Sally Khalifa Isaac
Dr. Isaac is an associate professor of international relations and director of the Euro-Mediterranean Studies Programme at Cairo University. This paper was first discussed in an author workshop, organized by the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University and the Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies at the University of Southern Denmark — in the framework of the DJUCO-initiative, funded by the Danish Arab Partnership Programme, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In analyzing European policies and instruments towards the southern Mediterranean area, previous academic and policy-oriented writings have mostly highlighted the security-democracy dilemma in European Union (EU) foreign policy. These writings have mainly emphasized how the short-term need to safeguard political stability and security considerations has often pushed the EU away from the promotion of democracy, good-governance and human rights.1 The European pursuit of security and stability objectives during the past two decades, in many cases at the expense of democratization, has therefore dominated the narrative of EU approaches to the Mediterranean.
However, the experience of Euro-Mediterranean relations in general, in the post-2011 period in particular, suggests that some structural factors influence the capacity and efficiency of the EU in the southern Mediterranean area. This paper attempts to focus on three structural factors that have represented over the past two decades illusive European assumptions about the Mediterranean. These are, first, the early assumptions on "region building," which stressed a workable European project to construct the Euro-Mediterranean area as a "region." Such an assumption omits the multiple de facto structural features that separate the two shores of the Mediterranean into distinctive regions. Second, there is the assumption that the southern Mediterranean area constitutes primarily the EU's "Southern Neighborhood," implicitly omitting (or marginalizing) the roles of regional and international powers. These powers include the United States, some Arab Gulf monarchies, Russia and China, whose policies and actions, especially post-2011, were highly visible and influential in the wider MENA region. Third, there is an implicit assumption that "Europe" or "the EU" enjoys a high level of unity in both policy formulation and implementation. This assumption seems to ignore the obvious structural impediment of European incoherence.
The EU explicitly referred to the existence of a "Mediterranean Region" at the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process) in 1995. Several references were made in its launching document to stress the promotion of "regional security and stability," the "economic development of the Mediterranean Region," the "reduction in the development gap in the EuroMediterranean region," the "encouragement of regional cooperation and integration," the emphasis on a "regional approach to environmental issues," and the promotion of understanding and cultural dialogue among the peoples of "the Mediterranean Region." In fact, reference to a Mediterranean region and to a "Euro-Mediterranean Region" appeared six times in the Barcelona Declaration, while reference to a "Region," a word used throughout the document to refer to the Euro-Med region, appeared 11 times.2 In addition, despite the introduction of the "European Neighborhood Policy" in 2004 and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, there was still a clear reference to the existence of a region. The UfM, as a pragmatic and operational framework for economic cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean, did not refrain from describing the UfM initiative as one involving "new regional and subregional projects with relevance for those living in the region."3
These bold and optimistic statements clearly indicate that, in the EU's early attempts to develop its relationship with the southern Mediterranean area, there were clear assumptions that the Mediterranean could be constructed as a "region," that the EU is the region builder, and that such a region has political, security, economic, social and cultural dimensions.
However, after more than two decades, it is clear that European assumptions on the possibility of region building were misguided. Structurally, the Mediterranean area has never been homogenous. Rather, in contemporary international relations, it has merely constituted the unstable near-abroad to the European continent. The multifaceted security threats and intense economic transactions between some European countries and some North African countries have instead developed some sort of security interdependence, which progressively took on a "regional form." These structural facts were actually acknowledged by the EU in its November 2015 revision of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). This latest review of the ENP totally abandons any explicit mention of region building or any similar reference to a Euro-Mediterranean region. Instead, it is remarkable how the EU uses the word "region" in this document to refer solely to the southern Mediterranean area. Further, the EU puts itself on the defensive by expressing that Europe's own interdependence with its southern neighbors has been placed in sharp focus, affirming that "the new ENP will take stabilisation as its main political priority in this mandate."4
Entrenched disparities separate the two shores of the Mediterranean. One is the obvious heterogeneity in identity, culture, norms, and historical and social processes of communities' development. In specific moments in history, one could also talk about cultural and civilizational antagonism rather than mere heterogeneity.5 Two is the question of memory and the colonial heritage in political and economic terms. Indeed, memory has never ceased to fuel Arab mistrust of European policies and positions in Arab politics, especially in times of confrontation. The "West," a significant part of which is logically Europe, has always had the image of an "outsider" in the Arab "world." These disparities have not been helping the dissemination of the European-promoted "we-feeling" in a hypothetically "Mediterranean Region." Rather, they have worked to portray European initiatives as attempts to disseminate Western values, norms and institutions to the Arab region. Three is the obvious divergence in types of political institutions and the profound gap in economic development.
