The non-Jewish minority in Israel — Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs, Druze, Circassians and Bedouins — has been a topic of ongoing research since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. The Arab sector is the largest in population. One of the key issues that concern scholars, and the Arabs themselves, is the political array within this minority.
A historical analysis shows that the evolution of all political centers is triggered by a dynamic reality. These political forces differ mostly in the weight each one attributes to national identity, civil society, religion, and to being both a non-Jewish minority and Israeli citizens. The first one to offer a platform was the communist party (a.k.a. Maki), followed by (in chronological order) al-Ard (the Land) movement in the late 1950s; Abna al-Balad (the Sons of the Land) in 1972; the Islamic Movement in 1972 and 1979; and Balad in 1995.1 During the first decade of the Israeli state, Arab political representatives were split between two political frameworks: Maki, the only national political entity that represented the Arab minority; and public individuals who joined Zionist parties.
Over the years, both internal and external events influenced not only the Arabs' Israeli identity, but also political developments. The June 1967 War was one of these events. Scholars see the war as a turning point in the development of political awareness among the Arab citizens of Israel. They argue that in the wake of that war, especially during the 1970s, Palestinian national identification began to gain momentum among the Arab citizens of Israel. Borders changed, and family gatherings with relatives living in the West Bank enabled some of the profound national awareness of the inhabitants of the territories to seep in. The two populations engaged in daily contact, including familial ties as well as economic, commercial, educational, and cultural ones. Young Arab citizens of Israel began to study in colleges, universities, and religious institutions in the West Bank.2 It was not long before the influence of political organizations from the West Bank and Gaza Strip was felt among the Arab citizens of Israel. At that point, their attitude toward Israel was becoming extreme, leading to political activism. This process further matured following the 1973 war, when national sentiments and a sense of alienation were accentuated among the educated.3
It was only a matter of time before new political organizations were set up in an age identified with an enlightened generation and growing political awareness. The first of these organizations, established in 1972 by a group of young academics, took the name Abna al-Balad, Sons of the Land (in Hebrew, Sons of the Village). Their ideology was based on the following ideas: denying Israel's sovereignty over Palestinian territories, identifying entirely with the PLO and accepting the political platform of the Palestinian resistance movements. The Abna al-Balad platform also stated that the Jewish people had no right to self-determination and that the establishment of a secular democratic state in the entire area of pre-1948 Palestine should be pursued. This meant that there would be an armed Palestinian revolution in which all Palestinians — in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel — would participate.4
Political organizations that focused on civil matters, such as the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, also adopted belligerent behavior in encounters with the Israeli government. These groups were led by members such as Jamal Trabia in Sakhnin, Jalal Abu Tua'ma in Baqa al-Gharbiyya, and Ahmad Masalha in Daburiyya. The more these political figures were involved in the committee's activities, the more it resembled a movement fighting for the rights of Arab citizens of Israel on all levels, including the national one.
Another important political development occurred in the 1970s. The rise of Islamic movements was also linked to the ties forming between Arab citizens of Israel and inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This direct connection between the populations on both sides of the Green Line led not only to the renewal of familial and commercial ties, but also to the exchange of national and religious ideas. Religious movements operating in the West Bank continuously since 1948 found a new area into which to expand following the 1967 war. Among these were the Muslim Brotherhood, the Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir), and charities that sent representatives to Arab villages within Israel's borders to spread the word of Islam.5
This direction of Arab policy continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and was embraced by new political groups such as the Progressive List for Peace, which believed that Israel should speak to the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, including the Arab population in Israel; the Arab Democratic Party, which based its platform solely on being Arab and refused to allow Jewish members; and Balad, which called for a state for all of its citizens.6
The rapid growth of new political organizations adopting a wide range of ideologies and modes of action, from separatism/extremism to dialogue/restraint, posed a challenge to attempts at categorization. A new way of outlining the political forces active within the Arab minority in Israel is to analyze their actions in various fields and their attitudes toward items on their sector's agenda. Historically speaking, the activity of all such political organizations focused on the three areas mentioned above: national, civil and religious. By analyzing their activities according to this distribution in the decades surrounding the October 2000 events, other fields of interest addressed by Arab political parties can be classified under the three categories and a new terminology created.7
The ideological and political differences, as well as personal rivalry, expressed in a wide array of parties and movements, continued during the past two decades. Their practical expression was the coopting of each political framework separately in the general elections up to 2015. A number of factors led to the decision to compete in a Joint List ahead of the elections for the twentieth Knesset (Parliament), as will be detailed in the next chapter.
