"Can the Two-State Solution be Salvaged? - Print Version"
Unedited Transcript
Fifty-fifth in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S. Middle East Policy
Can the Two-State Solution be Salvaged?
Speakers:
William B. Quandt
Professor, University of Virginia
Ali Abunimah
Founder, ElectronicIntifada
Asad Ghanem
Professor, Haifa University
Alon Ben-Meir
Professor, New York University
Moderator/Discussant
Chas W. Freeman, Jr.,
President, Middle East Policy Council
Heldref Publications Building
1319 18th Street, NW
Washington, D.C.
Friday, January 16, 2009
Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, DC
CHAS. W. FREEMAN: I'm Chas. Freeman, president of the Middle East Policy Council. And for 30 years - nearly 30 years - this council has devoted itself to educating the public and policy-makers on the complexity of U.S. interests in the Middle East, which we believe deserve constant review without regard for political correctness.
The council does three things. It runs a series of conferences, of which this is one, usually on Capitol Hill. But Capitol Hill is pretty closed down and all the hearing rooms are engaged - all the hearing rooms are engaged at present. So we're very grateful to the Independent Institute for lending us this facility. The second thing we do is publish "Middle East Policy." The first item in this is always the edited transcript of the conference proceedings, so this conference will be - there will be a transcript up on our Web site - an unedited - probably mid-week next week and then it will appear in the next "Middle East Policy" as the lead item.
And the third thing we do is train high-school teachers throughout the country on how to teach about Arab civilization and Islam. We confuse about 1.4 million kids a year with a fact or two that they otherwise would not encounter in the course of their passage through our public education system. This program has been redesigned and it's being relaunched on a Web-based and greatly enriched basis.
Just on a personal note before we get into the topic at hand, 12 years ago I was asked and really bludgeoned into becoming president of this organization for a five-year term. That was 12 years ago.
The first program that I presided over, since one of the things that I contribute is the topics of these conferences, was devoted to the question of, "After Saddam Hussein, Who and What," which is a question that I thought was timely given the fact that we were proposing to remove the man and to which we do not know the answer to this day. I'm proud of the way we have anticipated developments and opened minds and conducted a civil discourse about issues that are often very emotional, but this may well be my last conference since I will be stepping down as president of the Middle East Policy Council sometime in the first half of the year. And the board of directors is actively looking for someone - some sucker, perhaps I should say -- to take over this job and the endlessly contentious issues that it deals with.
Among those issues is the question of peace between Israel and its neighbors. Six years ago in April, Middle East Policy Council had a conference on whether the two-state solution was viable or not. At that time, this was a topic that no one was really willing to address and I must say the panelists found it too difficult to confront directly. And yet, even then, there was reason to doubt whether the two-state solution was achievable. This morning we're conducting a conference on whether the two-state solution can be salvaged. The change of topics does not represent progress. In the interim, the process of colonialization of Palestinian lands by Israelis or Jewish immigrants from abroad and the occupation and its brutality have continued. We've come to a situation in which there is very little land left for a state, there's no agreed framework anymore for a discussion of two states and, in fact, there is no one on the Palestinian side with whom Israel is prepared to talk who has the authority to make a deal.
This is sad. And the definition of the two-state solution continues to slide, as we were reminded by Tzipi Livni, who declared that one of the merits of a two-state solution would be it would allow Israeli Arabs to be transferred to an independent Palestine and stripped of their Israeli citizenship. Thisdoesn't speak well to my mind of the direction of Israeli politics or the hope for this solution. So President-elect Obama, in a few days when he takes office, will inherit a situation in which there's no clear diplomatic process and Israel's existence as a military power in the region is well understood and recognized, but its legitimacy as a country is not accepted. In many respects, Israel is not part of the Middle East at all: not politically, not economically and not culturally.
For Israel, clearly, the long-term issue is how to achieve acceptance from its neighbors - how to achieve acceptance of its existence, whether they believe Israel's coming into existence was right or wrong, and that remains an unattained objective. And for Palestinians, aspirations for self-determination remain unfulfilled. It's not clear yet what the long-term effects of the disgusting scenes in Gaza will be, but the record of the past suggests that it's probably likely to strengthen hard-liners on the Palestinian side rather than empower those prepared to work with Israel.
So President Obama will confront a worsening situation in a region where the credibility of the United States, of Israel and the Palestinian leadership, divided as it is, is close to zero and the two-state solution is not seen anymore by most as viable. In these circumstances the question of whether that solution can be salvaged is very appropriate and timely, because if it isn't salvaged the consequences for Israel and the Palestinians and the United States are grave, indeed.
Today to talk about this topic we have four, I think, extraordinarily well-qualified analysts and their biographies are on the back of the program. I will not go over those biographies in detail. We will proceed in the order of the program, that is, Bill Quandt, who is the Edward Stettinius Chair at the University of Virginia and of course worked on the Camp David and other accords, which are the sole monument to effective peacemaking to date in the Middle East, will lead off. And he will be followed by Ali Abuminah, who is widely known as the founder and operator of the ElectronicIntifada, but is also the author of "One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse" and a long-standing advocate of a one-state solution. Asad Ghanem, who is a professor at the University of Haifa, now visiting at the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies here at the University of Maryland and who's written numerous books about Israeli politics, will go third.
And finally - and I'm saving maybe the best for last - Alon Ben-Meir, who is professor at Columbia University - sorry, New York University's Center for Global Affairs and the host of the widely-viewed program and specialist in Middle East politics whose article on the two-state solution we hope to publish in the coming journal of Middle East policy, will go last. Each speaker will have about 10 minutes, maybe 12. If they begin to exceed that, I will use my vast bulk, which I have accumulated carefully over the years, to throw them off the platform. So I warn them now: If they see me sidling in their direction, they should prepare to vacate the podium.
After the four speakers have finished, we will have an open question and comment session. If you signal me, I will make a note on a piece of paper and I will call you in the order I notice you. And you don't have to queue up because I'll give you a heads-up before it's time to make your comment or ask your question. I ask only that you identify yourselves and if you can direct your comment or question to a panelist, that's excellent. Try not to make a speech in this venue - we'll all come hear you make it somewhere else if you want to invite us - but be succinct and to the point. I think - I hope we have microphones for - do we have a microphone?
MR. : (Inaudible.)
MR. FREEMAN: I may have to repeat the questions - oh, you're in trouble. At any rate, with these few words I would like to invite Bill Quandt to lead off the 55th Middle East Policy Council Capitol Hill Conference.
WILLIAM QUANDT: Thank you, Chas. Thank you for organizing this panel and thank you for 12 years of service of bringing intelligent debate to issues that often are not intelligently debated in this town and in this country. Also, thank you for staking out a position on the issue at hand that is going to make me look even less pessimistic than you. I think you gave us a pretty sober preliminary outlining of the problems concerning the two-state solution and I will try to give you a little bit different take on it, but obviously in the midst of the current crisis in the Middle East, Gaza and with the record of the past 10 years in mind it takes an enormous act of faith to believe that the two-state solution can be salvaged and I think we all know that it's a long shot at best.
But I've been around this business long enough so that you find it hard in the midst of a crisis to be quite sure where we're going to come out at the end of it. There are moments when crisis can kind of clarify issues, can sober people up and give them the sense that we can't really afford to go through this too many more times and something needs to be done. That sense of urgency, obviously, has been lacking in the past decade or so, perhaps we can rediscover the reasons that this crisis needs to be - this conflict needs to be resolved and resolved on a basis that is viable and sustainable so that we don't go through these periodic crises again.
The other thing that makes me think that perhaps this is a moment where we might look for some new developments is that of course new leadership is about to arrive in Washington. I don't want to pretend that that's the magic solution to all problems, but it is clear that who is president in this country can make a difference. We've had presidents who have taken this issue more seriously and dealt with it more forcibly and others who simply have thrown in the towel and declared that there is no compelling American national interest involved and we ought to stand on the sidelines, until of course they discover their very last year that maybe that's not the best stance and by then it's too late.
So I'm willing to believe that out of this crisis and with new leadership in Washington there are some possibilities for new approaches, but it's obviously still going to be very tough to revive the framework of the two-state solution that has been the primary one that we have been thinking about for quite a long time. Let me go through a kind of balance sheet of what I see as the negatives and the positives for new diplomacy and for the possibility of a negotiated outcome along the lines of the two-state solution, because I think there are obvious negatives; there are a few positives.
Let me start with the negatives so I can end on something that sounds a little less grim than perhaps what Chas. outlined, but I'll start with something that's equally grim. First, we know that the facts on the ground make a two-state solution extremely difficult. The last time that I spent any prolonged period in the West Bank, I drove around to look at all the places that I've seen off and on since about 1970 and it truly is shocking how little there seems to be left over which to negotiate and to build a Palestinian state on. Settlements are all over the place and most of them look like they aren't about to be packed up and dismantled and moved on.
So the first question that one has to ask is can a two-state solution be constructed without a massive relocation of settlers back to Israel proper in the order of maybe a hundred, 150,000 and is there any Israeli government that we can imagine that is capable of pulling off that kind of displacement of people who have been encouraged, after all, to go and live in the West Bank and have been given incentives to do so? I guess on one level I could say that this was done politically, that is, political incentives were given to people to move there. You can reverse those incentives and it is primarily a political challenge; there is nothing built into the demography that says it's impossible, but it makes it very difficult.
Okay, the second obvious point - and I'm going to have to go quickly because I've already got my first warning at five minutes through - weak leadership. Weak leadership is a bad formula for peace making. When you have leaders who are looking over their shoulders or are looking towards the next election they tend to do things that they think will enhance their popularity but that's rarely consistent with making the tough decisions that we know an Israeli leader and a Palestinian leader and an American president would have to make if this problem is going to be resolved.
Now fortunately, I think we have a strong American president whose inclinations are untested but probably not too bad on this issue. We're very likely to have divided and weak Palestinian leadership, so that's going to be a problem until it gets resolved and we don't know what we're going to have on the Israeli side. Within a few weeks we will perhaps know, but it's unlikely that we will have a strong, peace-oriented coalition emerging from this crisis. We'll be lucky if we don't get Benjamin Netanyahu and a very hard-line, right-wing leadership.
And then in the past we were always able to say well, at least Israeli public opinion and Palestinian public opinion, insofar as we can measure it, is on the whole in favor of a compromise solution - more or less a two-state solution. Is that still the case? I don't know. I don't know that there's any evidence for it, but at least it's a question as to whether, out of this crisis, we haven't seen a hardening of positions on both sides. And ultimately politicians need supporters if they are going to make peace and right now it's not clear to me that the kind of underlying politics of the Israeli or Palestinian communities is ready for a negotiated compromise deal.
Let me switch to the positive side in my last few minutes. I've already said that I think the Obama administration has an opportunity: Simply by not being George W. Bush, Obama has great credibility all of the sudden for a brief moment in the Arab and Muslim world, simply because they're glad to see a change in Washington. Now, once he starts taking positions and saying things, obviously many people will not be as pleased as they would like to be. And as they look at the team forming around him who will deal with the Middle East, they may conclude that this is going to be Clinton-redux all over again; that we're going to see incrementalism, confidence-building and we know, in all honesty, where that's going to end: We're not going to get to a negotiated agreement with that approach.
So there are a lot of question marks about the new administration - that they will benefit for a period from simply not being George W. Bush. And I think that when Obama says from day one he's going to start tackling this issue we ought to hold him to it, because it's one of the few positives in the equation. Secondly, there is a lot of international support for settling this problem once and for all if we could figure out how to do it. Europeans will support it, the vast majority of the Arab regimes will - not that they're all very robustly legitimate in their own right, but nonetheless having them all signed on to the Arab League initiative is worth something.
