Unedited Transcript
Middle East Policy Council

Thirty-ninth in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S. Middle East Policy

Democracy: Rising Tide or Mirage?

Speakers:

Marina S. Ottaway
Senior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Jillian Schwedler
Assistant Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland; Chair, Middle East Research and Information Project

Shibley Telhami
Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland; Senior Fellow, Saban Center, Brookings Institution

Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Professor of Political Sociology, American University of Cairo; Chairman, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies

Moderator/Discussant:

Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.
President, Middle East Policy Council

216 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.
April 22, 2005

Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, DC

CHAS FREEMAN: I think we should probably get started, although we're still missing Saad Eddin Ibrahim, I'm sure he's on his way and we'll allow him to listen to everybody else and rebut everything they say at the end.

I'm Chas Freeman; it's my honor to be president of the Middle East Policy Council, which is a small organization with a history of twenty-five years. For that 25-year period we have done three things which we like to think we do reasonably well. The first is, we come up here on Capitol Hill and with the help of a member of the House or Senate, we use a hearing room to raise politically incorrect questions for public discussion; that is, questions which otherwise might never get answered or discussed because they're too embarrassing, awkward, or difficult. And then we take the edited transcript of those discussions and it becomes the first item in Middle East Policy which I am sure you all know and which I'm proud to say is the most often cited journal in the field; perhaps unique in focusing on issues of concern to people in the Middle East and Americans from the point of view of U.S. national interest. And finally outside Washington, in the great heartland of the United States, so far in virtually every state, we conduct teacher training programs for high school teachers and we have trained now about 18,000 teachers on how to teach about Arab civilization and Islam and we thus confuse something like 1.4 million kids a year with a fact or two which they would otherwise never encounter in out educational system about Arabs in the Middle East. (Laughter.)

For those of you who know us well and who were at the last session, I will just add a note that for 25 years, this organization had depended on donations largely from the American business community in the Gulf, American companies here doing business in the Arab world, wealthy donors in the Arab world, and occasionally Arab governments when they wake up and roll out of the bed on the right side. But I think everyone is aware of the deterioration in U.S.-Arab relations. Many donors in the Arab world have given up on Americans, they don't think we're educable and believe they have ample experiential proof of that; empirically it's hard to refute. Others are inhibited by financial controls from giving; they consider that if they write a check or wire money, they might be investigated, which is entirely possible. And finally the U.S. business community in the Gulf is greatly reduced in numbers and new business starts are also greatly reduced.

Therefore we have had to make a decision that either we get an endowment or we go out of business; I'm happy to say that the decision will be made in June. That is to say, by June we will know whether we are going to have any substantial progress toward an endowment or not. I'm happy to say that we have had had some progress, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia stepped forward with a generous gift which at least ensures that if we do have to shut down, we can do so in an orderly fashion over a period of a year or so. But I'm really - I won't say I'm confident, I'm optimistic that other donors will step forward and that this - these activities which will have to be carried on 50 years from now, as now, will in fact be endowed so that they can do so. In any rate, we will decide in June.

So much for the commercial, anyone who has a checkbook handy and would like to - we promise we will not investigate you - (laughter) - if you write us a check.

We're here today to talk about a subject which at least in Washington doesn't appear to be politically incorrect. Everybody in Washington knows that history is teleological and it ends in the triumph of democracy and the only question is: how far along in progress towards this end of history different peoples are? Of course, in the Middle East, every country is undemocratic in its own way, to paraphrase Tolstoy, and if you travel out there, you sometimes wonder - welcome - sometimes wonder whether we inhabit the same planet because the conventional wisdom in Washington, which is self-congratulatory about a rising tide of democracy in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Egypt, and even in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf, is greeted more often with derision than agreement by people who actually live there.

So, we're here today to talk about the question of what is happening in the region. Clearly, changes are occurring. Is what is happening democratization or is it something else? And is what is happening going to take us to some definitive conclusion or to anywhere in particular? And I, for one, in the spirit of the Middle East Policy Council, have not a clue of the answer to any of the questions is. (Laughter.) We firmly avoid taking positions on issues, we simply raise nasty questions. And we have here with us four people who are splendidly qualified to address these issues. And I'm not - I'd just like to welcome Saad Eddin Ibrahim, thank you for braving the Washington rain and coming here. I'm not going to introduce each of the participants in detail because you have a program and if you look on the back of the program and assuming you are able to read without chapping your lips, you can quietly get the gist of the background of all four participants.

I'm going to ask Marina Ottaway to go first. She is, of course, a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project and a lecturer on African Studies at the Nitze School, SAIS, Johns Hopkins and a much published and I think an extremely insightful commentator on current evolution in the region, especially in Iraq. So she will lead off.

Jillian Schwedler, who is an assistant Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, will talk about particularly Jordan and Yemen in the context of this evolution from - (foreign phrase) - to demokratia that we're referring to. And then Shibley Telhami who is, I think probably needs no introduction, one of the most prominent American commentators on the Middle East and the Anwar Sadat Professor Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, has I believe a lot of actual facts to share with us, which is always something startling in the case of the Middle East. (Laughter.) I didn't know there were any facts out there, but they are apparently polling data and other interesting points that illuminate the issues we are discussing from a factual point of view.

And finally - Saad Eddin, we made this decision in your absence, if you could have been here, then you would have got to go first. Finally, we will ask Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who also I think is becoming well know in Washington: a pro-democracy advocate, Professor of Political Sociology at the American University in Cairo and also Chairmen of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, who is here as a visiting scholar to talk about his own country, Egypt, and his own experiences as Egypt travels along this one-way rail line that we imagine exists.

So with these few introductory remarks, I'll ask Marina to go first. I would- for those who haven't participated in these events before - just offer a final cautionary note: I look like a mild-mannered, rather sort of couch potato, but actually I'm a mean-spirited, Stalinist chair - (laughter) - of these discussions and I have a tendency to pull people off the podium - we don't have one so, so I'll just pull the microphone away - if they go much over ten minutes. So I'd like to ask everybody please to keep the presentation to ten minutes and then we'll have a general discussion which is usually the most interesting part of these proceedings. Those of you who have sat patiently and listened for 40 or 50 minutes will have a chance to throw verbal eggs and tomatoes at us and all I ask is that you please identify yourself and try to keep whatever question or comment you have succinct rather than giving us a history of Egypt from the time of Ramses II to Hosni Mubarak I.

Thank you very much. Marina?

MARINA OTTAWAY: It's more intimidating to start speaking with all those warnings, but let me try. I pick up from one image of that Charles used, that is the triumph of democracy in the end of history and I think if the end of history comes with the triumph of democracy, the Middle East has plenty of history ahead of itself yet. That does not mean that there are no signs of change; there a lot of sign of change right now. It does not mean that democracy is not possible in the Middle East, that democracy is not possible in Muslim societies. I think that that's an issue that we need to put to rest once and for all. But what it means is that are a lot of different and conflicting trends that are alive and well in the Middle East at this point and that it is more too difficult to predict how, not only how the story's going to end because I'm reasonably optimistic. I think in the end probably it is going to end with a much greater degree of democracy than what we are seeing to date, but when that change is really to take place. Trends do not amount to real change.

Let me start talking about the positive trends and I will not talk about specific countries because my colleagues are going to do that, so, but I'll tell you more about some of the general trends that we see.

One of the really important ones is that the concept of democracy meant is really liberal democracy, what we like to think Western democracy, but we should stop talking - calling Western democracy because it's really a much broader concept. I mean, it is something that we all hope will become a universal concept than not just a Western concept. These ideas are gaining a much greater degree of acceptance than they had. It's a trend that has developed over a period of time, but I think it's really coming to head now.

Yesterday afternoon, the UNDP and the Carnegie Endowment together - just to put in a little plug for ourselves - did the joint launch of the third Arab Human Development Report, the 2004 Arab Human Development Report, which actually has just been released. The Arab Human Development Report is a very remarkable document for two reasons: one is that it represents the most wholehearted embrace of the concept of liberal democracy that I have seen coming out of the similar document. It even represents a change over previous documents because one of the most remarkable things to me is that the report goes through one by one some of the arguments that have been historically used to - by Arabs to argue Arab intellectual - to argue why is it that democracy is not suitable for the Arab world. And what the report does, it refutes them one by one, so that it really comes out in the end with a wholehearted embrace of the concept of liberal democracy.

Embracing the concept is a long way from actually being able to implement it in practice, but there is certainly this ideological change. And what is most remarkable is that most of the authors of the report - a good number of the authors including the principal authors of the report were people that 20 years ago would never have embraced the concept of liberal democracy. There is sort of - many of them are people who really grew up intellectually, if you want, in the tradition of Arab nationalist, Arab socialist, Nasserist, and there is this really remarkable change in the thinking.

Now, these are ideas of intellectuals. The question now is how are those ideas being propagated? How is it possible for these ideas in fact to move from the realm of intellectual discussion to the realm of widespread political discussions in which not just intellectuals participate but a much broader segment of the population participates. And this is certainly a matter of concern because until now, until recently, the Arab Democrats have not - the Arab liberals have not been terribly successful in spreading their message to a broad segment of the population. I'm not sure I have quite an adequate explanation for this, why this has been the case, whether it is the cultural differences, the social distances that are very strong in many Arab countries, but there is certainly - there has been a break essentially between the discourse of the intellectuals about democracy and what transpires more at the popular level, but certainly these trends are going on.

And in addition to intellectual trends, I think that these, you know, specific events that we have seen. Let me just talk very briefly; the election in Iraq, although I would - probably I should not start with the election in Iraq because probably they are the least important in terms of the trends because they were the result of - they were not the results of a domestic process, but they were results of a foreign intervention and the question is to what extent then the domestic process is getting retrofitted into these elections. But there are certainly signs of change.

In Lebanon there are signs of change. In Egypt there are signs of change, in Palestine - although, again, there is a major factor which is sort of an exogenous factor concerning the - you know, which is the death of Arafat which certainly was bound to bring about the degree of change. We'll know a lot more after we have seen the result of the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council.

Before these trends - before these trends for change that we see, this movement or its change; this new ferment that we see in the Arab world can turn into democracy. I think there are a number, if you want, of specters that have been - that have been - that have to be put to rest, because there are a number of really serious problems that are haunting the Arab world at this point as they haunted, I'd like to point out, all democratic transitions that we have seen since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In other words, this is not something which is unique to the Arab country, except for the tradition of Islamic fundamentalism, to which I will come - to which I will come later on.

So, let me - what are the specters that are haunting democratic transformation? And the first one is the specter of sectarian strife. The mainly middle - and of course this is a more serious problem in some countries than in other countries. I don't think it's a major problem in Egypt, for example, which has a reasonably homogeneous population. It has a minority, but it's a small minority so that probably - a relatively small minority so that probably - and I'm not saying that there are no problems; there are certain problems with the rights of the Copts, but I don't think it's a kind of situation where you are likely to see sectarian strife in the real sense of the term. There is certainly a definite possibility of sectarian strife in Iraq. There is definitely a possibility of sectarian strife in Lebanon. One of the real dangers in Lebanon is that as the country moves out of the Syrian control, it's going to plunge back into some of those conflicts that invited the Syrian intervention in the first place, so this possibility of sectarian strife is there.