BEFORE THE 2015 ELECTIONS
The negotiations for the formation of the Joint List began in December 2014 and ended shortly before the last date for the registration of electoral lists at the end of January 2015. Under this acute time pressure, the parties had to democratically approve the measure and agree on a joint program and the line of candidates. With these two important questions needing answers, Hadash (the communists-socialists), which was most hesitant to join the List, had the upper hand. Not only was it the biggest faction; it also had the most common and comprehensive social, political and economic programs.
This negotiation among the Arab parties was a result of a series of political and social developments that happened within Israeli politics and the Arab minority. The inevitable result was a joint Arab list geared towards the general election to the Knesset in March 2015.
First, the election law was changed from a threshold of 2 percent to 3.25 percent. The original bill was submitted to the Knesset by Israel Beiteinu (Israel Is Our Home), a right-wing party, in order to reduce the number of parties in the Knesset and increase the government's ability to govern.8 However, the Arab parties within the nineteenth Knesset (and other small Jewish parties) claimed that the new law was a political maneuver to reduce the likelihood of re-election. In practice, the new law did reduce the odds of the Arab lists (Hadash/communist, Balad, Raam-Taal) passing the higher threshold. Therefore, their leaders decided to consolidate a Joint List. Some Arab-Israeli scholars argue that this decision was taken for personal political survival, since some of the prominent public figures were interested in maintaining their status as members of the Knesset (MK).9 It should be noted that the fear that not one Arab list would pass the electoral threshold was authentic. Over the years, and especially after the events of October 2000, there was a steady decline in the number of Arab voters in the elections.10
The second reason was social pressure within the Arab sector for joint candidacy. A survey showed 85 percent of the Arab interviewees supported the Arab parties running in a Joint List.11 The Arab population wanted a list that would advance civil issues first, alongside national Palestinian goals. Another survey was conducted during December 2014 by Stat-net,12 in which 48 percent of 700 interviewees noted their disappointment with Arab MKs' performance regarding the civil affairs of the Arab population.13 In December 2014, three months before the elections, 83 percent of the Arabs indicated a preference for one list of candidates.
The findings of these surveys are reinforced by an analysis of content that appeared in Arab social networks in 2013. More highly educated Arabs shared their political and social thoughts calling for unity within the Arab society. As Manal Harib put it, "Since 2013 there has been a noticeable trend of a steep rise in the civilian involvement of young Arab people in politics on the Internet and on social networks. Through extensive use of Facebook, these young people built campaigns to influence public opinion and succeeded in leading the Arab street in Israel and the Arab parties to large demonstrations and protests about programs and laws that stood on the public agenda in Israel, such as the National Law."14 This law was passed by the Knesset in July 2018. A group of young educated Arabs created a new Facebook account under the title "United Arabs" (mutahidun in Arabic) and stated that this time they would vote only for a unified list. The fact that this Facebook account received thousands of "likes" within a few hours was one of the triggers for consolidating a joint political list. This activity in the social networks and the findings of the surveys were a watershed for the Israeli Arab leadership. Arab politicians were aware of a steady decline in voter turnout and feared that low rates in the 2015 elections would keep them outside the House of Representatives.
The third factor that accelerated the decision to compete on a Joint List was the widening rift between Jews and Arabs since 2009. A series of new bills was submitted to the Knesset, most by right-wing politicians, who became part of the ruling coalition headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. The main goal of these rules was to exclude the Arab population from public life and enhance the Jewish character of the state. The prevailing mood within Arab society was a sense of real threat to Arabs as a minority group. Arabs shared their fears about this threat to their national Palestinian identity and their personal and collective rights as Israeli citizens. These worries, from 2009 on, encouraged Arab politicians to unite their forces in order to protect the rights of the minority. In practice, the new joint-list platform stresses that the decision to combine forces was a political response to racism and an expression of national-political unity.15
Despite the common political platform, statements made by Arab spokesmen on the eve of the elections in 2015 pointed to fundamental disagreements that made it difficult to achieve true unity. Moreover, most of the political activity on the eve of the elections was done separately by the parties.16 For instance, Awad abd al-Fatah, a senior member of Balad party, stated a few days after the election that the Joint List may work closely with the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah in order to achieve Palestinian national goals. He did not mention civil affairs, which were (and still are) part of the Joint List's platform and constituted a very important issue for the Arab citizens of Israel.17 This pattern remains after the elections, as will be demonstrated below. Jaafar Farah, an Israeli Arab and prominent activist for minority rights, argues that the decision to form a Joint List was defensive, to protect Arab representation in the Israeli parliament.18
The fourth reason was a growing dissatisfaction within with the national Arab leadership. This disappointment was well stated in social networks, and its political expression finally occurred in 2013, when the communist candidate in the big city of Nazareth, the veteran Ramez Jiraisi, was defeated in the municipal elections. The frustration of the Arab population with the functioning of its leadership was well known to Arab politicians. This is why the list platform highlights the need to deal first with the various civil issues of the Arab public and with national issues only later on.
