Unedited Transcript

Middle East Policy Council

Thirty-third in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S. Middle East Policy

Aftershocks of War: What Purposes Have Been Fulfilled?

Speakers:

Judith Yaphe
Senior Research Fellow for the Middle East, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Kenneth Katzman
Middle East Affairs Specialist, Congressional Research Service

Omer Taspinar Visiting Fellow in Foreign Polciy Studies, Brookings Institution; Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins University, SAIS

Martha Neff Kessler
Consultant; CIA (Ret.)

Moderator/Discussant:

Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.
President, Middle East Policy Council

160 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.
June 20, 2003

Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

CHAS W. FREEMAN: We will give it about another five minutes. We have a lot of acceptances of people that have not arrived yet, and we can be forgiven for running on Arab time, perhaps. Ladies and gentlemen, could I ask you to take your seats, please? That reminds me, those of you who have cell phones, it would be a courtesy to mute them at least.

Good morning, it's 9:30 Arab time. (Laughter.) I'm Chas Freeman. It's my honor to be president of the Middle East Policy Council and to welcome you this morning to one of our regular series of discussions of controversial, difficult, awkward, and politically correct - incorrect issues. Middle East Policy Council, for those of you who are not frequent attenders of these sessions or do not know us well, really does three things.

First, we try to ensure that the policy issues that are neglected for some reason or another are given an airing with a variety of views; and we try to do that up here on Capitol Hill, where the need for enlightenment is, perhaps, most acute. Second, we take the transcript of these sessions, edit it lightly, and make it the first item in our quarterly Middle East policy; which is, I'm proud to say, the most-cited journal in the field of contemporary Middle East policy issues. If you haven't read it, you're missing something; it's stimulating and even fairly well written. The third thing we do is to quite invisibly, in Washington, manage a program of teacher training. We have taught some 14,000 high school teachers how to teach about Arab civilization and Islam, and we think we have confused a million kids or so every year with a fact or two they otherwise wouldn't have encountered. This is wonderful work and totally invisible within the beltway and, therefore, I suppose, irrelevant.

In any event, again, let me welcome you here today for a discussion today of some of the aftershocks of the conquest of Iraq: a discussion, particularly, of this issue in its regional context. This discussion may, in some respects, be too soon; that is to say, the Iraqi people are still pondering the question of whether they have been liberated or subjugated, a question only they can answer; that is to say, whatever we call it, they will decide subjectively what it is they are experiencing. And how they answer that question and what their reaction to the American occupation is, along with developments between the Israelis and Palestinians, will in turn determine the nature of our relationships in the broader region and affect our position in the world.

We're here to talk about a war that had multiple purposes, sort of a multipurpose war. Depending on the time of day and the day of the week, the purposes were stated differently. But I count about six reasons that the president gave for going to war, and I think on most of them, the jury is still out. We will, I hope, in the course of the discussion - as we deal with Syria, with Iran, with Turkey, and with the Gulf states in particular - and I hope everyone will bring in some discussion of the Arab-Israeli issue and the impact on the war on terrorism as they discuss this. We will be dealing, in a sense, with the unanswered questions of the justification of the war.

The war was to eliminate the massive weapons of mass destruction program which Saddam Hussein was conducting. Well, if we do find weapons of mass destruction - it now appears unlikely. That now appears unlikely that they will be of a magnitude to have justified the attack on Iraq. And, in the meantime, in the absence of such a discovery, American credibility on a range of issues -- not limited to the Middle East, North Korea for example - other proliferation issues is arguably very negatively effected.

The second reason was regime change, and it's clear that we did get rid of Saddam Hussein's regime. The only problem is we haven't yet apparently figured out how to replace it. So there is no government in Iraq at present, and it's not clear what sort of legitimate authority will emerge and when it will emerge, an open question.

Then we were told this was to democratize Iraq, which it now appears mainly de-secularize Iraq; remove that element of Iraqi society which was most closely in tune with the secular notions of the West, even though it operated in the Ba'athist context, and replace it with religious parties and leaders of religious orientation. So it's not clear whether democratization and de-Ba'athification do not mean de-secularization in Iraq.

And then, fourth, we were to improve the lives of Iraqis who are obviously vastly better off today than they were before we bombed the hell out of them. This, too, is a lengthy period of transition, the answer to which is not clear.

Then it was stated that this war would be a mighty blow against international terrorism. So far, the terrorists don't seem to have noticed that, except in terms of their exploitation of the issue for recruitment purposes. But again, the jury is still out; this may prove to be better founded than it seems to be at present.

And finally - and this brings us to the topic of the day - the conquest of Iraq and its reform under American tutelage were justified as bringing about a transformation of the broader region of which Iraq is a part. And it's clear there are many immediate after-effects of the combat. Redeployments going on in the Gulf, rearrangement of the pattern of U.S. engagement there; even as, on a popular level, relations between Americans and Gulf Arabs have never been so embittered. There is motion in Iran of a nature that is unclear. And whether it is related to the American presence in Iraq or something that has spontaneously arisen within Iranian politics is a subject I'm sure we will want to discuss. Syria is reassessing its position and its policies, and we will want to talk about that.

I think we are very fortunate today to have an exceptional panel to address these and other questions that I mentioned, and some I didn't. I think, for example, the question of the relevance of Turkey as a model for a future Iraq is one that Omar Taspinar may wish to discuss. We're going to proceed in the order on the program, since nobody objected to it.

And that means that we will hear first from Judith Yaphe, who probably needs no introduction to a Washington audience. She is a very noted expert on many aspects of the Gulf and Iraq in particular, and she's currently a senior research fellow and Middle East project director at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University.

Following Judith, Ken Katzman, again, someone who, for those who follow Iran in particular, probably need little introduction. Ken is at the Congressional Research Service, has been there for a dozen years or so. Before that, he worked for a congressional committee and was an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. He is an expert on Iran and you can read his bio on the back of the program.

Omar Taspinar is - who has - I think this is your first time appearing with us, we're glad to have you here. Omar is a visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, and also teaches at Johns Hopkins, Paul Nitze SAIS -- or whatever it's called these days - the School for Advanced International Studies. And he is an expert on Turkey, and again, you can read his biographic information and list of publications on the back of the program.

And finally, a member of our own board, Martha Kessler; the author of a very well known book on Syria. Extraordinarily highly regarded for 30 years within the intelligence community as the U.S. government's foremost expert on Syria, and now in the private sector and enjoying life, and I hope being paid better, and is free to speak. So, delighted to have you here, too, Martha.

With this introduction, I turn this over to Judith, with the admonition those of you who have been here before know that there is a pretty strict 10 to 12 minute rule enforced on panelists, and if they exceed it I am likely to get up and haul them physically off the podium. But this is not a threat, it's just a statement of fact -- (laughter) -- nd I'm sure that everyone will be able to meet the requirement. Following the panelists, we will have an open session until about noon, and ample opportunity, I hope, for people to raise questions, you might be thinking about them, or to make comments if they're short and cogent and not long and rambling. Thank you.

JUDITH YAPHE: Thank you for that kind introduction, Chas, and I have to say that the deck is loaded up here. You see the deck of cards - my son sent me one of those, the top, you know, Iraqis that we wanted to arrest. Well, the deck is loaded here, because these two are - we're all former colleagues and - (chuckles) - know each other well. Chas, you did it again. You have always started with a lot of the points I wanted to make, but I will make different ones. I will try to talk quickly so I can get everything in in 10 minutes, of course. I will try to break some china and be a little provocative, because I think that's one of the reasons I'm probably here.

Now, I looked at the title: "Aftershocks of the War, What Purposes Have Been Fulfilled." I don't know how to address that topic. I think Chas is right, it is much too soon to think about that. I don't know what an aftershock is in political terms. The kind of earthquake typology may not be the best metaphor for war and its aftermath, it's not always like an earthquake. I am reminded, however, of a memoir that was done on the Iran-Iraq War by an Iraqi general who defected and who, at least for a brief time, was a wannabe successor in Iraq, General Salihi: it was called "Al Zilzal," "The Earthquake."

Now, it's hard to compare those eight years of war with the three weeks -- some call it war, some call it other things. But I do think it is premature to talk about purposes fulfilled. I think that this is a - we have to take a longer view, and it does depend on why you think we went to war. It will also depend, as we will see in the succeeding weeks and months to come, what did we know and when did we know it, as we go through the attempts to, what, assess blame, measure what the intelligence community did or didn't do in all its component parts.

Now, I have a list of reasons and some of them are the same as Chas's, so I can save time and not repeat them. My list is in no real order. Yes, regime change, yes to weapons of mass destruction: Saddam had them, he will use them if challenged, he has them - excuse me - we're at imminent risk from his weapons. By the way, where are those tons of anthrax and botulinum and sarin and the prototype of - with a bomb. Now, this claim, I have to confess, I do still have some residual faith in, if only because knowing what was well documented as to what they did.

Terrorism, state sponsor for many years, no question about it; but responsible for acts against the U.S., responsible for the '93 twin towers, for Oklahoma City, for al Qaeda support, hosting Osama bin Laden, giving terrorists WMD to use against us - I don't think so. This claim is based, in my opinion and my professional experience, I have so say, on unsubstantiated claims and circumstantial evidence at best. It's not been corroborated and I think it's not likely to do so, even though we do have in custody one of the alleged participants in this chain of events.