Related to this specter of sectarian strife is something which is beginning to be quite visible in some - in those areas that have an important Shiite population; that is, the rise of the Shi'a in the sense that there is - some people put it, there is a Shi'a moment right now; that there is a time - that this is a time when Shi'a may fact gain finally an influence which is proportional to their numbers. And there is very interesting development here that - that is probably not - that have not received much attention. If you look at Saudi Arabia and this local election council in Saudi Arabia; which have been dismissed by many, including by me in a sense because the councils are not really powerful, but one thing that has happened is that all the councils in the eastern part of the country are now controlled by Shi'a. And not only are they controlled by Shi'a - because this is where Shi'a minority is in the country - so that in fact you have - and this is significant because although the councils themselves don't have much power, there is clearly a very - you know, an assertion of Shi'a power, so certainly the specter of sectarian strife is there.

Second there is a specter of nationalism and this is related - it's not - it's nationalist in all its form and nationalism takes place - and we can see it - we can see it in Lebanon; there is a - there is a Lebanese nationalism that is manifested vis-à-vis Syria, but then there are also ethnic and sort of religious nationalism within this broader nationalism and the great danger is that it is sectarian nationalism that are going to triumph once the Syrian presence has been removed. That there is - there is a major issue of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and there is the definite possibility that that then is going to feed, particularly if the Kurds get what they want, is going to feed the nationalism of, for example, the Berbers in toward Africa, where there has been a long-standing problem.

And finally there is the specter of Islamic fundamentalism. Now, there is - because you cannot talk about a democratic opening in the Arab world without talking about a much greater role for Islamist organizations. The Islamic organizations are there and they have a considerable amount of support. Nobody knows for sure what would happen in free and fair elections if Islamist parties were allowed to register and to really compete without any hindrance. There is the example of Algeria where they essentially won the election - would have won the elections if the elections have been allowed to continue. That does not mean that that scenario is going to repeat itself; the case of Algeria has many, many peculiarities that I cannot - I don't have the time to discuss. But certainly there is this very important factor out there; that it is - that the existence of these Islamist movement with the broad base of support, essentially, is both - could be a tremendous help to the democratization of these countries if they joined the democratic trends and of course it's going to see a very serious hindrance if they don't. The most likely development we can expect is that the Islamist movement will divide and some will join the democratic trends and some will not, but I don't think at this point we are in a position to say how they will divide.

So, there are these three major issues essentially that meet - you know, that are in the way of a democratic transformation and it is how those issues are handled that is going - are - is going to determine, I think, whether the outcome of what everybody's calling the Arab Spring is going to be the Czech Republic or it's going to be the Balkans.

Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you Marina. That was superb. I think there are two questions that you didn't address which I know you have views on and which I hope we can come to in the discussion period. And the first is, of course, the difference between elections and democracy and with specific reference to Iraq whether the brave turnout in elections in Iraq represented a decision by the Iraqi people to accept the framework for constitution-making that the occupation had essentially imposed or whether it represented a vote by each community for its vision of Iraq. In the case of the Shi'a, a centrally governed, strong Iraqi state dominated in some manner by Shi'a. In the case of the Kurds, autonomy verging on independence or actual independence. And in the case of Sunni Arabs - of course we all have different views with in these communities - I'm generalizing - in the case of Sunni Arabs, neither of the above and no participation in disempowering their own community. So the question of what the significance of the elections in the Iraq was in terms of both constitution-setting and democratization and ultimately the future of Iraq, I think is something that will want to get into.

And the second issue, which has bothered me for a long time, and I hope all the panelists will in due course offered opinions on it, is whether in fact democracy is possible in a rentier state. If you consider the history of democracy in the West, the mother of parliaments, the British House of Commons was convened by the king because he required money. He couldn't get money without taxing people and in the British constitution that required the approval of the people's representatives. That there was always a tremendous tension between the Commons, which wanted to restrict the king's spending authority - the king wanted castles and the navy and fast horses and fast women and lots of parties and the Commons didn't want to pay for that - and the king who, as I say, wanted to spend a lot.

Now we find in the rentier state where experiments with democracy are occurring, as in Kuwait or in Bahrain, the money comes from the king or from the emir and the parliament distributes it, so the king or the emir doesn't want to spend money, but the parliament does. So we have an inversion of the normal situation and there is the question of whether accountable democratic government is in fact possible given the structural inversion. So that is the second question I hope we will come to is the course of discussion, but again I commend you on a really superb survey of the changing intellectual climate and the challenges that the Arab world faces as it undergoes significant change.

I'm going to ask Jillian now to come in with a discussion focused primarily on two states that are not rentier states, although they both have natural resources to one degree or another that are significant; namely Yemen and Jordan and of course other observations about the region and if you want to offer an opinion on the rentier states that would be welcome.

MS. SCHWEDLER: Thank you. Well, I think my comments follow nicely on the previous comments and I tried to focus my comment tightly around the subject which is, you know, what is it that we're actually seing? Is there a rising tide of democracy or is it a mirage? And in your opening comments you made reference to this teleology, which I think is tremendously imported because when we look at a lot of the transitions in the region, they're stalled and we sort of stop there. We say, "Oh, we're not making progress. We're stalled." And I think that's right, but I think you end up missing a lot of activity and a lot different practices and developments that are emerging even in stalled context; particularly in states that have brought initial openings - opened up the political sphere a little bit and stopped. The stalled metaphor doesn't really capture what's going on. A tremendous amount of change has happened in the decade since Jordan and Yemen both initiated openings and didn't really push them very far. So I wanted to use those cases as an example.

In the stalled transitions, we tend to focus on elections, as you mentioned. You know, how important are the elections? Is electoral politics really making legislation, et cetera? And typically the answer is no. In Jordan we've constructed a nice system where you can have, you know, free and fair elections; the electoral system's structured in a way to produce particular results. And in the early nineties we also introduced legislation whereby anything passed by the lower house has to be approved by the appointed upper house, thereby ensuring that nothing the king wants is really going to ever get out of the house, the king's never going to have to really use veto because you've created a mechanism there.

I think that's all very important and that's been the focus of our attention but I really wanted to try and talk about two things that I think get lost or aren't systematically addressed, and just make two points.

The first, I think, is the location of the ruling régime vis-à-vis the sphere political contestation is extremely important. And what I mean by this - and this is Jordan and Yemen are very instructive in examining this - they're both cases of sort of top-down, elite-led political openings for very different reasons. They both stalled in the '90s, the mid-'90s, for very different reasons. But you see a very different issue at stake in terms of the régime vis-à-vis the elections and that is this: in Yemen, the régime claims legitimacy because it wins elections. In Jordan, that's not the case. In Jordan, the king sits above the sphere political contestation and that sets serious implications to for the activities of opposition parties, movements within that public sphere, political activities. In Yemen alliance with the régime is the only game in town. You are either allied with the régime or you're out. There is no king party, obviously you have pro-régime parliamentarians, et cetera, so you have a block, but there's no ruling Hashemite party in Jordan that you are either allied with or you're out of power. And I think that has significant implications for the types and quality of engagement in the diversity of political parties between those cases.

So Yemen would be a case like Egypt; you'd have that at stake. And I think the régime has different issues at stake in winning elections. Of course Jordan structures the electoral system to produce particular results, but again there's something very different at stake for Jordan in the outcome in allowing a diversity of voices, where in a Yemen you're seeing more and more people who want to be politically engaged. You go over to the ruling party or you're out and that's been particularly the case since the defeat of Yemeni socialist party in an armed conflict, but essentially you have one ruling party in Yemen and the Islamist party - the Islah party - is really caught with this: do we continue to try allied with it or do we move to the opposition? But again the stakes are really high in it.

In Yemen - in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front can be a loyal opposition party. It can ally with different parties; it can be pro-régime on certain issues. And so I think that the sort of location of the political party or the régime to the sphere political contestation is very important; again, even in stalled contexts, even though we're not seeing the sort of democracy move forward to the end of history. And I think that bears serious consideration across - I think you might see interesting trends and I think that bears much more serious attention than we've given it.

The second issue I wanted to raise is that outside the sphere of formal political contestation in terms of elections and even to some extent attached to that, we're seeing significant changes in political activities in both of these countries. Again, the focus is on the fact that the processes aren't going forward and that's an important point and I'm not suggesting that we don't pay attention to that, but in both the countries, with an important difference, you are seeing the emergence of the Islamic-leftist cooperation and it's not only in these two countries. You're actually seen it in a large part of the region.

Now, I'm engaged in a collaborative project exploring this throughout the region, but - so I still want - I'm going to just pose some possibilities of the significance of this with the caveat that obviously a lot more work needs to be done. But you're seeing instances to take Jordan, in- After the '89 election, the Islamists held approximately 40 percent of the seats. Leftists, nationalists, socialists, liberal parties and sort of other opposition parties held about 20 percent of the seats. So together that gives you 60 percent of the seats; you know, not such a happy situation for the régime. Of course, we introduced a new electoral law before the '93 elections and you came up with opposition parties with about a third of the assembly and that's a nice number. You know, it gives you two thirds, you can pass what you want and you relegate opposition parties to the small minorities.

The importance of this is that had the Islamists and leftists allied in the '89 parliament, they could have done a lot and they didn't ally. They would not talk to each other; they did not meet with each other even though they even actually shared some common interests; particularly around the question of Palestine, around the question of Iraq, et cetera. There were no cooperative activities. After the '93 elections, they together formed an opposition block and on a regular basis to this day, every month, all the opposition parties go to the headquarters of the Islamic Action Front and meet there and these are enemies, you know, they oppose each other ideologically, they oppose each other on a lot of issues, but they meet. They engage in sort of a cooperative activity on very specific issues, for very specific ends. Again, they're not an alliance. The Islamists and Jordan are clearly the dominant opposition party. But I think that's really significant; the sort of fear of engaging with your enemy, the sort of ideological enemies, it's not happening. There's an evolution that's taking place and they cooperate on a number of issues on protests, you know again, they have a lot of issues in common, but where they didn't cooperate before, they're willing to cooperate now.

I think this potentially - and again this is where I'm cautious about overstating it - but potentially if you're talking about democracy, is it a rising tide or a mirage, the emergence and spread of these types of activities may be extremely significant. They bode very well for question of tolerance, live and let live, cooperation: the types of activities we really would like to see if were going to build truly a democratic society or societies. And these types of activities are completely lost in our attention on elections, on stalled democracies, et cetera. And so I think we need to look systematically at that.

And I'll just end by way of the caveat of what happened in Yemen and what is happening in Yemen - great - and this ties in with my first point about the location of the régime to the sphere of political contestation.

The Islah party in Yemen is not actually a cohesive party the way the Islamist party is in Jordan. It's a number of different tribal groups, different Islamist groups that you know - sometimes the Islamist groups struggle with the Wahhabism versus the Zaydi trend and all these things. So it's a complicated party, but it served - from the beginning of the unification it served as an ally to Ali Abdullah Saleh's ruling party, when the socialists were in the political sphere.

With the defeat of the socialists, Ali Abdullah Saleh did not need the Islamist party anymore as an allied because he was really the only game in town, and so over the years you've actually seen a number Islamists argue whether we should remain allied with the ruling party or whether we should break off and join the opposition party and a number of the leaders within the party, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood leaders from that trend, have been exploring ties with YSP leaders - they socialist leaders - pushing that forward. And there's strong other voices in the Islah party who are adamantly opposed to this.

So pushing these cooperative activities forward, Jarallah Omar, who is a deputy director of the YSP in Yemen, was invited in December of 2002 to address the Islah general assembly and it was really a huge thing to invite a socialist to come and address the assembly. And he addressed the assembly and he was shot and killed as he left the stage by people with in the party, by someone within the party, but representing a strong portion of the party that reject this type of cooperation.