AFTERWARD: JOINT BUT SPLIT
The Arab Joint List became the new home for communists, socialists, liberals and the religious. Some members are Christians, others Druze, and the majority are Muslims. In addition, the Joint List has women in key positions, such as Hanin Zuabi (Balad) and Aida Tuma-Suliman (Hadash). The notable religious Muslim members opposed their inclusion, but had to accept it in order to survive politically.
The common goal of all the parties who join the list is to be represented in the Israeli Parliament — except for those who do not recognize the State of Israel: Abna al Balad and the northern branch of the Islamic movement, which were outlawed in November 2015. This political supermarket is a sure formula for conflict, disagreement, and constant tension among the Arab MKs, even in situations where Arab unity is required to face the challenges of a Jewish-majority government controlled by a right-wing coalition.
The Arab minority in Israel has several affinity groups: (1) within the Israeli arena as civilians; (2) in the Palestinian arena through shared national identity; (3) and in the Arab and Muslim worlds due to a common religion. This reality leads to various kinds of activities. This section of the study examines the Arab MKs' activity in the Knesset (since May 2015) in national, civil and religious affairs, including parliamentary activities, statements to the media, and participation in public events and protests.
National issues refer to the Palestinian arena and include initial activity or responses to Israeli policy (since March 2015):
a) Meetings with the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, as occurred in February 2017. Abu Mazen, president of the Palestinian Authority, decided to enhance ties with left-wing Jewish parties and the Arab minority in Israel. Surprisingly, only Balad members, headed by Matanes Shadah, the general secretary of the party, accepted the invitation. Other MKs of the Joint List did not visit the presidential compound (the Muqataa) in Ramallah.19 They did not explain their position publicly, but a reasonable inference is that they preferred to promote civil affairs over national ones.
b) Visits to terrorists' families. On February 3, 2016, Jamal Zahalka. Hanin Zuabi and Bassel Ghatas, three MKs from the joint Arab list, all Balad members, met in East Jerusalem with families of terrorists. Other MKs from the Joint List did not accompany them. This visit led to harsh criticism; Zahalka had to explain that the terrorists, who died during their attacks against Jews, civilians and security forces, were victims of the Israeli occupation.20 Balad's colleagues in the Joint List remained silent, not wanting to worsen the disagreements and knowing such a meeting meant breaking Israeli law. The only public comment came from Ayman Odeh, the chair, who said the meeting was meant to discuss assistance from MKs in transferring terrorists' bodies to the Palestinians.21 This statement was far from convincing, however, as the move would have been considered a significant political success. The lesson was learned: The three members of Balad did not visit terrorist families again. The fact that they met the families secretly was proof that they knew the act was prohibited by Israeli law.