One could additionally question the term "Mediterranean Region." The question is geographically legitimate when noting that Jordan, for instance, is not a Mediterranean country. Besides, European assumptions on "region building" have always included Israel as a component in this to-be-constructed region. But apart from geographical proximity, the exclusion of some Arab states from the Euro-Mediterranean framework and the inclusion of Israel have been repeatedly criticized in the southern Mediterranean as "Western" attempts to divide the region, or, as described by one analyst, it has unavoidably created new "exclusionary boundaries."6
It is also notable that parties to this "Mediterranean Region" do identify themselves more with other regions. For instance, most Arab North African countries perceive themselves as part of the Arab region more than as part of a Euro-Mediterranean region. By the same token, most European countries perceive themselves as part of the transatlantic region more than as part of the Euro-Mediterranean region. This idea leads also to questioning intra-regional differences. In the southern Mediterranean, there is a clear divergence between the west and the east. East Mediterranean countries perceive more homogeneity with the Middle East region than West Mediterranean countries, just as western, eastern and northern European countries do not share an equal interest in the southern Mediterranean. It is relevant here to recall how the inception of the 5+5 initiative came to reflect the common interests that some southern European countries share with some North African countries, and how the 5+5 initiative did not attract the rest of Europe nor the rest of the southern Mediterranean countries.7
These examples are meant to highlight how geographical proximity is not a sufficient factor in region construction. European assumptions about the ability to construct a "Mediterranean Region" have obviously omitted all these structural elements, both the tangible and the intangible. Hence, while it is true to argue that the Mediterranean Sea connects the Euro-Med area, it is equally valid to argue that the Mediterranean Sea separates two different worlds. At the same time, that same sea connects these two different worlds in the way that pressing threats have created and intensified security interdependence.
This security interdependence, or regional security complex, which replaces the multi-dimensional regional project, has been continuously deepening, due to the many political and security repercussions of the post-2011 Arab uprisings. During the past six years, many budding or potential threats have grown into actual and severe ones: state failure, mass migration and refugee crises, armed conflicts and an upsurge in terrorist activities. Besides, the fact that not all European states have an interest in deepening ties with the Arab Mediterranean area, added to the fact that only a few European states feel more affected by the unstable conditions of the Arab region, has steadily worked to advance bilateralism at the expense of multilateral regionalism.
In an effort to reconstruct and further institutionalize its diverse relationships with the southern Mediterranean countries, since 2003 the EU has been referring to that area as its Southern Neighborhood. In this respect, a comprehensive and multifunctional approach has been adopted in the framework of the first ENP of 2004, reviewed and modified in May 2011 and November 2015. The straightforward goals of the ENP are to create a "ring of friends" around the EU by achieving the closest possible degree of political association and economic integration.8 However, the EU's reference to the southern Mediterranean as its neighborhood, even if it is geographically apt, is a European assumption that has been implicitly marginalizing the roles of regional and international powers in the Mediterranean. Specifically, after 2011, the roles of such powers have been notably visible and influential, especially when compared to those of the EU or key European powers. Moreover, a careful observer could even argue that the roles of such external actors have challenged the capacity of the EU to act in its neighborhood and made visible its many limits. It is indeed interesting to see how the EU admitted these limits in the November 2015 revision of the ENP, acknowledging that "the EU cannot alone solve the many challenges of the region, and there are limits to its leverage."9
This section therefore discusses how the past six years have shown that the troubled context of Arab transitions represented an open theater for the political and economic influence of many regional and international actors. Those actors have mostly dealt with the region as a battlefield in which a rough competition for power and influence increasingly grew. Most important of these were the United States, Russia, China and the Gulf states, which intervened in the processes of Arab transformations to advance various political, security, economic and cultural interests. The past six years also demonstrate that the political, economic and, in some cases, ideological leverage of such actors undermined EU actions in the southern Mediterranean, which alone could scarcely meet the political, security or economic expectations of countries in transition.