So I raise this example to say, let's not make too much of it; let's not say this is happy pluralism flourishing, but there's something happening here that gets lost in the attention to just progress towards democracy. And I think looking across a number of cases systematically at these types of different cooperative activities that we seem to have missed - looking at these, what they mean, studying than systematically and comparatively I think is going to tell us an awful lot about this question of how deep pluralism, tolerance, these types of practices and norms are becoming more and more common. And I will end there.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, I think that is an absolutely fascinating excursion into two examples that we really don't pay enough attention to and when we come to discuss Iraq, I think probably this is quite relevant because you're in a sense describing, if I understood you, a situation in which despite really seminal differences between parties and individuals, they accept the framework of the contest and are therefore able to form shifting coalitions on specific issues, which sounds like normal democratic politics to me. And whether that is the case in Iraq or not, it's going to be fairly key as we either move forward or don't in the coming months.

We turn now to Shibley Telhami who as I said, probably doesn't need an introduction; therefore I won't give him one. But Shibley is going to talk about I think the broad reason and introduce some polling data. Shibley?

SHIBLEY TELHAMI: Thanks very much. First, I think we all agree no matter how we define democracy that the Middle East badly needs political and economic reform and that we all agree, I believe, that most people in the region desperately want political and economic reform. I think those are important points to begin with.

What I'd like to focus on though is two aspects of this issue. One is the extent to which American foreign policy is linked to democratic moves in the region and number two, how the public sees both the issue of democracy and the American role in that issue. And I begin first with the American role and I think that in our public discourse clearly there's been a very quick move to claim all of these things that had transpired that are seen to be moves towards democracy in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the Palestinian areas, Iraq. And I think, first, one of the failure in this discourse is to differentiate between the impact of the Iraq War itself on the issue of political reform in the region and between the advocacy of democracy as a priority in American foreign policy and the actual consequence for political reform in the region. Those are not two - not the same. And I think that to begin with I would argue that the consequence of the Iraq War has been largely negative on the issue of reform in the Middle East in the short-term; that the consequence of the advocacy of democracy has been more positive than negative on reform in the Middle East. Let me give you examples of what I mean and how the region sees it.

I do public opinion polls in largely in six Arab countries that include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. And in general I ask them questions about social-political issues and foreign policy, the U.S.; the role of the media. In 2004, which is the last one I took - I have not done when in the last few months. I intend to do when in the next few months to see whether there's been measured change, but as of 2004 when you ask people in the Middle East - in the Arab world - in those six countries: do you believe that the Middle East is more democratic or less democratic than it was before the Iraq War? The vast majority of people in every country believe the Middle East had become less democratic than it was before the Iraq War. And now, when you ask why that is the case - why is that the public perception, certainly part of it is probably psychological. I mean you've had 90 percent of the people really oppose the war and it's very hard to then come back and say, well, something good came out of it. There is probably some of that.

But in the reality I think there's something objective that they're seeing that transpired just before the war, during the war, and immediately after the war. That is, you had a situation where 90 percent of the public passionately opposed the Iraq War. They believe that it went against Arab interests. Arab governments had to make a strategic decision whether they support the U.S. or not support the U.S, and they made a strategic decision generally to support the U.S. and in the process they became far more insecure; they preempted organizations, they arrested, they limited the freedom of speech and in the case of Egypt, extended emergency law on the eve of the Iraq War. And all of that took place, and that's what the public sees in general, and that is what the public is reacting to. So, in general, I think one can argue think the War has had, at least in the short-term, clearly more negative impact on reform than anything else.

Now the advocacy of democracy, which I see as a completely separate issue from the Iraq War - one can even argue that the Iraq War delayed the possibilities on democracy if that had become the primary advocacy issue prior to the war. The advocacy of democracy has had a generally a positive impact, although I think it is sometimes exaggerated, but certainly more good and bad and I'd like to articulate some of that.

First, I want to state that again as of 2004, based on that survey, when you ask Arabs whether they believe that American policy intends to spread democracy in the Middle East, the vast majority of Arabs say no. So there is a mistrust. They don't - the public in the region does not see the advocacy of democracy as a priority in American foreign policy and they're basing that ultimately on a historical trend; the reversals in the past, the contradictions, the double standards in a variety of issues. We can name them and they're known, but in general they think that this is a tactical move by the U.S. Now, some people do you believe it and I think most people even who don't believe it are not unhappy to see it because they - it could have positive consequences for them and some of the consequences are clear. But before I talk about the consequences, I want to differentiate some of those cases that have been talked about.

The Iraq one Marina's already talked about, it really is the consequence of the war itself and how we interpret that is not clear yet. I think in general having elections is good; people are inspired by having elections. I think people in the Arab world are somewhat inspired, but the general interpretation in the Arab world is that you still have an American occupation; that this is a Shi'a empowerment and that there is an intense to weaken the Arabs in the Muslim world, that's an interpretation that's also prevalent. In the case of the Palestinian areas, I think it's fair to say that it's not a direct consequence of the advent of democracy. There you've had the Palestinians had elections the middle of 1990's. They have been asking for elections for a couple of years, but they were not given elections either by the Israelis or supported by the U.S. while Arafat was still there for the fear that he would win and therefore be empowered and as a consequence, in fact, there was a delay in having elections until Arafat died and that opened up the possibility of elections.

It was a completely different circumstance in the Palestinian election. In the case of Lebanon, clearly it's not an issue of democracy, but it is important for democracy in the sense of having people stand up to people in authority, taking risks, and that's inspiring. I think the view of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese taking to the streets is consequential for people in the Arab world.

But if you look at the responsiveness of Syria to that, one can argue that the American factor was only one part of it. Clearly, the demonstrations themselves were first and foremost driven by the assassination of Rafik Hariri, but the Syrian responsiveness was not in general related only to the American position, but it was related to the fact that you had a UN resolution and a French-American position. The Syrians could have probably withstood American pressure if they had unanimous support in Europe and the Middle East and in that sense I think we really ought to be careful here in terms of what we see in consequence and relationship to Syria in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

I think you can argue that certainly there is domestic pressure to reform, and in the end both of these governments are responding, but you can also argue that these governments did respond to some pressure of the United States of America. They believe that they had to; that the U.S. is making this a priority, that the president of the United States needs to have something for political reasons at least.

I don't think these governments believe that the Bush administration is advocating democracy as an end in itself. What they believe is that the Bush administration is using it to get strategic cooperation from them, number one; and number two, to claim political credit at home. And what each one of them has done is give the Bush administration enough to claim political credit. And the problem, I think, for the Bush administration will be once they move a country from the negative ledger to the positive ledger, their hands are tied. It's very hard politically to move it back into the negative ledger.

This we've seen with Libya because it was claimed there was no democratic reform, it was claimed on weapons of mass destruction. It's now on the positive ledger. The minute you move it back to the left, you lose ground politically and so now your hands are tied. I think we have a problem, but allow me just to make one final comment on the unintended consequences.

One, it is clear that whatever the intent for the advocacy for democracy, I think it opens up space. It takes away the Tiananmen Square option for governments in the Middle East and that does allow people to be more empowered to test the waters. They take more risk, I think, and we'll see how that unfolds and I think it is a consequence.

But the second impact that I think most of us haven't thought about enough and that is that in our own discourse - it's been profoundly important and helpful in our own discourse in America. It's been profoundly important and helpful because it has overshadowed the "clash of civilizations" thesis. Suddenly Arabs are normal people in the American discourse. It's not the barrier of culture, it's not the barrier of religion, it is really just bad governments and people. We talk about an Arab Spring like we talk about a Prague Spring. This is an incredibly helpful discourse in America and it might in the end also in a way reduce the sharpness of the clash of civilization on the other side.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, Shibley, and particularly for that, I think, very important last point. As we look at the issue of democracy or the appearance of democracy or the feigning of democracy in the Arab world, I think I at least am reminded of scene in The Wizard of Oz where there is some little man off on the side and manipulating the whole thing and he doesn't want to be noticed. I wonder sometimes when I talk to people out there how real all this is and how much is a shadow play for the benefit of an audience over here. Just as you suggested, some of it on our side is probably more directed at feeling good about ourselves than it is actually doing anything in the region. I'm sure we will return to these things as we go forward.

Saad Eddin, you've had a chance to listen to I think three very different, but very illuminating, presentations and on the basis of your experience in the Egyptian - your country. I know you are an Egyptian patriot who has been very outspoken in Egypt, just as outspoken as you've been here. What is your view?

SAAD EDDIN IBRAHIM: Thank you and good morning everybody. Based are my experience, I feel good. That's to start with. I feel good for what is happening in the region. I feel good for what is happening to me personally because two years ago I was in a courtroom like this pending trial for my advocacy of democracy, and it was my third trial. And that third trial could have sealed two previous trials condemning me to seven years in prison. The fact that the Egyptian high court reversed the previous rulings and acquitted me and my colleagues felt very good. It made me feel that maybe our fight, our long fight for democracy in Egypt and the Arab world is not in vain.

True, one day after my acquittal the Iraq War broke out, and I was opposed to the war. However, as a social scientist I couldn't help entertain the notion that awful as it is - a war - it may in fact have some unintended consequences that are positive for the region. Now that is not a very popular intellectual position to take nowadays, but I'm telling you my very honest feeling when the war broke out.

I have to tell you that when I was in prison I wrote a letter to Saddam Hussein advising him or pleading with him to step down voluntarily to avert the war. Of course, he didn't listen to me; nor did President Bush in my plea to roll back the preparation for the war. But that - having done that in prison to the amazement of my victimizers, who thought that this is very audacious of me to be confined to a two-by-two meter cell and asking a head of a state to step down and asking another head of state - a super-state, superpower - to roll back preparations for war. But I'm just giving you that personal, existential experience in - as a pretext to make two or three points about the subject at hand.

Whatever happened happened. Today, we do have real, real signs of advances toward liberation, toward freedom, toward democracy. Is it a mirage? No, definitely not a mirage. The thousands of people who descended in the streets of Beirut in defiance of Syrian occupation to demonstrate and to demand sovereignty back to their country and out to Syrian occupation after nearly thirty years, these are the middle-class kids that we as social scientists always thought they would never really amount to anything - very indifferent, very self-absorbed in their pleasures, and so on. But all of a sudden a middle-class formation from all sects of Lebanon at a given moment, of course triggered by the tragic assassination of Rafik Hariri, stood up and said we want to reclaim our country, we want to free our country, we want our freedom back.

So, here you have in Lebanon real; nobody can doubt that. You have Iraq: real. Eight and a half million Iraqis braving out, despite terrorism, despite violence, despite threats, despite their hatred of occupation, and yet they went out and voted very proudly that the footage you have all seen on television tells us that there is something real there. Something that could not have happened only three, four years ago. So here you have another very real thing.

And then you have the Palestine. You have the Saudi election. You have demonstrations in Egypt demanding free and open and honest elections and demanding change of the constitution and saying "no more" to Mubarak. Raising that very interesting slogan that many of you probably have learned by now, Kifya, K-I-F-Y-A, meaning "Enough. Enough is enough." And that very simple slogan will probably enter the English language, or all the European languages, as the second probably most well-known word in Arabic after "Intifada." So, 10, 15 years ago introduced the word intifada - uprising - and now this year the word Kifya.

