. persons engaging in financial transactions with states on the terrorism list. Sections 325 and 326 impose so-called “secondary sanctions,” sanctions on third countries not on the terrorism list itself that provide assistance or lethal military equipment to a state on the list. Finally, Section 327 amends the International Financial Institution Act (22 U.S.C. 262c), requiring the United States to vote against loans to terrorism-list countries by international financial institutions.13
The 2001 ILSA Extension Act (PL 107-24) extended the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act for five years, lowering the operative investment level for triggering sanctions from $40 million to $20 million in the case of Libya, the same level applied to Iran since 1997. Initially, the White House favored an extension of only two years on the grounds it would give the United States additional flexibility in dealing with Libya and Iran. Nevertheless, congress voted overwhelmingly for the five-year extension, arguing that a shorter extension might signal a lack of resolve on the part of the United States to combat terrorism and the states suspected of supporting it. The ILSA Extension Act of 2001 requires the president to report periodically as to its effectiveness, a report which may include a recommendation for modification or termination of ILSA.14
In compliance with the National Emergencies Act, President Bush on January 2, 2003, continued for one year the national emergency with respect to Libya, as every president has done since 1986. A White House press release explained that the president had taken this action because Libya had not yet complied with its obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 731, 748 and 883, including “Libya’s obligation to accept responsibility for the actions of its officials and pay compensation.”15
MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME
The multilateral sanctions regime imposed on Libya by the United Nations after 1992 can be dealt with in an abbreviated manner. The U.N. Security Council, at the behest of the United States and United Kingdom, adopted Resolution 731 on January 31, 1992. In the resolution, the Security Council expressed its determination to eliminate international terrorism, condemned the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 and U.T.A. Flight 772, and urged the Libyan government to respond to requests made to establish responsibility for these terrorist acts. The terms of Resolution 731 requested but did not require a Libyan response.16
When the Libyan government failed to provide a “full and effective” response to Resolution 731, specifically refusing to surrender two accused suspects in the Pan Am Flight 103 case as well as failing to cooperate with the French in the case of U.T.A. Flight 772, the United States and United Kingdom returned to the Security Council to seek an additional, binding resolution. Resolution 748 was adopted on March 31, 1992, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which deals with threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression and which, under Article 25 of the Charter, is binding on all U.N. members. Its terms demanded Libya “cease all forms of terrorist action,” demonstrating by concrete acts its renunciation of terrorism, and cooperate with requests to establish responsibility for terrorist acts. Resolution 748 gave Tripoli two weeks to comply, after which a range of sanctions would be imposed. Adopted under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, the sanctions imposed included the cessation of all air links with Libya, the prohibition of trade in arms and related material, and the reduction of staff in Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts abroad.17
When these sanctions failed to persuade Libya to surrender the Pan Am suspects or to cooperate fully with French authorities in the U.T.A. case, the Security Council adopted Resolution 883 on November 11, 1993. This resolution extended the multilateral sanctions regime to include a freeze on all Libyan funds or other financial resources held abroad, excluding petroleum or natural-gas-related assets together with agricultural products. It also called for a ban on trade in oil-related equipment and the cessation of all dealings with Libyan Arab Airlines, including any assistance to Libyan airfields.18
Finally, Security Council Resolution 1192, adopted on August 27, 1998, reaffirmed the measures set forth in resolutions 748 and 883 until such time as the Libyan government remanded the two suspects accused in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. In addition, the resolution reiterated the call for Libya to satisfy French authorities with regard to the bombing of U.T.A. Flight 772. Once Libya took these actions, Resolution 1192 called for the immediate suspension of the multilateral sanctions regime.19
In August 1998, the Libyan government accepted a joint American-British proposal to try the two Libyan suspects in the Pan Am Flight 103 case in the Netherlands under Scottish law, eventually remanding them on April 5,1999. Three days later, the Security Council recognized that the conditions set forth in Resolution 1192 for the suspension of U.N. sanctions had been met. While the U.N. sanctions regime was immediately suspended, it was not lifted permanently because the Libyan government had still not yet met four important requirements:
- to disclose all it knows about the Lockerbie bombing,
- to accept responsibility for the role of Libyan officials in the Lockerbie bombing,
- to pay compensation to the relatives of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing and
- to formally renounce terrorism.20
U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA
Shortly thereafter, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Ronald E. Neumann, detailed the Clinton administration’s policy on Libya in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa. After describing Libya as an area of the world where “patience and our diplomatic initiatives have brought a significant success,” he recognized that “sanctions fatigue” had set in and was making it increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain, let alone expand, the existing sanctions regime. Neumann then highlighted the difficult negotiations that led Libya to remand the two suspects and the United Nations to suspend its sanctions. Neumann concluded his statement with a challenge to the Qaddafi regime:
We acknowledge Libya’s recent declarations of its intention to turn over a new page, but, given its history, such statements are not enough. Positive actions are essential if Libya is to be re-integrated into the international community, beginning with full cooperation in the Pan Am 103 trial, and full compliance with the remaining UNSC [United Nations Security Council] requirements. We recognize that Libya has publicly declared its intention to play an active, constructive role in regional conflicts. It will be important to test that this rhetoric is supported by constructive and consistent actions.