We would find support from our other allies, the quartet, the Turks are being helpful; so there is a lot of international enthusiasm for tackling this one again, but they will need American leadership. I don't think it can only be the Americans doing it, but they will work with the new administration with money, with peacekeeping forces if necessary - we're seeing that already in the Gaza crisis - and with diplomatic energy. So I would say that's a plus: We don't have to do this alone if we decide to get engaged as Americans.
Third, the Syrian-Israeli track seems pretty easy. Now, I don't want to exaggerate it; it's not going to fall into place overnight. But people who have been in Damascus quite recently tell me that Bashar al Assad is ready to go to make peace, he's putting out all the right signals. And that actually helps rather than competes, in my view, with the Palestinian-Israeli track. I think it's always better to be moving on both tracks rather than to have this kind of competition that we're only going to do one and then there's a competition whether we want to get one at the expense of the others. So that could be a plus if we saw real progress being made on that track; it could encourage those who believe that peace negotiations can still work.
And then I would say that the fourth positive factor is, on the whole, if there is ever going to be a negotiated two-state solution we kind of know what it's going to look like, not that it's going to be easy, but the Clinton parameters plus Geneva give us the idea that that's the target to aim for: more or less the 1967 lines, a few adjustments, a few percentage points here and there, offset with other territories; Jerusalem divided; and the others issues more or less as they had been laid out in 2000. Now, it's not going to be easy, but that's the target and I don't think we have to start from scratch in trying to image what it would look like.
And finally, I would say - and here probably the other panelists will not agree - is I think the two-state solution comes back into focus for us because there is not a good alternative in terms of a negotiated solution. There are other outcomes - we're seeing them right now, we've seen them for the last 10 years. We haven't had a two-state solution, we've had violence, we've had chaos, we've had, you know, a five-state kind of de facto outcome, a little enclave up here, a little enclave there, a little enclave here - Gaza and Israel.
That may be the future, but it's not peace. So I think there will be - you'll probably hear a one-state alternative - I have no objection to the theory, I just don't think there are enough takers in the Middle East right now to make it viable and it has virtually no support in this town, as far as I can tell. So practically - and I will confess to thinking practically, that's the business I am in; it's politics, it's diplomacy - and that's the art of the possible. It's what you can get accomplished. There is no alternative in my mind in terms of a negotiated solution, other than the two-state one.
With that - I'm about to get kicked off the stage - so all I would say for Obama is go for it one more time, but do it seriously and don't wait till your eighth year.
(Applause.)
MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, Bill. Thank you very much. I think that was an excellent introduction to this topic. And of course it is true that optimism is to diplomats as courage is to soldiers. And therefore if you are trying to solve a problem it makes sense to understand it in its worst dimensions but it never makes sense to abandon hope. So I take it you are a disciple, Bill, of the "yes we can" school.
(Laughter.)
MR. QUANDT: Yes we should.
MR. FREEMAN: Or yes we should. (Laughter.) And I applaud that. Let me now ask Ali to come up and refute your thesis.
ALI ABUMINAH: Thank you. It's a great pleasure and honor to be here with a distinguished panel and I don't know if I will refute Professor Quandt's thesis, but I will give my own ideas. As we're speaking here, war that's going on in Gaza has to be mentioned. Massacres and atrocities on a scale that the world has not witnessed so openly and brazenly in many years. What is happening will be remembered in an infamous list including Deir Yassin, Qibya, Kafr Qasim, Jenin, Sabra Schantil (ph). To these infamous names, others will be added: Tel al Hawa (ph), al Zeitun, Jabalia and many, many other places in Gaza.
I hope and pray that Israel is made to stop the bombardment; this is not a war, this was an unprovoked attack based on fabrications about rockets. As we all know, despite the Israeli lobby propaganda that is being asserted with such force in Washington, Hamas had kept to a ceasefire meticulously until Israel violated it on November 4th. And Israel had been waging a silent war of siege against a million and a half people imprisoned in Gaza, denying them food, medicine, electricity, water and other basic necessities.
The purpose of this war on Gaza was never about terrorism or rockets; it was about breaking Palestinian resistance and opening the way for Palestinian surrender: agreement to Palestinian Bantustans, which would then be given the name of a Palestinian state. But despite the massive destruction and massacres in Gaza, paradoxically what the events of the past few weeks reveal that it is not the Palestinians who can't survive in this region, but Israel. Furthermore, it has exposed the so-called moderate Palestinian leadership for what they are: collaborators with a ruthless and relentless occupation.
Now, Israel's problem, as I mentioned, is not - as its ceaseless propaganda insists - terrorism, its problem is legitimacy or rather a lack of it. Israel was founded and maintained through ethnic cleansing. The goal of the so-called peace process was to normalize this and gain Palestinian's blessing for their own dispossession. So some of the axioms of the so-called peace process are that it is pragmatic for hundreds of thousands of colonial settlers, many of them from Brooklyn and New Jersey, to go and occupy Palestinian land and live on it in perpetuity. We're told that it's part of the peace-process consensus that these settlers will remain where they are in the context of a Palestinian state and we're told that it's not pragmatic for hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees caged into the Gaza Strip to return to their lands, which are mostly empty, North and East of the Gaza Strip where very few Israeli settlers now live
We're told that that's not pragmatic. The reason for that, of course, is that those Palestinian refugees are the wrong religion, they're the wrong ethnicity. If they had the wrong skin color everyone would understand what this is at its root: racism and apartheid. Racism is never pragmatic, it's always wrong and we have to introduce an element of morality into this discussion - not just pragmatism and not just the art of the possible, but some things are right and some are wrong. Today, 50 percent of the people living under Israeli rule are not Jews. Like nationalists in Northern Ireland or non-whites in South Africa, they will never recognize the right of a settler-colonial elite to establish and maintain an ethnocratic state by force, repression and racism and to keep that state in existence in perpetuity.
But haven't the events in Gaza demonstrated that there is no way around this? That Israel is simply too strong? I don't think so. In terms of destructive capacity, Israel is unmatched; it can bomb schools, hospitals, U.N. stores, mosques, private homes; it can assassinate people by all means of technology like no one else in the world. These are the things Israel has perfected and brought to the region. But a state that loses legitimacy cannot bomb its way to legitimacy and normality. And I think in hindsight, when the history of this period is written, Gaza will be seen as the moment after which it became impossible for Israel to be integrated into the region as a so-called Jewish-Zionist state.
There is another moment in recent history that can instruct us on the choices Israel faces: When F.W. de Klerk became president of South Africa in 1989, he gathered his military chiefs around him and said give me your assessment. They said look, nobody can defeat us military: We have the warplanes, the tanks, we have nuclear weapons - no one can take us on; we can go on indefinitely. But the cost of that will be increasing international isolation and we will have to kill hundreds of thousands - perhaps hundreds of thousands of people. Israel has reached that moment, where the only thing maintaining it in existence is brutal force and the desire - the ability to try to bomb the indigenous peoples of Palestine and its neighbors into submission.
Will Israel make the wise choice that de Klerk made and the apartheid leaders in South Africa to agree voluntarily to dismantle this system, to de-Zionize the state of Israel and decolonize Palestine and seek a peaceful solution? They will if they are forced to and they must be forced to. There is a mounting realization - Washington exists in a bubble, but the rest of the world is recognizing that Israel cannot be allowed to go on the way it is. In Europe governments are beginning to talk, quite correctly, about war-crimes tribunals for Israeli leaders - a very appropriate, reasonable and moderate minimalist measure that must be taken in the wake of what has been going on in Gaza and before - and sanctions. Sanctions are being talked about first of all at the level of civil society, but we saw recently the president of the U.N. General Assembly talking about adopting these at a governmental level. We've seen the EU slowing down and suspending its upgrades of relations with Israel and more will follow.
What will not happen is a return to the business of usual of the so-called peace process. I can say that I think that this will be tried - we have to expect that the official apparatus of the peace-process industry - the Hillary Clintons, the quartets, the Tony Blairs, the Javier Solanas, Ban Ki-moons, the whole canopy of official and semi-official Washington think tanks - will carry on with business as usual, trying to make believe that through their administrations a Palestinian state will come into being. It won't happen. They're even more nakedly exposed today that their so-called Palestinian partner, Mahmoud Abbas, whose term has expired - it expired on January 9th - has no authority, no respect, no legitimacy among Palestinians whatsoever.
I think that the moment has come where we have to speak very frankly about these things in a way - I said to Chas. before we started that I'm going to speak to you like I'm in Chicago, not like I'm in Washington. (Laughter.) And we have to recognize the silence about these things is no longer an option. Peace for the 11 million souls who inhabit Israel-Palestine is possible. Remember that in 1985, '86 during the state of emergency in South Africa, when like Israel, South Africa banned journalists from entering the townships to see what was going on, to see the repression. Most people thought that this could only end in disaster, in civil war, in millions of people being killed. We have to impress on Israelis collectively that the choice is theirs, whether to face international isolation or to choose a different path. I think that is what lies before us and I will yield the remainder of my time - (laughter) - to the gentleman from Washington.
MR. FREEMAN: Thank you. (Applause.) Thank you, Ali. I think Ali's statement and its passion illustrate very well the possibility that he's correct, that recent events do mark a collapse of options, which have been central to the peace process and the aspirations of peace for all of us. His answer to the question whether the two-state solution is salvageable clearly is no, it is not salvageable. I was struck by the analogy to South Africa, which I happened to have worked on as F.W. de Klerk made his historic decision to release Mandela and change course and later as the elections loomed and the South African Defense Force contemplated a coup d'état and the establishment of separate state for Afrikaners within South African territory, something which they were talked out of with considerable difficulty and in which I played a role.
I think the crisis of conscience was the solution in South Africa. It came from religious traditions which were deeply held. Those religious traditions also exist in Israel and one has only to read the liberal Israeli press to understand that many Israelis do not accept the actions that Ali condemned. But I think the crucial question that I think Ali poses and the one we need to deal with as a country in terms of crafting solutions rather than inflaming passions is the question of whether Israel can achieve legitimacy in its own region in the Middle East.
Israel is regarded by the perpetrators of the Holocaust in Europe and by the forces that intervened to end the Holocaust here as having a right to exist. It is not regarded in the region where it has been established as having such a right and there is the difficulty and that is the issue that must be resolved. Finally, the South African analogy of course illustrates that the sort of crisis of conscience to which Ali referred leads to the end of an - led to the end of an Afrikaner-dominated state and to a very different society in South Africa, the success or failure of which remains in doubt. But it ended the notion of separate development and replaced it with something quite different. And so I think what Ali is saying is entirely consistent with his long-standing view that the only solution is a one-state solution. I don't believe that's going to be imposed by the United States, for the reasons Bill Quandt mentioned, but that may in fact be the very painful outcome, which is no longer impossible to imagine.
We now turn to Asad Ghanem to talk about some - I believe he's going to talk about some of the Israeli political -
ASAD GHANEM: (Inaudible) - I only have a few items from my lecture because we get only 10 minutes.
MR. FREEMAN: Okay, all right. Well, then, we can take your expanded remarks in the form of an article, but I welcome you to the podium, Asad.
MR. GHANEM: Thank you, Mr. Freeman, and thanks for the Middle East Policy Center for inviting me to this meeting. Thank you, Ali, for saving a few minutes from my time, because I thought that - I planned to speak a little bit about Gaza, but I will plan at the end to speak a little - a few remarks about the significance of Gaza. But it seems to me - Ali says that he speaks that - he's from Chicago, I speak, because I'm in the Middle East and I speak as somebody who's from the Middle East.
So I try to draw, again, the basic principles of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, which is related to all the conflict, all the wars between Palestinians and Israelis, including the last war in Gaza. This is a war between colonial project and post-colonial initiative - post-colonial aims. That fact that Jews still push for maximalizing (sic) the power and the hegemony of the Israeli state - the Jewish state that controlled by Jewish and serve the Jewish interests make it clear that the opposite to this project is the one that proposed by the Palestinians in different shapes. I mean, one shape is - (inaudible) - form. It is one concept of what Palestinians, what many Arabs think that should be the future of the conflict. But this is not only the only option: I think we've learned to speak here about the other - what I call the democratic options.