The United States
The United States has long maintained a robust political, economic and security presence in the Mediterranean.10 This was the case even before the EU took on its comprehensive neofunctional approaches to institutionalize its relations with the southern Mediterranean area. This is also the case even with the gradual reduction in the priority that the United States and NATO have been ascribing to Mediterranean affairs.11 Nonetheless, and upon mention of NATO, it also remains true that NATO started institutionalizing its relations with the southern Mediterranean by launching the "Mediterranean Dialogue" one year before the EU launched the Barcelona Process.
Militarily, the U.S. Sixth Fleet has been permanently stationed in the Mediterranean since the 1950s, and NATO's operation Active Endeavor has been patrolling the Mediterranean in reaction to the 9/11 attacks on the United States since 2001. In fact, the United States set itself up as the chief strategic and military partner to several Mediterranean countries (such as Morocco, Egypt, Israel and Jordan) even before the EU adopted any cooperative initiative in the Mediterranean. The United States is also considered the chief strategic partner and security provider to many Arab states in the Middle East and the Gulf region through security accords, military bases, arms sales, and active political and diplomatic engagement in political crises and security affairs.
Economically, the United States has an important presence, especially in terms of economic cooperation and assistance, even if Washington does not assume the top position as a donor in the region. In a recent academic study, Steven Heydemann highlights the following:
Despite the Obama administration's rhetoric in support of Arab protesters and their demands for political and economic change, and despite the U.S. president's commitment to place the full weight of the U.S. foreign-policy system behind political openings created by mass protests, U.S. foreign assistance programmes to the MENA region were largely unaffected by the dramatic political changes of 2011 and beyond.12
Yet, as is always the case, the United States has been demonstrating a practical willingness to engage in the region's security since 2011. Even if Washington appeared keen to maintain a general profile of noninterference in Arab transformations post-2011, its role has been evident in certain cases of high political and strategic significance, mainly in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Egypt.
In Libya, the United States has provided essential military assistance to the NATO operation "Unified Protector" after intervening European countries failed to militarily lead the operation. This was to the extent of describing the U.S. indirect role in the operation as "leading from behind."13 U.S. officials have also contributed to international diplomatic efforts since August 2014 aimed at the establishment of an inclusive government. Besides, and as noted by a recent American study, "Statements made by U.S. officials in 2016 suggest that U.S. counterterrorism concerns have grown and that military action against the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and other extremists in Libya may continue and/or expand."14
In Yemen, Washington did not merely endorse the Gulf Initiative for the transfer of power in Yemen, as was the case of the EU. Rather, it was actively engaged in counterterrorism efforts in cooperation with the Yemeni government during 2011 and 2012. It is notable that by mid-2012, U.S. military assistance to Yemen contributed to fighting al-Qaeda centers in the south of the country and successfully pushed al-Qaeda out of Zinjibar in the southern Abyan area.15 As the situation in Yemen continued to deteriorate, following the revolts by Houthi fighters, it was Saudi Arabia that led an Arab military coalition, aiming at the restoration of order in Yemen.
In Syria, during the first few years of the conflict, it was widely perceived (internationally and regionally) that if the United States did not lead a military intervention, there would not be one. But despite a lack of enthusiasm for full-fledged military intervention, it was widely reported during 2013 that Washington facilitated the transfer of arms to various factions of the Syrian opposition, in cooperation with some Arab Gulf states and some of Syria's neighbors, such as Jordan and Turkey.16 Besides, Washington has been contributing to all international diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the Syrian crisis, especially after it decided to form and lead the international coalition to confront the ISIS threat.