The interesting thing about Kifya in Egypt. It was Kifya to Mubarak's 24 year of autocratic rule, the third longest rule in Egypt's 6,000-year history. The first being Ramases II the longest, followed by Muhammed Ali who ruled Egypt for 40 years. And then we have Mubarak 24 years. That's the third longest.

For Egyptians to demonstrate, even in small numbers, to break the fear barrier and to continue to do so for now three months continuously, small groups here and there continue to demonstrate. The Muslim Brothers demonstrate, the leftists demonstrate, the Nasserites demonstrate. The judges - that is the latest - the judiciary in Egypt is rising up also in defiance, demanding its own independence - wanting to restore its own independence.

What I'm saying really is that the changes that we see in the Middle East, in the Arab world, are real and therefore, yes, they may not amount to a Spring yet, but differences are not a mirage. And definitely the long winter is over in the Middle East, in the Arab world.

All right what are the problems building? Marina mentioned some of them. Jillian mentioned others. Shibley mentioned the overall context in which the Arabs are perceiving what is happening to them and looking at the outside and the role of the outside. And these are precisely the three issues that I'd like to conclude with.

One, are the people - are the forces - civil society forces, democratic groups in different countries in the Middle East ready to take over from the autocratic regimes? Interesting question, important question and, I would say, it varies. The answer to the question varies from one country to the other. In some countries I think they are ready, like in Lebanon for example: a country that has a long experience with democracy and with pluralism. I think they are ready in Egypt. I think they are ready in Iraq. Definitely ready in Palestine. Other countries I'm not so sure. Saudi Arabia, I'm not so sure. Other, Libya I'm not so sure. Tunisia I'm not so sure. But anyhow it varies from one country to the other.

The second question has to do with the role of the Islamists in this overall scheme of government, democratic government. Should they be allowed? What do we expect? What to anticipate? And then - and here I speak as an activist more than an ideologue - I say Islamists on principle and on pragmatic grounds must be included in any democratic transformation of the region. One, for the reasons that were mentioned by our colleagues: they are substantial, they are there on the ground, they are disciplined, they are committed and they have been performing very important social services for the poor, for the needy and they have managed to project an image of a corruption-free political force in contrast to regimes that are plagued by corruption. So for these reasons I think they are substantial constituencies and they have to be included in any scheme for political governance.

The third point that I'd like to just mention and we probably can discuss that: the role of the foreign power - external power. The chair mentioned that the Bush administration likes to take credit for everything that's happening in the Middle East, everything that's positive happening in the Middle East and that is very troubling issue whenever I'm asked how much you give in the way of credit. And the best I could think of is as much credit as a midwife. Bush is not responsible for the pregnancy, but he may be responsible, or may be credited, for the delivery. In other words, all of the thick trends that have existed for years - people have been fighting for democracy for years. People have gone to prison for years. People have died for years. For Bush to come at the very end and claim that he takes credit for all of that is probably an overstatement and I would like to say that, yes, the outside has a role and the outside can help us to continue our march toward democracy.

The only thing we ask the outside is not to send armies, guns, tanks, planes, but to just stop supporting dictators because it was autocracy in the Arab world that fed the theocracy in the Middle East. So between the theocrats and the autocrats I think we were beleaguered for a long time, but now it may be the moment for the democrats and if the outside powers can help that is really what they are.

Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you very much. We now come to the question and comment period. I think one question that occurred to me as Saad Ibrahim was speaking was whether his very sophisticated construct of democracy indeed is what other people in the region are talking about. People power meaning the power of the common man versus the autocrat is one thing and a commitment to limited government under procedures of law and to participation in decision-making on a mass level is another. And I think, in this regard, again we come back and I guess we will discuss the difference between elections and democracy.

Marina noted that in Saudi Arabia, in the eastern province the results of the municipal council elections was to bring Shi'a elements into office. In the nudged (ph), in the central region of Saudi Arabia, it brought a largely Wahhabi extremists into office and it's just resulted in some people being killed in Mecca as the election proceeded. And I don't know what the result is there, but it raises a question of whether elections, in fact, are not a mechanism in the case of Saudi Arabia for redefinition of politics from its traditional tribal base to an ideological base. And whether that's a good thing or not is not clear to me.

So, we come now to questions and comments and here the procedure is very simple. You raise your hand, I notice you and I give you a wink, or I point at you, or I look angry at you when you know you've been noticed and I write you down and then I'll call on you in order of the first person who had his hand up was Jeff. You have to come up and tell us who you are at the microphone, even though I suspect I know who you are.

Q: Jeff Steinberg with Executive Intelligence Review Magazine. I worry probably because I'm sort of inside-the-beltway-centric a bit too much that the leading advocates of democracy here in town are among the people who are most vociferously opposed to the Israel/Palestine peace process, and I wonder whether or not there's been sort of a bait-and-switch pulled off by people like Elliot Abrams, Natan Sharansky who has been touted around Washington as the democracy and anti-tyranny guru.

It strikes me that the best way to fuel all of these various different kinds of processes that the panelists have talked about would be if there was a fundamental breakthrough on the Israel-Palestine peace process, the establishment of a genuine two-state solution which would have, in my view, more of an impact on spreading the opportunities for democracy. And so I worry that the people most opposed to this around here seem to be the biggest advocates of forcing democracy down the throats of regimes in the Middle East. I'd like the panelists to comment on that observation.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you and I think Shibley will want to lead off. Others will have comments.

MR. TELHAMI: You know, I don't know what motivates most people who advocate democracy in the Middle East. I suspect that in Washington and around the Bush administration there are very differing kinds of motivations by different people. I mean, clearly, there is an assumption that the president himself is behind this notion of spreading democracy; clearly accepted the notion and made it the primary issue in his second term inaugural speech. I don't suspect that he himself is advancing it as a way of avoiding the Arab-Israeli issue. Perhaps he doesn't believe the Arab-Israeli issue is a top priority as much as I do or some of the analysts do, but there probably are other motives.

Now, I have to say that there's always a fear and a danger, and I think we've seen that in the Iraq War, that by highlighting some other problem it's taking away from a core problem like the Arab-Israeli issue. And I think you can argue that a lot of Arabs' opposition to the Iraq War, including governments initially, hesitation was tied to the notion that administration should have spent the capital that came out of 9/11 first to resolve the Arab-Israeli issue and that was a distraction that was going to delay the resolution to the Arab-Israeli issue. And you can make an argument that that was a legitimate position to take, but what you don't want to make the argument is that because there's the Arab-Israeli issue, the advocacy of democracy is not legitimate.

I mean, I think that, you know, the problem obviously in the region, and it's an indigenous problem, is not to allow the Arab-Israeli issue to be a detriment to the pursuit of democracy and I don't think we should - regardless of what the motives are, we should separate the two.

I happen to think that, in the end, the view of the United States in the Arab world is, in large part formed through the painful prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict more than any other. Authoritarianism is important and the notion the U.S. is bolstering authoritarianism, but you know, the oddity of it is that even the authoritarian issue is connected in the public mind in the Arab world to the Arab-Israeli issue because it is thought to be essentially making deals with governments who are helpful on the Arab-Israeli issue in ways that is postponing a solution, and so the public sees the two in a connected fashion. I don't think that the view of the U.S. in the Middle East would significantly improve so long as there is a bloodshed on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

MR. FREEMAN: I'm going to ask Saad Eddin to comment, but I will add my own thought that the question is a serious one, mainly because for a long time while Mr. Arafat was alive, it appeared that the White House and Mr. Sharon were busily redefining land for peace as the formula for peace between the Palestinians and Israelis to make it Palestinian democratization for Israeli tolerance of Palestinian leadership and some sort of deal that might be done. So land for peace became reform for coexistence or something like that. I think that was an evasion and I think it was deliberately directed at outlasting Yassir Arafat.

Whether the president now continues to have that set of priorities is an open question and, I believe, will be discussed among other places at Crawford on Monday when Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia meets him because, as Shibley said and as we all know, this is the central question touching on the issues that we're discussing throughout the whole region.

Saad Eddin?

MR. IBRAHIM: The addition I will have to that is where the Mubarak regime plays with this issue. For a long time, the demand for democracy and for opening up the political system was said to have to wait until the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved. And, as we all know, the Arab-Israeli conflict is now entering into its sixth year - nearly 60 years and God knows when it will be resolved and will it be resolved to the satisfaction of the autocrats who are out of work.

But it has been used cynically to postpone before, and I think even our Palestinian colleagues, Hannan Ashrawi and others, finally made the very brave statement last summer saying we don't want Arab rulers to use us as Palestinians as an excuse to postpone democracy in their countries. If they have reasons to postpone it they can state their own reason, but don't use us, please don't use us. And that I thought was very good for us as democracy advocates. And therefore - and that when our foreign minister was here two months ago, every time they brought the question of Haim Menhor (ph) who was being detained, one of our opposition leaders, he wanted to talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of Egypt in bringing together the parties to Sharm el Sheik. Three times, you know, he made that over and over.

Q: My name is Tamal Verazzi (ph). I'm an Arab journalist. There's one question which always repeated in the Arab press that anybody who like take ideas or meet with American officials about democracy and so on, especially I mean, like Saad Eddin Ibrahim or other, they call them the people who is - (foreign phrase). That means taking strengths from the foreigners and, of course, we have case in point the Iraqi occupation how Chalaby and others gave false information the Americans to invade and so on. So how can any democrat - Arab democrat - really be talking the American and so on and so on without burning himself the (recent ?) Arab street?

MR. FREEMAN: Who would like to start?

MR. TELHAMI: Well, I'd be glad to take this on a little bit. I think there is some truth to that, of course, and we, particularly at times when there is strong hostility to the U.S. and particularly during the Iraq War. I think the Iraq War clearly made Saad - I can't speak for him, but people like him in Egypt had a tough time during the Iraq War and there were many people who clearly were advocating democracy and the fact that the U.S. took claim to that issue at a time when it was very unpopular because (this ?) foreign policy made it more difficult. So, yes, there are times when it is difficult. But, it is also clear that in general if you look at it in a long-term perspective and you look at some other examples of history, whether it's Argentina, Latin America or other parts, even those who are seen to be delegitimatized in the context of political system are in the long-term seen to be reformers with consequences.

International - there is an international role and it is important. People - when there is momentum for change, when people start challenging the paradigm, things could change. So, in the short term it's a barrier, but the question of course that is open is whether there is a trend of empowerment. That these people are going to have to get some source of power.

The fact is, whether you want it or not, the international pressure that did result in part in the release of Saad Eddin Ibrahim - of course it was a legal issue as well, but in the end, I think one can make an argument that there was a connection and that connection has consequences for others, including those who don't want to be directly associated with the United States.

MR. FREEMAN: Marina?

MS. OTTAWAY: I think part - you know, certainly that problem does exist, but part of the solution, I think, is for more and more people advocating reforming the Arab world to seek contact with the United States, even if they don't agree on a lot of issues. I think one - we all need to get over the idea that talking to somebody means agreeing with what they have to say. The U.S. has to talk to the Islamist movements even if they don't - you know, that does not mean having to agree with them. The democrats have to talk to the United States. The people who are advocating reform have to talk to the United States and to Europeans, even if they don't agree on a lot of points. I mean, you don't have to agree in order to talk in other words.

MR. FREEMAN: Jillian?