One democratic option we're presented in the last 20 years or less than 20 years is the option of two-state solution and reaching a settlement between the two national groups in the same territory based in separation. This option used in different places in the world; it succeeded in some places, it failed in other places. The other option that we might consider - I would like to consider - is the one-state option, whether a bi-national option or a liberal state option. I want to remind you that when we speak about two-state option, creating a Palestinian state beside Israel, this means that we will resolve one aspect of the conflict - the occupation aspect of the conflict. It doesn't mean that we will resolve the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, because the conflict is the - the complex of the conflict are the results of the '48 war, including refugees, Palestinians in Israel, compensation and so on.
When Israel withdraw from Gaza and Israeli claims that it resolved the occupation problem in Gaza, it is not true. I mean, because the problem in Gaza is the fact that 75 percent of the Palestinians in Gaza are refugees who have the right - the full right, in my understanding - to return to their homelands. And when we speak about Israel withdrawal from Gaza, Israel doesn't care about compensation for Palestinians who were under Israeli control and direct occupation for 38 years - who will - (inaudible) - these peoples? Israel thinks, with huge support by Israeli and others' propaganda, that this is the end of the conflict with Gaza. This is not the end of the conflict with Gaza; it's one aspect how to deal with the conflict but the conflict is more than this aspect.
I want also to remind you that when we speak about two-state solution, usually we mean a full withdrawal of Israel to the '67 borders, the full evacuation of the settlements. This what we mean, usually, by using the word two states. And besides that, is creating a viable Palestinian state. I want to surprise you: Except the period between '93 and '96, nobody in Israel and - at least in Israel - took care, took seriously the meaning of two states, because otherwise Israelis and supporters of Israel in the States, in Europe - they mean something else rather than two states. They mean one Israeli states and many semi-, quasi-Palestinian states beside Israel. And more than that, it is quite clear that following the collapse of the peace process - I remind you that Oslo process collapsed when Netanyahu came to power, but if you want to give Israel another 40 years, when Sharon came to power he proved to the public a new idea about what should be in the West Bank.
Israel moved under Sharon from the concept of two-state solution - from resolving the concept by Rabin - that was in Israel - five minutes I have left - to the concept of managing the conflict. Managing the conflict for Israel includes many aspects: building up the wall - separation walls, it continues the settlement in the West Bank - this part of Sharon. Do you remember - (inaudible) - interview in Haaretz, when Sharon unleashed the separation, the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, he said very clearly our project is to withdraw in Gaza and to continue our settlements in the West Bank. This is Sharon's concept. Part of Sharon's concept is to build a strategic agreement with a few Arab states - Egypt and Jordan, the Arab League - major role supporting Israeli managing-the-conflict project.
And now, I want to say a few things, because I have only five minutes, I want to say a few things about the significance of Gaza because it's related to our discussion here. And I might surprise you in many ways. I think that this war in Gaza - and I agree with Ali about the description of the war - tells a lot and a lot for us Palestinians; I think it should tell for the international community and it should tell for the Israelis a lot about the nature of the society in Israel, the nature of the regime of Israel. Using mass destruction, using massive killing of Palestinians, Palestinian boys, kids, women without any question except two, three journalists in Haaretz - any question from the Israeli side raise a huge and dangerous questions about the nature of Israel, but this is not the only thing that I want to tell you.
The second thing that I want to tell you - it tells more about Palestinian politics. This is in my own judgment the most important war for the Palestinian politics after the '67 war - and I mean it. I want to tell you that this war in Gaza mark the end of the PLO. We now in this war - this is the historical moment where we, Palestinians, are the world. And the Israelis - we moving from the PLO era to the post-PLO era. Remember, this war, if you followed the discussion, nobody speaks about the PLO. They speak about the PL, Abu Mazen and about Hamas. That's one.
Secondly, I want to remind you, that you remember this is the first war of the Palestinians that Palestinians engaged in a war with Israel - foreign aid clashes with Israel - that the PLO are excluded from the conflict. This is the first war, remember - think about that. This is the first war since the reemergence of the Palestinian national movement in the '50s where the Palestinian national movement, the PLO, are not part of the conflict. I think that they are collaborators with Israel, the PLO - if that's the PLO of Abu Mazen, because Abu Mazen, Egypt and Jordan and other Arab states are taking part of this conflict, they are supporting - generally speaking - the Israeli side - not generally - practically. In the field Egypt helps Israel to control the Palestinians and to keep them under siege while Israel attacks the Palestinians in Gaza.
Remember that. And what is going to be created - I'm not sure that two states will not be created, I'm not sure at all - I think, I mean if you - you don't follow Arabic, but Olmert was interviewed in al Arabiya one day before the war - and al Arabiya is a Saudi channel. And he was given one hour at least to explain his next steps against Palestinians in Gaza in Arabic. But the other thing that he said that he reached with Abu Mazen an agreement and the war is also about the implementation of this agreement if Kadima will won next election and might be possible, might be possible that they will sign under Obama administration an agreement. I'm not sure that it's going to be fulfilled because there are, I mean, I can count here the settlements and the Jerusalem and the refugees and the Palestinians in Israel and the water resources and so on as there are many reason why any agreement will not be implemented.
But there are another two aspects of the problem in the Middle East and I will finish with that. The first one: There is no possibility in the near future that any Israeli government can take measures to implement an agreement. Not only to sign an agreement - it might be possible if Tzipi Livni will be elected as the Israeli prime minister she will sign with Abu Mazen an agreement to establish a truncated Palestinian state in part of the territories - excluding Jerusalem, excluding the refugees - but it might be that they will sign an agreement. This agreement will not be fulfilled because in the next day this government will be failed and we will call for another election in Israel - next time for sure Netanyahu will be elected - I'm quite sure that this time he will be elected, but that's one aspect.
The other aspect: The Palestinian national movement is a failed national movement. There is no one example in the history of both colonial or fights against colonial powers that there is no national movement that lead the liberation movement. There is no such a case; otherwise, a collaborative government will be established in Ramallah, but there is no Palestinian national movement. The PLO's collapsed; there is no PLO; there is no Palestinian national movement. Think about this - Israeli politics, Israeli-American politics, Palestinian politics, the facts in the ground and you will came to the conclusion that we have only two alternatives: or apartheid that we already have or one-state solution. Thank you.
(Applause.)
MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, Asad. Bill Quandt accused me of being somewhat pessimistic in my - (laughter) - introductory remarks, but you're suggesting that we are at a defining moment in several different respects - a post-PLO era in which there is, as you said, no national movement representing Palestinians that is effective. You did not mention but much of what you said and Ali said implied that one of the victims of Gaza is the so-called Arab peace plan, which has offered acceptance of Israel in exchange for a viable two-state arrangement between Palestinians and Israelis. I take it from your premises that you are concerned that this may now be if not dead, close to it.
And finally, I think you make a point, which is very sobering and that is that a two-state solution, which consists of Israel plus a sort of Indian reservation or a set of Indian reservations or Bantustans, as is often said in the region - is not a basis for peace but for continuing strife and a resumption of conflict, perhaps on a wider scale, and such an agreement could not therefore last. These are all very sobering thoughts; I have to say, I hope you're wrong. And I'm sure that we will end on a note of optimism looking at the possibility, notwithstanding all of these difficulties and trends of a resolution by Israelis, by Palestinians, by Arabs and by the new administration of Barack Obama, which will take office next week. And I now invite Alon Ben-Meir to take the podium.
ALON BEN-MEIR: Thank you, sir. Thank you, thank you, good morning to all of you. I appreciate very much the fact, Mr. Freeman, that I've been invited to this really very important event, specifically this time. You know, the plight of being last to speak and by a large it's usually a diversity from everything you have to say, because either somebody already said what you wanted to say or they said something that you disagree with and you come to feel compelled to respond to that. But I am going to withstand the temptation because to me, more than anything else in this tragic conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in particular, is the biases that we hear from both Israelis as well as Palestinians.
And that is probably the fundamental problem that has perpetuated a conflict that could have been resolved years ago - decades ago, for that matter. When you talk to Israelis they will speak about the righteousness - the right of the Israelis to be in that part of the world. And people disagree with that premise, but there is no question about it: Jews have certain rights to that part of the land, be that historic, be that practical, be that circumstances: They are there and they have been living there for more than 60 years and this is a fact that needs to be recognized. And you have to also look at the Palestinian side: They have been in that land for thousand years or more. They have an inherent, inalienable right to that land just the same.
So anyone who start talking about divesting or denying either side the right to be in that land simply is living in denial itself. There is no other solution. It is an illusion to assume that you can somewhat concoct a solution that is going to deny one party or the other right to live in peace in security with one another. What is the one-state solution? What is that supposed to mean? You know, the one-state solution reminds me of this fellow who said you know, I can solve the economic crisis of American very quickly to his friend. And the friend was very surprised and said how can you do that? He said I'll tell you. A couple of weeks later they meet again and the friend asks tell me, what progress have you made? He said terrific, 50 percent of the solution is already at hand. He said what did you do? He said I persuaded the rich to give 50 percent of the money to the poor and everybody is going to be happy.
But how are they going to be happy? It is okay to talk about the Palestinian desire to have one-state solution because obviously, the results are obvious. There is a demographic issue here, demographic fundamental issue. A one-state solution would mean almost automatically overnight a Palestinian majority, which leaves the Israelis in a minority, which is inconsistent, totally contradictory to the premise of the establishment of the state of Israel as the last refuge for the Jews. You may disagree with this premise, you may think it's right, you may think it's wrong, but this is a fact of life.
I have been dealing with this crisis - I've devoted literally all my adult life to it. My dissertation on the Middle East, which was written 30 years ago, I stated: Occupation is not sustainable, it must end. And it remains today unsustainable and it must end. To solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, therefore, we have to look, not at what the wrong that Israel simply has done over the years, but also the wrongs that the Palestinians have done. We have to look at the proper equation. I remind my friends here, Ali and Asad, immediately after the 1967 war Israel offered to return all of the territories for a comprehensive peace. And that was in July of 1967. In November of the same year the answer came from Khartoum in an Arab League resolution known for the three nos: no peace, no recognition and no negotiation.
This is just a fact of record. The Palestinians were invited in 1977, '78 to come to the negotiations with the Egyptians. They have refused. Every party - I can go through history and tell you so many incidents of missed opportunities, both by the Israelis and by the Palestinians. So it is very easy to sit down here and say well, everything that Israel has done is wrong, everything that the Palestinians have done was the right thing. Do I have to remind you of the horrific violence that had been undertaken by each other all these years? Do I have to remind you of the suicide bombing, of the Israeli retaliation and rockets and missiles and all these war after war with thousands of violent incidents that has in fact robbed both societies from the ability even to think in terms of coexistence.
But regardless where we have been, the only way we can solve this problem is by looking ahead and by stop the game of blaming. Israel is to blame for this and the Palestinians are to blame for that - that is not going to lead anywhere. And we can sit here in judgment and decide who was right in this incident and who was wrong in that incident, you can sit down and now, I tell you the last event in Gaza today - what's happening today. It's tragic by any means, but it is not only tragic for the Palestinians, it is just as tragic for the Israelis, because you can't just make a judgment on the basis of numbers - how many people died here versus how many people died there. And anyone who think for a second that the Israelis enjoy to go and kill Palestinians does not understand the Israeli as a society, doesn't appreciate the - (inaudible) - in Israel.