In Egypt, the EU seemed dependent on the United States; most EU reactions to the troubled Egyptian transition came after those of Washington. The role of the United States ever since the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution in 2011 has been indeed evident, whether during the interim rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), or in opening up and extending political support to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Even with the confrontation between the United States and Egypt after the ouster of MB president Mohamed Morsi, 17 bilateral relations were soon normalized. A major factor in the failure of Western pressure on the Egyptian regime after June 2013 was the extraordinary support extended to Egypt by key Arab Gulf states.
The Arab Gulf States
The Gulf states, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a whole, have been playing crucial roles in regional dynamics post-2011, attempting primarily to face the destabilizing ramifications of the Arab uprisings. They have demonstrated a notable capacity to act collectively under the GCC umbrella, as a bloc within the League of the Arab States, and individually in a highly visible and assertive foreign policy conducted through a multiplicity of instruments. First, they engaged in military efforts; Qatar and the UAE contributed to NATO's operation in Libya in 2011; Saudi Arabia and the UAE coordinated militarily under the umbrella of the GCC in suppressing what was largely perceived in the Gulf as a "Shiite-led" uprising in Bahrain; and the Gulf states were generally willing to intervene in Syria to put an end to the Assad regime. Second, they extended political support and mediation efforts, such as the Gulf Initiative, for a smooth transfer of power in Yemen. Later, when things went out of control in Yemen, Saudi Arabia did not hesitate to lead a military intervention to stabilize the country. Third, they disbursed huge amounts of funding, whether in the form of aid, loans or investments. This was mostly evident in traditional areas of political and strategic interest within the Gulf area, such as Oman and Bahrain, or elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt.
The size of economic assistance, loans and investment from key Gulf states to Arab countries in transition contrasts significantly with the limited funds the EU has been able or willing to allocate to its Arab Mediterranean partners. The question of size not only appeared in funding capacities, but in almost every political or security initiative. Consider, for instance, the case of the European Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM-Libya), which appears to be a case in point.18 Another example regards the EU's regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Daesh threat, which was released by the European Commission in February 2015.19 In light of the region's actual needs, it is highly doubtful that the EU would have been able to act as an influential peace promoter, considering the amount of allocated funding for the implementation of this exceedingly ambitious strategy (only €1 billion from the EU budget for 2015 and 2016). It is striking to compare this to the aid promised by Saudi Arabia alone to Lebanon in the course of 2014 ($4 billion) to enhance that state's capacity to confront the IS threat.
Russia and China
The political and economic influence of Russia and China has been steadily growing in the Arab region since the outbreak of the 2011 uprisings, and is still in the process of taking shape. It would not be informative, therefore, to compare their current trade volumes in Mediterranean countries with those of the EU, the United States and the Gulf countries. It is more indicative to see how rapidly trade between key Arab countries and Russia and China has been growing, especially during the past two years. Sino-Arab economic ties have increased from $25.5 billion to nearly $240 billion since 2005. As noted by an economic analyst in 2014, China "is looking to increase its trade volume with Arab countries from last year's $240 billion to $600 billion; increase [its] non-financial investment stock in the Arab countries from last year's $10 billion to over $60 billion; accelerate negotiations to conclude the free-trade agreement (FTA) between China and the GCC states and push forward the Arab countries' participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to get an early harvest."20 China's economic expansion in North Africa, mainly through infrastructure projects, has been exceptionally rapid. In Algeria, for example, China is undertaking many such projects and currently ranks as Algeria's third trading partner after France and Italy.
Even with its limited economic role in the Mediterranean, Russia's various political stances have raised its profile as an attractive interlocutor to many Arab actors who wish to diversify their political and military contacts and to counter U.S. and European influence in Arab transitions. Similarly, China's rising political presence in the Arab region post-2011 offers a comparable political opportunity for Arab countries.