MS. SCHWEDLER: I would just add a sentence, I mean that I've definitely found that in my experience, and I've been told anecdotes such as the worst thing you can do for an opposition movement is either to have the government endorse it or the U.S. endorse it and it just destroys it at that.

But I think a lot of it is tied up in Shibley's first comments: the extent to which it's not contact with the West, or the United States, it's suspicion about the U.S.'s true intentions. So if you're working with U.S. agents or talking to representatives from the United States who are not really interested in promoting democracy, then it's clearly problematic. I think if the U.S. is able to reshape its image and demonstrate somehow that it really is, in fact, pushing this forward, I think that prohibition and the public's fear will evaporate very quickly.

MR. FREEMAN: It seems to me that there is a very interesting phenomenon internationally which the Japanese call giatsu, foreign pressure, and governments typically like foreign pressure from friendly countries when they want to do something, but don't have the courage to do it on their own. So they want to do something and they do it and blame it on foreigners because the foreigners put pressure on them. But, it only works when the foreigners are seen to be well-intentioned, and unfortunately, at the moment, the United States is not seen in the region we're talking about to be well-intentioned.

The irony is that many of the advocates of democracy in the region, were they to come to power, would not accommodate the United States as the autocrats have done on issues like Iraq, but would act like the Turkish Parliament did in refusing cooperation rather than offering clandestine collaboration as was the case by most of the autocrats.

Saad Eddin, since this is in a way aimed partly at your dilemma, would you like to comment?

MR. IBRAHIM: I don't have a dilemma. That's a dilemma is that I don't have a dilemma. My agenda's fairly clear: I am fighting for democracy. I don't care what my detractors - autocrats - say. If you are going to condition your behavior at what your enemies are saying, you're not going to be serving your cause. So the moral clarity is very important when it comes to issues like this.

Thank you.

Q: Good morning, I'm Mike Harwood from the Foreign Service Institute and my question concerns the role of the media. You touched on it really briefly during your talk. What is the role of the media in shaping Arab opinion in this country or around the world? Responsible citizens will take a bit from column left and some from column moderate and some from column right and kind of make an informed decision on how they want to vote or perceive what's going on in their particular country. Is that the case and is that possible in the Arab world right now?

Secondly, is there any kind of trend that you see in the Arab media moving away from just anti-Americanism toward pro-democracy, or is it possible to have a foot in both camps?

MR. TELHAMI: I'm glad he asked that question because it gives me a chance to plug my forthcoming book which is, "Reflections of Hearts and Minds: Media Opinion and Identity in the Arab World."

In fact, actually most of these public opinion polling that I've been doing really were intended to see whether there's a relationship between what the media puts - what people watch on the media and their opinion, but also on political identity; how political identity is affected by the media.

I can tell you one central finding. There is no statistically significant relationship between what people watch on television and their attitudes toward the United States. There is no statistically significant relationship. You can say what you want to say about the media, and some are better than others in the Middle East and aggregately it's far better than it was a decade ago. There's no question in my mind. But the attitudes toward the U.S. are not a function of the media, and I think I show that very clearly both in terms of what I measured statistically in the context of public opinion polling, but also by going outside the Middle East to control it in other segments of the population to find out whether my findings are correct. I think I make a very strong and persuasive case, I believe, that there is no relationship in general.

I think what I've called issues of core identity of - people have predispositions based on a whole host of issues related to policy, sense of self, historical trends and when they watch the media, they generally go to the media that reflects those opinions on those core issues. The media affects you on matters that you don't care as much about or you don't know as much about, but you in general if you have pre-formed views on issues that are related to what I call your core identity, you are going to watch the media that is going to reflect your view.

In America, if you are a strong Republican or a strong Democrat and we're in the heat of the battle of an election, when you watch a television story that is a negative for the Democrats and you're a Democrat, you don't say I'm going to vote for the Rublicans, you say it's a biased station. And that happens on every single issue that people care about in general, so I think there is a huge exaggeration of the relationship between the media and public opinion particularly on attitudes toward the U.S. I think it's an excuse for poor policy, we shouldn't allow it to be - to take away from the debate on this issue.

Second, I think there's a misunderstanding about where the media does have an impact as a phenomenon. I mean, I think if there's a - if you look at the Middle East in media today and say what's different from 10 years ago, it is now market driven. Not financially driven, but viewership driven, and therefore it's putting out what people want to see far more than before by virtue of the competitive market because people have choices. And the bottom line of that is that when they show things that we consider militant, like their reporting bloodshed in the West Bank and Gaza, which we think is inciting them, that's a function of the state of affairs that is taking place. Al Jazeera Television, which is now being accused of being part of the anti-American machine - we forget, first of all, that it's sponsored by one of the most pro-American governments in the region that is hosting American forces on its soil, and we also forget that in the late-1990's, al Jazeera was accused of being an American agent and "an Israel agent" because it was seen to be normalizing Israel in the Arab world. It was the first one to put the Israel issue on in a big way with having an al Jazeera representative in the West Bank and the Knesset and covering Israel in a normal fashion - that it was getting criticism for that coverage. That's what the public wanted and today when we have the demonstrations in Beirut and we talk about we want it to be empowering, inspiring, al Jazeera is there to cover that in a way that is, or al Arabiya or any of the satellite television, they're going to be there to cover it.

So the fact that the public responds - they're not responding to the media, they're responding to the event. The media now conveys the event, whether it's positive or negative. The fact that you have Abu Ghraib prison coverage is not the troubling part to me. What's troubling to me is that the Abu Ghraib scandal takes place and, frankly, when it does, I as a citizen, when something like that happens, want it out there. I want to see it and while there is a lot of coverage - you know, a lot of criticism of the media covering a lot of bloodshed in the war, I'm one actually to want to see bloodshed in war because I don't think war should be so sterile because they are horrible, they are painful, they are troubling. And I think I as a citizen want to see it, want to know about it. I don't want to be separated from it. I think we have a different philosophy on that. We can argue about it, but I do think that the media is blamed unnecessarily for state of affairs that is there for other reasons.

MR. FREEMAN: Marina?

MS. OTTAWAY: I just want to - I don't like to take issue essentially with your characterization of how Americans get their information picking from here and there because, in fact, what opinion polls here that is particularly work done by this project for international public opinion on this issue show exactly the same thing that Shipley was talking about concerning Arabs: that people - there are very clear differences of views, for example on international issues, but a lot of it was on the war in Iraq between the people who watch, for example, Fox News and people who watch the NewsHour. But, that is not because their ideas are shaped by those different channels they watch; it's more because people who have certain views go to a certain station and people who have different views go to different kind of stations.

In fact, that is quite clear that if you ever find yourself - I have been a couple - several times, on the Washington Journal on C-Span. The Washington Journal is quite interesting because they have two call-in lines. Call this line if you are a Bush supporter and call the other if you are a Democrat and it's quite clear from the questions that are asked that people have access to very different sources of information; that the factual basis of their questions are totally opposite.

Q: (Off mike.) (Laughter.)

MR. FREEMAN: Well, I think we should move to another topic, or maybe it's the same one. Tell us who you are first.

Q: Jim Plant, Cambridge Energy Research Associates. It is a different topic. The panel, quite appropriately, has generally taken favorable notice this morning of the elections held in Palestine earlier this year with the result of the election as the president of the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas. More recently, his authority seems to being challenged in various ways and to the point that one could almost say that it's being threatened. In addition there's another election coming up and that is for the head of Fatah, and it's not clear that Mahmoud Abbas is necessarily going to win that election. If he doesn't, for the first time, those two roles would be separated. Of course, they were combined in Yasser Arafat. That would also undercut his authority.

I would be particularly interested in Shibley Telhami's view on, first of all, the short-term trend toward democracy in the Palestinian territories. How viable is it? And, how viable is Mahmoud Abbas in his present role?

MR. TELHAMI: That's a really tough question and let me just say that part of the problem that I saw early on after the election of Mahmoud Abbas was that if you look at the Palestinian agenda; that is, what the public wants, they're looking at primarily two issues that have risen to the top. The first is the obvious one which is they want to see relief and change and promise hope for a real state - end of Israeli occupation. But the second is corruption issue.

Whatever it is, it's become a hugely important political issue particularly in connection with Fatah. And most of the analysts who saw the results in Gaza in which Hamas made some significant gains locally connect those gains with the issue of corruption far more than they connect them with philosophical shift toward Hamas within the Palestinian areas.

So, the challenge for Abu Mazen was always going to be how quickly he can deliver on those two. The problem is that he's entirely dependent on those two. In part on Israel, but in part on the very institutions that he needs to reform.
That means that if he's going to reform the security services, he needs them because he's one man. If he's going to reform Fatah bureaucracy, he needs them. If he's going to reform the Legislative Council, he needs them. And, so the question is, can he use the popular sentiment that is so strongly in favor of reform to take a populist approach, to do some high level kind of events in relation to fighting corruption and take risks, therefore, with his own constituency and, therefore, perhaps take a chance that he could score better in the upcoming elections in the West Bank. Or, should he play it safe? So far, he's been playing it safe. That has helped in the short term, but it is obviously potentially consequential for the elections in the West Bank, both for the local elections and the legislative elections where Hamas is going to enter and they have a good chance of winning some of these elections at least in some districts, certainly increase their power. And that's going to tie his hands. That's one worry.

The other worry I have is that even if he rides through this, and I think he probably will, he will be weakened, but he will ride it through. You're going to have Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and I think my worry is that the gap of expectations is so large between the Palestinians and the Israelis on what follows that, that we're headed for a clash. We're headed for a clash, and I don't think we've prepared for it. We thought about it. And I don't think Abu Mazen is going to be strong enough to deal with that gap of expectations. That's my real worry.

MR. FREEMAN: I think, it would be fair if, I don't know, Shibley, you or someone else would like to address Saad Eddin's third factor, which is the role of external powers, in this regard because I think you point to a lot of issues - how much difference does it make what stand the U.S. or the EU, and how much aid goes in to the Palestinian authority in this context.

MR. TELHAMI: Hugely. I would say that from the U.S. point of view, let me just say that there are two things that are extremely important. One is helping the authority in the short term, both economically and politically to reform and stabilize both in the security arena and also the economic arena. And that can only be done if the president of the United States makes this a priority issue. We saw it already, when the president in his speech offered aid to the Palestinian Authority after the election - significant aid. We saw very quickly that Congress raised questions about it. Some members of Congress, important members of Congress raised questions about it. Now, the president - to push this sort of thing through, he can only succeed if this is a priority issue for him because it's going to come with some expense. Even at that level, a question of whether this is a priority issue or not, matters.

At the level of politics, the role of the U.S. is going to be indispensable. First, in terms of assuring the Palestinians about final status. It is clear that the Israelis at this point are not going to put out some more detail about their notion of final status and, frankly, according to the roadmap they're not obligated to it at this stage. And so what they are doing at this stage is essentially implementing - you know, they're still not violating the road map. So given that the president had given assurances to the Israelis about some parameters for final settlement prior to the election, it is extremely important for him to provide some kind of parameters on the Palestinian side about what the American notion of final status as an assurance. Because the biggest worry for the Palestinians is the final status issue, particularly if there is a postponement, which is what the Israelis want to do. If there's a conventional wisdom in Israel, it is that "let's get through this, find some security then begin negotiations." Many people are very comfortable delaying the final settlement to the next generation. I don't think that is a Palestinian position, and, clearly, that is where the U.S. can step in a very helpful fashion.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you.

Sir?