Mass murder, human rights, repression, you know, the genocide issue. Yeah, I think it's a shame we didn't view this as a sufficient reason because it certainly was. And I say that even though I know it's an inconsistent and incoherent thing to say, that we apply this policy by choice, selectively, unevenly. Nevertheless, we have long known about ethnic cleansing, mass murders, forced resettlement of populations, use of torture, we just never said much about it -- or his use of that famous phrase that I hate, he has used the chemical weapons on his people. The mass graves being unearthed now serve as new testimony to what we knew all along but deliberately, I think, avoided discussing.

I like the strategic prize thesis - it's the oil, the bases, the democratic-minded Iraqis who will make the new democratic Iraq a paragon of virtue, the model to be emulated in the region as we remake the political map of the Middle East - I don't think so. Then there's the strategic realists: it's the oil, the bases, and we will eliminate the weapons of mass destruction - but democracy? They don't think so. Somehow, that doesn't come up in what are called the realist school of approach.

And then my two favorite conspiracy theories. The first one: Israel and its lobbyists have taken U.S. foreign policy hostage. Not exactly, I don't think so, and I'm uncomfortable when intelligent people go around spouting this as if it's gospel truth. Conspiracy theory number two - and this one I'm sure Chas and all you people who have been so often in the region, John Duke Anthony (sp), I saw you here somewhere - the U.S. knows where Saddam is, they have let him live, it's a plot to keep Iraq - (chuckles) - and the Arabs weak. God, I hate that one.

Now, if you subscribe to any of these theories, you must be disappointed that our purposes have not been fulfilled. Where are those weapons? Where is that terrorist evidence? What about those terrorist training camps and all the other things? Well, we knew about some of those for a long time, the camps, and the other evidence just isn't there. And I could go over a lot of the mistakes we have made, I think we all know them. But I would like to keep some basic points in mind as we continue what I think is almost a near-mindless criticism of everything the U.S. has done. There are many things we should be criticized for: we did not plan the day after well, we are having great difficulty and will continue to do so.

But before we get carried away by that, and by the daily interview which is everywhere in the media and on the press, that poor, angry Iraqi who still has no water, no electricity, little food, no job, and little left of his dignity and pride, let me look at just a few things. And I would point out, my fearless analytic prediction - which Martha remembers I always love to make - the security situation will almost certainly deteriorate further this summer, especially in July, as the average daily temperature passes 130 degrees; and the month of revolution in Iraq, July, is upon us.

Now, here are the points I would like to keep in mind. What did not happen is as significant as what did occur. The crises we anticipated - and I can't fault us here, that we anticipated the wrong crises, we anticipated the, what, the usual, the standard crises. Mass movement of internally displaced persons and refugees didn't happen. Use of weapons of mass - oh my God, all right, let me move right along. You can read it all later. Confusion in the region and at home regarding our goals and objectives; that continues, and I have heard this from friends in the region.

The strategy for the day after did not match the war strategy. If the strategy for the war was to roll on to Baghdad, it was correct. The strategy for the day after was very much a rolling in kind of thing, based on an entirely different kind of military strategy. It's said that religious extremists and tribal warlords appear, for now, to be the only forces organized to take charge and provide security and social services, and that this spells the future of a what, non-secularist and even an Islamic republic. I think you will hear more about that from Ken, and I will argue that I don't think that that is true. I think there are a lot of issues and fears that have to be worried. The good news: Saddam is gone. The bad news: so is everybody else. And what is the cost, in terms of administration and government?

To get to the neighbors a bit, we fretted about WMD but nobody else did. It wasn't a worry in the neighborhood, except to Iran. Not a worry to Iraqis, many of whom now think and are angry that Iraq will be denied weapons of mass destruction, nuclear research and development while others in the neighborhood have them already or will have them soon. I won't point out the fact that we may raise some impossible conditions for whatever new government we put in, interim, provisional, or otherwise. That the fact that there is no information on our plans -- will there be reparations or not, what about oil or not; and by the way, where are the women? There were only four women present at the Nasiriyah meetings. What kind of Iraq do we see as reconstructing? I think all of these things need a lot of looking at.

Now, there are regional implications of war and regime change. Whatever we plan on doing in Iraq will not sit well with the neighbors. Syria, Turkey, and Iran all worry about developments in Iraq and the potential for spillover. I'm sure my colleagues will discuss it, but I would point out that all three are ruled by virtually dysfunctional regimes with weak and easily distracted leaders and sagging economies. They made a bet on what would happen in Iraq; they miscalculated, and it's cost them in their relations with the U.S., so that there are worries. But if we are intent on rebuilding an Iraq which will have a conventional army because they can't have WMD -- you can't leave them with just space junk to put together again - it's the kind of worry that the neighbors have most.

Will they worry about Iraq and democracy and institutions? I think it's an existential threat and concern, but one they think that will also be limited to Iraq. Let's go back to the way - (chuckles) - I'm talking faster - let's go back to the way things were before as soon as we can. Those things may exist in Iraq, but they won't be a problem for us. They would like a role in shaping the new Iraq, political institutions, and leadership, just like they did at the bond meeting for Afghanistan - not going to happen. And I will think the reason why this is not a good idea is that all of the neighbors have agendas for Iraq, and the Iraqis know that and are afraid of that or worried about it. I think, in my own sense, I could be wrong.

And I will say what is, I think, unspeakable for many, that to have the - I think Iraqis would view, yes, occupation as unendurable, humiliating, and reprehensible. But involvement of the Turks, Iranians, Saudis, and Syrians would be even more humiliating and self-serving to Iraqis because they have agendas that will be intent on keeping Iraq weak. The problem: how do you get the neighbors to buy in to a new Iraq that they're uncomfortable having nearby? But I will say quite firmly that I don't think they will welcome Iraq, or a long time, into any security architecture or new arrangements for the future. Iraq is not going to become a member of the GCC.

One last thing that disturbs me. When one considers the question of what was the purpose and what was gained by the war, I do believe it was the only way to get rid of a harsh and brutal dictator, there was no other way. But I am worried about the consequences of the witch hunt for who was responsible for misleading the president and the people of the United States with unsubstantiated information on the imminent threat that regime posed. Was it the intelligence community, which was supposedly too limited in intellect and analytic skills to recognize the truth? Or was it those who were determined to remove Saddam, regardless? I think this is going to be worrisome and could impact on our ability to reconstruct.

Concluding, and finally, Iraq is a complex society. It's impossible to determine how important a role individual elements - the Kurds, Arabs, Sunnis, Shia, tribes, townies (sp), women, whatever - or even the U.S. will play in shaping its future. Chas is right, it has to be their choice not ours. They will resent any imposition of a government, and rightly so. They will view the U.S. - both Iraqis and their neighbors view us with great suspicion; uncertain what our goals are, what our priorities are, and whether we will be there long enough to see them through, to see them completed. And it seems to me that we need the fullness of time, I think is the Koranic expression, to realize that.

The last point I would make, I think we have to stay the course, be firm and fair. We need to establish real law and order and justice, and we haven't done that; a return to civil society as quickly as is possible. But remember that we can only be effective if we make an honest effort and commitment to stay the course, I think, in Iraq, and make that commitment to the region. And, yes, my final thought - to doing the other business, which is resolving the stalemate between Israelis and Palestinians, if we want to prove that we are not just the bad guy with the weapons on the block. Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, that was terrific, and delivered at extraordinary high speed, too. I think there are two issues, really, that you posed. If I can summarize, I hope they will be sort of a focus of the whole discussion.

One is, you know, the United States -- somebody analogized the United States to a dog chasing a car, you know, and the dog hadn't really thought what it was going to do with the car if it actually caught it. Well, we now have caught the car. We have our wheels in the tire. And the question before us is not whether we're going to chase a car; we have done that. Whether that was right or wrong is really beside the point. We're there, we're accountable in Iraq. We have to do something with it. What is it that we plan to do? What is it that we need to do to make this go right, or at least not badly wrong? That, I think, was the gist of much of your presentation and I think it's the key question.

The second issue that you posed is a very, very important one, and it leads directly to the follow on discussion. And that is, how does Iraq, a future Iraq, fit into the region? What is the relationship of that Iraq with the GCC, with Turkey, with Syria, with Israel, with Iran? And there, too, the choices we make with the Iraqi people will be determinative.

And those, I think, are the two issues, and I thank you for posing them. Ken, you are invited to come up and tell us about Iran in relation to all this.

KENNETH KATZMAN: Thank you very much, Ambassador Freeman. Thank you, Middle East Policy Council. Well, I'm going to talk about Iran by way of Iran's - Iraq's Shia community.

Let me just say, in an overview: there's a spectrum in Washington optimistic to pessimistic. I am probably on the -- very, very much the pessimistic side of the spectrum. My own view is that Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq will ultimately become the dominant powers in postwar Iraq. As the Ba'ath Party is dismantled, as the coalition provisional authority s doing and is intent on doing, the organized counterweight to Shiite Islamist power is being weakened. The Shiite Islamists, in my view, are simply better organized and more well-funded than their competition. They are the only groups, in my view, that have demonstrated yet the ability to mobilize large numbers of Iraqis in political demonstrations.

Of course, not else - not everything's equal. U.S. troops are the major power in Iraq at this time, and Shiite Islamists, in my view, have decided to tread very carefully as long as U.S. forces are in Iraq in large numbers. The Shiite Islamists appear to have settled on a strategy of allowing the Sunni Muslim groups to be the ones to openly challenge the U.S. occupation. The Shiite Islamists are hoping that Sunni Muslim violence in central Iraq will weaken the U.S. commitment and possibly trigger a draw-down of the U.S. presence in Iraq, which would then pave the way for the Shiite groups to assert themselves. For now, the Shiite Islamists are content to allow the Sunnis and U.S. forces to punch each other out in an all-out brawl, and then the Shiites wish to pick up the pieces afterward. My view is that we are, indeed, on the leading edge of a Sunni-led intifada against the U.S. presence that will, in my view, cause progressively escalating difficulty for U.S. forces, and will prevent an early stabilization of the situation in Iraq.

