The authors wish to thank Ronald Francisco, Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz and David Williams for their helpful comments and encouragement.
On March 10, 1991, the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),1 Egypt and Syria agreed in principle in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a regional collective-security arrangement proposed by James Baker, U.S. secretary of state in the Bush administration. The plan included joint exercises of air and ground forces from the United States and moderate Arab countries. Furthermore, the objective was to have a strengthened, permanent American naval presence in the Persian Gulf. In contrast, four days earlier on March 6, foreign ministers of the eight moderate Arab states had agreed in Damascus, that Egypt and Syria would provide the nucleus of the Arab peace-keeping force in the Gulf. The Damascus and Riyadh declarations illustrate different approaches toward ensuring security in the region. Whereas the former envisages a Pan-Arab expansion, the latter directly involves a Western power.
Interestingly, neither the Damascus nor Riyadh declarations incorporates Iran and Iraq, two countries with demonstrated regional aspirations in recent years. Rather, the signatories sought to deter aggression from outside the group, particularly from the two excluded countries. In regard to threats from within the group, the Arab sheikhdoms felt vulnerable to domestic political upheavals.2 Thus, the aforementioned post-Desert-Storm plan for regional security more closely resembles an alliance of pro-Western governments than a regional collective-security arrangement in the Middle East.3
In view of the limited capabilities of the participants, it is appropriate to ask whether the GCC can function as an effective security umbrella for its members? By the same token, is the Damascus Declaration militarily feasible? Given the present anti-Western sentiment in the Islamic world, is the Riyadh Declaration politically viable? With progress in relations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, is it prudent to include Iran, Iraq and Israel in a collective-security arrangement? This article will examine these questions. In particular, it will analyze the transformation of the GCC into a regional collective security organization in the post-Cold War period.
At its inception in May 1981, the GCC did not specifically identify military security as one of the areas for regional cooperation.4 Because of its military weakness, the council adopted that strategy in order to avoid raising alarm among its ambitious neighbors. Yet, South Yemen was clearly a threat to Oman and, in late 1981, a coup d’état was staged in Bahrain. The following January 1982, the defense ministers of the member countries held their first multilateral meeting. Those events consummated in the creation of a Military Committee within the GCC secretariat.5 Thus, the security issue came to the forefront as a result of both external and internal concerns.
In moving toward an integrated command structure, the GCC began working on a joint strike force by mid-1983. Later in October, the "Peninsula Shield" joint exercises in western Abu Dhabi anticipated the Gulf countries' own rapid deployment force (RDF). In November 1984, the GCC announced an agreement among its members to create an RDF. That year, the "Peninsula Shield II" joint exercises at Hafr al-Batin (King Khalid Military City) in northeastern Saudi Arabia included parachute landings for rapid deployment.6
However, the problems of the 1980s continue to haunt the GCC in the 1990s.7First, the federal forces of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Union Defense Force, are overshadowed by competing military units of the seven emirates. The decentralized command structure, reflecting distrust among the constituent political units, does not permit the UAE to fully develop its military potential. Second, the armed forces of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE are primarily organized to play an internal policing role. In particular, Bahrain and Qatar have very limited military capabilities; their contributions within the GCC are symbolic. Third, manpower shortages plague all of the GCC members in shoring up their armed forces.
At its core, the calculus of GCC security rests with Saudi Arabia. However, that country does not have the military capabilities to alone police the Gulf.8 While the Saudis have worked to overcome regionalism, the royal family is wary of the potential risk to its own survival from a large professional military force.9 This is a rational concern given the military's penchant for attempting to overthrow monarchies in the Middle East.10 Moreover, the perception about the Saudi security umbrella varies within the GCC. While Bahrain and Qatar rely on the Saudi air-defense system, the UAB has a serious concern about the adequacy of the Saudi shield. In addition, not only did the GCC fail to play an effective role in thwarting Iran's "tanker war," Saudi Arabia itself suffered heavy damages. For example, in May 1984, a Saudi oil tanker, the Al Ahood, was set aflame by an Iraqi missile as it was leaving the Iranian oil-terminal at Kharg, at the mouth of the Gulf. That same month, a Saudi supertanker, the Yanbu Prince, was targeted by unidentified planes off the Saudi coast.