Q: My name is Saodad Alif (ph) from the Syrian embassy. I have a simple question to Mr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim. There is always accusations to you that you are connected to outsiders and receive money from governmental sources - from external governmental sources to enforce democracy. What is your comment on that?

Thank you.

MR. IBRAHIM: The accusation is correct. And I say, so long as Mubarak receives money, every civil society organization in Egypt and in the Arab world is entitled to receive help from the outside. We don't hide that. We are very transparent about it and we say, when our rulers stop dealing with outside, we will also stop dealing with outside. And that is really, probably, very brief comment on the last question.

I think it would be really healthy for everybody to deal with Hamas in the West Bank. And I think it may be healthy also for the Palestinian evolution to a democracy and good governance to engage Hamas in the democratic process. I'm actually heartened by the fact that they are going to compete in the next election.

MR. FREEMAN: Right.

MR. IBRAHIM: And I think this is part of what democracy is all about. And this is, ultimately, what would make Hamas come to the table and be prepared to deal with the Israelis and the Americans.

Q: My question is a follow-up -

MR. FREEMAN: Oh, Andy, please tell us who you are.

Q: Oh, Andy Constanzas (ph), independent consultant. My question is a follow-up to some remarks that were made by the panel. Very true, actually, because I spent most of my life in the Middle East, so - first that the policy of - the U.S. policy right now of democracy promotion has very little credibility among the Middle East people. Second, that some Arab states or Middle East countries are more ready for democracy than others, and that we need definitely help.

In that case, the question is what does the panel thinks would be the right adjustments to the US policy as far in promoting democracy in the Middle East?

MR. FREEMAN: Who wants this then? Jillian, you have - oh you, Marina.

MS. OTTAWAY: Oh, yes. I can. After all, I deal with democracy assistance in the work we are doing. I think, I agree with what the other members of the panel said that the assistance is important; that assistance to groups that are seeking to promote change is important. The question is how it is done because I think it is very dangerous when United States - the model that United States has in mind, at least this is my understanding from the conversations I've had, is essentially the Eastern European model. You supported dissidents. You single out certain people who that for - you know, who sort of incarnated, if you want, the view of democracy and so on.

I think that this is not the right approach in the Middle East because what you have at this point is much more - first of all, you have a much more open political situation despite - you know, I'm not trying to imply that there are no problems to freedom of expression and so on, but compared to what you had in the Soviet Union, for example, you certainly have a much more open political situation. There are more access to information, there are more possibility of speaking out, and so on.

What is missing in the Middle East is really the organization. It's not just the individual people who embrace certain ideas, but organizations that embrace certain ideas. And I think it would be very important for emphasis to shift from specific individuals to helping dialogue among organizations. And the first way to do that would be for the United States to start engaging itself in that activity. Democracy is not going to come to the Middle East, I am convinced, until the Islamists and the liberal reformers start talking to each other much more so than they are doing now. And one way to promote that is for the United States to start itself broadening the number of interlocutors with which it is willing to talk. This is one of the ways, I think, we could make a much bigger difference than what we are doing now.

MR. FREEMAN: Jillian?

MS. SCHWEDLER: Yeah, I agree completely. I think the United States needs to be consistent in speaking out against anti-democratic moves that happen in the country, and I think that would go a long ways.

I actually want to ask Saad to comment on this because I think he has an interesting contrary view, and we've had this conversation before. But I've spent a lot of time - the project I'm working on now has to do with protest and policing, and a lot of people complained to me - people that - after they've gotten out of prison, you know, where was United States? You know, we were arrested simply for critiquing the prime minister or something and where was the United States? Where was the Western voices saying why are you imprisoning Toujan Faisal for these completely spurious reasons, as an example, in Jordan?

And so I think the U.S. consistently speaking out on that would go a long way towards building credibility, but - and this has been my conversation with Saad - that's not necessarily the most helpful to the people in prison. So I think there's a little tension there. I'd love to hear your comment, Saad, on whether this would have been more -

MR. FREEMAN: Please.

MR. IBRAHIM: All right, very good. When you are in prison, you welcome any help whether it comes from China, Japan, or the United States, and that is the difference between somebody who is in a dark, damp cell in Siberia or in Tora (ph) in Egypt or in Saudi Arabia - whatever. There are three prisoners now in Saudi Arabia, all on charges of dissension - fitnah - sedition. And the punishment for that crime is beheading. There were initially 12 of them. Nine have agreed to compromise and to more or less implicitly apologize for having criticized the Saudi royal family. The other three persisted, and as a result they are still in prison. Now they have completed two years in prison; they are entering into their third year.

Now, facing that punishment, the American government - Western governments have not really spoken. Amnesty International has. Human Rights Watch has. Many human rights organizations have spoken on behalf of them but not Western governments, and that is inconsistent. And therefore the answer is, of course we - as human rights defenders, as democracy advocates, we would welcome any support we can get. We only hope that this support will be consistent, will be multilateral. It will not be - again, we will not have to explain why I am defendant and the 18,000 Islamists imprisoned with me were not. And they had to explain that. And the best I could say is that, rightly or wrongly, I am perceived as sharing some of the universal values that Western democracies uphold, and that's why they are defending me and they are not defending you. But that was a very painful way of explaining it.

So the answer is, be consistent. Just have that clarity that you are defending principle.

MR. FREEMAN: Shibley?

MR. TELHAMI: I think that really what's important - obviously, consistency is central because the credibility issue is very important there, but I think it's setting priorities. And when you say we are advocating democracies, it's too big an issue. We don't even know what that means. I mean, even those people who truly work on it have differing views of it. And I think that human rights, as such, should be at the top of the priorities of advocacy, in part because I think that's an issue over which there are international agreements, not just an American preference over a choice of what we think is right or wrong, but there is a body of literature; there are international rulings and agreements. And I think human rights should go to the top of the priorities, and obviously that does have consequences in the end about what type political system and empowering of the public.

But if you start somewhere, I would start on human rights very, very directly. And I think that there there is even more room for maneuvering even with governments whose help you absolutely need, including outside the Middle East. For example, Pakistan, where you do certainly need the help of General Musharaf in the war on al Qaeda. That's a strategic interest of the U.S. There are worries about the consequences if you were to leave the scene. And those sort of trade-offs of national security interest versus human rights or democracy issues are always there for the U.S. foreign policy, but I think the public in the region understands them at some level and I think if we had a little bit more an honesty about it, it'd probably be better than not.

I have to tell you that when I look at the credibility issue, I'm looking at it also in terms of measuring it in terms of public opinion because if you look at - over the past four, five years and you say, "What has been the most important transformation in public opinion in the Arab and Muslim countries toward the U.S.?" I don't think it is just that you had an increase in the number of people who have an unfavorable view of American foreign policy. In fact, in the 1990s and 1980s, most people in the Arab world had an unfavorable view of American foreign policy. Maybe it's more intense now, so it's a degree, but it's not a profound change.

The change has been what I call the collapse of confidence - the collapse of credibility, and we can quantify that. In 2000 - in the spring of 2000, there was a State Department survey in Saudi Arabia and one in the United Arab Emirates asking people whether, quote, "they had confidence in the United States of America." And I think this is interesting measure: confidence. Not whether you like American foreign policy or not, but whether you have confidence. And the finding was that over 60 percent of the public expressed confidence in the United States of America. Right now it's in the single digit.

And I think what you - the difference here is very important because I think whether you agree or disagree on a subject, if people first of all believe or understand what you do, they can deal with it; they can find a way to have a relationship, to bargain, negotiate, take it into account. When people believe that American policy in the Gulf is mostly motivated by oil, they don't like that but it's something they understood and they can negotiate and bargain that. When people started believing the U.S. is aiming to weaken the Muslim world, which we saw going to the top of the priorities, they can't negotiate that. And so I think what we have to keep in mind here is there is a notion of confidence and credibility, and it's in the end very, very important to the effectiveness of American foreign policy, and it starts with some degree of honesty about what you can do; sometimes honesty with ourselves about what we can do and we cannot do.
The case of Tunisia is enlightening because while you can make a case in Saudi Arabia that is strategically important; a case of Pakistan is strategically important, Tunisia's been a friendly country to the U.S. but where there's been very, very difficult environment for human rights and reform, and there is no obvious strategic reasoning for it, and that's what the public sees.

MR. FREEMAN: Is your question related to this discussion or is it on a different topic? I ask because I think this nicely leads into the issue that I posed at the beginning which is the difference between elections and democracy and the question of being honest with ourselves about whether what is or is not happening in that regard. And, if so - if your question is related to this -

Q: (It's more ?) related to the question of economic issues and the -

MR. FREEMAN: Okay, would you mind then waiting just a little minute and let us just follow on this last discussion. And, Marina, I think you probably had a point or two?

MS. OTTAWAY: Yes. Just listening to Shibley talking about the importance of prioritizing human rights, it seems to me that this is a very good point because unfortunately I think lately we have been prioritizing elections. There has been a tendency to confuse elections and democracy. Certainly, you cannot have democracy without elections. The question is, at which point is - do elections become really crucial and the best means to promote democracy?

And I think what - and I think we are regressing on that point because in the '90s we learned a lesson and the lesson that we learned in the '90s, we as the people in the international community trying to help in the processes of the democratic transformation, one of the lessons that was learned is that early elections - elections that take place very early in the process of democratic transformation are not necessarily a good thing; that elections require a certain degree of consensus before they can be successful. For example, the example that everybody cites now is that the insistence by the United States and the OIC - I think, everybody carries responsibility for that - to have elections in Bosnia as soon as possible after the assigning of the Dayton agreement was a major mistake because all it did is confirm the power of the extreme nationalist movements, essentially. People in early election tend to vote their identities. And to put the emphasis on - in the process of transformation on having the elections as soon as possible, it's a very serious mistake.

Now, there are situations in which you cannot avoid. And, frankly, there are elections carried in Lebanon and the last thing in the world the United States should say is we are not - you know, those elections should be postponed. That's the same thing in Palestine. But I think, for example, those elections in Lebanon are going to be extremely dangerous because they are going to take place in a situation where has been big change, in the sense of the removal of Syria, but there has not been enough time for the various parties to build up their sort of consensus on where that country is really going.

So, I think that we have to think very carefully about what is it that we are prioritizing, and I think human rights is a very good place where to start rather than the election process.

MR. FREEMAN: Other comments? Jillian?

MS. SCHWEDLER: Yeah. I would just add briefly an agreement. I think human rights absolutely must be at the top of the issue, not just because human rights are a value in and of themselves, but because deep, thick, democratic practice entails norms about the right to have different voices heard. I mean, and I think the new media is playing a really important role in that regard, particularly al Jazeera, but others as well. That it's good to have different voices on a forum talking to each other, presenting different views; that that's a legitimate and appropriate mechanism for bringing forth different ideas and the practice of that - as that happens more and more, I think it bodes very, very well for democracy, the prospects for democracy, connected with the things I was talking about, these sort of practices of different types of alliances that are emerging; different types of engagements among, you know, actors that have no contact with each other.

I think this sort of thickening of these types of democratic practices is extremely important and I think the emphasis on human rights provides the sort of framework within which that can emerge. Without that emphasis, you're going to have - like you have in Jordan and many other cases - a shutting down. You can't - three people can't meet. You need to get a permit to meet now. Essentially shutting down all dimensions of civil society so it's kind of moved in professional associations and now we're - the professional associations to have a meeting in the professional association's building itself has to get a permit. I mean, so it's just this shutting down of any sphere for the sort of pluralist debate, discussion, activities, alliances. It's extremely problematic. And then we still have elections as sort of a political performance every four years and you traipse in the media and it's very thin.