The turning point for the divergence between Russia and China, on the one side, and Western powers, on the other, regarding the political and security developments in the Mediterranean was the experience of NATO military intervention in Libya in 2011. Even if the Russian and Chinese abstention from voting on the UN Security Council resolution authorizing intervention had actually permitted the NATO operation in Libya, the repercussions of the intervention reinforced the perception in Moscow and Beijing that Arab transformations have opened the way for Western powers to advance their interests in the region. Besides, both Russia and China have an interest in reinforcing the principle of state sovereignty, and consequently nonintervention in domestic affairs, which also serves them in their confrontation with the West.21 The Libyan experience has thus contributed to shaping the stances of Russia and China in negotiating the Syrian crisis, contributing to diplomatic efforts in Yemen, supporting the Egyptian regime under al-Sisi's leadership, and even participating in the negotiations of the Iran nuclear deal of July 2015.
While the EU and the United States usually connect their aid to political reforms in the MENA countries,22 Russia and China continue to stress the principle of sovereignty and the policy of noninterference. This has led to mitigating the dependency of many Arab countries on Western powers through the provision of foreign aid, investment funds, political support and even armaments.
Another important structural limit on EU action in the Mediterranean is the particular nature of the EU as a foreign-policy actor. The multiple levels in the EU decision-making process and the fact that the common EU foreign and security policy remains highly intergovernmental render the process of seeking consensus and acting coherently very challenging.
When it comes to the southern Mediterranean in EU foreign and security policy, the lack of consensus among EU members as well as the influence of certain EU members is notable. Traditionally, the interest of southern European states in the security and stability of the Mediterranean has been particularly high. This interest has not always been shared by other northern and eastern EU member states. Several academics have continued to highlight these issues. For instance, Richard Youngs noted in 2003, "Southern European states are judged to have attached the highest priority to gaining north European financial support for new border-control systems."23 Also, Rosa Balfour noted in 2012 that the Arab region has usually been a reason for "great divisions between the member states, not just in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but also in the perceptions of the priorities to be pursued, from contrasting irregular migration to fighting terrorism."24 The experience of the Arab uprisings and the way the EU dealt with them have further demonstrated the problem of incoherence in EU policy towards the Mediterranean. It was obvious that in several cases EU members were pursuing national objectives that were at odds with official EU positions.
One of the most striking examples is European discord over the decision to undertake military intervention in Libya; this eventually led to some European members undertaking the operation under the NATO flag.25 In May 2011, at the same time that the EU issued a review of its ENP, promising "free mobility" to the southern Mediterranean, there was a standoff between Italy and France over the influx of Tunisian refugees, as well as a restoration of border controls between Germany and Sweden. The problem of incoherence in dealing with the influx of migrants and refugees to the Schengen zone reached its peak in 2015-16, with the increasing flows of Syrian migrants and the expansion of the ISIS threat. By early 2016, the European Court of Auditors had published a disapproving report on EU migration policy, condemning it as incoherent and lacking in strategy, just as EU leaders were preparing to agree on a controversial deal with Turkey to control the flow of migrants into Europe.26
A third example of inconsistency is revealed in the timidity of the EU and its member states' reactions to certain uprisings in Algeria and Morocco. In these two cases, poorly prepared reforms by the Moroccan and Algerian governments were quickly welcomed by certain European states, such as France.27 French individualism was noted as exceptional in these incidents, as well as in the early phases of the Libyan crisis. It is indeed remarkable to see how France attempted to channel most of its funding to Arab countries in transition through French national programs rather than under the EU umbrella. This was obvious when France promised during the G8 summit in May 2011 that it would contribute €1 billion bilaterally to the democratic transitions in both Tunisia and Egypt.28 It could be argued that these actions might not be inconsistent, since EU members could both contribute to the EU budget and run their own assistance programs. However, when member states choose to allocate the bulk of their funds through national programs, it becomes a sign of national idiosyncrasy.
Most recently, and apart from its correctness, the close rapprochement between southern European members, especially France, and al-Sisi's regime in Egypt is certainly inconsistent with other European positions. It is even inconsistent with the positions of EU institutions such as the European Parliament, which issued a nonbinding resolution in March 2016 condemning the killing of an Italian citizen, Giulio Regeni, in Egypt and calling for suspension of security cooperation with Cairo. Nevertheless, during the month after this resolution was issued, Egypt received high-level visits from the French president, François Hollande, and the German vice-chancellor and economic affairs minister, Sigmar Gabriel, in order to conclude security and economic agreements.