We expect Libya to fulfill all of the UNSC requirements: renounce and end all support for terrorist activities, acknowledge responsibility for the actions of its officials, cooperate with the trial and pay appropriate compensation. Only when Libya has complied fully will we be able to consider lifting U.S. sanctions against Libya. Right now, such steps would be premature. At the same time it is important to make clear that we have no hidden agenda. We have given Libya clear, specific benchmarks that it must meet if it is to become a responsible and constructive member of the international community. We have set goals Libya can meet if it has the will to do so.21
Secretary Neumann continued to articulate U.S. policy in virtually identical terms for the remainder of the Clinton administration, but the U.S. government never presented a detailed agenda for Libya with specific goals or benchmarks. Following the January 31, 2001, conviction of one of two defendants in the Pan Am Flight 103 trial, President Bush stated his administration would maintain unilateral sanctions on Libya and oppose permanently lifting U.N. sanctions until the latter fulfilled all the stipulations contained in U.N. Security Council resolutions 748 and 883. There has been no deviation from this policy since that time, and no U.S. official has suggested Libya was being considered for removal from the terrorism list in the near future.22
On the contrary, the Bush administration has followed a carrot-and-stick approach toward Libya, often with the emphasis on the stick. As the Qaddafi regime has moved to satisfy the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, the Bush administration has shifted focus, in effect raising the bar, with growing emphasis on weapons of mass destruction. In reviewing the international aspects of terrorism, John R. Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, made the following comments at the Hudson Institute on November 1, 2002:
Without question, the states most aggressively seeking to acquire WMD and their means of delivery are Iran, Iraq and North Korea, followed by Libya and Syria. It is no coincidence that these states, which are uniformly hostile to the United States, as well as to many of our friends and allies, are among the ones we identify as state sponsors of terrorism.
Libya continues to pursue an indigenous chemical warfare production capability, relying heavily on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, technical expertise, and other key chemical warfare-related equipment. Moreover, the United States believes that Libya has an offensive BW [biological weapons] program in the research and development state, and it may currently be capable of producing small quantities of biological agents. It continues efforts to obtain ballistic missile related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. Further, we are persuaded that Libya is continuing its longstanding pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the suspension of U.N. sanctions against it has increased its access to nuclear-related materials and equipment.23
More recently, an unidentified U.S. official emphasized that the payment of compensation to the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 and the subsequent lifting of U.N. sanctions would not end U.S. sanctions on Libya. He added there was no prospect of moving toward a normalization of relations until the issue of weapons of mass destruction was settled. The policy articulated by this official was inconsistent with the rationale behind the imposition of the U.S. sanctions regime, but it would appear to be consistent with the central tenets of the Bush Doctrine as it is now being applied to the Middle East.24 Like its predecessor, the Bush administration has also failed to present a performance-based roadmap for Libya, similar to that developed for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the 1990s or more recently for a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.25 Without such a mutually-agreed-upon, detailed plan, it remains difficult for either side to build on whatever opportunity exists today for a stronger, deeper relationship based on encouraging and rewarding Libya for taking policy actions favorable to the United States.
Outlined below are the central elements of a performance-based plan, leading eventually to the resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations between Libya and the United States. The roadmap emphasizes clearly spelled-out, reciprocal obligations, providing the Libyan government specific, incremental incentives to adopt the policy behavior desired by the United States.
Where possible, the roadmap seeks to remove sanctions in the reverse order in which they were imposed, in an attempt to deconstruct from the top down. At the same time, it must be recognized that some sanctions can be lifted by executive order or include a provision for waiver by the president on the grounds of national interest. Others require congressional action, which could prove more time consuming as well as less certain in outcome.