Having said that, I mean, elections are incredibly important and I think they create the opportunity - the sort of structural opportunity for these groups to come together to push agendas in parliaments, et cetera. So, we don't want to say elections - take elections off the menu of priorities, but I think highlighting human rights is an incredibly important means to get to richer activities.

MR. FREEMAN: Saad Eddin?

MR. IBRAHIM: I don't know why do you have to put priority on human right vis-à-vis priority on elections. Couldn't you have both? If you have to err, err on the side of the election. That I say as somebody who's an activist for democracy. I do not want to postpone election under the pretext that autocrats have always argued for. Mubarak has a famous phrase; he said the only problem with election - with free election is that you cannot predict the outcome. That is his understanding, which is true. You cannot predict the outcome. That's what election is all about. But that - an autocrat looking at it would welcome any argument to postpone the election under any pretext: because we don't have enough people who are educated, we don't have enough people who are well off; poverty; election could be bought; sectarianism. They will find 1,001 reasons.

On the other hand, I, again having monitored the election; having participated in the election; being an advocate of election, I say no matter what negative fall off, it will still far better than autocracy continuing to rule. That's all.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you for your patience.

Q: My name is Mary Burdman. I'm with Executive Intelligence Review but I'm based in Wiesbaden, Germany. I'm an American, but I want to raise this question which has been touched on which is the question of the economic situation because having observed since 1989 the transition in Eastern Europe - obviously, there's dissimilarities. However, this was brought on the economic problems - was a great - very large factor in this transition. However, I'm best acquainted with the situation in East Germany, and many people are sort of wondering - raising a lot of questions about what came after in terms of the economic security of their lives; from a full employment country to one in which there is extremely high unemployment.

Obviously, you know the situation in Palestine, the extreme poverty, the income gap in Egypt, et cetera. That is not it very important in terms of democracy to also have in place a very effective economic policy that you don't go through the tremendous disillusion which was gone through in Eastern Europe, Russia, and many other places? So, I'd just be interested -

MR. TELHAMI: Let me just say two things. One directly related to the economy and attitudes, at least toward the U.S. I already said that in my statistical findings there was no apparent relationship between what people watch and their views of the U.S. I could tell you that when we mined the data to see what variables mattered most, not only on attitudes toward the U.S. but also some other social issues, we found that that two were the most critical: one was income, one was education. Those were the most important; not the views, not the affiliation, not the - those were the most robust variables that accounted for those attitudes. And they accounted in this way: on the attitudes toward the U.S., the more - the less income you had, the more resentful you were of the United States. The better educated you were, the more resentful you are of the United States. The most difficult combination for the U.S. was being educated and unemployed. And education doesn't measure the quality of education because you're measuring people who may have a BA and been out for four, five years and have no jobs and have low income.

And so first - you know, from my point of view when I'm looking or talking about democracy and talking about what we should do about this issue, we have - to my mind - the issue of economy and education; and by education, I don't mean cultural education. I'm talking about skillful education - education on skills that will compete in the global economy. Those to me are hugely important in what transpires in the Middle East; obviously, you know, related to the issue of democratization.

And I would suggest that they're probably much more related, in the end, to the question of whether you're going to have militancy or not than whether you have democracy or not, personally. And I'll put that on the table for the following reason which is related to our whole notion of why the United States is advocating democracy. I mean, the notion here, the confidence that people now have in the current way of advocating democracy, as opposed to the wave in the end in the late 1980s. I mean, Chas Freeman was in the first Bush administration when the first Bush administration just on the eve of - just before Iraq invaded Kuwait had decided to make democracy an issue. That's when we had a lot of change in the Middle East.

Clinton, when he first came to office the first year before the Oslo agreements, highlighted democracy. They were backtracking. People have more confidence in this wave of American advocacy for one reason only, and that is, that American elites have come to believe, at least, rightly or wrongly, that the advocacy of democracy is connected with American national security; that 9/11 meant that the terrorism against America emanated because of the absence of democracy in Arab and Muslim countries and that the more democracy you have, the less terrorism we have.

By the way, that's not a hypothesis over which there is sweeping agreement amongst scholars; hugely differing agreements. And there is counterargument in the literature about whether that's true or not. In fact, you can make a very strong argument that in the short term what you're likely to have whenever you have transformations from authoritarianism to democracy is periods of high instability, both because of the economic dislocations that you talked about or because of the fear that emanates from disintegration of social or political structures that could even result in some backlash in some instances and certainly could result in more militancy, as we've seen in Iraq and other places in the short term.

So my worry actually is that, in some ways, this instrumental conception that we have of advocating democracy could very quickly lead to backtracking as we see a couple of failures, the likes of which are certainly possible whether it's along the lines of what Marina talked about happening in Iraq - you know, continued economic struggles - as well as a civil war perhaps emanating. Same thing in Lebanon.

When you ask people in the Arab world as of 2004, "Do you believe that Iraqis are better off today than they were before the Iraq war?" majorities of people said the Iraqis are worse off than they were before the war. And the reason why is because they are looking at how Iraqis are living their lives and in terms of the absence of secure, the economic difficulty. So my suggestion - all of this is leading me to the point: democracy is a worthy cause. I believe that the American advocacy of democracy is a good thing. I worry that it's instrumental because I think there's likely to be backtracking. I would, therefore, very much reorient our attention in part toward the economic and educational issue because I see those far more connected to militancy than the issue of political structure as such.

MR. FREEMAN: I think it's fair to say to someone coming from Germany that this is not a case of one country uniting with another. This is a case of many countries with vast differences among them, standard of - per capita standard of income in Qatar, let us say, which is measured in the hundreds of thousands of dollars per family, contrasts with Mauritania at the other end of the Arab world where it's perhaps less than $100. So we're talking about a region of unbelievable diversity in the economic sphere as well as in many other spheres. And this is - ought to be a caution to us against cookie-cutter approaches to the various issues we've been discussing. As I said at the outset, each country is undemocratic in its own way and deserves its own attention.

Marina?

MS. OTTAWAY: I totally agree, and we have seen it all over the world, that lack of economic process - progress as part of - you know, in the context of the democratic transition is, in fact, very dangerous - can undermine confidence in democracy. We are beginning to see it, for example, in some Latin American countries where the increased level of poverty in the last 10 years are, in fact, beginning to lead to a backlash which is very, very worrisome. But I'd like to turn my attention briefly to another aspect of this relationship between economic condition and democracy. And that is the issue that Chas asked earlier about the oil countries - the oil-producing countries, and what are the prospects for democracy in oil-producing countries. And there is no doubt that countries that are very dependent - rentier states - countries that are very dependent on what the government is totally dependent on oil revenue and therefore is not dependent on its citizens because it does not have to tax its citizens for its - in order to have an income, have a much greater problem in sort of turning to democracy.

There are very few oil-producing countries - major oil-producing countries that were not democratic before oil start - was discovered that have become democratic. And that is something of great concern, in fact, for Saudi Arabia and for the other countries in the Gulf.

MR. FREEMAN: Mr. Putin in Russia, too.

MS. OTTAWAY: And for Mr. Putin, yes. And we really don't have any good solutions because there are attempts underway, for example, to - and that, to me, is the most promising - to try and help citizens of these oil-producing countries access more information about how much oil revenue that country really gets so that then there can be some accountability on how that money is spent. There are various transparency issues that are sort of being developed around the world. The British government has taken a major role in this. The U.S. government has kept, somewhat, away from it, arguing that all initiatives have to be purely voluntary. But essentially the goal of these initiatives is to try and get the oil companies and the governments of the oil-producing countries to disclose the amount of oil revenue that is on the table. It's one of the few steps, I think, that can be usefully be taken, but it is an issue of great concern.

MR. FREEMAN: I think one of the few truly constructive notions that emerged from the ill-fated CPA in Iraq in the early stage was the notion of giving all Iraqi citizens direct access through dividends to oil income, and then taxing them on the dividends that would have provided an answer to this problem. And there are some experiments going on elsewhere in the region - in Qatar, for example, with the distribution of national wealth directly to citizens that could, in time, should the Qataris wished to do that, lead to that kind of organic relationship between the citizens and the government, but it has yet to emerge.

Sir?

Q: Fred Hill, former correspondent partly in this region and worked on the Middle East when I was working here for Senator Matthias some years ago. This has been touched on to some extent, but a question about the intellectual climate and the treatment of dissident writers. Obviously, the media in the Middle East is much more pluralistic, particularly with Al Jazeera and the different outlets, but how are the more autocratic regimes treating the Salman Rushdies of today? And is he still unable to travel, not just in Iran but in the region? How easy is it for a young novelist to produce a book? And just, I guess, I've read isolated cases but I know now what happened in Mr. Ibrahim's case, but in terms of novelists or critics who try to write seriously and critically whatever their views? What is the measure of their treatment as an indication of how more open these societies are becoming?

MR. FREEMAN: Saad Eddin, I'd like to hear your comment on this. I know, as I said at the outset, you were just as outspoken in Egypt as you have been here. And that got your into a bit of trouble, but you're still - but you're here.

MR. IBRAHIM: It does - yes. It does get anybody in trouble if you speak your mind, and that is difficulty of being an intellectual: people who speak truth to power. And when you speak truth to power, there are dangers.

In my - in the prison where I was, or one of the prisons where I was, there were several authors who were there because they were considered blasphemous. Their writings were considered heretical. They were daring, critical writers, and the penalty in the law in Egypt is three years when you engage in this kind of writing.

Who would decide what is heretical? There are two sources in a country like Egypt. I can speak about Egypt to some confidence. One is the al-Azhar (ph) has a council called the Islam Research Council who can determine that a given writing is heretical. And also public opinion. Some zealots can raise questions about a given writer even if al-Azhar had not declared him heretical. And I have in mind the case of not Salman Rushdie, but somebody like him in Egypt. His name is Nasr Hamid Abu Said. His case is very famous our part of the world and in Europe because what those zealots did was to declare his writing on the Koran - a different, fresh perspective on the Koran, our Holy Book, was considered to be heretical interpretation or a heretical view. And he was taken to court, and one - the first level of court condemned him. Yes, he is heretical and as heretic he should not be married to a Muslim woman. And, therefore, the ruling was to separate him from his wife even though his wife loves him and she wants to continue to live with him. She did not ask for a divorce because of his heresy. And the government was at a loss of what to do, especially when that first level of ruling was confirmed in an appeal court.

Å And appeal rulings, you must implement - the government has to implement. And the government didn't want to implement. So, he was encouraged to flee the country, and he took refuge in Holland and where he is still living. Now he's been living there for 10 years, he cannot come back to Egypt without the risk of having to be separated from his wife, who is also another professor of French literature, so there are both living now in Holland. So the intolerance of views is not just on the part of the autocratic regime, but sometimes on the level of zealot groups, extreme groups, fanatical groups who under the guise of Islam can harass writers.

MR. FREEMAN: I think both Jillian and Marina have comments. We have limited time and I have two commentators or questioners. So, please -

DR. SCHWEDLER: I'll be quick then. I think in the case as I know best, the climate for dissenting voices is just atrocious at the moment. I mentioned earlier Toujan Faisal who is a former parliamentarian, a secular reformer -published an open letter on the internet, not even in Jordan, that questioned the prime minister's abuse of temporary laws, which was supposed - when the parliament is not in session it was supposed to be used only for issues national security, and she questioned why insurance rates were doubled via a temporary law, and she was imprisoned for it. She spent over a month in prison, and her sentence was suspended. The prison sentence was suspended and she has still has a misdemeanor, so she is not eligible to run for parliament anymore.