You might disagree with this, but Assad and Ali, with all due respect - there is a moral tenant to the Israeli society. Israel is speak loud and clear to the injustices that are being made and perpetrated sometimes against the Palestinians. You do not hear that from the Palestinian side, ever. Who ever spoke about one - 10,000 rockets being fired at Israel from Gaza since 2005 - 10,000. You've got to go and live in Israel, you've got to go live in these cities and take the children and men and women - 10, 12, 15 times a day and take them to shelters. And then you will understand how it feels to live under that kind of condition.
But does that mean it is okay for Israel to go and does what it does? Does that mean that targeted killing is always alright? Does that mean - I am not going to sit here and tell you what is right, what is wrong because both have made - are making mistakes. Both have made mistakes, will continue probably to make mistakes and the time has come for us to ask ourselves the basic, simple question: Where do we go from here?
And I'll say to you the following: two-state solution is not one of many options, it is the only option. It's the only option. The right of the Israelis and Palestinians has garnered tremendous currency in the last 60 years, many conferences, many meetings. And we can talk about whether the Clinton - (inaudible) - whether the roadmap, whether the Arab initiative, whether the current negotiations - been going on between Israelis and the Palestinians: All speak about the simple requirement of a two-state solution. But yes, it takes bold action. It takes on the part of the Israelis to come to the conclusion that a two-state solution cannot be made a name, it has to have fact, proper border, proper places for the Palestinians, which means to me relinquishing 99 percent - I say 99 for a reason - of the West Bank and certainly the entire Gaza in order to establish economically viable Palestinian state independent, living side by side the state of Israel.
I now will tell you that consistently among Palestinians as well as among Israelis 70 percent of both sides - it ranges between 69 to 70 to 73 - all support without any question the creation of a Palestinian state living in peace side by side the state of Israel. This is what it has to be. I agree 100 percent with Bill when he mentioned the issue of leadership. Leadership has been in short supply in both Israel as well as among the Palestinians. And therefore, you know, I have - how many minutes do I have?
MR. FREEMAN: Two.
MR. BEN-MEIR: Two more. You know, recently I wrote a major work on what it is going to take. I can only say to you the following: I'm hoping, I'm praying that the new administration will look at this process anew and ask the basic, simple question: What is this going to take? I think the new administration ought to deal with Israel with a sort of a tough love approach. Yes, we will support you; yes, we will guarantee your national security; yes, we will take all the necessary measures in order to be sure that you remain a viable, secure state; but occupation has to come to an end. Yes, we can talk about the difficulties and the impossibilities about withdrawing 50,000, 100,000, 150,000 - it can be done, it should be done and it will be done. But we need leadership coming from here, from this city - from Washington.
And we also need a leadership in Israel. Certainly we have to look at the Palestinian side as well. Leadership matters. Leadership matters - what Rabin was able to do, what Begin - with all our disagreements with him - was able to do. And what Sharon was planning to do. I just want make one note - Sharon wasn't going to limit himself to the West Bank. You've got to look at the Kadima platform and the Kadima platform was very clearly: Ending the occupation, including the West Bank, not limited to Gaza. And so what I think is, there is a new election in Israel; the hope is that whoever arrives, be that Tzipi Livni or even Netanyahu, the opportunity to bringing these sad, tragic conflict to ending is there. But we're going to have to stop looking at the past and live past history and begin to look to the future for a resolution. And that is the only way we can advance what is best for the Israelis and the Palestinians so that there will be no one other child, be that Israeli or Palestinian, that is going to die in vain as of this very moment.
I thank you so much.
(Applause.)
MR. FREEMAN: Thank you very much. In a sense, you returned us to where we began with Bill Quandt's observation that the outline of a solution is quite clear. There is a latent solution and yet current events - not the past, but current events - are moving things in quite the wrong direction. And so the question, I agree, is whether new leadership in our country can rise to the occasion to move things in the right direction toward this solution, which involves withdrawal, as you said, from 99 percent of the lands taken in 1967. There is reason to hope that a solution that is possible may become real and the stakes are terribly high, not just for the participants.
The ironic result of the effort to find a safe haven for the Jews has been to place half of the world's Jewish population in conditions of great danger. Jews are safe in the United States; they are not safe in Israel. The other ironic result has been to place Palestinian lives in great danger. But for those of us concerned with the United States and our interests, the impact of this situation is equally tragic. It has poisoned our relations with a fair part of the world, it is now, as Ali enumerated, beginning a process of separation by others from Israel and potentially from the United States, which is totally identified with Israel. And therefore I agree, again, with Bill Quandt and with you that the new administration has no choice: It must seize this issue because time is moving against a reasonable outcome.
Let me hand this and now, we'll move to questions, comments. I'm sure much of the passion and many of the statements have enflamed views. Yes?
MR. : (Inaudible.)
MR. FREEMAN: All right, okay, all right. I'll run it from here, then. But I see a habitual - first out of the gate is Jeff Steinberg (ph) but we will - let me take down a note or two. Jeff, you may ask your question.
Q: Should I wait till that mike - (inaudible) - or?
MR. FREEMAN: No, just go ahead.
Q: All right. First of all, I have to say that being from New Jersey there is a silver lining, which is that the West Bank's loss has been New Jersey's gain. (Laughter.) That's not my question. I wanted to step back and look at the broader implications of what's going on right now, because several of the panelists talked about the issue of the collaboration of a number of Arab governments. And my concern is that there's a geostrategic framework for this collaboration, which is the argument that the new geopolitics of the region is the conflict between moderates and extremists and that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and perhaps at some future point Syria are aligned with Israel in the moderate block and that the extremist block is made up of Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and the jury is still out on the Syrians.
So beyond the immediate of this hideous tragedy, I fear that the implications are in the near future of a broader conflict, which is already being redefined in terms of the collaboration that we've seen from a number of Arab states plus the Palestinian Authority in the events of the last 21 days. So I'd like the panel to comment on that.
MR. FREEMAN: I wonder who would like to start on that issue.
MR. ABUMINAH: May I?
MR. FREEMAN: Ali, please.
MR. ABUMINAH: Yes, I think that's a very important context. The Bush administration tried to divide the region into moderates and extremists. Now, the real division is between those who want to resist Israeli and American hegemony in the region, on the one hand, and those who want to collaborate with it and benefit from it. Those who believe in resistance - labeled by the Bush administration extremists and those who believe in collaboration or who rely on collaboration to maintain their seats are called moderates.
And it's clear that those who have argued for a practiced resistance have by far won the popular support in the region. And the so-called moderates, those who are propped up by U.S. support, have lost completely - are totally exposed. And the regional system where the U.S. is trying to hold things together with these repressive, so-called "moderate" regimes is coming apart at the seams. And Gaza is going to hasten the bursting of this system and, for the first time, we see the so-called "moderate" regimes like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, openly siding with Israel.
During the Lebanon war, they tacitly sided with Israel; now they've openly sided with Israel. The same with the Palestinian authority: openly siding with Israel against the Palestinian resistance. That battle has been lost in terms of U.S. policy. There's no way to put the Humpty-Dumpty of the so-called "moderates" back together.
And we see the regimes that want to survive pivoting towards public opinion. Qatar has done it very clearly in the past few weeks. Jordan is still, as always, trying to run a middle line; they say one thing in private and another thing in public, but I think it's going to have to be - if it wants to survive, will have to push in that direction.
But that is really the effort that the - Israel tried to strike a blow against the resistance front in Lebanon in 2006 and failed. It has tried to do the same in Gaza. Yes, it's killed a lot of people, but it will have failed to destroy the resistance and what we'll have done is recruited tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, more people to the camp of resistance that the U.S. labels extremist.
And I don't expect that false labeling - that the Bush administration imposed - to change after January 20th, unfortunately.
MR. FREEMAN: Alon.
MR. BEN-MEIR: (Inaudible.) I'd like to think that the so-called "moderates" out today are not puppets on a string being pulled by the United States. Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood that existed in Egypt going back more than 60, 70 years; this is just a fact in the history. Hamas resistance against occupation itself I would justify even the president of Israel said, the occupied has a right to resist. But Hamas is not merely resisting occupation; Hamas' charter is very clear: is seeking the destruction - I repeat, the destruction - of the state of Israel.
Let's call a spade, a spade. This is what Hamas seeks today. This is not a plain, simple resistance movement. The PLO at one point also had in its charter the destruction of the state of Israel and, finally, was persuaded that if they want to coexist, that clause has to be removed. And subsequently it was modified. Hamas is a threat to Jordan and Egypt and Saudi Arabia just as any other terrorist: al Qaeda or other groups. That's how they see it. They did not side with Israel sort of tacitly or overtly because of the love for the Israelis. If they supported Israeli incursion in any way, it is because of self-preservation. This is just fact of life.
So, yes, I support resistance, but if Hamas were to say, we are resisting the occupation but we recognize Israel otherwise, I will be the first one to cheer you up -
MR. ABUMINAH: They did do that!
MR. BEN-MEIR: Absolutely untrue. I would be the first one to cheer you up and say, enough is enough.
MR. ABUMINAH: But they did do that and Israel rejected -
MR. BEN-MEIR: Please, please.
MR. FREEMAN: Let's -
MR. ABUMINAH: That's the problem is that -
(Cross talk.)
MR. BEN-MEIR: If I may, Ali, I'd like to - I think Israel today ought to make abundantly clear, abundantly clear to the Palestinian that this war is not against the Palestinian; it's against Hamas. And I have already been talking and working and moving. Israel has to show in very practical, immediate, on-the-ground some major moves in order to demonstrate what is happening in Gaza, it is not in any mean, by any interpretation is to subdue, to undermine the Palestinian cause. And, therefore, it has to work openly and clearly to bring about the reduction - eventually, the elimination - of occupation. That's got to be done.
And if Israel doesn't do so, then we can hold Israel responsible for what happened today in Gaza and this year and next. But it's got to be done. I'm told that the Israelis - understand this perfectly; they want to make it abundantly clear to the international community this is not a war against the Palestinian, this is a conflict against a group, a renegade group that is working, operating at the behest not of any Arab country, not even the Palestinian cause, but the behest of Iran. Hamas gets its order from Iran; it doesn't get its order from anyone else.
(Cross talk.)
MR. ABUNIMAH: This is really cheap propaganda -
MR. BEN-MEIR: Listen. This is just a fact of life.
MR. ABUNIMAH: Very cheap propaganda.
MR. BEN-MEIR: This is propaganda, let's call it propaganda, but if you want to wear blinders that is your prerogative. We have to look at reality and ask ourselves - Look, I am against occupation in every sense of the word, I have always been against it, but I am not going to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by merely saying, this one is wrong, this one is - we've got to do something about it on the ground. And that is where Hamas and groups such as Hamas have been undermining the peace process from day one. And that's why - where the issue is today.
MR. FREEMAN: This obviously touched a nerve and - (laughter) - and Bill wants to say something and so does Ali.
MR. QUANDT: Well, very briefly because I really want to hear more questions from the audience. I do think we've gone through a period when, on the American side, the Middle East has been portrayed in a way that Iran is pulling the strings, whether it's Hezbollah or Hamas or fomenting radicalism and so forth and so on. And I don't want to make Iran sound like they're the most peace-loving country in the world, but we have created this notion of an extraordinarily powerful, manipulative country which I think runs really quite at odds with the reality of a fairly, you know, problematic regime that's got lots of internal divisions, where its economy has just sunk by about 50 percent because of the drop in oil prices with elections coming up.
And the one thing I must say I am looking forward to is a new American regime who at least in public is willing to say we should be willing to talk to Iran and to Syria. And God bless her, Hillary Clinton said the same thing in her confirmation hearings. Now, the test will come in doing it, but we've been through a period of not talking to Iran seriously, not talking to Syria seriously, therefore opening this kind of paradigm of moderates versus extremists which is a really counterproductive way for the United States to play the Middle East game.