Phase I: Lifting of the U.N. Sanctions Regime
Libya would fulfill all outstanding requirements of U.N. Security Council resolutions 731, 748 and 883, specifically the following regarding the Lockerbie bombing:
- disclose all it knows about the bombing,
- accept responsibility for the role of Libyan officials,
- pay compensation to the relatives of the victims,
- formally renounce terrorism.
In response, once Libya has fulfilled all outstanding requirements of Security Council resolutions 731, 748 and 883, the United States would support the permanent lifting of the U.N. sanctions regime against Libya.
Phase II: Resumption of Commercial Ties
Regarding U.S.-Libya relations, Phase II can and should begin before Phase I is completed. Moreover, since some elements of the U.S. sanctions regime are linked, at least indirectly, to Libyan compliance with Security Council resolutions 731, 748 and 883, these would be among the first U.S. sanctions to be lifted in Phase II following successful conclusion of Phase I. Libya would do the following:
- end support for terrorism, severing any remaining ties and support for terrorist groups,
- join and comply with all international antiterrorism conventions,
- provide clear and concrete support for the Middle East peace process, including the underlying principles of the Madrid process,
- play a constructive role in Africa and the Middle East.
The United States would be prepared to take the following actions, one step at a time, as Libya makes substantive progress on the above issues. The sequence of these actions would depend on the direction and speed of bilateral negotiations:
- rescind restrictions on the travel of U.S. citizens to Libya,
- terminate the so-called “secondary sanctions” found in the 2001 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) Extension Act and the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
- remove Libya from the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism,
- lift the block on Libyan government assets in the United States or held by U.S. persons,
- initiate a gradual relaxation of the prohibitions on trade and related transactions in the U.S. sanctions regime beginning with the non-oil sectors of the Libyan economy,
- make U.S. credits available for the sale of U.S. goods to Libya,
- lift the ban on direct and indirect assistance (loans, credits, insurance, guarantees) to Libya,
- initiate low-level diplomatic contacts in the form of “interests offices” in Tripoli and Washington.
Phase III: Resumption of Diplomatic Relations
Libya would do the following:
- continue to support U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism,
- comply with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (1972), both of which Libya has signed,
- sign and comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993),
In response, the United States would be prepared to take the following actions as Libya makes substantive progress on the above issues:
- remove Libya from the list of states not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, lift any remaining trade components of the U.S. sanctions regime with the probable exception of military sales,
- resume full diplomatic relations with Libya.
A performance-based roadmap, providing a step-by-step approach to the resumption of full commercial and diplomatic relations, offers numerous benefits to Libya and the United States. While not a formula for regime change, it would strengthen the ability of the U.S. government to encourage and promote a more pluralistic society in Libya, including increased respect for human rights and the promotion of democratic reform. Providing Libya with incremental incentives in support of modified policies, it would also build support in the United States for a change in U.S. policy toward Libya. Few Americans have interest in or knowledge of Libya or the Libyan people. Consequently, a relatively small number of Americans with intense feelings about Libya and the Qaddafi regime have dominated U.S. policy for most of the last three decades. Increased communication and commerce, including the revival of the once-vibrant exchange of academics and students, would accelerate the process of building a U.S. constituency supportive of increased political dialogue, leading over time to normal bilateral relations.
Most important, this approach would help separate the wheat from the chaff, thus focusing on the real concerns separating Libya and the United States. Once the outstanding issues contained in Security Council Resolutions 731, 748 and 883 are resolved, for example, state-sponsored support for international terrorism will likely become a dead issue in the Libyan case. There has been no evidence of Libyan involvement in or support for terrorism for more than a decade, and the U.S. government has acknowledged this fact in recent years. Libya’s regional policies in Africa and the Middle East are a mixed bag, including some policies Washington can and should support, others it should oppose and a few on which it will likely remain neutral.26 Navigation of the proposed road map would involve bilateral dialogue at a relatively high level, most probably that of the undersecretary of state, and thus would provide regular opportunities for Washington to identify and discuss these policy differences with Tripoli.
In contrast to the state support for terrorism and regional issues, Libya’s policies toward weapons of mass destruction remain a matter of genuine concern and a subject for ongoing emphasis, even as lesser issues are resolved. Libya has signed the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and acceded to the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, and it has indicated a willingness to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention although it has yet to do so. At the same time, Libya has continued development, following suspension of the U.N. sanctions regime, of its ballistic missile program, despite the expressed concerns of the United Kingdom and United States. And it has continued to develop its nuclear infrastructure through foreign cooperation and procurement. Nuclear development in the civil sector remains a valid source of concern because it could provide Libya with access to nuclear technologies also suitable for military purposes. A performance-based roadmap would best enable the United States to place heightened emphasis on the issue of weapons of mass destruction even as progress is made in other policy areas.