At a meeting in Riyadh later in May 1984, the GCC condemned Iranian attacks against their oil tankers. At that point, the GCC opposed direct American involvement and raised the issue before the Arab League and United Nations. However, during 1987-88, at the urging of the Kuwaiti government, the U.S. Joint Task Force Middle East escorted reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers against Iranian attack. Furthermore, during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, the GCC made a formal request to the Bush administration to intervene against Iraqi aggression.11
In the aftermath of the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, the wealthy Arab sheikhdoms aggressively embarked on a shopping spree for high-technology weapons.12 The revenues earned from oil exports will enable key members of the GCC to acquire additional weapons despite their immediate cash-flow problems.13 In 1993, the Saudi government allocated $35 billion, 66.7 percent of its budget, for defense expenditures. Although King Fahd announced a nearly 20 percent cut in that country's 1994 budget, the measure did little to reduce Saudi Arabia's relative share of military expenditures. Even though facing a $780 million deficit, the Omani government earmarked $1.5 billion in 1994, amounting to 30 percent of that country's budget, for defense expenditures.
In 1992 the Saudi government negotiated a $9 billion deal with the Bush administration for the acquisition of 72 F-15 fighter jets. According to a U.S. government report prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, the following year Saudi Arabia purchased 12 Patriot antimissile batteries for $4.2 billion. Kuwait spent $1.1 billion on arms purchases, including six Patriot and an equal number of Hawk antimissile batteries. Furthermore, the Kuwaiti government paid $4 billion for 236 advanced M-1A2 Abrams tanks purchased from General Dynamics Corporation.
During his visit to the Middle East in 1993, British Prime Minister John Major signed a $6-7 billion arms deal with Saudi authorities, including the purchase of 48 Tornado ground-attack aircraft manufactured by British Aerospace PLC. Furthermore, he concluded an arms sale to the Omani government that included scores of Challenger 2 battle tanks from Vickers PLC. Edouard Balladur, the French prime minister, succeeded in negotiating an arms and industrial package worth approximately $2 billion with Saudi leaders during his 1994 trip to the region.
In spite of the weapons purchases, the GCC's RDF is essentially symbolic. It is not an effective instrument for either deterrence or defense.14 It is not surprising that Kuwait decided to unilaterally strengthen its defensive perimeter after the 1991 Operation Desert Storm. In May 1993 the Kuwaiti government announced plans to construct a security trench along its 130-mile border with Iraq set by the 1992 U.N. Border Commission. However, Kuwait will need more than a trench for self-defense if irredentism is rekindled in the future.
Ironically, it was due to Kuwaiti opposition that the GCC in 1984 failed to agree on a joint defense treaty. Thus, a regional force was created without a commensurate security framework.
Despite the thorny issue of Palestinian self-rule, the security dangers to the GCC in recent years have not emanated from the non-Muslim countries, near or distant. Instead, the threat has alternated from the council's two powerful and ambitious Muslim neighbors, Iran and Iraq. The situation is complicated by an anti-Western undercurrent of public opinion in the Middle East that views the prevailing political regimes with disdain.15 Unable to unilaterally thwart military challenges from either neighbor, the GCC is faced with a significant dilemma. Sworn to "serve Arab and Islamic causes," the organization finds it politically unpalatable to accept help from the militarily powerful, non-Muslim West. The dilemma is particularly acute for Saudi Arabia, the pillar of the GCC, as custodian of the two holiest shrines in Islam. In fact, in October 1986 King Fahd proclaimed himself Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in the face of the Islamic puritanism of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's regime in Iran.16
POLITICAL INCOMPATIBILITY OF WESTERN PROTECTION
Whereas degrees of bilateral military relations by individual countries have existed over time with Western powers, there is little consensus over collective ties to major powers. Since British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, there has been a shift to rely on the United States for security assistance. On the one hand, with the oldest military institution in the Gulf, Oman has historically been the most supportive of defense cooperation with the West. On the other hand, preferring a nonaligned posture, Kuwait has traditionally favored an equidistant policy vis-a-vis the superpowers.17 However, Iranian attacks on its oil tankers in the 1980s and Iraqi occupation in 1990 forced Kuwait to reconsider its position regarding Western security protection.