Besides the many signs of incoherence between the EU and its members, there were other signs of incoherence among EU institutions themselves. The relationship between the 2011-born European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission was criticized by many observers, who referred to a rivalry between the two institutions. For decades, the European Commission used to dominate communications with EU governments in a wide array of issues, including trade, development, neighborhood policy, enlargement and humanitarian aid. By contrast, the relationship between EU capitals and the EEAS appears to lack similar trust or depth.29 The state of inter-institutional rivalry was particularly striking during 2011, even if some analysts expected the EEAS to become a new institutional innovation ending the institutional rivalry between the Commission and the Council.30 The Arab uprisings were the first test case for the new-born EEAS, whose powers and functions were not clearly delineated vis-à-vis other EU institutions, mainly the powerful European Commission, which still dominated key financial instruments and policy implementation. Therefore, the process of dealing with these uprisings in EU institutions has been criticized for lack of coherence and inter-institutional coordination.31
The inconsistency in European policies, declarations and actions not only highlights the challenge of unifying European policy towards the Mediterranean, but also contributes to undermining the very credibility of the EU in that area. The latest revision of the ENP in November 2015 came to explicitly acknowledge the dilemma of incoherence by emphasizing the focus on a more coherent effort by the EU and the member states and by stating "the importance of seeking a deeper involvement of EU Member States in re-energising work with our neighbours."32 It further states that the "EU is more influential when united in a common approach and communicating a single message." Accordingly, it stresses that "Member States will be invited to play the role of lead partner for certain initiatives or to accompany certain reform efforts."33
While various analyses put the blame on the EU's own policies and instruments in the Mediterranean, this paper demonstrates that there are many structural impediments to the capacity of the EU to act in the Mediterranean. Some of these structural impediments have to do with the heterogeneity of the Mediterranean area itself, which defies an early European-born initiative towards "region building." Some other structural impediments have to do with the EU's own structure and its very nature as a foreign-policy actor. This structural challenge was repeatedly manifested in incoherent policies and in numerous signs of national idiosyncrasies. Finally, other structural impediments have to do with the Mediterranean area as a stage for international and regional competition among various powers. The EU's reference to the southern Mediterranean as its neighborhood, even if it is geographically correct, appears to be a deceptive European assumption in the way it has implicitly, though perhaps unintentionally, undermined the roles of regional and international powers in that area. Previous analysis demonstrates that, specifically during the past six years, the political, economic and, in some cases, ideological leverage of such actors has dwarfed EU policies and actions in the Southern Mediterranean. While EU leaders could scarcely meet the political, security or economic expectations of Arab countries in transition, the roles of the United States, some Arab Gulf states, Russia and China appeared to offer convincing alternatives to local regimes in many cases.
The latest review of the ENP in November 2015, however, reflects a realistic awakening concerning the way the EU envisions its future involvement in the Mediterranean. In this recent policy document, the EU completely abandons its previously idealistic reference to a Euro-Mediterranean region or even the less ambitious objective of creating a ring of friends. The EU also clearly acknowledges the limits of its leverage in the Mediterranean and admits its inability to solve its many challenges alone. This appears to be a reasonable recognition of the influence exerted by established regional and international power centers in the Mediterranean area. Finally, the EU explicitly acknowledges its own problem of incoherence by emphasizing a future focus on a more coherent effort and unified action. This is intended to be realized through enhancing member states' space in playing the lead role for certain EU initiatives and reform efforts.
1 See Vera Van Hüllen, "The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: Strategic Choices after the Arab Spring," in Policy Change in the EU's Immediate Neighbourhood: A Sectoral Approach, Tanja A. Börzel and Katrin Böttger, eds. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), 119-44; Richard Youngs, "The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous Strategy?" Democratization 9, no. 1 (2002): 40-62; Federica Bicchi, "Dilemmas of Implementation: EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean," Democratization 17, no. 5 (2010): 976-96; and Radwan Ziadeh, "The EU's Policy on Promoting Democracy in the Arab World," International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2009.
2 The Barcelona Declaration (November 27-28, 1995), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf.
3 European External Action Service (EEAS), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm (accessed July 20, 2016).