We have common interests with Iran. We have common interests with Syria. We may even have common interests with Hezbollah and Hamas. The only way you discover that is by engaging in a very sophisticated, complicated diplomacy which is hard to explain in sound bytes or bumper stickers. Therefore, sometimes, you do it covertly. We had relations with the PLO for years when we had fundamental differences. The PLO was committed to the destruction of the state of Israel, formally, although we learned, through contacts, that there was - there were terms and conditions in which they might agree to enter a political negotiation. Those were useful contacts. They could never be kind of brought out in the light of day. Congress passed laws that made it literally illegal - when I was in government, I could not meet with somebody from the PLO. I could before and I could afterwards, but I couldn't when I was in government.
I think we have to get out of that both mindset and practice where we as Americans - and I'm speaking as an American here, not as a Palestinian or pro-Israeli - I want to talk about my country's interests. This conflict has hurt the United States for years and years and years. I frankly as an American don't care whether there's a two-state solution, a one-state solution, I want a solution that lasts and brings peace to the Middle East because in that context, I think American interests prosper. Plus, there's a moral and humanitarian reason for it that matters to me, but I'm speaking hard-headedly - yes, as a pragmatist - what should the United States do for its own interests. I think that's the only way an American president can sell a policy to the broad American public: This is good for our country. And it's the right thing to do.
But if it's not intuitively obvious to Americans why peace in the Middle East is good for the United States, it's not going to get the kind of political support --- and we're going to instead see these stupid bills introduced into the Congress which get 99 percent support from people who don't know what they're even voting for. That kind of politics has to change, and the only way it changes is from the top with political leadership that is sophisticated and is able to explain to the American public why these paradigms - good guys versus bad guys, radicals versus moderates, Iran manipulating all the strings in the Middle East - has to be broken down and challenged.
Now, that doesn't mean you solve all your problems by changing the mindset. But if you don't change the mindset and the practices, we are in deep, deep trouble.
MR. FREEMAN: (Inaudible.)
MR. ABUNIMAH: Just two sentences. I think that it is very important for the understanding any conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is to make a distinction between intentions and the practices. I mean, I have no doubt that you believe that ending the occupation is the - is what, is the only way to stop the suffering of the Palestinians and the Israelis. And this is part of Israeli - maybe - part of the Israelis' intentions, part of the official Israeli propaganda. But what happened really in the field, in the land of Palestine? What holds Israel and their - what is it, I don't know how to call it - Abu Mazen is in power since 2004 - what told Israel to get an agreement with Abu Mazen for the - in the West Bank at least and to withdraw from the West Bank?
In fair, Israel speaks loudly about peace, about withdrawal, evacuation of settlements, but in fact, it continued with settlements, with occupation, with oppression of Palestinians and with not allowing them to move from one place to another place by creating a huge presence - in Nablus there is a huge presence, in Gaza there is a huge presence, in Jenin there is a huge presence. This is what is really in the field is going on, and that what you - I mean in Israel there is the moderate government, with Abu Mazen in power in the West Bank, who holds them to agree with Abu Mazen? That's - this is the difference between what Israel speaks loudly and what Israel practice in the field which is occupation, continue settlements, and so on.
The other thing - the only small thing - when I speak about one-state solution, I speak about democracy and peace. When you speak about two states, when Israel speaks about two states, they mean controlling the Palestinians and for this big present that will be called Palestinian state, and Israel doesn't mind if Palestinians would call it empire, kingdom, whatever you want to call it, but it will be a - (inaudible) - under Israeli control. This is in fact the Israeli peace - this is war. What I mean by one-state solution is a peaceful solution that gives and guarantees the Jews security, self-determination equally with the Palestinians and not as the superpower and the chosen people who have the right to control the others. Sorry about that.
MR. FREEMAN: So obviously there are different perceptions.
MR. ABUNIMAH: There are facts in the ground.
MR. FREEMAN: But still there are different perceptions of the facts, let us say, and I feel obliged in the spirit of political incorrectness that guides this presentation to inject a thought or two. That is to say, the so-called moderate bloc is indeed in my view, a fiction invented here for convenient purposes. And I noticed, for example, that Prince Saud al-Faisal from the foreign ministry of Saudi Arabia, when he blamed the Palestinians in part for the situation did so in a very nuanced manner which was totally lost in the news. What he said was that - what had happened in Gaza was because the Palestinians had failed to achieve unity between Hamas and Fatah. That is a very difference thing from siding with Israel on this.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt have their own difficulties with Hamas, and we explored these at great length in April, and I invite you to look at the website and see the transcript of that discussion because each of those countries have their own fears of what Hamas represents, whether those are well-grounded or not is something that we don't know.
I think John Duke Anthony was next. John?
Q: Can I ask my question from here?
MR. FREEMAN: You may. I invite you to do so.
Q: Good. Bill Quandt was just touching on it at the end, but in the part of the discussion among the panelists, you in fact still are leaving off - and that's the 800-pound gorilla - that is the domestic situation in the United States. These are - (inaudible) - leadership of Barack Obama. He's at his all-time high in terms of domestic political capital. It's hard to believe that - (inaudible). It will remain so high for the following reasons: If you address the reality of the - (inaudible) - and limitations on - (inaudible) - with regard to changing policies - (inaudible) - 535 members, there's no more than 35 of them who have been courageous at all on any aspects of the decision in my life time. That's probably 10 percent of them. And you're right about the overwhelming majority on - (inaudible) - bills. And secondly, there is the Democratic Party itself, which in every election since 1948 with the exception of 1972, has overwhelmingly supported people - (inaudible) - there seems to be no dramatic change to that to this day. The contributors to Obama's campaign - not the small ones, not the grassroots, independent ones but the big bucks - they signed their checks not as - (inaudible) - of Nelson Mandela - (inaudible). There are also the Christian fundamentalists, the evangelical - (inaudible) - that's even more rigid - (inaudible) - on this particular issue.
MR. FREEMAN: So John, I take it your question is whether -
Q: The effect of the domestic aspects - the media, the think tanks, and others who have - (inaudible).
MR. FREEMAN: Don't forget the belief tanks which are more powerful than the think tanks. (Laughter.) Bill, would you like to address this? And I think others will probably have thoughts on this also. I'm glad to see a return to a discussion of U.S. policy, and I would ask the panelists please not to exchange judgments about the moral character of the various participants in this because I don't believe that making judgments about who's right and wrong or who was right or wrong really advances the cause of serving the U.S. national interests by producing some solution to this. And I think Bill made that point quite effectively in his last intervention. Would you like to address the politics?
MR. QUANDT: Sure. Very briefly, though. There's not an awful lot new to say on this topic. Politics is not for sissies. Nobody forced Barack Obama to run for president. If he's not prepared to use the political capital that he has, why did he work to so hard to build it up? Sure, he's going to have to draw down on that political capital if he wants to be a peacemaker in the Middle East, maybe quite a bit. If he succeeds, however, it's a big plus.
The process of doing it is going to be painful. He's going to be arguing with people whose - who are programmed to react negatively because they're suspicious, they're afraid, they're on the payroll, whatever. Presidents when they put their mind to this and are willing to explain to the American public what is in the American national interest can sometimes succeed. It is leadership. If you're not prepared to use that unique opportunity to speak to the American people and explain to them why an Arab-Israeli peace settlement based on what seemed to be pretty reasonable terms - that is, I'm talking about the two-state solution - with the kind of international support he could now mobilize, which would be substantial, if he's not prepared to do this, this will fail. And he'll blame it and others will blame it on, you know - (inaudible) - the Arabs or the Muslims or the radicals or the whatever else - but if he wants to do it, if he as he says from day one he's going to tackle this, he's going to have to accept that people will criticize him.
As I said, politics is not for sissies. If you're afraid of being criticized, you don't go into this business and you don't tackle the Middle East problem. If you want to tackle the Middle East problem, you have to be like Jimmy Carter and say, okay, people are going to say terrible things about me but I actually happen to believe what I said. And okay, he didn't get re-elected. Getting re-elected is not the most important thing in the world. If you're president of the United States, actually doing something for your country might be.
MR. FREEMAN: On that idealistic note, I call on Alon Ben-Meir.
MR. BEN-MEIR: You know, I absolutely echo what Bill has just said. You know, I would remind you that if you, for example, if you look at the roadmap that actually President Bush introduced, it does call for the two-state solution. The problem was implementation; that is to what extent the Bush administration was really committed to the very instrument it has produced, and that was a problem.
Had the Bush administration lived up to what the roadmap has called for, and for example, stationed some presidential envoy with the proper mandate from the president to sit down there with instruction, don't you ever come back home until this is resolved. This is what I think the President Obama should be doing. Follow the roadmap, for that matter, but make sure that whatever it is suggested, that it is implemented, that the United States is going to be behind it.
You know we - surely there are constituencies in the United States that support Israel, but there's also grassroots support for Israel in the United States. This is just fact of life. The point, however, is you need a leader - specifically now that we have the opportunity with President Obama - to look at himself and say perhaps, enough is enough. And United States national interests require that we find such a solution and follow it. The solution to the problem has been staring at us for ad nauseum. We need leadership to put it in place, and that would mean pressure on Israel. Absolutely. That would mean consistent approach with proper pressure to give a - on Israel in order to make Israelis, those who resist, to understand that the time has come to make the important decision, the critical decision, the historic decision, or else there will be absolutely no end to this horrifying, tragic conflict.
MR. FREEMAN: Alon, may I ask you a question? This is a follow-up because you and several other speakers referred to the prospect of Benjamin Netanyahu returning to power, and clearly the direction in which he would like to lead things is not consistent with the roadmap or Oslo which he did his best to repudiate when in office the last time. Do you think we should be - President Obama - I take it your advice is that we should get serious about this and that we should not say things unless we are prepared to follow up - do you think he should signal an interest an outcome in the Israeli elections?
MR. BEN-MEIR: Well, you know, I'm really not sure that he should necessarily signal that. That may or may not have any effect on what the Israelis are going to do. It looks like Benjamin Netanyahu may very well be elected as the next prime minister. But I also recall the following and this is a sort of a thing that's often historically happened. It was Begin who gave up the Sinai, it was Sharon who change his mind on the - and the father of the settlement came to the realization that this is not going to work, so you never know, it may take someone from the Likud party to be a prime minister in such a time where the Israeli public will not feel he is going to sell Israel down the river, and they will trust him to do the right thing. If he is going to be the prime minister, in all likelihood, Ehud Barak will be the Defense Minister from Labour, and they cannot form real government without Kadima.
And so between the three, they will have to agree on the next step. But I have yet to see a prime minister in Israel that can actually withstand the proper pressure if that pressure comes from the White House in a consistent, constructive way. And that's what we are looking for President Obama to do. Notwithstanding the grassroots support that Israel enjoys in the United States, it's going to take that kind of leadership to tell to the American public Israelis and Palestinian deserve to live in peace. We have to be the conduit for it, and we can do it. And I think the president will be able to engender that kind of American support if he - even if he has to put the necessary pressure on Israel.
MR. FREEMAN: Ali, the view from Chicago?
MR. ABUNIMAH: Yes, it's also a view that I also give as an American just to make that point very clear. That I think there are two factors when it comes to considering an American role. One is political will, and we've heard some views about that. And the other is the notion that is put forward, and we've heard it today that a solution is available. And everyone knows its outlines and all we need is leadership to grab it. And I want to take two minutes to challenge that view and to talk about political will.
Barack Obama made his peace with the Israel lobby many years ago in Chicago. His campaign finance manager, Penny Pritzker, is one of the most - comes from one of the most activist, pro-Israel settlement-building families in the country. And Barack Obama understood early that to reach the lofty heights he has reached today, he would have to give on some issues, and Palestine was one of them. I do not expect any courageous, new, or bold initiatives. I understand that there remains both hope and wishful thinking about that, and that's fine, but that doesn't mean to rule out that there will not be some sort of change. I'm not saying that there will simply be a continuation of Bush administration policy. I doubt that, in fact. There will be some change, but whether it will be a change that is commensurate with the challenge, I very much doubt. I, like everyone else in this room, would like to be surprised, and I hope that I'm wrong, but I fear that I'm not wrong on that.