Following their visit, the Balad MKs pointed out in an interview that the only thing they regretted about their meeting was the leak to the media. Answering another question, MK Zuabi made clear, "I am not representing those who accept the reality of a strong Jewish state." Her colleague, Zahalka, added that Ayman Odeh "is the chair of the Joint List but he is certainly not the leader of the Arabs."22
c) Assistance to Palestinian terrorists or prisoners. The most salient affair since 2015 was Bassel Ghattas' conviction after being photographed smuggling envelopes containing 12 cell phones and other objects to security prisoners in Ketziot Prison in southern Israel. He used his parliamentary immunity to pass through prison gates without his possessions being examined. Two days later, the Knesset removed his immunity and he was arrested. On January 2, 2017, the Knesset Ethics Committee decided to remove Ghattas for half a year from Knesset committees and plenum sessions, with the exception of votes. At this point, the Joint List denounced the decision, in that "it is a harsh and unprecedented punishment."23 On March 16, 2017, Ghattas signed a plea bargain according to which he would resign from the Knesset and be sentenced to two years in prison, and was convicted of moral turpitude. Not surprisingly, after Ghattas' conviction, Arab MKs did not respond in public. It was clear evidence that their position did not favor Ghattas, who assisted terror cells in prison. Moreover, it was clear that they did not want to be identified, albeit indirectly, with support for terrorism. As early as December 2016, Odeh said publicly that he could not believe Ghattas would perform an illegal act like assisting Palestinian security prisoners. In response, Ghattas accused Odeh of "lacking any pride or self-esteem." Ghattas made it clear that the Joint List did not need what he called "agents of the racists."24
d) A response to terror attacks carried out by Israeli Arabs. On July 14, 2017, three Israeli Arabs opened fire on policemen on the Temple Mount (Noble Sanctuary), killing two Druze officers. As a rule, the Arab struggle to improve its minority situation did not include using terror against the state of Israel. Moreover, when Israeli Arabs committed acts of terror, most of the Arab political entities condemned them. This was the case in July 2017, but the Joint List was not able to formulate a unified communiqué, and its MKs issued separate statements of condemnation.25
e) Contact with the Arab world. Bitter public differences of opinion broke out among the members of the Joint List regarding the situation in Syria. The chair, Odeh, refused to condemn the Assad regime after it used chemical weapons against civilians, explaining that he did not believe Assad did indeed use these weapons in Idlib and Duma. In response, Taleb abu Arar, an Arab MK, declared that "Odeh is not representing the Joint List."26 It is worth mentioning that in the Arab sector, there is fierce debate between supporters of the Assad regime and its opponents. This debate is conducted not only between members of the Joint List and in the Knesset, but also in the press and social networks.27
In April 2015, the Arab League headquarters sent an invitation to the Arab Joint List asking to discuss the interaction between the Arab world and the Arab minority in Israel. Odeh announced that the Joint List rejected the invitation and explained it by citing a desire to focus on the internal (i.e., civilian) issues. He admitted the list had different views on the situation in the Arab world, with an emphasis on Syria and Yemen, adding that its members had not succeeded in forming a unified position on these issues.28
f) A response to the transfer of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018. This issue, together with the National Law, was the only topic that unified the Arab MKs of the Joint List. Based on the national schism between Jews and Arabs, they accepted the initiative of the High Follow-up Committee to protest in front of the new embassy building and express their objection to President Trump's decision. This protest turned into a violent clash between Arab demonstrators and the police; 14 people were arrested. The Arab MKs' responses denounced both the Americans and Israelis for making a poor decision and using violence against the Arab minority, including its formal representatives.29
g) The National Law. Last chronologically, but definitely no less important, is the National Law, approved in the Knesset in July 2018. Israeli Arabs, in general, and the Joint List, in particular, opposed this law, which enhances the Jewish character of the state. But this time the Arabs' protest was marginal, because the Druze subgroup within the non-Jewish minority, considered allies of the state since its establishment, stood at the forefront against the law. Despite a consensus against the law, the Joint List members did not take the initiative to summon the Arab population to protest against it. As had happened before, some of them condemned the law; MK Ahmad Tibi did in a special column in the French newspaper Le Monde. Tibi argued that Israel had been and still was a democracy for Jews and a Jewish state for Arabs, adding that this law turned Israel into an apartheid state.30 On this issue, the High Follow-up Committee took the lead and decided to involve the United Nations and the European Union, in order to put pressure on Israel to abolish the law. The traditional umbrella of the committee, again, concealed the differences among members of the list on the course of action to be taken in response to the law.