It has long been assumed that, while U.S. troops are there in force, Iraqi National Congress Executive Director Ahmed Chalabi might enjoy supremacy as first among equals. However, he does not appear to have attracted a large following, and the U.S. decision to delay the formation of an Iraqi self-rule authority has tarnished his aura of inevitability, that he was attempting to cultivate. Having lost the impression of U.S. backing and with no real party structure under him, I don't really see what political force or forces are sustaining Chalabi politically at this time.

Much has been made of an intra-Shiite power struggle among the Sunni Islamist groups. I do not believe this is going to turn into any major infighting, certainly not violent infighting among them. There is a many, multi-tiered, interlocking of relationships within the Shiite Islamic community. Much has been made of the young Moqtada Sadr, head of the Sadr clan, trying to assert himself against the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution, SCIRI, headed by Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim. But, you know, Moqtada Sadr's great uncle Mohammed Baqir Al-Sadr, he was an associate of Baqir Hakim's father, Muhsin al-Hakim. They were associates of Khomeini when he was in exile in Najaf. So there is a lot of interlocking relationships and ties that put a break on infighting in my view. And let's not forget Khomeini, before he died, had designated Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim to be the head - his choice to head an Islamic Republic of Iraq.

My own view is that SCIRI, the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, will emerge as the dominant political force within the Shiite community. And in my personal view, Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim will become at least the de facto most powerful leader of postwar Iraq. His homecoming demonstrated that his movement is well organized, well funded by Iran. Iran has offered him a virtual blank check. They are underwriting him, financially, almost entirely.

There are now indications that there will be Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the head of the Hawza al-Ilmiyya group of seminaries in Najaf, is starting to - there's starting to be sort of a separation of responsibilities, where Sistani serves as the religious, theological leadership, and Mohammed Baqir Hakim is the leading political decision-maker in politics; which goes very much with Sistani's quietest tradition of not wanting clerics to play that much of an active role in politics.

Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani traveled to Najaf in early June. He met with Sistani and Hakim. There appears to be some sort of a marriage between the two, as well as the Kurds. And Hakim is supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini, he is supported by Rafsanjani, and he supported by Khatami, President Khatami.

Even if Iraq does become a liberal democracy, one man one vote, let's say, I think here, again, SCIRI and other Shiites have a major say in who wins. We almost had a - almost had an election in Najaf the other day. The SCIRI candidate was about to win the election and then, apparently, Ambassador Bremer canned the election because, in my view, he didn't want the election because SCIRI would have won the election. This indicates, I think, Bremer's concerns with SCIRI; it's building in my view.

Now, I recognize I will get strong arguments against this assessment. I think Judith has already started to throw some of these out. You know, there are other groups in Iraq. This is not a homogenous society. You do have the Kurds, you have the Sunnis, you have Arab nationalism to deal with. In my view, SCIRI has sort of negotiated all these trends, and they have very good relations with all the other factions. I don't feel that SCIRI is completely unacceptable to any faction in Iraq, even the Ba'athists. Mohammed Baqir Hakim has been remarkably muted on the idea of weeding out the Ba'ath Party. It's actually been Ahmed Chalabi that has been the most vocal on this issue, and I think the Ba'athists would be very hesitant to work with him.

Now, let's - whether this scenario comes to pass or not, let's put that aside. Let's assume it does and say, what does it mean for U.S. interests? Is it a disaster, is it good, is it neutral? I think these are important questions. There is significant concern that, if this scenario unfolds, Iran will have a tremendous amount of influence in Iraq, and I think that's right. Iran may acquire strategic depth if the Shiite Islamist SCIRI takes over. There could even be an arms and technology relationship between Iran and a new Iraq that gets going. You know, with Saddam out, we have got found or preventing any further WMD rebuilding, let's say years go by, there could be a technology relationship reemerging between Baqir Hakim and the Iranians.

Let's talk a little about just overall Iran policy, which has been in the news much lately, in light of fears about Iran's strengthened hand in Iraq, its reported hosting of al Qaeda activists, and the nuclear program which has been in the news very much this week. There is definitely increased talk in this town about new options on Iran. There appears to be a growing market, I think, in town for some type of regime change strategy towards Iran, although that is acknowledged to be extremely difficult to achieve. Even if the U.S. could change Iran's regime, could it do so in time, before Iran has a nuclear weapon? Would a new regime necessarily cancel Iran's nuclear program? How could you be sure that regime change solves the nuclear issue?

Because of these doubts, there is increasing talk about basically focusing only on the nuclear program. And there are various ways that that's being talked about. One is the diplomatic route: can you work with the IAEA and the Security Council to perhaps persuade Iran to foreswear its nuclear program? If that fails, however, you know, it's no secret there is talk in this town about targeted military options against Iran's nuclear infrastructure if diplomacy fails. I do not hear talk in town about any type of major U.S. offensive, on the level of what was conducted against Saddam Hussein, to change the regime, eliminate the nuclear program, et cetera. I just do not hear talk of any U.S. military action against Iran on that scale. However, there definitely is talk of some sort of targeted, more targeted military action.

And, of course, there's always talk of international sanctions. Before you get to military action, can you try international sanctions against Iran? And, in my view, it's difficult. Are you sure - can you get a vote in the Security Council to impose sanctions, first of all? Would other countries, especially in view of what has happened on Iraq, agree to sanction Iran? Would sanctions work? Would they be tough enough that Iran would be dissuaded from continuing its nuclear program? So I very much doubt that that's going to - that international sanctions will be the end stage of U.S. policy, but I do believe there has been a decision made in the administration. I think President Bush pretty much announced it the other day, that Iran must not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon; and I do believe that that will focus much administration attention in the next several months. Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you very much, Ken, for that rather depressing presentation. If I understood you correctly, you suggest that even though there may be grounds for concern that the American presence in Iraq could be a springboard for some action against Iran, perhaps the more pressing issue is that the American presence in Iraq has opened major opportunities for Iran to extend its influence into Iraq. If that's the case, then I suppose in due course Iraq will be - will not be an asset in many respects against Iran, and I assume that's the Iranian purpose in all this.

The second matter that you raised again, implicitly -- which I think needs to be discussed more directly, perhaps in the discussion period - is whether the program of de-Ba'athification, removing technocrats in particular, whose identification with the Ba'ath Party was more in the nature of that's the union card you need to be in the government, whether dismissing these people from a future role in Iraq is not, in effect, disarming the very courses that stand against Iranian influence of the kind you fear; a question that, again, relates to decisions that are being made somewhere in Washington and Baghdad in a complete vacuum of public debate.

Ken, you mentioned the Kurds, and I'm sure Omar Taspinar probably can't talk about Turkey and Iraq without mentioning the Kurds. And I hope you will; I know it's part of your academic expertise. But we're also concerned about, as I mentioned, the role of Turkey as a secular Islamic society and the relationship of Turkey as model to Iraq. Please, Omar.

OMAR TASPINAR: Thank you. I just want to talk about the relevance of the Turkish model for Iraq, and I think there are two major questions which have to be addressed. First, what do we understand from the Turkish model, because different people have different understandings of the model. And I think the two elements which are crucial to the Turkish model, which are the way the Turkish model deals with political Islam and the way it deals with Kurdish nationalism, are very relevant for Iraq. So, in that sense, there may be lessons, positive or negative ones, for Iraq.

When you look to Turkey from Washington, D.C., there is a tendency to see, of course, probably the only secular, Muslim, pro-Western, democratic country in the Islamic world. After all, there aren't many countries in the Islamic world where governments regularly alternate with free elections. On the other hand, when you look to Turkey from Europe, there is a tendency to see that the military plays a major role. And probably the more important question is: how does the Arab world perceive the Turkish model? In a time when anti-Americanism is high in the Arab world, is it a good strategy for the United States to present Turkey as America's model for the Middle East? This might undermine the appeal of the whole project from the very beginning.

So how does Turkey deal with political Islam and Kurdish nationalism, and what can be the lesson for Iraq? Well, the issue is Kemalism. Kemalism is still official ideology in Turkey, it is still state ideology. And, in many ways, there are elements which are in the periphery, the Kurdish elements and Islamic elements, which are coming more and more to the Turkish political center. Right now we have a political party with Islamic roots which calls itself - they don't want to even call themselves a Muslim democratic party, but they pretty much buy into the rhetoric of a moderate, conservative party with Islamic roots. So this is a new development in Turkish politics, and I believe it is a positive one, which will test whether Turkey is democratically mature, to really - to really afford such a government.

But how does Turkey have dealt with political Islam so far? Well, the answer is Turkish secularism, Kemalist secularism. You don't have separation of mosque and state in Turkey. This is a misconception that many people have. The model for Turkey has been - the model for the model has been France, and Jacobin France, in fact. Jacobin France in a very anti-clerical, anti-religion - so Turkey tried, under the Kemalists in the 1920s and 30s, to basically control religion by establishing an institution called the presidency of religious affairs. And, to this day, the state tries to supervise - control - Islam.

So that's Turkish secularism, to try to control Islam, and the Arab world perceives this as such. They don't believe that this is a very good model because they believe that the model survives thanks to the vigilance of the military, which is evidenced by the fact that, in 1997 for instance, when Erbakan was believed to go across the line to military - basically engaged in what came to be called a postmodern coup, a soft coup. The National Security Council came up with a list of things to do, and basically kicked Erbakan out of power. And this showed, basically, that in fact, Turkish secularism as it exists today is under the vigilance of the military; the military plays a major role. And this is very interesting because such a role is very appealing to Pakistan. Not to many Arab countries, but Pervez Musharraf is probably the only leader in the Muslim world who takes the Turkish model very seriously because he believes that Pakistan can have - the Pakistani army can have such a role. In the eyes of the Arabs, this is not a very good model because of the role of the military.