Now, the other notion is let's suppose in the best possible case that Barack Obama comes in and he says, I'm going to put all - forget about the economy, forget about Iraq, forget about Afghanistan, we are now going to focus all our attention on solving this issue. The notion that an agreement is available, whether it's the Clinton parameters or the Geneva Initiative or Taba is a fallacy. We're constantly told there is a consensus, everybody knows what the outlines of a solution are. This is not true. There is a consensus, not - the Arab peace initiative I include in this - there is no consensus on a solution. There is a consensus on a set of vague formulations that hide the extent of the disagreement. So everybody - I'd just give a couple of examples - everybody agrees on a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, based on. Well, for the Palestinians, that means a full withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967, whose location is not in doubt. To Israel, it means the annexation of expanded Jerusalem, 80 percent of the settlers remaining where they are, control of the Jordan Valley, and so on and so forth.
Everybody agrees to a just resolution to the refugee problem, everybody. Even Ariel Sharon would agree to a just resolution to the refugee problem. To Olmert and Livni and Barak and Netanyahu, that means not the return of one single Palestinian refugee. So we can all agree on vague formulations, and whether we package them as the Arab peace initiative or the Clinton parameters or whatever else doesn't disguise the extent of the problem. The final point I want to make on this is that to emphasize the point, as I've made, that a two-state solution solves only the problem of the 1967 occupation; it doesn't even begin to address the situation of the 1.5 million Palestinians who are citizens inside Israel - second-class citizens - who face increasing threats to their existence. We constantly hear this refrain about Israel threatening others with destruction. It is, in fact, Palestinians whose lives and livelihoods and society has been constantly threatened and destroyed.
And Livni, just a few weeks ago, again threatened the transfer of 1.5 million Palestinians in Israel. And I would predict that if a two-state solution is agreed, in whatever form, you could expect shortly after that the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from inside Israel, because an extremist Israel, the one that exists today, if it's left intact the way it is, will say, what is the point of a two-state solution that doesn't leave us with an exclusively Jewish state. And the next target of that Jewish state will be to get rid of the 1.5 million Palestinians who are living there. So a two-state solution is neither available nor stable nor just.
And this is what we have to open the discussion - to keep insisting there's only one solution, there's only one solution, when, for over 40 years, this has failed. And we've been hearing the same refrain time and again: Oh, a new administration is coming. New diplomacy is coming. A new initiative is coming. We have heard this time and again. When does the moment come when we say, let's open our minds to something new? When does that moment come? Eight years from now, or 16 years from now or 24 years from now, after who knows how many U.S. administration? We must take this bull by the horns; time is running out.
MR. FREEMAN: I hear agreement on the notion that time is running out, that we have to do something. And Asad, since time is running out, can you be brief?
MR. ABUMINAH: Sorry. (Chuckles.)
MR. GHANEM: Sorry if I disappoint you. I think that time is running out, but this conflict is not going to be - to get to an end in the near future - not in my age, I think. I hope that in others' age, where part of us will be still alive, where they'll reach some agreement in Palestine. I'm sorry to disappoint you in this regard. But I have something to say about the domestic politics in the United States. I think that we have to make a distinction between the administration's politics and the American public.
And in this regard, I want to say - to tell you that I have no illusions. We do not have any case in the Israeli public - in the American public - as Palestinians. So I mean, I'm following up what's going on - the discussion, the coverage of the media. All the what we hear from the average American is - those who are also mobilized Americans in the Israeli-Palestinian case, I mean, our case is - I'm not saying we don't have to make an effort to change this situation, but there is not any case in the near future to believe that Americans - the majority of them - will support any kind of just solution for the refugees - Palestinian refugees. And in this regard, I think that the - (inaudible) - should be more in Palestine, rather in any other state, including the United States of America. So I'm sorry to disappoint you.
The other thing that I want to emphasize is the administration level. I have no doubt that this administration - the next administration - will put much efforts than any other administration in pushing for a two-state solution - in pushing for an agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis, although it is what's clear the last two administrations - Clinton and Bush administration - they clearly that they support two states. They give a blanket - an open support for Israel and the Palestinians to get to an agreement, but they didn't because of many aspects that I mention in my lecture: Israeli politics, Palestinian politics, the situation in the field, the settlements, so on and so on. So in fact, I think that this administration, as the other administrations, they will send envoy, the foreign minister, Hillary Clinton, she will speak a lot about the two-state solution, but in two years, three years, four years, they will come back and say we cannot afford it.
And I'll tell you the next administration will help us to understand more and more that the two-state solution is not a viable solution. And somebody has to start, among the Americans, among the Israelis, among the Palestinians that settlement and peace mean peace - means that the situation of the whites in South Africa are much powerful and much better after the apartheid than before the apartheid. That's the situation that we offer for the Israelis - for the Jews in Palestine - that they should enjoy being in Palestine as equal citizens, not as you are privileged and have to use force in every day in order to keep this privilege.
I want to remind you about something in Palestine: Palestinians in Palestine are 50 percent of the population. They hold only 13 percent of the territory. This is an apartheid system of privilege that is there for the settlers - for the Jews - rather than for the indigenous people. Palestinian citizens who are citizens of Israel - I am a citizen of Israel; we are 18 percent of the population. We hold 3 percent of their territory. This is an apartheid system. It should be stopped! And I know that I speak with people who are interested in what's going on, and when I speak about the general elections in the United States, there is no chance for me to convince the Americans that this is the situation, but this is the situation - these are the facts!
Not to speak about two-state solution and peace. These are the facts. The fact that settlements and the Israelis inside the Green Line is the ethnization (sic) policies is the main project for the state of Israel. And this should be stopped.
MR. FREEMAN: Well, I think your -
MR. GHANEM: Sorry.
MR. FREEMAN: - your key point, if I may, going back to the issue of what we should do, or rather, what new presidents must do, is that you doubt -
MR. GHANEM: I doubt - I hope that he will be as serious, more than Clinton and Bush.
MR. FREEMAN: You doubt whether there is any political base in the United States for the kind of vigorous diplomacy that would be required, if I understood you. And therefore, you believe the solution, when it comes, whatever it is, must come from people in Palestine -
MR. GHANEM: Jews and Arabs.
MR. FREEMAN: The Jews and Arabs, not from the United States, which is a viewpoint that I think is probably gaining ground. And I'm glad you stated it, even though I don't, myself, agree with it. Sir?
Q: I'm Saul Fishman (ph). I'm sorry I came late this morning. I was listening to the - (inaudible) - said the Arab Peace Initiative is dead.
MR. FREEMAN: Yes, as I speculated it might.
MR. GHANEM: It was already dead for a few years, so -
Q: My question, and - (inaudible) - the leadership as a major tool. I am - (inaudible) - the same Middle East envoys that we had for the same 20 years, we nevertheless expect - (inaudible). Will it be the same as we had before - talks, talks, talks, and nowhere? What do you think?
MR. FREEMAN: So if there's no change in the people, in other words, can the policy be different? That's the question.
MR. QUANDT: Well, it doesn't inspire a whole lot of confidence - (laughter) - in "change you can believe in" to see a lot of retreads. I don't know. I mean, I think we know who we're talking about. Dennis worked for James Baker and Baker was in charge of the policy and Baker got Madrid, which I think was a potentially interesting step in the right direction. Working for Clinton, he was an incrementalist who wasn't prepared to push as hard as the first Bush/Baker presidency, so I think it makes much more difference who's president and who he really listens to than to look at the second echelon.
But at some point, the second echelon does matter, because day in and day out, they're helping to shape the interpretation of events. I'm quite eager to see who the rest of the team is. And I don't know who those are going to be. In all honesty, I don't know anything more than what I've read in the press and talked to a few people on. So I'm still - the jury's still out a bit, in terms of my mind. We have a few new faces, a lot of old ones, and I guess, you know, the slight - I'm not an optimist, in case you didn't notice; I'm actually quite deeply pessimistic about the prospects - but insofar as I have any hope, it is that decisions, at the end of the day, will be made by the president, if he wants to make them.
Now, he may decide that this isn't worth it. That's what, I think, Bush II decided, that this was not worth his time. And so he delegated to various people who had their own agendas, and if that happens, we're not going to get anywhere, because then you will, really, get the bureaucratic response, which is to be cautious. Bureaucrats don't take risks. They're buck-passers; they want to do things that are safe and that guarantee that their careers prosper and all the rest. That's - we're never going to get there that way.
Presidents who want to make a difference have to be like Eisenhower, who was willing to stand up for what he thought was the American national interest in 1956 - hasn't happened very often since. I think Carter had the guts to get out and push hard. And, in a curious way, Nixon and Kissinger did after a disaster that befell them when they were looking the other way. And I think that the first Bush/Baker team, had it stayed on for a second term, might have surprised us and been a pretty competent peace-making presidency. We haven't had many others. And I think my fear is that we're going to see a return of Clintonism, which was a lot of words, a lot of talk, endless process and no results. And that does scare me.
MR. FREEMAN: Alon.
MR. BEN-MEIR: I'm not sure who is going to be, really, the person to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, if we mention Dennis Ross, I understand he would be more - he would be focusing on Iran, rather than on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But I really believe that if a President Obama is really serious about changing America's image in the Middle East that has been almost destroyed and restore America's moral authority, he must begin with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because the situation in that region, going almost all the way from Morocco to Southeast Asia is not going to be settled. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unfortunately, feeds into the extremism in one form or another.
Every single Arab state is affected by it. There will be no resolution to the Iranian problem; there'll be no resolution to many - a seriously sustainable peace in Iraq, not to speak of Afghanistan, unless we're beginning to calm down this frenzy, this extremism that's being fed into by this perpetuated crisis. So I think that President Obama has an historic opportunity and an historic obligation. If he wants to mend America's reputation in the Middle East, he's got to begin by putting out the fires between Israel and the Palestinians. If America wishes it to happen, it can happen. It can happen. It is not going to be easy. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are going to roll over and say okay, you can get what you want. But it can be done.
It can be done because, I think, both sides have reached a point of exhaustion. We may not think so, but I absolutely believe that. This conflict, where the people - the majorities on both sides have reached that point of exhaustion and they are looking for a solution. And certainly, it's going to have to be led by some power, that only the United States can do, in order to move them into that direction. But that is going to be first and foremost, also, in the interests of the United States. Again, I repeat, because this is so critically important - this is a point of departure: America cannot mend its position, its strategic interests, its reputation, not to speak of its moral leadership, unless it begins solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Not to the exclusion of what needs to be done in Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere, but that's going to have to receive some attention. And I hope that Mr. Obama will be looking at it in the same manner.
MR. FREEMAN: I think Ali wants to have a quick word and then I've got a few people who have questions or comments. I just want to add a footnote, if I may, and that is a reminder, given what George Hashmi (sp) tells us about the Arab Peace Initiative being dead now, a reminder that our embrace, officially, of the two-state solution under George Walker Bush came after a threat from King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia - then crown prince, I believe - to downgrade relations with the United States if we did not demonstrate a measure of sincerity and commitment on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
This is an illustration of the impact, more broadly, that this continued dispute has on U.S. foreign relations, and it is an illustration that, even in periods of what can only be called autism in our government - the world's first genuinely autistic government has been right here in Washington - we are somewhat responsive to the impact of adverse developments. So it will be interesting to see what comes of evolution in the Arab position and what changes it produces here in a new administration. Ali.