Civil Affairs
The term "civil affairs" includes a long list of topics relevant to daily life: education, health, employment, transportation, equal opportunities at work, agriculture and welfare (not a complete list). Historically, the Arab minority in Israel and its formal institutions and representatives have tried to promote their civil issues through legislation in the Knesset and informal activity, mainly protests, which in some cases have turned violent. This was a regular pattern of activity until the first decade of the twenty-first century, when a series of political and social processes directed the Arab public to demand civil rights by means other than protesting.31
Due to these changes, civil protests have become less common in recent years. One exception was in January 2017, when the state decided to implement the evacuation of Umm Hiran, an unrecognized Bedouin village in the Negev, the southern part of Israel. During this activity, Yaacub abu al-Giyan, a Bedouin, was shot to death after policemen thought he had run over one of them with his car. Arab MKs of the Joint List saw this civil event as an opportunity to promote their political agenda separately. In 2015, Odeh had already drawn attention to civil affairs: "We cannot accept the continuation of demolishing houses." In contrast, Zuabi highlighted the national aspect, "This is our soil." Her colleague from Balad, MK Zahalka, threatened, "If blood had to be shed — that would [happen]." Following the evacuation, some Arab MKs of the Joint List hurried to Umm Hiran to demonstrate against the government policy. Odeh himself was injured in clashes with police officers.32
Most of the civil activity of the Joint List was conducted in the Knesset. An analysis of Arab MKs since 2015 finds that most of them participated in protests when the issue of the conflict was national. This, however, is in stark contrast to Arab voters' expectations. Since the beginning of the twentieth Knesset, April 2015, Arab MKs had proposed 3,469 bills, only 75 of which were approved (2.1 percent).33
Most of the bills submitted by MKs of the Joint List deal with issues such as housing, education, welfare, transportation, infrastructure, gender equality and employment. It is worth noting the phenomenon that characterizes the bills. They seek to advance issues for the entire population, not only for the Arab sector. In doing this, the Arab MKs hoped to increase the chances that their bills would be accepted.
A limited number dealt with national matters, all submitted by members of the Knesset on behalf of Balad, which belonged to the Joint List. In April 2018, Jumaa Azbaga, Hanin Zuabi and Jamal Zahalka submitted the Proposed Settlement Evacuation Bill. Based on UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which determined that the settlements in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) were illegal, the bill called for the State of Israel to accept the international position and evacuate the Jews' settlements within six months.34 A month later they submitted a bill to remove the separation fence, which was built in 2002 to reduce terror attacks that were originally planned by Palestinians in the West Bank. Again, the bill leaned on the verdict of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, in 2004, that the fence was illegal. Moreover, the explanatory notes of the bill stressed the isolation of the Palestinian community (and families) because of the fence.35 Not surprisingly, other members of the Joint List did not join Balad; they preferred to promote civil affairs.
This was a paradox worth analyzing. Parliamentary activity was barely reflected by the Arab minority; protests and clashes with security forces were more evident. The act of submitting bills also received less media exposure. The outcome was a contradiction between the real activities of the Arab MKs and their public image. There was growing criticism among the Arab population towards the joint-list members for lack of promotion of Arab minority affairs. This dissatisfaction was the result of two factors: lack of information about the Arab MKs within the Knesset and the Arab population's assessment of its representatives according to their media performances.
The following table, based on the National Legislation database, presents the number of bills proposed by members of the Arab minority in the twentieth Knesset, divided into national (linkage to Palestinian identity) and civil (as Israeli citizens) issues.36
TABLE 1. Bills Proposed by Members of Arab Minority in Twentieth Knesset
Member of Knesset |
Origin Party |
Total Bills Proposed |
Civil Bills |
National Bills |
Odeh Ayman |
Hadash (social-communists) |
706 |
704 |
2 |
Abu-Maaruf Abdallah37 |
Hadash (social-communists) |
741 |
739 |
2 |
Atawna Yussuf38 |
Hadash (social-communists) |
14 |
14 |
0 |
Jabareen Yusuf |
Hadash (social-communists) |
650 |
648 |
2 |
Abu Taleb |
Raam-Taal |
161 |
159 |
2 |
Abu Rahmoon Nivin39 |
Balad |
0 |
||
Azbarga Jumaa40 |
Balad |
49 |
47 |
2 |
Ghattas Bassel41 |
Balad |
141 |
2 |
|
Zuabi Hanin |
Balad |
156 |
152 |
4 |
Zahalka Jamal |
Balad |
166 |
162 |
4 |
Al-Kharoumi Said42 |
Raam-Taal |
41 |
41 |
0 |
Ghnaim Masoud |
Raam-Taal |
232 |
230 |
2 |
Haj Yhia abd al-Hakim |
Raam-Taal |
276 |
274 |
2 |
Hijazi Ibrahim43 |
Raam-Taal |
0 |
||
Tibi Ahmad |
Raam-Taal |
363 |
361 |
2 |
Sa'adi Osama |
Raam-Taal |
348 |
346 |
2 |
Yunes Waal |
Raam-Taal |
17 |
17 |
0 |
The findings lead to some important insights. All Arab MKs of the Joint List have submitted bills of a civil nature. Balad MKs, following the national agenda of the party, were involved in all four such bills. But more interesting is the position of the MKs of the Joint List who were not Balad members. They submitted two bills:
1) To abolish the special status granted by the legislature to the Jewish National Fund (JNF – Keren Kayemet Le-Israel), Keren Hayesod, the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Israel. The source of the special status granted to these institutions lies in the period of the Yishuv,44 and is anchored in Zionist ideology rather than in civic or state needs. Articles 4 and 5 of the Status of the World Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1952, explain this well. The essence of these institutions is service of the "Jewish people." When these institutions received the status of a "state," that state used them as their own arm, making it possible to discriminate against non-Jewish citizens of the Arab minority.45
2) The Proposed Basic Law: The Arab Minority as a National Minority. Its purpose is to anchor in a basic law the status of the Arab minority in Israel as a national minority entitled to collective rights and full civil equality. The basic rights and fundamental freedoms of the Arab minority are based on recognition of the value of human beings, the sanctity of their lives, their dignity and their liberty, and they will be respected in the spirit of the principles of natural justice and the rules of international law. This, while emphasizing the fact that the Arab citizens are indigenous.46
These two bills are of a national nature with a direct connection to the civil status of the Arab minority in Israel. They were intended to improve the status of the Arab population, so it was only natural that all members of the Joint List submit the bill. If any of them had withdrawn support for the bill, he would have been perceived by the Arab electorate as opposed to a matter based on consensus.