So how can we transcend this? I think this political party, if it can show that, basically, the issues - sensitive issues to Turkish secularists, like head scarves, like Islamic education, do not become major polarizing issues, then it can essentially try to prove that there can be a smooth transition from a type of secularism which tries to control Islam into a secularism where there is a clear separation of what is politics and what is religion. This may be very hard. Orientalists believe that Islam and democracy is not compatible. In order to have democracy in Muslim world, they believe that you have to really control Islam. So unfortunately, in Turkey many people also believe in this orientalist theory, and it remains to be seen, but it's definitely an interesting era in Turkish politics to see how AKP Party, Justice and Development, will behave.

The other question: Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish nationalism, again, France is a model for Turkey because the French model was based on assimilation, assimilation of different ethnic groups of France. And the Turkish model is again based on assimilation.

Now, there is a civic element in assimilation, which means that if you assimilate, if you decide to become Turkish, so to speak, upward mobility in politics is possible. So in that sense, Kurds who assume Turkish identity in Turkey are not discriminated against. The problem starts when you want to do politics as a Kurd, as a Kurdish nationalist, and you want to assert your Kurdish national identity and enter politics and expect upward mobility, then there is again the Kemalist dogma, there is again the Kemalist elite which sees that as the beginning of national disintegration, with a lot of memories in the collective memory of Turks going to the Ottoman Empire. There is a belief that when you give cultural rights to the Kurds, political rights will follow. Then there will be a federation, then after federation autonomy, and then division. So just like in the case of the headscarves, you give the right for these girls to wear headscarves, this is the beginning of an Islamic revolution. So there is a zero-sum-gain polarizing attitude.

So, again, the Arab world sees that, the Arab world sees that Turkey has a difficult time even giving cultural rights to the Kurds, and sees what kind of a model is that? You have the military, which plays a major role, you have a secular system which is very aggressive anti-clerical, then you have a concept of Turkish nationalism which is uneasy, at least to say with the Kurdish cultural rights. So why the United States is promoting this? Well, because of an absence of a better alternative. Again, as I said, when you look at Turkey from Washington, or from Ankara, you see that, compared to the Middle East, this is a country where governments come to power with free elections, and there is civil society, there is freedom of press, there is a major discussion of all these issues that I'm mentioning, therefore, it's the best we have.

Now, the Arab world, of course especially Iraq, will have to come up with its own model. Change has to come from within. A model is not a blueprint; it's not something that you can impose on countries, but it gives you a framework of a progressive agenda. Of course there has been many things which could have been better in Turkey, but when we look at the Kemalist era of the 1920s and '30s, the understanding back then was democratic gradualism; no shock therapy -- no democratic shock therapy. The free elections were perceived as the culmination of an era, not the inauguration of democratization.

And I think one lesson that Turkey teaches in terms of Iraq is that free elections at this early stage may be very difficult. It may lead to an Islamic government; it may lead really to political Islam come to power. Therefore, the Kemalist strategy of trying to first modernize the country, secularize the country by investing in human capital, by increasing literacy rates, by emphasizing gender equality, all these things are the right things to do. They have been emphasized in the Arab Human Development Report, and Turkey in many ways has scored very high on all these issues - gender equality, literacy rates, high human capital, good universities - and then slowly, incrementally, once you establish the rule of law, independent judiciary, in the way once you establish a constitutional understanding of liberalism then maybe you can switch slowly to democratic elections. So I think in that sense Turkey is becoming a model Kemalist Turkey in the 1930s and '40s - it's becoming a model.

The Kurdish question and political Islam. The Turkish model has to become a better model in this. I think what we need in Turkey is a more liberal balance between Islam, democracy and secularism, and on the Kurkish front what we need is a more civic understanding of Turkish nationalism, which will allow Kurdish cultural rights, which will allow a more multicultural Turkey.

I'll be happy to answer more questions later.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you. I thought that was very interesting, your statement that the Turkish model really has not jelled, that it has not resolved some of the fundamental contradictions in Turkey is a useful reminder, I think. Again I'm driven to the question of what our relationship as occupiers should be with the secular element in Iraqi society.

I also appreciated your candor in stating that military regulated constitutional orders are not very appealing, either in the Arab world or, I daresay, to Americans, and your reminder that Turkey has not come up with an answer to sub-national identity, and if it were to be emulated in Iraq it would imply the Arabization of the Kurdish zone, which all seems to me to rather limit the utility of Turkey as a counter to the Iranian problems we were discussing.

We should turn now to the other Ba'athist country. I remember years ago the famous telegram from my colleague, the ambassador in Doha, Qatar, entitled "What do the Saudis Think About Qatar?" And the first line was, "Not much, but they know that Qatar is the only other Wahabi state, which is why they take their vacations in Bahrain." And we have a similar sort of interesting relationship between the two Ba'athist Party-run societies. Because they're Ba'athist they seem to annoy each other enormously. And I wonder - I'm looking forward to Martha's dissection - vivisection of the regime in Damascus and its reactions to events, and what opportunities and perils it may see before it.

MARTHA NESS KESSLER: Thank you, Chas., and thank you all for coming. I've divided my remarks into sort of two sections, the first being a more general look at those factors which I think very much are important to Syria and an impact on Syria, but they have applicability to the whole region, and then I'll speak more specifically to Syria itself and what is unique about their predicament right now.

And I certainly would second what my colleagues have said and what Chas. has emphasized, that I think this is early in the game to make any predictions about how things are going to play out, but I have selected some things I want to talk about, those things that I do think are going to persevere; things that we've already done that are going to have reverberations. Some of them seem to be below the radarscope right now, but they certainly are on Syria's radarscope, and that's one of the reasons I wanted to bring them up.

Now, on the positive side - and I feel compelled to sort of make this point in terms of what we've achieved; how we use it of course is another very big question - but I think the U.S. has acted very boldly and decisively against Saddam, certainly exposed him utterly as a despot, and no doubt impressed our friends and our foes alike with our extraordinary military prowess and willingness to act essentially alone. And I think that's an important point because it wasn't that long ago that the United States was thought to be hobbled by its commitment to multilateralism, post-Vietnam syndrome, lots of different things that would have - that I think allowed states in the region, Syria being one of them, to push pretty hard against us, and I think that's changed.

I think our friends in the Gulf, who unabashedly depend upon us and are willing to move into our - despite the cost to them in terms of Arab politics, are obviously more comfortable now that this is over. Other U.S.-aligned states -- Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- have, I think, a much more complicated calculus to struggle with now but are no doubt relieved at our quick and decisive victory and the removal of Saddam.

And I think all the states of the region, particularly our detractor, are almost certainly intimidated to some extent by U.S. action and power, especially since our crosshairs have been sort of swinging across the region ever since the victory in Iraq, and this time I think they have considerably more gravitas than they had before. But I really don't agree with the punditism that suggests we've burst some bubble of terrorism by acting so authoritatively against a state sponsor of terrorism. In fact, I think it would be easier for us if states were still the primary perpetrators of terrorism, but the strategy of going after state sponsorships misses two very important points -- and this has relevance for Syria, but I think more broadly - and that is that terrorists have, with considerable success, weaned themselves from relying so heavily on states, and globalism has been a big boon to them in this.

And the other point I would make is that states in the Middle East, with very few exceptions, have continuously diminishing control over their populations and their institutions of power. No matter how intimidated the governments in that region are by U.S. saber-rattling, few can guarantee that their security services and militaries will necessarily toe the government line, nor can they deliver up popular support for anti-terrorist cooperation. I think this is true in Pakistan, to a lesser extent in Egypt and Jordan, and of course in Saudi Arabia, which is almost a case unto itself.

Not only, I think, have we not burst the bubble of terrorism, I think we've badly blurred our case. Post-9/11, the United States had the moral high ground, world sympathy and a clear-cut and very intentional policy of going after al Qaeda. Washington's case was made very simply and compellingly to the American public and to the rest of the world, and we elicited a great deal of support and help, and Syria is, I think, a notable case here. But even before the war with Iraq we were getting into trouble with the case against Saddam and his support - his alleged support to al Qaeda, and now in its aftermath, the frenzy over the absence of WMD has eroded U.S. credibility badly and I think contributed to really, truly dangerous levels of anti-Americanism virtually everywhere, but especially in the Middle East.

The sense that the United States has invaded and now occupies Iraq, an ancient pillar of Islamic culture and of Arab civilization, is likely to replace any gratitude for chasing out the regionally troublesome and much despised Saddam Hussein. The more toxic combination that dominated Arab politics following the 1948 and 1967 wars - humiliation, powerlessness and rage - is, I think, more likely to set in, possibly stimulating greater Islamic extremism, challenges to existing regimes, especially the pro-American ones, and a resurgence of active rather than the more passive rejection of Israel.

While this U.S. administration may have secured for itself the shied that comes with that kind of intimidating exercise of prowess, I think subsequent U.S. leaders, whenever they're elected into office, can expect to be doubly tested, both by extremists and regularly constituted power. I also think that while they wait, the extremists in the region are very much going to look for and vent their energies against more accessible and vulnerable targets.