Although the 1990 Operation Desert Shield is credited with defending Saudi Arabia, some scholars view the 1990-91 Gulf War as a testimony to the failure of America's extended deterrence in protecting Kuwait.18 A successful deterrence warrants the incorporation of a credible retaliatory threat in case of policy failure. While a "trip-wire" defense would enhance deterrence, an RDF is essential if deterrence fails. The logistics of rapid deployment are improved by the pre-positioning of weapons and forces.19 The March 1991 Riyadh Declaration by the GCC countries supported the Bush administration's post-Desert-Storm framework for a long-term security arrangement between the United States and anti-Iraq Arab coalition members.20 The plan included provisions for joint military exercises and a lengthy commitment of American naval forces in the Gulf.
In May 1991, Richard Cheney, U.S. secretary of defense in the Bush administration, explored with GCC officials the possibility of an expanded American military role in the Gulf region. Washington sought a long-term pre-positioning of American troops and equipment in the region, which subsequently resulted in a two-party agreement. In July 1992, the Pentagon announced the deployment of batteries of Patriot antimissile systems in Kuwait and Bahrain. When American troops from the Army's First Cavalry Division arrived in Kuwait in January 1993 to bolster that country's defense along the Iraqi border, their weapons were already in place under the 1991 defense pact between the two countries.
Earlier, in August 1992, more than 5,000 American troops, including 2,000 marines, participated in joint exercises with Kuwaiti forces as part of the same 1991 agreement. An additional 2,400 army troops, based in the United States, were mobilized to join the rapid deployment exercises. The following January, a total of 38 bombers and 72 fighter planes and support aircraft raided newly deployed Iraqi mobile missile batteries and command and control posts in southern Iraq. The massive American led air strike was the first such operation since Desert Storm and included four British Tornado bombers and six French Mirage fighters.
Even though a political rival of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad publicly criticized the August 1992 allied no-fly zone operation against Iraq. By the same token, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak felt "deep regret" about the January 1993 air raid, and Jordanian and Turkish officials voiced reservations about the use of military force in the Middle East. These sentiments explain why the Pentagon was reluctant to acknowledge Saudi Arabia's direct involvement in the air strike.21 Similar concern for Arab public opinion during the 1991 Operation Desert Storm prompted King Hussein of Jordan to view the allied assaults as aggression against the Arabs.
Both Syria and Egypt have voiced reservations about various security arrangements in the Middle East. During the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, for example, Syria threatened to boycott the U.S.-led anti-Iraq coalition if Israel became involved in the operation. Even Saudi Arabia was concerned about Israeli participation exacerbating Islamic extremism in favor of Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Earlier, in January 1988, President Mubarak offered to provide additional military advisers and equipment to the Gulf sheikhdoms, but only in return for petro-dollar investments in Egypt's arms industry. Absent satisfactory financial arrangements, Cairo subsequently showed scant inclination to send significant numbers of ground troops to Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian government agreed to maintain its forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia under the March 1991 accord with the GCC and Syria. However, that post-Desert-Storm security policy was reversed by the Mubarak administration two months later with the withdrawal of 38,000 Egyptian troops stationed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The volte-face in Egyptian policy could be attributed to, first, resentment over the GCC's reluctance to implement the Pan-Arab security arrangement. Traditionally, not only Iran and Iraq,22 but also Egypt and Syria have shown regional political ambitions.23 Reluctant to station Egyptian and Syrian forces on their soil, the GCC opted for the "over the horizon" security arrangements with the United States. Second, disagreement ensued over compensation for Egypt's participation in the anti-Iraqi coalition. The situation was exacerbated by Kuwait's failure to grant reconstruction contracts to Egyptian companies. Third, the Egyptian government was concerned about prospective Iranian participation in a regional security regime, particularly because Iran was not a member of the anti-Iraqi coalition. Furthermore, Egypt perceived Iranian involvement as a challenge to Egypt's revived political influence over Arab security issues.