The other two bills were submitted only by MKs on behalf of Balad; the other members of the Joint List did not add their signatures. The first bill demanded the removal of all Jewish settlements from Judea and Samaria within a period of six months. It was based on Security Council Resolutions 446 from March 22, 1979, and 2334 from December 23, 2016, which determined that the Israeli settlements were illegal.47 The second bill demanded immediate removal of the separation fence in Judea and Samaria. The explanatory notes to the law relate to the severe harm inflicted on Palestinians who lived on the route of the fence; they were forced to find alternative housing and new occupations because of their inability to cultivate their land.48
These two bills had nothing to do with the civil status of the Arab minority in Israel. They dealt only with Palestinian national concerns. Obviously, Arab MKs of the Joint List would not resist these laws, yet only Balad members, rather than all of the MKs, submitted them. The reason was simple: They preferred to promote civil affairs rather than national topics in accordance with the will of the Arab population. Ayman Odeh, as chair of the party, has consistently refrained from promoting bills of a national nature or protest activity on national issues, having made his stance clear from the beginning. When he expressed his views on Arab national topics, such as the civil war in Syria, one of his colleagues on the list stated that Odeh did not represent the joint Arab list.
Last but not least is the Law of Nationality case study, which provided the Arab MKs with an opportunity to join forces. Indeed, such cooperation was achieved when a delegation from the list representing all the founding parties of the Joint List met international (United Nations and European Union) and Arab (Arab League) diplomats, calling on them to act against the law.49 The reason they cooperated was that this law was intended to emphasize the Jewishness of the State of Israel by pushing its non-Jewish citizens to the margins. Despite its name, the nationality law, in the eyes of the members of the list, distinguished between citizens based on ethnic and religious discrimination, and in order to undermine the unjust situation of the Arab minority. They stood as one against it.
CONCLUSION
The Arab Joint List's achievements in the twentieth Knesset are considerable — mainly to promote legislative processes in the areas of social, gender and environmental justice, which serve not only the Arab population, but broad segments of Israeli society as a whole. Perhaps the list's highest accomplishment is its involvement in advancing the five-year plan for the Arab sector (decision 922) of the Israeli government under Prime Minister Netanyahu.
These achievements are credited mainly to Ayman Odeh, the chair of the Arab Joint List, who consistently prefers to promote civil affairs over national ones and calls for dialogue between Arabs and Jews. This is exactly the bone of contention between Odeh and his communist-socialist colleagues and the national hardliners of Balad's members in the Joint List. These disagreements created a situation in which the Knesset members of the Joint List who did not identify with Balad's ideology had no choice but to participate in protest activities on national issues. Moreover, when Balad's members decided to advance Palestinian national goals such as removal of the separation fence or returning bodies of Palestinian terrorists, the other members of the list did not join in these activities. Bassel Ghattas's arrest and conviction was another such activity in which the Arab Joint List could not participate.
The ideological differences and controversies surrounding the priorities of the issues to be dealt with created a conceptual and practical split. In some cases, this has led to direct criticism by list members of the chairman, Odeh. Some of them even believe that he does not represent the list and the Arab public. The inability to agree on condemnation of a terrorist attack in Jerusalem or on expressing reservations about aiding terrorism, as in the case of Ghattas, are clear examples of a lack of unity within the joint Arab list.