MR. ABUMINAH: Yes, another scoop from the summit is that Qatar and Mauritania have announced their full suspension of all economic and diplomatic ties with Israel. That's a very welcome step. I hope Jordan follows suit as soon as possible. And that would also be a very positive and constructive and pro-peace step in the region, because I think Israel, and indeed the United States, don't understand except pressure. The point I want to make about U.S. policy, very briefly: One of the most damaging aspects, in addition to this false dichotomy between moderates and extremists, has been a kind of more or less tacit sectarian incitement that the United States and its allies have engaged in in trying to divide the region between Sunni and Shia, and to claim this - the reason I bring this up is because it's a point that Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk have been making very publicly.
They've been saying, you know, the main split in the region today is not between the Arabs and Israel, but between Sunni and Shia. And this has been a very explicit effort to try to, actually, foment and incite sectarian conflict as a diversion from the conflict with Israel and to try and solidify this so-called "moderate" bloc of Arab states plus Israel. The verdict on the proverbial Arab street has been to overwhelmingly reject this, and to see, for example, Hezbollah, not as a Shia Iranian and sectarian organization, as the propaganda effort tried to paint them, but to see them in the mold of an Arab nationalist and resistance organization, which I think is how people do see them.
So the point I'm making here is that the reintroduction of the Rosses and the Indyks and the others could also mean that this policy - very dangerous policy of sectarian incitement, might also survive the Bush era into the Obama era. That would be very dangerous and very wrong.
MR. FREEMAN: Sir, you've been waiting patiently.
Q: Yes, one of the things that I think could influence this debate a great deal is what happens if the U.S. economy and the U.S. power and it decreases and - (inaudible) - see a result of the - (inaudible, background noise). So the president of the United States will go back to being the president of the United States, and I think Obama will make a great president for the United States and a terrible president for the world - (inaudible).
Getting beyond this two-state, one-state, I have an alternative option: How about a United States of the Middle East, modeled after Europe and Israel-Palestine will - (inaudible) - with Jerusalem as the seat of - you know, a place where everybody has an emotional connection with it. And this will become the engine of global economic growth, will create a peace model, and then we will all be living happily ever after. That's what I believe. Why is it that all the smart Israelis, like yourself, move to the United States? Why is it that the smartest Israelis move to the United States, while crazy Brooklyn Americans move to Israel?
(Laughter.)
MR. QUANDT: It's an exchange program.
(Laughter.)
MR. FREEMAN: In your last line, you said something that I meant to say in response to the notion that New Jersey's gain was the West Bank's loss. And that is to say that the fact that many smart Israelis are moving here, which reflects some of the despair among the better people in Israel with the continuing struggle and its direction, is our gain - very much our gain - but it is Israel's loss. And I think it's quite tragic. As to whether the kingdom of god on earth can be established in Jerusalem, I don't have any comment, myself. But perhaps someone else - I think we'll get - the last time I asked a Steinberg to pose a question, it was disastrous, but, recognizing the risk, I'm now going to ask Michelle Steinberg to raise a question.
Q: Okay. This is a follow up to EIR's previous question. And I'd like to ask Ali to elaborate on something that he said as Mr. Ben-Meir was answering, which was the very tentative but real offers that Hamas has made. Now, I'd like to say a couple of things to begin with. I've been told by some of my Arabic friends that there are 153 Israeli violations of the cease-fire from June 19th. I tried to find them on every news service and I could not find them there, as I could find many, many, many if not all of the bombs - the rockets - that have gone to Sderot in the Israeli press.
Chas., you said optimism is to diplomats what courage is to soldiers. Optimism is also a requirement at EIR. But on the perception of facts in this town and in the United States generally, the facts aren't really known. And I heard, also, that a Mr. Hamdan al Malik (ph) from Hamas spoke this past week and said, yeah, we have a charter that is against Israel, but it's only a charter; it's not a holy book, it's not the Koran. Maybe that's apocryphal, but I looked at the charter of Likud on the Knesset site from 1996. The Likud charter says that the eastern border of Israel is the Jordan River, and that while Palestinians have autonomy, they will never have an independent state. Does our Congress know this? So when we talk about charters, please, let us be equal. But can you talk about what Hamas has -
MR. ABUMINAH: Yes.
Q: - and the cease-fire violations?
MR. ABUMINAH: Yes. With your permission.
MR. FREEMAN: Of course.
MR. ABUMINAH: The - I want to talk briefly, as quickly as I can, about the immediate ceasefire and then expand on the point about what Hamas has offered politically in recent years because I think those are both connected and relevant. The ceasefire lasted from June 19th until November fourth. During that time, according to the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs website, 26 rockets were fired from Gaza into Israel - 26, compared to hundreds in the previous months. Not one of those rockets was attributed to Hamas - not one. They were all fired either by smaller factions or by unknown parties. And Israelis have acknowledged themselves on several occasions that Hamas moved to stop rocket fire whenever rockets were fired. No injuries were reported at all by those 26 rockets.
After Israel carried out an unprovoked attack on Gaza on November fourth, which killed six Palestinians, Hamas began to retaliate with rocket fire. During the period of the ceasefire - during the period of the ceasefire, more than 30 Palestinians were killed by Israeli attacks in the West Bank and Gaza strip. No Israelis were killed by Palestinian attacks. Never in history - never in history has a single rocket been fired from the West Bank into Israel. And yet during the period of the ceasefire, Israel continued to carry out house demolitions, extrajudicial executions - we saw settle pogroms, we saw all the full panoply -
MR. : Okay, but I -
(Cross talk.)
MR. ABUMINAH: We saw the full panoply of occupation violence continuing unabated in the West Bank. Now, the Israeli talking points that are always ready on some lips assert constantly that thousands of rockets have been fired from Gaza into Israel and why does nobody ever talk about that. Let's talk about it. According to Israel, 6,300 rockets and mortars were fired at Israel from Gaza since 2005. This sounds like a lot.
Now, let's assume that these all landed in Israel. The reality is many did not and the vast majority landed in open areas and fields and did no harm to anyone. But according to - just take Wikipedia, look up Qassam rocket. These rockets carry about two pounds of low explosives. So if you do the math and add them up, you get to about 13 tons of low explosives fired at Israel over a period of several years.
Does anyone ask how much high explosive Israel has dumped into the Gaza strip during the same period? Well, on the first day of the current attack, December 27th, Israel boasted it dropped 100 tons of bombs - we're not talking about fertilizer bombs that Hamas is firing. We're talking about military grade high explosive shipped from the United States - 100 tons of bombs in the first day - eight times more than Israel claims that Hamas fired at it in three years - on the first day.
According to Human Rights Watch, from September 2005 until May 2007, the Israeli Army fired 14,617 artillery shells into the Gaza strip - this is not counting missiles and bombs dropped from the air and this is only a periods of about a year-and-a-half. It doesn't include the first six months of this year when Israel bombarded the Gaza strip and in March killed 110 Palestinians. Why is nobody counting that? Why is that never ready on the lips of those who keep lecturing us about rockets?
Now, on the bigger point about Hamas - yes, the same refrain. Remember when the PLO was a banned terrorist organization and we were lectured constantly, the PLO Covenant, the PLO Covenant, the PLO Covenant. Now, it has become the Hamas Charter. Well, the Hamas Charter - the facts about it is that it was written by one man in 1988 during the height of the First Intifada. It was never ratified by any legislative body. Hamas leaders never refer to it; they never take it as their program. When they ran in elections in 2006, they did not run on the platform of the charter. They had maintained the ceasefire for one year, unilaterally, before the elections took place.
There have been numerous statements before, during and after the elections about offering Israel a long-term truce. I encourage you to read an article by Ahmad Yousef from the New York Times about a year and a half ago called Pause for Peace, where this strategy has been laid up, a long term truce modeled on the IRA ceasefire with Britain leading to a political process. They have more or less openly accepted the two-state solution, which I think that they are deluded as anyone else if they think that's going to happen - but nevertheless, they've accepted that.
But they have the propagandists who want to constantly say to us, Hamas equals al-Qaeda, Hamas equals an extremist group, you can't talk to these people, you can only bomb them. Well, the proof - forget about what I say, forget about what Jimmy Carter says, who very courageously and wisely went and met with Hamas leaders a few months ago. Look at Israel! Israel negotiated with Hamas. Israel reached a ceasefire agreement with Hamas. Israel acknowledges that Hamas kept to the ceasefire agreement until Israel decided to violate it on November fourth and violate it by never lifting the siege, maintaining the silent war against Palestinians in Gaza - the Terror Famine, which Israel has maintained now for almost two years.
So the reality is, there are people in Hamas you can talk to. Hamas began a political process. It was never allowed to complete it. It won an election fair and square. Instead of being allowed to take office and to perhaps - if there had been a normal political process in Palestine, who knows what program Hamas would have put forward. Who knows what national consensus they would have achieved with the other Palestinian factions on a peace negotiation program if we didn't have Lieutenant General Keith Dayton and Condoleezza Rice and all other panoply training militias trying to overthrow them in the Gaza Strip.
If they had been given a chance, we would have seen a different situation. Israel and the United States are the ones who missed enormous opportunities after the election of Hamas and this needs to be states and that policy needs to be reversed after January 20th.
MR. GHANEM: Can I add another comment?
MR. FREEMAN: Quickly please.
MR. GHANEM: Quickly.
MR. ABUMINAH: I'm never quick, even when I promise to be.
(Laugher.)
MR. GHANEM: Yes.
MR. ABUMINAH: I know you hate that. I've got a lot to say - (inaudible, cross talk).
MR. GHANEM: It should be acknowledged that Hamas talk a telling point when they decide to run for election and that of the Oslo Accord Agreement. I mean, in the PA and following the Oslo Agreement, and this was really a telling point in the history of the Palestinians. But unfortunately, the same day that Hamas was elected, Israel declared that this is a declaration of war from the Palestinian side and they start all the efforts in order to make sure that Hamas will not gain legitimacy and the collaborators in Ramallah were joining Israel in the same day in order to diminish Hamas-elected government.
I'm not a Hamas person - I am against Islamic regime. But I think that democracy means democracy. It is only one thing that people are elected should be given the chance to run their political program and I agree with Ali that Hamas is not only one thing. It is not only one group of persons. I mean, we know now under the siege, under the attacks, under the war that Hamas is different things and we will have to - I mean those who are ready to talk with the others like Ahmad Yousef and others - they should be given the chance to be - (unintelligible).
I want to remind you that the Hamas parliament members - they are parliament members - they are in Israel jail for a year or more than a year - nobody ask about - nobody raise their question publicly or while they were arrested without any charges, without any court - they didn't go to any court, and so on and so on.
The other thing - the small thing that I want to - there is a lie by Israeli government that Israel doesn't attack civilians. This is a big lie. Israel attacked civilians in Lebanon War - Israel attacked Lebanon in Jenin if you remember and Israel now attack and purposely, with previous decision - civilians in Gaza. This including the schools and hospitals and the majority of those who were killed in Gaza are children and women - they are not fighters, they are not - and what - can you please go on the internet and see what's happened in Gaza now - what are the total destruction in the Palestinian life of normal people?
These are the crimes against humanity. This is something to be ashamed if you are an Israeli - to be ashamed about it, to say this is the time to take these criminals to the court. And nobody - unfortunately, the Israelis continue with these lies that we do not attack civilians, we are committed to human values - where are the human values? To attack 30 children in a school - no, not 30, it is now hundreds - in a school. They took shelter, they left their homes and they find shelter in the school. And Israel, on purpose, on purpose - they know what's going on in the school - they attacked this school and the people were killed.
MR. FREEMAN: I think the passion that is being evoked by Gaza is clear in this room, as well as internationally. There is a question - was a question - implicit in Michelle Steinberg's question, and that was, why is there no real coverage in the U.S. press of the details of this savagery? If you look at today's Washington Post, you will find a story on page 14, which is about truce negotiations and which mentions the bombing of the U.N. warehouse in Gaza in passing. One would have thought that would have been a rather large story.