In any event, the GCC is not strong enough to defend its members from either Iran or Iraq, and entertaining the notion of "dual containment" is, at best, wishful thinking.24 Furthermore, the Gulf monarchies are insecure regarding their political future with a Pan-Arab arrangement where military might rests with countries outside the sheikhdoms. In addition, while the American security guarantee is militarily more assuring, it is politically costly for the long-term stability of the Gulf regimes.25
What is the alternative to the Damascus and Riyadh declarations for regional security in the Gulf? One possibility is to eschew an alliance approach in favor of regional collective security. That option reflects the position of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, when he appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee during which he in 1991, advocated active participation by all regional countries, including Iran and Iraq. Once all of the outstanding issues are resolved, perhaps, Israel could be involved in the arrangement. Such a comprehensive security regime would be both "cost-effective and stabilizing."26
AN EXPANDED AND INCLUSIVE ORGANIZATION
For the GCC to be a viable collective security organization in the Middle East, it must extend its membership to important non-sheikhdom regional actors. Of course, in the process the institution will be transformed from a Gulf Cooperation Council to a Middle East Cooperation Council. However, a collective-security framework warrants not only incorporating Egypt and Syria, but also Iraq, Iran, and Israel.27
In 1993 the Iraqi government finally acceded to U.N. monitoring of that country's weapons programs. Although suspicious of hidden weapons, in July of that year the U.N. Special Commission inspectors believed that all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in Iraq had been destroyed.28 In renouncing its long-standing claim over Kuwait as Iraq's nineteenth province, in November 1994 Baghdad recognized Kuwait as a sovereign polity. In view of Iraq's moderated position, even its historical enemy Iran in February 1995 favored the lifting of U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
It is noteworthy that in 1988 the Iraqi government did not condemn the Palestine National Council's implicit acceptance of Israel's right to exist. Furthermore, Tariq Aziz, Iraqi deputy prime minister, privately expressed in 1994 that Iraq did not consider itself a "confrontation state" vis-a-vis Israel. He added that Baghdad was open to reconciliation with Israel commensurate with progress between the Israelis and Palestinians. Despite the public rhetoric, President Saddam Hussein desires "a role" in the regional peace process.29 It would be remiss to overlook that stability in the Gulf warrants military parity between Iraq and Iran.30 By the same token, both Iraq and Iran must be involved in any successful regional collective-security arrangement.
Iran's neutrality during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis earned it goodwill among the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.31 The Rafsanjani administration has shifted Iran's foreign policy from isolationism to improving relations with its neighbors, including the GCC countries.32 In March 1991, Ali Akbar Velayati, Iranian foreign minister, and Prince Saud al-Faisal al-Saud, his Saudi counterpart, held bilateral talks in Muscat, Oman, exploring the possibility of reviving diplomatic relations broken off in April 1988. Later in March 1991, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement on the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Without overlooking Iranian support for religious extremism, George Lenczowski of the University of California at Berkeley argues that ostracizing Iran is both futile and "counterproductive."33 Given its influence over the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the Hamas in the Israeli occupied territories, observes Louis Cantori of the University of Maryland, Iran's role as a major regional actor cannot be ignored.34 Furthermore, Tehran is interested in regional cooperation in the Persian Gulf.35 With the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iranian neutrality during the January 1991 Operation Desert Storm, and the restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations in March 1991, the stage was set for including Iran in a new security order in the Middle East.36
At the same time, events were unfolding for considering Israel's role in a regional security regime. Prince Saud al-Faisal al-Saud, the Saudi foreign minister, announced in March 1991 the GCC's decision to participate in the U.S.-Soviet cosponsored conference on the Middle East in Madrid, Spain. The GCC secretary general represented the group as an observer. While Saudi Arabia avoided direct endorsement, it found a way to indirectly support the peace efforts through a collective body. That gesture was important in securing Syrian and Israeli37 commitments to attend the conference.
A monumental feat, the October 1991 Madrid Conference for the first time brought together all of the major actors in the Middle East: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians of the Israeli-occupied territories and Syria.38 It was the first major step toward direct peace negotiations between Israel, on the one hand, and the Palestinians and Arab countries on the other. That crucial step of direct multilateral negotiations for a comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors took place the following January at the Moscow Conference.