It is precisely a public discourse that excludes the Arab minority and rejects the possibility of dialogue — which Odeh seeks to promote — that connects the members of the Arab list. This is due to the shared sense of threat. This was the case when a Bedouin from the Negev was accused of a terrorist act, and in the parliamentary process of approving the National Law. The continuation of a discourse that seeks to strengthen the Jewish component of the State of Israel rather than democracy may lead to a joint Arab list in the next general elections, despite personal rivalries and profound ideological differences.
1 O. Shtendel, Arviyey Israel Ben Hapatish Lasadan (Jerusalem: Akadamon, 1992); E. Rekhess, "Ben Kommunism Lilumiyut Arvit: Rakah Vehamiut Haarvi Beisrael (1965–1973)," Ph.D diss., Tel Aviv University, 1993; G. Hitman, Israel and Its Arab minority: Dialogue, Protest and Violence (Lexington, 2016).
2 A. Bligh, "The Intifada and the New Political Role of the Israeli Arab Leadership," Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (1999): 134-64; and Shtendel, Arviyeye Israel; I. Lustick, Haarvim Bamdina Hayehudit (Haifa: Mifras, 1985).
3 A.E. Zuabi, Haarvim Ezrahey Israel Bedilemmat Haezrachut Hakfula (Ma'arachot, Tel Aviv: 1971); K. Nakhleh, "Cultural Determination of Palestinian Collective Identity: The Case of the Arabs in Israel," New Outlook 18, no. 7 (1975), 31–40; E. Rekhess, "Haarvim Beisrael. Hitpatchut Bemishor Hapeilut Hapolitit," in Ehad Mikol Shisha Israelim, ed. A. Har-Even (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute, 1981).
4 M. Alhaj, Maarechet Hahinuch Ha'arvi Beisrael – Sugiot Umegamot (Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute, 1994); and Shtendel, Arviyey Israel, 254.
5 T. Mayer, Hitorerut Hamuslemim Beisrael (Givat Haviva, Hamachon Lelimudim Arvi'im, 1988).
6 S. Jiryis, "The Arabs in Israel, 1973–79," Journal of Palestine Studies 8, no. 4 (1979), 31–56; and N. Rouhana, "The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence to Challenge," Journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 3 (1989), 38–59.
7 G. Hitman, "Israel's Arab Leadership in the Decade Attending the October 2000 Events," Israel Affairs 19.1 (2013), 121-138.
8 "The Proposed Knesset Elections Law — Amendment No. 61," https://www.nevo.co.il/law_word/Law16/knesset-515.pdf.
9 A. Haidar, An Introduction: Political Aspects of Arab Citizens of Israel (Van Leer Institution, Jerusalem, 2018), 14.
10 A. Haidar, "The Joint List in 2015 Election: The Establishment, the Political Platform and the Challenges," Bayan 5 (May 2015), 13.
11 H. Amoury, Y. Bartal and T. Cohen, "The Joint List," http://www.rosalux.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/The-Joint-List-Eng….
12 An Arab survey institution in Israel.
13 D. Matza, M. Elran and M. Abu Nasra, "Distresses in Utopia: The New Arab Leadership in Israel Facing Challenges," Strategic Update 19, 2 (2016), 90.
14 M. Harib, "The Joint Arab List in 2015 Election: A Partnership That is Necessary," Bayan, 4, (February 2015), 1.
15http://hadash.org.il/%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A2-7%94%D7%A8%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9E%D7…. Accessed August 19, 2018.
16 Haidar, "The Joint List in 2015 Election," 14.
17 The general secretary of Balad after the election: the experience of the joint list may lead to cooperation with the national Palestinian leadership, from www.palwatch.org, March 20, 2015.
18 Ja'afar Farah, "Political Participation of Arab Palestinian Society in Israel," Mussawa Center, 2015, 3.
19 Dalit Halevy, "Abu Mazem Met a Delegation of Balad Party," February 20, 2017, accessed August 23, 2018, https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/340523.
20 Mako, February 5, 2016, accessed August 23, 2018, https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/politics-q1_2016/Article-eeac662a0…. Zahalka following the meeting: "We stood for a minute of silence. They are victims."
21 Daphna Liel, "Prime Minister: They Do Not Deserve to Be in the Knesset," February 4, 2016, accessed August 23, 2018, https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/politics-q1_2016/Article-7f922a86c….