1 For example, see Ronald Bruce St John, “New Era in American-Libyan Relations,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2002, pp. 85-93; Yahia H. Zoubir, “Libya in U.S. Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2002, pp. 31-53; William H. Lewis, “The War on Terrorism: The Libya Case,” Atlantic Council Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 3, April 2002, pp. 1-4; and Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001, pp. 62-72.
2 Ronald Bruce St John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), pp. 104-11.
3 “Export Administration Act of 1979,” Public Law 96-72 RL30169.pdf); and “Arms Export Control Act of 1968, Amended,” Public Law 90-629 (www.fas.org/asmp/ resources/govern/aeca01.pdf).
4 “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,” Public Law 104-132 (http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/ infousa/laws/majorlaw/s735_enr.htm).
5 St John, Libya and the United States, pp. 112-14, 124-25.
6 Ronald Bruce St John, “Terrorism and Libyan Foreign Policy,” The World Today, Vol. 42, No. 7, July 1986, pp. 111-15; and St John, Libya and the United States, p. 126.
7 “Executive Order 12543 – Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions involving Libya,” January 7, 1986 (www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1986/10786c.htm).
8 Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “License Application Guidelines for Exports to Iran, Libya and Sudan of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, and Medical Devices” (www.treas.gov/ofac); and Mark Suzman, “U.S. to Modify Iran and Libya Sanctions,” Financial Times, July 27, 1999.
9 “Executive Order 12544 – Blocking Libyan Government Property in the United States or Held by U.S. Persons,” January 8, 1986 (www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1986/10886e.htm). According to the 2002 “Terrorist Assets Report,” the net blocked Libyan assets in the United States total $1.2214 billion or 38 percent of the total assets of “state sponsors of terrorism” blocked within the United States (www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2002.pdf).
10 Robert D. Hersey, Jr., “U.S. Oil Companies End All Operations in Libya,” International Herald Tribune, July 1, 1986; and St John, Libya and the United States, pp. 141-42.
11 “FY 2002 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill,” Public Law 117-115, January 10, 2002; and The Atlantic Council, U.S.-Libyan Relations: A Compendium of Policies, Laws and Regulations, forthcoming.
12 “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,” Public Law 104-172, August 5, 1996.
13 “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,” Public Law 104-132; and The Atlantic Council, U.S.-Libyan Relations: Compendium.
14 “ILSA Extension Act of 2001,” Public Law 107-24, 3 August 2001 (www.aipac.org/documents/ ilsa2001.pd).
15 The White House, “Notice: Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Libya,” January 2, 2003.
16 “Text of U.N. Resolution Asking Libya’s Help,” The New York Times, January 22,1992.
20 United Nations Security Council, “Statement by the President of the Security Council (8 April 1999),” S/ PRST/1999/10 (1999) (www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/1999).
21 Ronald E. Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, “Testimony Before the House International Relations Africa Sub-Committee,” July 22, 1999 (www.access.gpo.gov/ congress/house).
22 Kenneth Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001 (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, September 10, 2001), pp. 27-28; Ronald E. Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, “Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,” May 4, 2000, Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State (http://usinfo.state.gov); Ronald E. Neumann, “U.S.-Libya Relations: Prospects and Obstacles,” The Middle East Institute Newsletter, Vol. 51, No. 2, March 2000, pp. 1, 4; and Ronald E. Neumann, “Libya: A U.S. Policy Perspective,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2, February 2000, pp. 142-45.
23 John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, “The International Aspects of Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” November 1, 2002 (www.state.gov/t/us/rm/14848pf.htm).
24 Guy Dinmore and James Drummond, “Libya’s Lockerbie Offer ‘Will Not End U.S. Curbs,’” Financial Times, March 14, 2003; George W. Bush, “Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave,” The New York Times, March 17, 2003; George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” The New York Times, January 29, 2003; and George W. Bush, “West Point Graduation Address,” June 1, 2002 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002).
25 “United States-Vietnam Road Map,” mimeograph, no date; “Elements of Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israel-Palestinian Conflict,” draft (October 15, 2002) (www.pna.net/ new/roadmap.html).
26 Ronald Bruce St John, “Libyan Foreign Policy: Newfound Flexibility,” Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 463-77.