Other events were unfolding that contributed to a favorable environment for considering Israel's participation in a Middle East security arrangement. In January 1992, seven leaders of the American Jewish Congress, a pro-Israeli group, visited Saudi Arabia. The visit was the first of its kind in a country where Jews were routinely barred from entry. While the Saudi policy reversal was designed to soften the Israeli lobby's opposition to the American F-15 aircraft sale to Saudi Arabia, the changed Saudi attitude added momentum to the Middle East peace process. Two months later, Bezek, the Israeli telecommunications company, opened direct-dial service to ten Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan.39 The following April, Saud Al Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, raised the possibility of his country's financial aid to the PLO in exchange for that organization's participation in the Arab-Israeli talks. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia was actively encouraging the PLO to join the peace process rather than objecting to Israeli participation. Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti foreign minister, reflected the changing political climate in his remark in June 1993 that the Arab countries had already stopped the "indirect boycott" of Israel by not retaliating against international companies involved in business transactions with that country.40
The September 1993 historic framework for interim Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho in the West Bank was signed in Washington, DC, by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. It was no surprise that earlier in the month the GCC expressed support for the accord. Another major achievement was the signing of the Washington Declaration the following July by King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin that formally ended 46 years of hostility between Jordan and Israel.41 Clearly, the shifting political environment enhances the prospects for Israeli participation in a regional security arrangement t.42
Increasingly, the security issue has become predominant for the GCC countries. Yet, the combined military forces of the member countries are no match for the potential threat from either Iran or Iraq. The sophisticated arms purchases since the 1991 Operation Desert Storm will serve no more than a psychological consolation in the event of an actual war.
Furthermore, the Pan-Arab regional force envisaged in the Damascus Declaration has done little to reassure the GCC leadership. Given the distrust among the political leaders, the monarchies are fearful of relying on Egypt and Syria for their security. These two Arab cousins have their own economic and political motives for agreeing to such an arrangement. In addition, the extraregional security guarantee from the United States enshrined in the Riyadh Declaration is not politically popular in the Arab world. This is a long-term concern for political legitimacy.
The policy of dual containment, specifically as it relates to Iran and Iraq, is impractical. The idea of playing off one against the other in a balance-of-power scenario is dangerous. Instead of excluding them, there is a greater prospect of containing both of the threats within a regional collective-security scheme. With tangible progress regarding the Palestinian question and resolution of Syrian-Israeli territorial issues, Israel could conceivably be part of such a security regime. In order to reinvigorate itself as an effective organization, the GCC must expand its membership to incorporate the major actors in the region. Of course, in the process, it will be transformed from a Gulf to a Middle Eastern institution. In light of the proposed regional economic bloc at the 1994 Casablanca meeting, it is no longer a farfetched idea. The hexapolarity among Egypt, the GCC, Iran, Iraq, Israel and Syria will be a stabilizing influence for a regional collective-security framework. Such a nexus will also be conducive to regional arms-control efforts.
1 The official name is the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Founded on May 25, 1991, the members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
2 For example, see Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 56-60, 81-82.
3 For a theoretical distinction between an alliance and collective security, see Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, "Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, March 1994, pp. 43-44. Also, see the classic work by Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 144-149.
4 Article IV of the GCC Charter. Nevertheless, security issues were of concern to the political leadership. See Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of security (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 148-149.
5 J. E. Peterson, "The GCC and Regional Security," in John A. Sandwick, ed., The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 172-173, 194-196.
6 Peterson, in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, p. 196.
7 For the remainder of this section, the authors are indebted to J.E. Peterson in borrowing from his work. See Peterson, in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, pp. 177-199. Also, see Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), chapter 3.
8 Robin Wright, "Unexplored Realities of the Persian Gulf Crisis," The Middle East Journal, vol. 45, Winter 1991, p. 25.
9 Thomas McNaugher, Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 139-143, cited in Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 71.
10 This culture of military coup is aptly discussed in a textbook by James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 180-218, 248-251.
11 Michael J. Mazarr, Don M. Snider and James A. Blackwell, Jr., Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 135-136.
12 Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War," in Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub, (eds.), Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), p. 123.
13 Yahya M. Sadowski, Scuds or Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 8-9, 70-71. For a discussion of the GCC members' budget squeeze during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, see Joseph W. Twinam, "The Gulf Cooperation Council since the Gulf War: The State of the States," Middle East Policy, vol. 1, no. 4, 1992, pp. 97-100. Also, the long-term U.S. military presence in the region will inevitably force the Gulf sheikhdoms to share the financial burden. See Stephen Zunes, "The U.S.-GCC Relationship: Its Rise and Potential Fall," Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, 1993, p. 105.