22 Gidi Weitz and Jackie Khouri, "Balad MKs do not regret," Haaretz, March 10, 2016, accessed August 23, 2018, https://www.haaretz.co.il/.premium-MAGAZINE-1.2878308.
23 "The Joint List Condemns the Decision to Remove MK Ghattas from the Knesset," Bukja.net, January 2, 2017, accessed August 24, 2018, http://www.bukja.net/archives/647880.
24 "MK Odeh on Ghattas' Accusation," December 22, 2016, https://www.mako.co.il/news-channel2/Channel-2-Newscast-q4_2016/Article…; Bassel Ghattas, "The Future to the Joint List," July 3, 2017, accessed August 26, 2018.
25 Jackie Khouri and Jonathan Liss,"The Members of the Joint List Failed to Formulate a Joint Statement Following the Terror Attack," Haaretz, July 15, 2017, accessed August 24, 2018, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/1.4257695.
26 Taleb Abu 'Arar, "Odeh Is Not Representing the Joint List," Rotter.net, April 10, 2018, accessed August 24, 2018, www.rotter.net/forum/scoops1/464455/shtmal.
27 Khader Sawaeed, "The Controversy in Arab Society over the Civil War in Syria," Ecohes (Hedim), March 2, 2018.
28 Tamar Beeleeji, "The Joint List Turned Down the Arab League Invitation," Times of Israel, April 21, 2015, accessed August 24, 2018.
29 Nasma Ali, "A Big Demonstration on the Transfer Day of the American Embassy," Erem News, May 7, 2018, https://www.eremnews.com/news/world/1320781; Hasan Sha'alan, "Detainees and Palestinian Flags Outside the Inauguration Ceremony of the Embassy," Ynet, May 14, 2018, accessed August 24, 2018, https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5260465,00.html.
30 Ahmad Tibi, "Israël est une démocratie pour les Juifs, et un pays juif pour les Arabes," Le Monde, July 31, 2018, accessed August 25, 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/07/31/ahmad-tibi-israel-est-u….
31 Alexander Bligh and Gadi Hitman, National Schism and Civil Integration: Mutual Relations between the Israeli Central Government and the Israeli Arab Palestinian Minority (Sussex Academic Press, 2018).
32 Gilad Zueik, "Joint list of the residents of Umm al-Hiran: If blood is to be shed, so will it be," January 18, 2017, accessed August 28, 2018, https://mida.org.il.
33 Yussuf Hadad, "Some of the Arabs Are Fed Up with the Joint List," Ynet, July 5, 2018, accessed August 26, 2018, https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5303908,00.html.
34 Parliament of Israel, "Settlement Evacuation Bill," p/5341/20, accessed August 29, 2018, www.main.knesset.gov.il.
35 Parliament of Israel, "Removing Separation Fence," p/5380/20, accessed August 29, 2018, www.main.knesset.gov.il.
36 This table contains 18 Arab MKs of the joint list, who have 13 seats in the Knesset. This is due to rotation agreements between the Arab parties.
37 He resigned on August 9, 2017, as required by a rotation agreement signed by the Arab parties.
38 Atawna was MK from October 25, 2017, to February 7, 2018. He resigned as required by a rotation agreement signed by the Arab parties.
39 Abu Rahmoun was sworn in as MK on August 10, 2018.
40 Azbarga was sworn in as MK in March 21, 2017.
41 He resigned on March 17, 2017 following an indictment filed against him for helping terrorists.
42 Al-Kharoumy was sworn in as MK in August 11, 2017.
43 Was MK from September 20, 2017, to October 25, 2017; he agreed to resign according to the rotation agreement between the Arab parties.
44 This is the Hebrew term for the Jewish community in Palestine before 1948.
45 Parliament of Israel, "Proposed Law for the Abolition of National Institutions" (Legislative Amendments), 2015, p/1578/20, June 29, 2015, http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawSuggestio….
46 Parliament of Israel, "Proposed Basic Law: The Arab Minority as a National Minority," p/1591/20, June 29, 2015, http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawSuggestio….
47 Parliament of Israel, "Proposed Law: Evacuation of Settlements," p/5341/20, April 30, 2018, http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawSuggestio….
48 Parliament of Israel, "Proposed Law: The Removal of the Fence Separation," p/5380/20 May 7, 2018, http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawSuggestio….
49 Assaf Gibor, "The Joint List Will Require Recognition of the Arab-Palestinian National Minority in Israel," September 4, 2018, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.20il.co.il.
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