A couple of other quick points from the general viewpoint. I think the fact that we're perceived to have acted unilaterally and preemptively has really hurt our credibility in terms of being a promoter of more traditional forms of conflict resolution. We've circumvented the U.N. and therefore hurt that institution and its role that it plays in the Arab-Israeli peace process. And finally, I think our willingness to act unilaterally against Iraq, even though we had some new faces, some Europeans surrounding us, has given credibility to this notion that we're seriously going to try to reshape this part of the world. And I think the implications for the states in the region are obvious. What's less obvious I think is that this is going to have a stimulating effect on the very large Muslim populations in Europe which have considerable capacity for unrest and a great deal of potential political clout.

Now, on to Syria. I don't think that the Syrians are as concerned now with their future relationship with Iraq as they are enormously preoccupied with our presence there. And I think this has been the biggest challenge to Syria in two decades. Essentially the choice for the Syrians is to risk U.S. action against them as a result of their support to Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups that they consider legitimate resistance and not terrorist groups, or lose credibility inside Syria itself and in the larger Arab world.

This situation that they're in has really aggravated cleavages within the young Bashar al-Assad's regime at a time when he's really trying to consolidate his power. The divisions don't break down simply, as the conventional wisdom might suggest, between an older generation or the old guard and his younger followers, but I think rather reflect the two competing aspects of Syrian foreign policy, which is on the one hand highly principled, supportive Pan-Arab goals on the one hand, and practicality on the other. I think so far the leadership has walked a fairly fine line. Iran has temporarily taken off the heat, but I don't expect that to last long.

I'd also make a final point. The Syrian leadership I think, for over a decade and a half, has relied on the United States, ironically, as the centerpiece of their security policy. They believe the United States is the only force that can restrain an aggressive Israel. They have had a floor beneath; they do not want relationships with the United States to fall. They also have a ceiling above which they are not prepared to go in relating to us. I think they'll have to recalculate that now, and it's conceivable that they will make major changes in how they cultivate their traditional ally, Iran, how they deal with us and their approach to the Middle East peace process.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you for that very, very thoughtful presentation which, if I understood it, suggested you think we may have, instead of rearranging the region to our advantage, perhaps laid the basis for rearranging it to our disadvantage, a theme that several others have struck in a different context.

I think you were right to remind us, Martha, that the military prowess of the United States that was displayed in the three-week conquest of Iraq is a very, very powerful, intimidating and inhibiting force, not just in the region but more broadly. But it raises the question of whether Caligula really was right, you know, "Let them hate us as long as they fear us," whether that is an adequate answer in the long run to the management of relations with other states. I have my own answer to that but I will defer to others.

We now come to the questions, comments and the like, and an opportunity for different panelists to go at each other in that context. I would ask that you come to the microphone for your question and that you identify yourselves and be - go ahead sir. And if you will give me a signal I will make a note, and so you don't have to get up and - I see several signals - you don't have to get up and stand at the microphone; I'll give you a tip that you're next.

Please, who are you?

Q: I'm Wolf Gross (ph) from Northrop Grumman International. First let me say that this was a very provocative panel and a lot of good points and some very controversial points were made. But let me borrow and aphorism from Chas. Freeman's other area of expertise, the Middle Kingdom, to wit: "Never wish for something fervently less your wish be granted." I think in this context the commendable idealism of the U.S., in particular the Bush administration, to recreate or to create democracy in other areas of the world fits very nicely. We pressed the Turks for years about the issue of democratic elections and sure enough they had a democratic election, and equally sure enough the Islamists made great progress, to our detriment as far as using Turkish bases were concerned in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly, in Pakistan we pressed the Pakistanis and President Musharraf very, very hard on democratic elections and sure enough, for the first time in Pakistan's history, the Islamists achieved more than about 5 percent, which is their usual before that, taking over a provincial assembly in the northwest frontier adjoining Afghanistan. Now we're similarly engaged in Iraq, trying to, some have said, reestablish democracy in Iraq, but I question whether there ever was any democracy, certainly in my lifetime, and question whether creation of democracy makes any sense.

I throw these ideas out to the panel. Please chew on them to whatever extent you can. Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, Wolf. I would like to ask, since Turkey was raised, a comment, and then I think we'll just go around the panel and those of you who are outraged by each other's comments now can get at each other. Please.

MR. TASPINAR: Well, the view that Turkey did not cooperate, or did cooperate minimally with the United States because of its Islamic government, because of the fact that it had an Islamic majority in the parliament - and I'm a little bit worried about using this term Islamist because really this party does a very good job of communicating its message without using Islam. They're really good at that, and they've learned their lesson well from Erbakan's party. So in that sense they're not really your typical Islamic party that you see in the Middle East. But the fact that to portray it that the cooperation was minimal because of an Islamic party basically does not see the real point that the opposition, which is a Kemalist opposition, the Republican People's Party, did vote totally overwhelmingly no to the cooperation in the parliament. So the Kemalist establishment, the CHB, the Republican People's Party, did not support the idea of cooperating with the United States.

More interestingly, as Paul Wolfowitz mentioned in an interview with CNN Turk, the military was not very outspoken on the issue; they did not make their point very clearly at least. Maybe they wanted the government to take the blame, and since this was a very unpopular idea in Turkey -- the idea of going to war against Iraq was opposed in the public opinion polls by 94 percent of Turks. The military, for also reasons having to do with the Kurdish question, with a kind of confidence crisis with the United States, not knowing what would be the future of northern Iraq, did not support this idea very clearly. And once again, this is relevant for the Turkish model because the military is a very important part of it, and they are concerned about the future of Iraq, predominantly because of the Kurdish question. The Kurds never had it better in the 1990s - when you look at Kurdish history they had a de facto state.

So what was the U.S. promising the Kurds now that would be even better for them in the new decade, in the year 2005? The Turkish suspicion was that it was something along the lines of federation or of potentially something even better, maybe autonomy. So this was the logic of the military, and they were really uneasy about this. And that's why I think to blame the Islamists just for this minimal cooperation is a little bit simplistic.

MR. FREEMAN: I think the key point here, Omer, surely is that if 94 percent of Turks, or 97 percent, as some polls suggested, opposed cooperating with the United States, similar percentages in the Gulf opposed the cooperation with the United States, except in Kuwait and the UAE, and yet autocratic governments cooperated; the democratic government ultimately found it impossible to lead its people into cooperation against such a large majority of opposition. And that is very striking that democracy worked to our disadvantage, not to our advantage, which I take it was Wolf's point.

Judith?

MS. YAPHE: Well, there are a couple things that bother me very much about what you're suggesting. It's true, Iraq has no history of being a democracy, but how can you say that they can't have democracy or function as democrats? I think that's a really unfortunate thing to say. We should not assume that - and we do - that because you have elections you have a democracy. And we should not assume that elections equal democracy, equal a pro-American government. That of course is all absurd.

But I would note that Iraqis aren't stupid. You had one of the best-educated populations with a lot, I think, of knowledge that we just kind of have ignored. And my point would be this: that I think they know what democracy could be for them but they don't know how to get from where they are not to get to that point, and they're not sure we're going to take them there.

I note that one of the mistakes I think the British made -- the British created fine democratic institutions, but that's like creating a Potemkin village and saying it's a real village. You don't have democracy if you don't have indigenous population - if you don't have the Iraqis with responsibility, with power, with the authority to make decisions. You didn't under the Brits, and you don't when this kind of a transition, if you want to call it, is going to happen. But the longer it takes to happen, the more difficult I think our position is going to be.

Finally, one could, if one wanted to, interpret what you're saying as, well, the Iraqis have to be ruled with a firm, strong hand from a strong centralized government, and only a Sunni Arab, what, general or patriarch could do that? I would never say that, and I don't think most people would. I'm not saying that that was your assumption, but the logic is sort of there.

Q: (Off mike.)

MS. YAPHE: That's fine. Please.

MR. FREEMAN: Go to the microphone, Wolf, if you wish.

Q: Judith, I had no intention whatsoever of putting down the Iraqis.

MS. YAPHE: No, I know that, and I apologize for suggesting that.

Q: The issue was imposition of U.S.-style or the U.S. vision of democracy upon other countries, whether it's Turkey, Pakistan or ultimately Iraq.

MS. YAPHE: Well, no, there I would agree with you, and I didn't mean to impute that you were imputing the Iraqis, but there you make a good point. And I would simply say this: it's taken us more than 200 years to get to where we are in our democratic institutions, traditions, experience. And we didn't get it right the first time. The Articles of Confederation didn't work; we had to go through it a second time. And now to think that, well, we've figured it all out so we'll just give it to you to do, no, you're right; there I do agree with you.

MR. FREEMAN: I think we are wrestling here with some obvious contradictions that the somewhat Orwellian use of language in the run-up to war concealed. That is to say, the notion that occupation can be liberation or that military rule can be democratization is inherently nonsense. And if you're looking for analogies to the Iraq experience, I would look to the Philippines, which we liberated and which we didn't enjoy the liberation. In fact, we had almost a decade of very violent warfare before we pacified it, and we successfully transplanted our democratic institutions, and few people would argue that they really took root in the manner that we had hoped.

So I think the question of whether you can transplant institutions and forms into a society which doesn't have the tradition that coincides with these forms is a valid question. It's got nothing to do with the national character of Iraqis or whether they're right or not.

Martha?

MS. NEFF KESSLER: That speaks to the point that I was going to make. I mean, we've watched elections take place in places like Algeria where the election delivered up what would have been a totally unacceptable - or not unacceptable so much as difficult government for us to work with. And, you know, a lot of glib things came out of that. You know, we don't support one man, one vote, one time and whatever, and it bothered me that following that there wasn't a more introspective and careful look at this whole issue of transplanting and encouraging democratic institutions. It's almost as if we demean our own heritage by not understanding and recognizing how complicated it is and how much more sensitive we need to be to the cultures we're talking about here.