14 See Wilson and Graham, Saudi Arabia, p. 160.
15 Herman F. Eilts, "The Persian Gulf Crisis: Perspectives and Prospects, " The Middle East Journal, vol. 45, Winter 1991, p. 8.
16 Ralph Braibanti, "The Gulf Cooperation Council: A Comparative Note," in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, p. 214.
17 Peterson, in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, pp. 172-193.
18 Mazarr and others, Desert Storm, chapter 2, particularly pp. 21-22.
19 Ibid., pp. 23, 48, 62, 143, 165.
20 The other three cornerstones of the framework were: ending arms proliferation in the Middle East, Israel's acceptance of the land-for-peace principle and a new program for regional economic development.
21 In requesting deployment of U.S. troops during the 1990 Operation Desert Shield, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia secured religious sanctification from Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, that country's preeminent religious leader. See Eilts, p. 8.
22 From the GCC perspective, Iraq and Iran represent a "potential threat" and an "actual threat," respectively (emphasis original). See John D. Anthony, "Iran in GCC Dynamics," Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 3, 1993, p. 117.
23 The authors are grateful to Col. James Bartholomees of the U.S. Army War College for underscoring this point.
24 The impracticability of "dual containment" in the Middle Fast is argued by F. Gregory Gause III. See Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 56-57. Also, see Louis J. Cantori, "Regional Solutions to Regional Security Problems: The Middle Fast and Somalia," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1994, p. 28; George Lenczowski, "Iran: The Big Debate," Middle Ea.st Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, p. 54; and Edward G. Shirley, "The Iran Policy Trap," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, p. 75. The Clinton administration's perspective on dual containment is argued by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 48-49. Also, see clarification by Martin Indyk, special assistant to the president, National Security Council, in "Symposium on Dual Containment: U.S. Policy toward Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-7.
25 Zunes, pp. 106, 112.
26 Here the authors propose a broader framework than Louis Cantori's Pan-Arab focus. See Cantori, p. 30.
27 Like Robin Wright, we view an anti-Iraqi "regional alliance" involving Iran and Israel as unrealistic (emphasis original). See Wright, p. 24.
28 Thomas R. Mattair and Stephen Brannon, "U.N. Sanctions against Iraq: Issues Influencing Continuation or Removal," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, p. 29. In addressing the fear of a reasserted Iraq, Mattair and Brannon discuss the pros and cons of lifting U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
29 Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, January/February 1995, pp. 71-72.
30 Wright, p. 29.
31 For a discussion of the importance of overcoming mutual misperceptions in improving relationships in another context, see Bill, "The United States and Iran: Mutual Mythologies," Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 3, 1993, pp. 105-106.
32 R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South," The Middle East Journal, vol. 46, Summer 1992, pp. 393-394.
33 Lenczowski, pp. 61-62. For a cautious optimism, see Anthony, pp. 119-120.
34 Cantori, p. 29.
35 Ramazani, pp. 394, 401-403.
36 For interesting perspectives on proponents and opponents of improved GCC-Iran relations, see Anthony, pp. 108-118.
37 Israel would like to break out of the perpetual state of tension with its Arab neighbors. See Israel Shahak, "The Israeli Myth of Omniscience: Nuclear Deterrence and Intelligence," American-Arab Affairs, vol. 36, Spring 1991, pp. 95-96.
38 Whereas Algeria and Yemen boycotted the talks, Bahrain, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia sent observers.
39 The other eight countries were: Algeria, Bahrain, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen.
40 American arms and aircraft manufacturers were "routinely exempted" from such a policy.
41 Those events followed the September 1978 Camp David accords and the May 1979 Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel, which were the first dramatic breakthroughs in Arab Israeli relations.
42 Syria is unlikely to be more accommodating without recovering the Golan Heights from Israel. Nevertheless, a Syrian-Israeli peace is not impossible in the near future. See Alon BenMeir, "The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, p. 78; M. Zuhair Diab, "Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?" Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, pp. 77, 83-84; and Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 150-151. Also, see "Damascus Making a Big Concession in Talks on Golan," The New York Times, May 25, 1995, p. Al, and "Peres Inches toward Ceding Golan for Peace with Syria," The New York Times, May 26, 1995, p. A2.