So there is, I think, indeed as Asad mentioned, a disposition in the United States not to want to hear anything that buttresses the cause of the Palestinians, or that appears to be critical of Israel. And that's a fact. And it does raise the question of how we, as a society, deal with these issues in practice if our knowledge base and our politics are so skewed. I do want to take issue with one thing that Ali said, although I think the recitation of the sequence of events and the numbers and so on are indeed valuable, and I'm sure would be disputed by some in Israel and here.
But I don't think that severing communication with Israel, whether it's Mauritania or Qatar or academic groups, is a desirable nor effective measure. Quite the contrary, severing communications with Israel replicates the mistake we have made with Hamas. We should have been talking to Hamas, regardless of what we think of its ideological stance or its charter. And it's very notable that the administration came in and, in the confirmation hearings for the secretary of state-designate, she spoke quite eloquently of the need for there to be dialogue with people we disagree with, like Iran, but ruled Hamas out as an appropriate subject of such dialogue, saying that for her, Hamas had to meet certain preconditions, which are well known. And that this for her was an absolute.
If it is an absolute, then I think the prospect for effective American diplomacy on the issues we've been discussing about is greatly diminished, because even before the bombing boosted solidarity behind Hamas among Palestinians, which seems to be its primary effect to date, Hamas had the legitimacy of an election victory behind it, and therefore, the ability to negotiate on behalf of Palestinians, which Abu Mazen, clearly, has not had. So I don't think severing communication is the answer. I think increasing communication is a better approach. And that is why, even though some of today's discussion has been heated, I think it was an important exchange of views. Yes, ma'am?
Q: Yeah, I would like - (inaudible). And I think he meant that - (inaudible). (Inaudible.) Originally, I wanted to say something else, which is - (inaudible) - just yesterday, or last night, about Obama - (inaudible). (Inaudible) - to continue this war until Obama is completely in office, and then he would come up with this suggestion and he would - (inaudible).
MR. FREEMAN: I doubt that. I doubt that very much, I have to say. That is not the tenor of what I'm hearing.
Q: (Inaudible.)
MR. FREEMAN: Well, at any rate -
Q: Unfortunately, we - I'm sorry - unfortunately - (inaudible) - after all this and there had been under all this - (inaudible) - all of this destruction and all of this insult and, you know. That said, I think we need to wait for - (inaudible) - United States can do about that. But I hope it's wrong, but that's the impression of what's going on. (Inaudible) - explosion and terrorist attack and - (inaudible).
MR. FREEMAN: Thank you. I would - I think you make an important point, which concerns me very deeply, and that is the impact of all of this on the U.S. reputation and influence, not just in the region, but more widely, so far, is very negative - very negative. And that should concern all of us, because I heard consensus here, behind the disagreement and the relative pessimism and limited optimism that was expressed, I heard a consensus that the time has come for the United States to get serious about addressing this issue. I remember Alon Ben-Meir used the phrase, "tough love," with respect to Israel.
I don't think anyone on the panel would disagree with that.
MR. GHANEM: No, we agree totally.
MR. ABUMINAH: We hope that will be - (inaudible).
MR. FREEMAN: But I think it is awfully early to judge the Obama administration, and I will not - it's not in office yet. It is politically unwise for someone who has no authority to take responsibility, since he can't do anything about the situation at present, anyway. We must wait until after January 20th to begin to judge - to begin to judge - what the new administration will do. And here - and perhaps this is the place to close this discussion - I will just make a general set of observations.
And that is that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not had a policy process that has been capable of developing a grand strategy. By a grand strategy, I mean a strategy that integrates political, economic, cultural and military instruments of power to achieve a defined result within a defined period of time. We have been very long on pious hopes and nowhere more so than in the arena of Arab-Israeli peace, where the Annapolis Conference, in retrospect, was a delusion, at best, and a fraud at worst.
I don't think the United States - this goes back to the question the gentlemen over here asked, or the comment he made about the damage to U.S. power, internationally, from the economic collapse. I don't think the United States can afford the purely tactical policy approach of running on autopilot and making minor adjustments in our direction that has characterized both the Clinton and the Bush years. I think we now need to develop - redevelop - the capacity for thinking strategically, developing goals and, as several people said here, then pursuing them seriously - not making pious statements and not following them up.
The Middle East - that is, this issue that we've been talking about, connected, as it is, to many other issues in the region - is the place that most needs such an approach. That is, everyone up here in this panel agrees there are gross injustices in the current situation, that there is much suffering - they may disagree about the history that produced this - but everyone agrees that it's intolerable and that it's damaging to the United States, as well as to those who are directly involved. And everybody wants us to do something about it.
I will wait until January 20th, I think, to begin to judge whether the president who appears to have a strategic bent of mind, although perhaps some of his advisors do not, is able to rise to this challenge. [Cell phone rings.] And so - if that's your wife, you better take it.
(Laughter.)
MR. GHANEM: It rings every five days, and when I - (inaudible, laughter).
MR. FREEMAN: I would like to invite each panelist, very briefly, to address this question of what we may hope for from the new administration and then we'll close. And Alon, I'd like you to start, if you would.
MR. BEN-MEIR: I believe that it's not unrealistic to hope that, given the last eight years - specifically, given the period since September 11th - the situation in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan, the continuing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. I truly believe that it is more than just wishful thinking to suggest that the Obama administration can, and should, look at the Middle East from an entirely different spectacle and decide the time has come to introduce a new dynamics - geopolitical - that should change the geopolitical dynamics in the region so that an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will take place.
From this discussion - I know we have excluded the very critically important player, and that is Syria. The United States ought to end its isolation and its efforts to marginalize Syria and begin an earnest, direct negotiation with Syria - well, that will be extraordinarily helpful, to the general and the overall peace process in the Middle East. And in so doing, I think the United States will be able to deal more effectively with the rise of extreme sentiment throughout the reason and be able to contain future conflict and future conflagration. So time has come to talk. Time has come to communicate - be that with Syria, be that with Iran.
There's interconnectedness between all of these conflicts, but I would begin, without any question, with the Israeli-Palestinian, not necessarily to the exclusion of dealing with other conflicts simultaneously. A capable administration should be able to deal with more than one conflict at a time and giving - hopefully the United States - a new resolve and a new commitment under the leadership of Mr. Obama. I do hope that this will fall in the realm of possibility.
MR. FREEMAN: Asad.
MR. GHANEM: Only one sentence. I hope that the next administration will try its best - their best - in order to play a fair role in the Middle East. I follow all this question - or this discussion - about why they hate us and I think that when it comes to the Middle East - the Arab world and the Muslim world, it is less than justified to say that the United States played a very unfair role in the history of the Middle East since the end of the Second World War and especially following the establishment of Israel and the Palestinian - (inaudible).
And it is time for the United States to start taking the role of the great power in a serious manner and to try to develop a way of a policy that might consider seriously to change the situation on the ground and to change the whole atmosphere in the region, including among Palestinians and among Jews. I hope that at least this will be part of the things that will be important or levered by Mr. Obama in the next administration. Thank you.
MR. FREEMAN: Ali, you're next. We're going in reverse order.
MR. ABUMINAH: I think there's a parallel between the Middle East peace process and the global financial crisis in that for years and years we were told what a wonderful economy we have, what a great economic system. We have the best capitalized, most dynamic banks in the world. And then, lo and behold, the whole system is revealed to be a giant Ponzi scheme. (Laugher.) And amazingly, the people who brought us that system and who put it in place and who told us it's all wonderful are the same people who are brought back time and again to explain to us why it didn't work and how we should fix it.
And I think that exactly the same happens with this issue. And the reason why I am very pessimistic about the Obama administration doing anything is because it's the same cycle over and over again with maybe minor little adjustments. But I'm not pessimistic about he prospects for radical and positive change but I think that the possibilities for that exist also outside the bubble of diplomacy or war. There are mass movements around the world; there are mass movements in the region. They are writing and determining the history of the region. Those decisions - as we've seen the past eight years - can't be made unilaterally in Washington. People will write their own history. The final point is that what constitutes a policy discussion has to be widened.
The refrain that no, no, no - we must not talk about anything other than the two-state solution is a position which has advanced out of fear, out of knowledge that this is a house of cards and that any serious academic and objective examination would find that yes, indeed there are alternatives, but those alternatives threaten the status quo and they threaten the current imbalance of power and injustice that many people are very deeply invested in and want to preserve. So look outside the bubble, look to the grassroots, look to the mass movements - that's where my hope lies. People will lead and Washington will be the last to follow them, as it often is.
(Laughter.)
MR. QUANDT: What's left to say? I don't think we can start all over again and have our same debates. I understand where Ali is coming from. I sympathize with the sentiments behind it. We do need to approach issues differently - Americans are not all-powerful. We can't snap our fingers and impose our will - a kind of arrogance that has lain behind American policy for the last eight years has cost us dearly and we have to understand that particularly in this new era of economic distress and emerging - whether they're popular movements or liberal movements or states that have interests that are opposed to ours, we cannot act as if we are the hegemon of the world and imagine that the only thing that matters is what we think.
Now, is a new American administration prepared to break with that mindset? I don't know. I think we are going to be forced to adopt different policies by reality - reality has a way of kind of educating politicians - even politicians. You can't just live in the bubble that you have lived in as a campaigner. You will have to start dealing with real issues, real problems, yes with mass movements but also with states.
States are not irrelevant - you may wish that they all would go out of existence but they have a kind of tenaciousness. And what I hope is that the Obama administration will realize that this is an important issue however it's going to be solved - as I said, one-state, two-state, United States of the Middle East - I don't really care if any of this can be made to work. I'm in that sense thoroughly pragmatic as long as the solution as viewed as fair by the vast majority of people on both sides so that they will make it work, because otherwise it won't work.
So the United States has to see urgency, the importance of this, the need for dialogue with people who we haven't talked to for a long time and the need for partners. And that's a lot. The other thing the president needs to understand is time runs out on you very quickly. If you don't start quickly and get results quickly, people will conclude that it's a hopeless case and then we really will be into the other paradigm of, American leadership no longer matters.
Well, who is going to take the place of that? Well, maybe nobody. Maybe the grassroots movements will eventually find ways of solving all this, but you're into a generational conflict at that point - you're not talking about an early solution. I'd like to see an early solution and then let the mass movements work out the contours of how a two-state or a one-state solution would really evolve in human terms.
But if we don't find a diplomatic solution among the states and primary actors in the Middle East soon, it is going to be a generational conflict and there's going to be lots more blood spilt even though I think the chance, with the current alignment of forces - to get a truce, to get the killing stopped, get the basic parameters of an agreement agreed to and to get a modicum of fairness built into the solution of this conflict, is there. And I simply hope that a new president will not miss that slim chance.
MR. FREEMAN: I will close by stating what I think is the underlying logic that everyone agrees on, and that is that a solution to this problem is in the American interest but an unjust solution is not sustainable. And therefore, the solution must be just to both parties and cannot be one-sided. Or conversely, the absence of a solution is dangerous to our country and its interests. It is corrosive of our influence abroad and it is menacing to our way of life at home, as 9/11 and the partially constructed garrison state that followed it illustrate.
No solution can be imposed. It will require contact, dialogue and some form of negotiation - be it mediation, conciliation or direct engagement with all the parties, whatever our view of their moral standing may be, whether they are right or wrong or whether their position is objectionable or not is irrelevant for this purpose. I think everyone has expressed the hope - some with optimism, some with pessimism, that the new administration will at last seize this issue and serve American interests by bringing it to a just conclusion.
And with that, we conclude our meeting and I would like to thank the panelists for their spirited presentations and very informative and thought-provoking words which you will be able to read online in a transcript by about Wednesday next week I trust. Thank you very much.
(Applause.)
(END)