Several other people, I mean, Hisham Bustani, Ibrahim Alloush - I could go on and on - have been arrested for publishing critiques, questions about protest in policing; critiques of the government, critiques of foreign policy in Al-Adab online, which is based in Beirut. And so this is dissent even from Jordanians outside of the country and they're ending up in prison for their efforts. So I think the climate for expressing dissent of any sort is extremely, extremely terrible.

MR. FREEMAN: Not too great here either, at the moment, but you don't end up in jail.

Please.

MS. OTTAWAY: I agree with what both Saad have - and Jillian have said, and certainly, there has - there is no doubt that the religious authorities are trying to weigh in more and more and that the political space for - that the space for publishing anything that religious authorities might consider blasphemous is narrowing in a rather dramatic fashion, even in countries where it did not use to be the case.

And certainly it is as dangerous as ever to criticize leaders, to criticize specific people. There has been, on the other hand, more space for debate about democracy, about the need for reform as long as it is couched in rather general terms. For example, if you look at the - you know, the Arab press recently has had a lot of discussion, a lot of columns on issues of democracy, on issues of reform, and so on. And so there is a little opening there, if you want, which probably does not - you know, which I don't think makes up for the closure in all sort of other important areas, but that is no doubt that there is more being discussed in the Arab press today than there was 10 years ago.

MR. FREEMAN: I think this is true even in countries with traditionally closed presses. There really is, in this respect, a wave of freedom for dialogue going on, but as has been indicated, it is severely limited when it comes up against religious, or direct criticism of authorities in most of these countries.

Sir?

Q: Yes, I am - (unintelligible). Actually, I have two quick comments. Number one, the issue of financial stability and financial welfare, and the ability to express your feeling and opinion about issues. I really have reservations about the possibility of having a person who is depending on the government for his employment and livelihood to go ahead and express himself on issues, and my point here is very simple: how many Saad Eddin Ibrahim we have in Egypt? Sixty million plus. So I think this issue needs to be articulated a little bit more.

Now, the second issue here - we read in the Washington Post recently that the U.S. established or in the process of establishing a center for democracy or democratic procedures or education in Yemen. The question is: do you feel it is possible to kind of copy the U.S. model of democracy in the Arab world, from Mauritania to Oman?

Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Jillian?

MS. SCHWEDLER: Well, I mean, in terms of copying the model in general, I mean, I don't think you just pick it up and plop it down, and I don't think people are suggesting that. I think a lot of it needs to be generated from within. Certainly, you can take aspects of what works and doesn't work. I mean, you can look to experiences, experiments in federal systems to think about how to deal with ethnically-divided context, for example: what has worked and not worked in the past. So clearly you don't just pick up a model and drop it. But, I mean, I also reject the idea, which isn't what you're suggesting, but I reject the idea that there is nothing that can be borrowed. I mean, there is certainly global experiments with democracy and global practices in democracy and we can pick and choose what works. And by 'we' I mean the societies themselves. You know, it's problematic when it come from the outside and say, "Ah, well, we want to restrain the Shi'a; so therefore we have to do these types of systems. I mean, that's where the problem comes up.

MR. FREEMAN: That seems to me to be the key issue: whether it is the borrowers who have to make the decision, and not the lenders. And I think, with all due modesty, Americans should recall that the total amount our federal government has budgeted to promote democracy in the entire swath of territory we are talking about with its 300 million people is less than the monthly household expense of some members of the royal family in Saudi Arabia.

MS. OTTAWAY: Considerably less. (Laughter.)

MR. FREEMAN: Considerably less.

MS. OTTAWAY: Exactly. I don't know much about this particular center in Yemen, and, very frankly, if you look at democracy promotion and the activities that have been undertaken in democracy promotion in the last 15 years, you find some very good programs and some very silly ones. So I don't know where this particular center falls. I think there are some universal - there are some universals in democracy and - you know, that the idea that government has to be accountable to the citizens. That, to me, is very universal. The protection of human rights is very universal, and I'd be very happy to see it applied from Mauritania to, you know, wherever, you know - (audio break, tape change) - also, export political systems and procedures that are tailored to the conditions of specific countries. I don't think the Americans system would work very well in Germany, for example. Or, you know, it's not a question of just the Arab world. I think that because the decisions specifically on how best to organize a government so that the citizens can hold it accountable really depends on local conditions. And we get into trouble when we try to export models, for example, they are too closely tailored on our own.

MR. FREEMAN: Let us recall that democracy with - American democracy with Asian characteristics exists in the Philippines, where we had 50 years to explain, tutor, and convince Filipinos to do things our way. And I don't think they actually do things our way very much despite the normal - despite the form of government there. That should give us a bit of modesty.

Sir, we've saved the best for last. Your it.

Q: (Laughter.) Yeah, I doubt that but - Mike Allison (sp), U.S. Army.

This question is specifically for Dr. Telhami, but obviously I'm desperate to learn, so I'll take any comments. But you mentioned in the context of Iraq, in its negative repercussions you stated that, you know, the American occupation is one thing. You also said that Shi'a empowerment could be perceived in a negative fashion, and those are crystal clear to me. But you also mentioned that there is a weakening of Arabs in the Middle East, and for me, at least, that begs more questions than any answers. And I just wondered if you could, sort of, thicken that point. Yu always seem to bring back the facts -

MR. FREEMAN: The weakening of what?

Q: Well, you just - and perhaps it's a result of my own note-taking, but you said weakening of Arabs -

MR. FREEMAN: Oh, I see.

Q: - in the Middle East. And I wondered if you could, sort of -

MR. FREEMAN: This is the - let me explain the question. This is the thesis of the Shi'a - the crescent of Shi'a - the, sort of, drawing by the United States of gerrymandering of the Middle East to empower Shi'a in Lebanon and Syria and Iraq and of course Iran.

MR. TELHAMI: Yeah, well, what I did say was that many Arabs, and I don't know whether it's a majority or not because I haven't directly tested that that way. I believe that there are about -

MR. FREEMAN: By the way, this is an Ayatollah-mander, I assume; not a gerrymander, at that.

MR. TELHAMI: Right. Right. That the Iraq war has resulted in Shi'a empowerment, and some people worry about the consequences of that in the context of, you know, Iran and Iraq. But I don't think that's really the over-riding issue in every single aspect of that relationship. And I think when you look - and it's interesting actually to see how the public reacted to events. I think the elections in Iraq, despite all the negatives of the perception, has had more of a positive impact on the perception of Iraq. They've modified. They haven't raised the opposition to the Iraq war. They haven't fundamentally changed the relationship in the minds between, you know, the Iraq war and the consequences in the Middle East. But there has been a mitigation of that opposition with their elections. So the elections, you can argue, have had a slightly important influence on the thinking toward Iraq.

I would also argue that early on after the Iraq war, there were two very important factors that were overriding. One is, they wanted to see the U.S. fail. I mean, they were essentially opposed to American foreign policy and the anti - you know, that was, one can argue, even was higher their wanting to see Iraq succeed. Because of this adamant opposition to the war, they saw the U.S. doing it for the wrong reason in their minds, and they wanted to see the U.S. fail. But they also believed early on that most of the opposition was legitimate nationalist opposition to occupation. And they were heartened by it and there was, you know, large - a lot of support you could see in the public toward that Iraqi opposition. I think as some, certainly - including Shi'a opposition - Moqtada al Sadr and company - they saw it as a defiance of occupation.

As this now has changed a bit because the face of the insurgency has become Zarqawi and al Qaeda. And I say the face because we really don't know, frankly, the extent to which these operations that are taking place - the attacks are really being conducted by Zarqawi. But he has become the face of the insurgence; there is no either Sunni leader, or Shiite leader, or prominent leadership that people can associate this is the national liberation movement. Zarqawi is not a national liberation movement and people may - some people may support in the negative that they want, you know, anything that would hurt the U.S. occupation, they will support. He's not the positive - so I think it's been a mitigation of that in their thinking.

I do believe, having said all of this, that there is, what we call a Shiite aspect to this in their minds. And I think strategically there is one. Let me give you just an example. We don't know what Ayatollah Sistani wants. What we do know is that in - clearly, he's in a - he's played a very important role in preventing Iraq from disintegrating and from having civil war. He's been - in that regard has been constructive from the American point of view in terms of preventing the situation from getting far worse.

And having the elections succeed; he probably is the single most important factor. He's been clearly on record for wanting to see Sharia law as being the basis of Iraqi politics. The Prime Minister Jafari believes that. They're not empowered yet. This is all empowered politically, but they're not empowered in the sense of having control. What will the - even if they, themselves, really want to maintain relative separation of religion and politics, will the replacement do? The people who will account for the power of this State? We don't know that. What happens next year if we emerge with a confrontational relationship with Iran? It's not a very - you know, it's certainly a very possible scenario in relation to the nuclear issue. What happens both in terms of Iran's relations in Iraq itself directly, and assets they have that they've not employed? And in relation to what the position will be of those significant leaders in Iraq who account for the relative stability that we see, and I say relative - obviously, it's not a stable place but we at least have some process in stability and the process itself. That's, I think, an issue that we're not talking about, and I think it's an issue that is profoundly consequential for the Arab world, for the Middle East, for the United States.

MR. FREEMAN: We've come to the end of our time. I think that was a good question to end on because it leads us probably into another session, assuming we survive as an organization, which I think we will. And I will just note that the previous discussion of the Iraqi issue, Colonel Pat Lang remarked that we did not invade Iraq, we invaded the Iraq of our dreams, a mythical country which we invented. Just so, I think, in many ways, as we look at low-intensity conflict in Iraq now, each of us sees a different war. And that is because there are many wars going on. There are territorial seizures by the - (unintelligible) - the Kurds. There are - there is resistance by Arab Sunni nationalist elements, whether secular and associated with the Ba'ath, or religiously motivated. There are Shiite efforts to assert authority over the Sunnis, and Sunni efforts to show the Shiite that Sunni Arabs cannot be pushed around, or ignored in the new order in Iraq. So there is a war of resistance against occupation. There is an incipient civil war or civil wars are going on.

And the interesting thing to me, and this goes to really your question about the Shi'a, and reactions in the region, is I find it traveling in the region considerably less concerned now about the implications of a Shi'a-governed Iraq than I did in the past. Now the concern is mainly about the wonderful training ground Iraq is providing for homegrown, Jihadi terrorists. Lots of kids out there learning how to run ambushes and build bombs, and coordinate complex military choreography to bring forth to bear on government authorities. And the concern is that even as the governments in the region, I think particularly Saudi Arabia, are winning their domestic wars against terrorists by discrediting their ideas, by co-opting them, by causing them to defect, or by killing them, that there is a whole new batch being trained at a higher level of competence thanks to the U.S. Army, which is a very competent opponent, which will come home and cause trouble in the future. And these people are not just from one country; they are from many so that…many countries in the Arab world will feel this sort of after effect of the Iraq war.

That seems to me to be the major concern rather than the empowerment of Shi'a per se, which I think is something that a more open Arab world is going to have to come to grips with in any event - a more open and democratic Arab world, which is happening in the region. So on that note, and with th