I would just say that one of the interesting things that I've discovered in sort of looking at my research from my recent - the book I'm working on on Syria now is what happened to them during the decade of negotiations during the Oslo decade? And one of the things is that it was a very long-running tutorial on the democratic practices inside the United States and inside Israel. And I would say our secretaries of State spent as much time explaining to the Syrians what was going on politically in our country and what was going on politically in Israel than they did in the actual negotiations. And I think that the Syrians emerged from that with a much clearer understanding of both the pluses and the liabilities of democracy, and in the case of Israel, which is the democracy they all live with, of the enormous instability of it, and saw six different prime ministers, one assassinated, and wild swings in politics. And I think it had a very sobering and lasting impact on them. I never hear anyone talk about that, and how they all sat and listened to us explain what was going on with the one thriving democracy in their region and what that decade meant in terms of Israeli politics. It's a real complicated business we're in.

MR. FREEMAN: Ken.

MR. KATZMAN: Thank you. I'll just use the floor to make a couple of points. On the issue of democracy, my assessment - and if my assessment is correct I think it's going to come back to bite us in a very negative way -- is that we seem to be for democracy in Iraq as long as the Shiite Islamists don't win.

I don't want to beat a dead horse, but I refer again to this election that was almost held in Najaf last week, which was cancelled because it was obvious that the SCIRI candidate was going to win. And I think that's going to be unfortunate because I think any democracy that's shaped that way is going to be inherently unstable, and I think it will be difficult to ultimately deny the will of the Iraqi people in one way or another.

On other points, I appreciated Martha's discussion of what she called dangerous levels of anti-Americanism as fallout, and I want to say that I agree with that, but also the Middle Kingdom, Asia was mentioned. Let's not forget, in the one year, March 2002 till March 2003, U.S. government attention was very much focused on Iraq, almost to the exclusion of almost all other major problems, and in that one year, what happened? North Korea basically has completely broken out of the nuclear cage -- if it was ever in a cage, but it's a lot clearer that they broke out of that cage in that one year - and the Islamic Republic of Iran made dramatic progress on its nuclear program in that one year.

So these other problems, these other threats in my view were not dealt with very much during that year, and they've become dramatically tougher problems in that one year. And in my view, these two programs, these nuclear programs, there are real threats. This is not, you know, some anthrax that we have not found in Iraq; this is not some nuclear program that was alleged and has now found not to have been in Iraq. These are real, confirmed programs. It's not murky; the intelligence is not murky in these two cases, and in my view we've lost time on them.

And then there's the broader question of, you know, are there doubts about U.S. intelligence now? Are we going to be able to deal with these other proliferation threats if the world is in some way doubting or questioning our intelligence assessments? And I think that's a very valid and important question.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you. Perhaps we can consider democracy adequately debated, but I do want to make one last comment on it, perhaps at the risk of beating a dead horse, as you've said. And that is that I think that the most effective means by which to spread democracy is by example. What we do at home is far more important than what we do abroad. And there is an emerging contradiction here between our professions of democracy and support for the rule of law in other societies as we suspend habeas corpus for Muslim Americans accused - or Muslim residents of the United States accused, rightly or wrongly, of terrorism.

I don't believe we can simultaneously promote the values of our Constitution and violate them at home. And therefore, whatever we do abroad, we need never to forget that we need to maintain the vigor, the strength of our tradition and our own values.

Sir. Tell us who you are, please.

Q: Jeff Steinberg, Executive Intelligence Review. If Ken is sort of taking the extreme pessimistic view of the prospects for the Middle East situation post-Iraq war, I'd like to maybe pose an optimistic alternative potential, which I think would pose a policy challenge in Washington. Basically, the alternative description that I've heard around town for the justification for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, rather than being the democratization or reinvention of the region, along the lines of that now-famous "clean break" report, was the idea that once Saddam is out of the way, posing the actual threat that he represented, that this would remove one of the major last excuses for Sharon and the right wing in Israel to avoid going forward with some kind of fundamental peace agreement.

Now, I think that the whole issue of democracy, as it's been discussed today I think quite insightfully, is really not to the point, and people in the region, both in Israel and in all of the various Arab countries, I think in real terms are far more concerned about the other D word, which is development, and that were we to take the approach of drawing upon the strengths in all of the countries that we're dealing with -- for example inside Iran clearly the vast majority of young people are looking to see Iran transformed into something more along the lines of a modern developing nation, not stuck in the theocracy of the Khomeiniites.

Inside Iraq, prior to Saddam Hussein's takeover, Iraq was really the kind of growing model of development, of scientific and technological prowess in the Arab world, and obviously Israel, unfettered from the sort of psychosis of being an occupying power in the West Bank and Gaza, has enormous potential for economic development. There are projects like the Caspian Sea development, there is now extensive discussions about transportation corridors and pipelines between India and Iran, and many other things, obviously, that could go that way. If the U.S. were to take the lead as we did in the post-World War II period with the Marshall Plan and what we did in Japan, we could, I think, perhaps reverse the directionality and again restore the American image in the region with this emphasis on development projects where all the elements are potentially there.

MR. FREEMAN: Are you asking for an assessment of the impact on what's happened in Iraq on our relations with Israel and the peace process?

Q: That's part of it, yes, and also on the broader question of putting development ahead of democracy.

MR. FREEMAN: Right, and I'd like to ask Judith to start with that.

MS. YAPHE: Oh, I'd like to ask Martha to start with it. (Chuckles.)

MR. FREEMAN: All right.

MS. NEFF KESSLER: Okay.


MR. FREEMAN: We wonder if you want to start?

MS. NEFF KESSLER: Yeah. You know, I think that's one of the imponderables at this point, whether we will be able to take our position following this war and turn it into serious momentum in the peace process. I have to tell you I'm not hopeful, just based on what's happened so far. We still have a structure of this peace process that gives a veto to violence, and I don't see anything that's changed that, and I think that our actions in Iraq have been a stimulant to violence, as I said in my formal remarks. So I think there needs to be real reconsideration as to how we approach negotiations.

As I also mentioned in my remarks, I think that we have appeared, fairly or unfairly, to be in lockstep with Israel's interests. That hurts us as an honest broker in negotiations. We have undermined the United Nations, and I would point out that every negotiation has been entered into on the Arab side on the basis of U.N. resolutions. To the extent they think the United States is no longer honoring that U.N. platform, I think you're going to see less malleable positions on the sides of the last two participants, the Palestinians and the Syrians.

MR. FREEMAN: Now Judith.

MS. YAPHE: All right. I always used to defer to more authority, and that's just a habit I suppose. I am not sure - it's easy to say that development is the answer, because in many ways it would be. If we could give everybody jobs and economic hope of prosperity, surely no one would be willing or interested in being recruited to extremist groups, Islamist or otherwise, et cetera, et cetera. I think that's a nice answer, but it's not the right answer in terms of what the reality is. And if the question is, what has been the impact of what we've done in Iraq on Israel, I'm afraid it needs something darker, and I would say there it might be encouraging, and I think we've seen signs of it, the Israelis to push us or to suggest to us that now is the time to deal with Syria and Iran in a similar fashion, because after all, they are as guilty as Iraq was of doing nefarious things. That would not be good.

I also think that - again, on the darker side of things - I mean, I would like to think it would make Israel feel more secure, but I'm worried that Israel hasn't been worried about Iraq threatening its security for a long time. But I do think the Israelis are probably more than eager to teach us how to deal with a surly occupied population, and that would not be a good model, as I think Martha has suggested.

MR. TASPINAR: Just very briefly, political economists always debate whether development and democracy, the two Ds, are mutually exclusive, and they often come to the conclusion that you need a certain amount of democracy to take the right decisions, to make the right investments. So in that sense there's a tendency among political economists to say that democracy is part of development. So they're not mutually exclusive projects.

But on the other hand, you're right. I mean, what we need is definitely not a top-down agenda of democratization but a bottom up, so we need a middle class in the Middle East in the Arab world.

When you look at how Europe democratized, how Europe became a secular continent, it's really the rule of the bourgeoisie. Without the bourgeoisie, without economic development, the industrial revolution, there wouldn't be secular democracy. In that sense we have to downplay the role of Islam and not ask questions about whether Islam is compatible with democracy, et cetera, but we have to emphasize really development and create an Arab middle class, which will itself have its democratization agenda. In that way I think your question is relevant.

MR. FREEMAN: John Duke Anthony.

Q: Yes, my question has two parts, and they're based on facts as well as perceptions, the latter sometimes being more rife with implications than the former. And they're embedded in some of the comments you've made, Chas., in between the speakers, as well as one you put at the very outset, that it is too early to say whether we will be perceived as having facilitated liberation or subjugation.

I think the short-term answer to that question is clearly the latter. We are the governing power, the government, the authority in Iraq, and in that context, from an Iraqi perspective, whether one is Sunni, Shia, north, south, Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, whatever, their situation is less than that which is the situation of the Palestinians, which has, from the intifada, been beamed into every living room daily in the region. So, from an Iraqi perspective, their situation is not nearly as good as that of the Palestinians. And there are implications but I want to see your responses to what all the implications to our needs, our concerns, our interests, our relations, our key foreign policy objectives.

The second half of it is that we talk a good game, as you mentioned, about being pro-peace, about being supportive of regional stability, and also promotion of the rule of law. And yet, among the nearly 190 members of the United Nations, no country of the total is more widely and pervasively perceived as having been the least supportive in terms of what we've done and what we have not done recently in support of those three ideals.