4 European Commission, "Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy," November 18, 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_rev….
5 Sally Khalifa Isaac, "The Quest for Intercultural Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: Opportunities and Challenges," European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS), No. 74 (2010).
6 Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Dimitri Nicolaïdis, "The EuroMed beyond Civilisational Paradigms," in The Convergence of Civilizations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region, Emanuel Adler et. al., eds. (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004).
7 Stephen C. Calleya, "The Euro-Med Partnership and Sub Regionalism: A Case of Region Building?" Working Paper PRI-4, February 4, 2003, http://ies.berkeley.edu/pubs/workingpapers/PRI-4-Euro-Med_Partnership.p…, 6.
8 European External Action Service (EEAS), "European Neighbourhood Policy," http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ (accessed July 24, 2016).
9 "Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy."
10 Ian O. Lesser, "The United States and the Future of Mediterranean Security: Reflections from GMF's Mediterranean Strategy Group," German Marshall Fund of the United States (April 2015), http://www.gmfus.org/file/5291/download.
11 John B. Hattendorf, ed., Naval Strategy and Power in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future (Frank Cass Publishers, 2000).
12 See Steven Heydemann, "America's Response to the Arab Uprisings: U.S. Foreign Assistance in an Era of Ambivalence," Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 3 (2014): 299-317.
13 Sally Khalifa Isaac, "NATO's Intervention in Libya: Assessment and Implications," Barcelona: IEMed Yearbook (2012), 123.
14 Christopher M. Blanchard, "Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 RL33142, May 13, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf.
15 "U.S. Government Assistance to Yemen," U.S. Department of State, September 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198335.htm; and Sally Khalifa Isaac, "Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies' Assistance after the Arab Uprisings," Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 3 (2014): 426.
16 See C.J. Chivers and E. Schmitt, "Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria with Croatian Arms," New York Times, February 25, 2013; and C.J. Chivers and E. Schmitt, "Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands with Aid from C.I.A.," New York Times, March 24, 2013.
17 Which has mainly appeared in the decision of the Obama administration to suspend substantial military aid, military training, and other economic aid funds to the Egyptian government in October 2013.
18 European External Action Service (EEAS), "EUBAM Libya," http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/index_en… (accessed July 20, 2016).
19 European Commission, "Elements for an EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as Well as the Da'esh Threat," February 6, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/20150206_JOIN_en.pdf.
20 Naser Al-Tamimi, "Why Arabs Should Embrace China's Silk Road," Al-Arabiya, December 9, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/business/economy/2014/12/09/Why-A….
21 Though political conditionality has rarely been applied by the West in its relationship with friend regimes in the Arab region.
22 Heydemann, op. cit., 302.
23 Richard Youngs, "European Approaches to Security in the Mediterranean," Middle East Journal 57, no. 3 (2003): 417.
24 Rosa Balfour, "EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring," EuroMesco Papers (Barcelona: IEMed, 2012), 29.
25 Nicole Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence?" International Spectator 46, no. 4 (2011):10; and Nicole Koenig, EU Security Policy and Crisis Management: A Quest for Coherence (Routledge, 2016).
26 Aline Robert, "Auditors Slam EU Migration Response as 'Incoherent,'" Euractiv, March 17, 2016, http://www.Euractiv.Com/Section/Global-Europe/News/Auditors-Slam-Eu-Mig….
27 Barah Mikail, "France and the Arab Spring: An Opportunistic Quest for Influence," FRIDE Working Paper No. 110 (October 2011), 5-6.
28 Ibid, 7.
29 Jan Techau, "How to Breathe New Life into the European External Action Service," Carnegie Europe Center, January 7, 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=54102.
30 Sanda Cinca, "Implications on the Security and Stability of the Easter Partnership," in The European Union's Eastern Neighbourhood Today, Valentin Naumescu and Dan Danguchiu, eds. (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 88.
31 See Stefano Silvestri, "A European Strategy for Democracy, Development and Security for the Mediterranean," Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Working Papers 1110 (May 2011).
32 "Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy," op.cit., 5.