And in terms of the peace aspect, while we have a bold rhetorical set of pronouncements coming from the administration, leading up to and in support of the roadmap, we have a media, we have an overwhelming sentiment in this building and elsewhere on Capitol Hill, as well as amongst the neo-conservative wings in the administration that could hardly be less pro-peace than any other prominent personalities and policymakers in the world.

What are the implications of these?

MR. FREEMAN: I think, John, others on the panel will probably have a response, but since you directed yourself to me I will begin the response by simply saying I think you have very eloquently, as usual, framed a major dilemma for the United States, to which Martha referred in her prepared remarks, namely we have a - we are losing our capacity to inspire and we are replacing it with a capacity to intimidate. We are losing international respect as we appear to be an international scofflaw rather than a champion of the rule of law and the sort of order that we did champion throughout the 20th century.

And this is a problem, and it's not going to be fixed by advertising campaigns or radio stations playing soft rock and contemporary Lebanese music. It is a more serious matter than that, and it requires us to do what we demand of others; namely, to engage in some soul searching, to consider where we are headed, and what we stand for. The question of whether, in the short-term, Iraqis perceive occupation as liberation or subjugation has, as you suggest, an obvious answer: occupation cannot be liberation. Subjugation, however, has to be looked at, I think, in a longer-term perspective. If the United States does certain things, then the intifada that Ken fears among Sunnis need not arise. If the United States does, as Jeff Steinberg (sp) suggests, emphasize development over crafting political institutions in Iraq, and allows Iraqis to fashion their own political institutions to match development, then I think the long-term pattern of resistance and hostility to the United States that otherwise might appear could be avoided.

And I think, with regard to peace in the Middle East, the jury is still out, although the indications are not good - of seriousness of purpose in the White House and the determination to carry through with the kind of decision-making and pressure on our friends - not our enemies but our friends - that will be required to compel them to make decisions that they otherwise will find every excuse to avoid. So that's my brief response to your questions. Others may wish to disagree.

MS. YAPHE: I would like to put a different - kind of a little different cast on that, get a little bit more, perhaps, Iraq-specific, if you will, because you had two important issues there that I'm glad you raised. I have said already that I think we assume elections mean democracy, and we also assume that elections and our role there is going to produce a pro-U.S. government that's going follow our policies. Well, I would make two points.

First of all, never assume - (chuckles) - is my first point, which is that, you know, a new Iraq government either would follow U.S. policy as expected or anticipated, or that it could afford to even if it wanted to. For example, I think in the minds of many in Washington, and you have - who you have labeled the neo-cons, have a certain agenda in mind as to what that new Iraqi government will do. It will recognize Israel, for example. It will join us in supporting the real enemies in the region, Iran, even Syria. It will pay reparations. It will follow all U.N. Security Council resolutions. It will gladly give up weapons of mass destruction. Why would we assume any of that? And even if a government that we hand-picked were to say they would do that, how could they and survive? This is putting a very heavy burden on a very fragile regime, whether it is going to be elected by the Iraqis or appointed by - whatever comes, it's going to be fragile for a long time.

And my second point on here, broader implications. Yeah, I think you have to go to a higher level of analysis, as one of my bosses once pointed out to me, one of my mentors, and that is embedded in our national security strategy and the image we are projecting. Personally, I was stunned that we put this in this national security document to be publicly read, but what we have said was: we are the sole superpower and we believe that we have the right of preemption, that if we see something which is threatening us, we have the right to act preemptively before it threatens us.

Now, what's the impact of that in the region? Blow everything else aside, it makes them more afraid of us. They have seen our use of power, they have seen our use of decisiveness: fine. Does it mean we are going to stay there? Maybe, and maybe that's good, but it also raises that all-important question: who's next? What if you don't like us, or what if we decide that - or we do something wrong? What if you decide - are you going to decide that - is Syria next, is Iran next? Or, if - I believe I read somewhere, if you carry this fantasy of remaking the Middle East to its conclusion, with Iraq as the model to emulate, it's not just going to be Syria or Iran, it's going to be Saudi, it's going to be the Gulf states, it's going to be Egypt, it's going to be everyone. Now, I think that's way overreaching, it is in the realm of fantasy. But in the region, I think people are very much, yeah, worried about that when they focus, and they have to focus because we're there. So I think those are important points.

MR. FREEMAN: I think it's interesting, Judith, that aside from Israel, which pioneered the concept of preventive warfare or preemptive warfare in the last century, the only government to have officially endorsed our statement is the government of India, which, if you were Pakistan, would give you a nightmare or two. Ken, you have a comment.

MR. KATZMAN: Thank you. John, thank you for your great question. You know, you asked what would be the result of, you know, being perceived as subjugating, and my view is the answer is that there's going to be rebellion in Iraq against the subjugation. I think we're already starting to see that. And now, my view is this rebellion may not be militarily significant, it may not - it's not going to defeat the United States military, but it's going to be, in my view, politically significant.

And why do I say that? CNN yesterday - I had it on in my office - they had one of their sort of instant polls, you know. The poll yesterday was, should U.S. troops stay or should they leave Iraq? That was the first sign, in my view, that the mass media - today The Washington Post has an article about the troops grumbling, they want to come home, they don't like their duties that they're doing as occupiers. We are heading into an election year next year. In my view, there will be a lot of pressure -- in my view, to have 150,000 U.S. troops still in Iraq by September 2004, October 2004, one month before the election, still taking casualties, still with no stable Iraqi authority - my view is that that is not where the White House wants to be in September of 2004. So I think there is going to be tremendous pressure on the administration, within the administration, to restructure the policy if, indeed, we don't start to see progress toward an Iraqi authority, a stable government that would allow us to draw the presence down.

MS. YAPHE: Could I make one -

MR. FREEMAN: Yes.

MS. YAPHE: -- historical observation on what Ken has said? I think the lesson here, and I have been saying this in a lot of other places, goes back to the British in 1920. The Iraqis' reaction to the British imposition of colonial rule and mandate and all of this I think was threefold: resist it, rebel against it - this is the pattern that Ken has laid out, but then I would say the third step was co-opt it. Okay, we will recognize they are going to be here for the short-term, get in, take over the institutions, and shape them the way you want, because they - the Brits then, the Americans now - won't be here long, or forever. And I think that there is a historical pattern, if history repeats itself, that could be repeated.

MR. FREEMAN: Sure.

Q: Balal Faisal (ph) from Kuwait Embassy. Thank you, Ambassador Freeman, for giving us this chance to learn from a very knowledgeable panel. Being from Kuwait, being from a country that was on the front lines, and we know and we believe strongly that the real war starts now, the real challenge is today. I would like to ask Ms. Yaphe and Dr. Kazman, specifically, on the challenges that the GCC will face. I know Ms. Yaphe shed some light that there are some agendas for the neighboring countries. I know for a fact in Kuwait we don't definitely have any agenda interfering into Iraq's internal politics.

We are very concerned about the stability of Iraq. I know I was a little bit concerned when I heard Dr. Kazman speaking about the possibility of the U.S. troops might not be there for a long time, which, in effect, will harm probably Kuwait and other regional countries. Where does Kuwait plays a role, and the rest of the GCC, in reintegrating Iraq within the region? I know for a fact that we are trying to reintegrate Iraq economically in a way that we should invest in the private sector in Iraq, help the economy of Iraq just to get on it's feet again. But if there is any specific things that you could shed some light on, I would appreciate it. Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Judith?

MS. YAPHE: Excellent question again, and I think this whole issue of how will Iraq fit in to the neighborhood now that the war is over, and also now that Iran may be assuming a much more looming if not threat - certainly, a presence that has to be dealt with. I have always viewed the region as very conservative, and I think right after the war for Kuwait's liberation was over, the day after, I think, most of the Gulf wanted to go back to the situation as it was before Iraq invaded; which was to say, yeah, you invaded Kuwait, that's fine, but let's get back to balance of power, we still need an Iraq to balance it out and play a role for us, well, it's too bad it's under Saddam. But I think that the tendency has always been to go back to things that worked before.

I would say this, I don't - what I said in my comments, I don't think that an Iraq with democratic institutions, assuming they get them, and elected parliaments and all the things that don't really exist in much of the Gulf now, I don't think that's the challenge. It's an existential concern, but I don't think it's the real concern or impact that many people, especially some of the people who supported the war here, thought. I do think that there will be pressure to integrate Iraq, yes; financially, sure; investment, yeah; because that will tie - it will give the neighbors a buy in. Iraq will not be a threat to you if you can involve yourself and engage in its reconstruction, show you're a good friend, you know, help to build that.

And that's all well and good, but I think if I were a Kuwaiti, I would think about the following. Enormous pressure to give up on reparations, you don't need them, they can't be expected - you can't impose that kind of a burden on a new Iraqi government. Iraq is oil-rich in theory, but in reality it will not enjoy the status or the use, or even have the oil to export that it once had for a long time. It's going to desperately need outside assistance, especially in terms of investment, money to rebuild, to get back to where it was. And in a sense, that's where the neighbors can help, even though that may be, you would say, self-defeating if it's going to effect OPEC decisions, whatever. It all gets very complicated; it is like the onion. But I would say that there are a lot of things that Kuwait will be pressed heavily to give up on, forget what happened in the past, we have to look ahead.

Having said that, my conversations with many from the region, including Kuwait and even the lower Gulf, there is a very clear sense that, yeah, we know we have to deal with Iraq and it's going to need help and we would like to play a greater role - which they probably will be allowed to do, in terms of shaping; they shouldn't be involved in reshaping Iraq internally. But we're not going to let the Iraqis into the GCC and we're really not ready to talk about security, either sharing or participation, those issues - that's a long way away, I think.

MR. FREEMAN: I think the question is a very, very good one. There are people in Kuwait who argue, and I happen to agree with them, that Kuwait's natural role, historically and in the future, has been as an entrepot for the hinterland in Iraq and extending up to central Asia; that it is a logical trading point for that whole basin, up to the Caspian. And if that's the case, then Kuwait's future lies in very close association with the Iraq that will emerge, and no country has a greater stake in the character of that Iraq then Kuwait.

A second point I would make is it's really quite startling to me to see the degree of redeployment by U.S. forces: withdrawal from Saudi Arabia of combat forces even as a new and expanded training role emerges for the U.S.-Saudi relationship; deployments to Qatar; shifts in and out of Kuwait; uncertainties about the future American presence, if any, in Iraq; adjustments in relations with the UAE and Oman; the 5th Fleet in Manama, in Bahrain. And yet, all this is going on with no collective discussion with the United States. No common GCC position, no strategy, no group dialogue, no effort to produce a rational division of labor, to reduce political and economic burdens and/or share them adequately - really quite a remarkable, to my mind, failure of that institution and of American policy, which ought to demand some measure of accountability by those we are deployed to defend. Judith?

MS. YAPHE: Just - I think you meant to say that we haven't consulted with the region.

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah.

MS. YAPHE: Yeah, and you're absolutely right. And I would add one more sort of footnote to what -- Chas has said it so correctly, the problem, which is: what will be the future of our relationships? I mean, how do we perceive, for example, Saudi Arabia? I think we all are aware that there are people who don't put high value on our maintaining a close relationship with Saudi, a need for Saudi oil, or the need for bases; maybe that's all gone and been replaced by this great new relationship we're going to have with and in Iraq. I don't know what the answer is, but I think that's a question to add to Chas's concerns.

MR. FREEMAN: Ken, and then Martha.

MR. KATZMAN: Well, Talal (ph), I didn't mean to press you with my presentation today. I think Kuwait will be just fine, actually. But, as Chas said, there is going to be a redeployment, U.S. draw down, eventually. Either after Iraq is stabilized or before it's stabilized, there will be some shifting of U.S. forces out of the region. Now, in one sense, that's good because it leaves - it relieves some internal domestic pressure that the Gulf states have been facing to some extent in their publics about the size of the U.S. presence. But, on the other hand, it has - it's problematic because it could leave the GCC states feeling much more vulnerable without that extensive U.S. security presence.

Which brings me to Iran, and I think Judith mentioned this, too. Iraq is no longer available as a strategic counterweight to Iran, and if U.S. forces also draw down substantially, does that essentially leave the field free to Iran in the Gulf? Would Iran seek to - would Iran acquire additional leverage, would it seek to use that leverage against the GCC states? That's a possible problem out there.

I also think what's happened in Iraq - the U.S. is going to focus now more on the internal politics of the GCC states. This is not necessarily a consequence so much of the Iraq situation as it is of the September 11th terrorism perceived threat. And the U.S. is taking much more interest in the internal political reform in the Gulf, seeking to advance that. And, you know, again, that could cut both ways. It could lead to reforms, which perhaps make the GCC more stable; or it could lead to a backlash against what - perceived U.S. meddling in the region.

I also think internally, within the GCC, there is going to be a shift in - more of a focus among the GCC publics on the Arab/Israeli conflict, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Perhaps the attention has been focused on Iraq, it still will be, but perhaps attention will be even more focused on the Arab/Israeli question. And if that does not make progress, again, that could come back to hurt the Gulf governments. So why are you not doing enough, why are you not doing more on that situation?

MR. FREEMAN: Martha, and then Judith has been stimulated to a further remark.

MS. KESSLER: (Chuckles.) My points are simple and I will make them quickly. I'm not as sanguine as my colleagues that we will be out of Iraq early, and I think that the impact on Gulf politics - internal politics - are going to be considerable if we stay for a long period of time. And I think it will also be very difficult for the United States to push - to push Iraq in the direction of more democratic practices and building democratic institutions without the spotlight falling very much on our other friends in the region. It's almost guaranteed the U.S. media will go after this once we enter that phase, and I don't think we're there yet. But this - but I think that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia particularly felt very much on the hot seat, as Ken pointed out, more as a result of the terrorist issue than in relationship to Iraq. But I think that a phase of this development is coming up in which that will happen, and the issue of democratization will become acute.

MR. FREEMAN: Judith?

MS. YAPHE: Two quick points on things that - on comments of Ken's. I think that there will be - there is already ongoing a shift in U.S. forces; but it's not outside the region, it's within the region, and I think that will continue. We will continue to maintain a presence. We may be out of Saudi Arabia, but yes, we're in more heavily in the smaller states and we're going to be in Iraq; which leads me to the fact that we're also in Afghanistan, central Asia, as well as the Gulf. Does that make a circle around another "I" country? (Chuckles.) Yeah, it does, doesn't it?

My second point would be this: that Iraq is still there as a counterweight to Iran, but not as the GCC or the Arab counterweight. It's becoming the - or it may become the U.S.'s counterweight to Iran, and that says something different than it being - protecting the Arabs as it professed to do in its invasion of Iran.

MR. FREEMAN: Sir, you have waited patiently. Who are you and what's the question or comment?

Q: My name is Ali Amar (ph), and I'm a risk consultant. I have a question; but before that, I hate to say on a Friday that development is a really bad example for democracy. USAID has poured money to Morocco since 1952, yet Morocco is ranked 128th on the UNDP development report. We have given Egypt over $40 billion since '79, yet the vast majority of Egyptians swim in poverty, and human rights and civil liberties are worse today than they were in the '70s. And I think - and I believe that if the U.S. wants to promote support of - encourage democracy, it has to change the way it deals with the Arab world.

I believe that if the U.S. wants to win the hearts and minds of the Arabs, you need first to read their lips. And if it does read the lips of the Arabs, what will it find, what will the U.S. hear? Simple things: change the way you deal with us. I think that the U.S. has failed, and I believe the panel also has failed, to grasp, to seize, and to distinguish between the stagnant, stale, and failing regimes, the governments, and the vital, thriving, civil society that might not be identified.

And so, with the Arab world, I need to remind you that the day after the bombings wracked Casablanca, Rabat hosted the Arab Annual Poetry Program. At the same time when the world was denouncing America and its supremacy, the Moroccans were renegotiating a free-trade agreement. Bahrain, Amman in Jordan, Morocco, all have some democratic experiments, and if you follow the events, you will see that in their campaigns, it's not anti-Americanism and it's not Israel and it's not Palestine; it's money, it's education, it's unemployment, it's health care - just like New Hampshire and Iowa.

I think the U.S. needs to stay away from the government and deal directly with the people in very dignified and respective manner. Development has failed because it has been a government-to-government policy. Democracy will fail, or democracy promotion will fail, if it is a government-to-government policy because the Arab governments do not want democracy, and thus the fact.

My question is, since most of the panel is from the intelligence community, is this an idea whose time has come? Is the U.S. ready and willing to read the Arab lips rather than give them lip service?

MR. FREEMAN: Who would like to respond? Martha?

MS. KESSLER: Well, I don't think it's an era that's here at all, unfortunately. I understand the point you're trying to make and I think that it's very legitimate, that we have not been successful, with only one exception that I can think of, of establishing close and effective rapport at a popular level. I think that it's highly unlikely that we will go in that direction, at least in the near-term. The one exception, I think, is during the development era of the Oslo negotiations and the Palestinian Authority, where there were nongovernmental institutions developed to handle monies to go directly to people. But unfortunately, I don't think that era is here. I think you make a very good point, though.

MR. FREEMAN: If I can respond briefly, I think you're right in principle, but the means by which Americans relate directly to foreign peoples are not through USAID, but through business connections, and business connections with the entire region are atrophying, decaying, and disappearing for obvious reasons. People can't get visas to come here. If they do get visas, they are reluctant to brave the Immigration and Naturalization Service, customs, and other indignities at the port of entry, or to travel domestically in the United States on airlines through a domestic security apparatus that is not particularly welcoming to people from the Middle East in particular, given 9/11. Americans, for their part, don't want to go to the region because they are apprehensive about hostile attitudes which, in fact, are a reality. So the two sides are disengaging, not engaging: that's the sad reality.

I think you're absolutely right, that is the wrong trend. It's ultimately injurious both to the United States and to the Arabs, but it is the trend, and we perhaps should have another discussion of how to deal with that. Sir?

Q: Thank you, Ambassador. My name is Jeffrey Winograd. I'm the editor of a publication called Focus Israel, it's a newsletter based here in D.C. I heard one speaker talk about the ability - the loss of the ability of states to control terrorist organizations within their countries. I heard another speaker talk about - or talk about Israel perhaps trying to teach the United States how to deal with a surly population. And I'm not sure I understand, Ambassador, when you spoke about Israel being the pioneer of the preemptive model, whether that was a compliment or whatever.

But taking this all into context, I ask all the speakers: what would you recommend, specifically, that Israel do regarding the peace process? And specifically, what do you want the United States to do regarding Israel and the peace process?

MR. FREEMAN: A slightly different topic than the one we have been devoting today to, but I think a very relevant one. I would point out we have had two sessions over the last year on precisely these issues, and those of you who wish to review those discussions, you can find them in Middle East Policy or on our website. Having said that, we have, I think, a very legitimate question and I would like to ask the panel to respond.

MS. KESSLER: Okay. Well, I think I mentioned in my remarks some of those things that I think are going to be deleterious to the process as it is currently structured. And I think it's interesting that this U.S. administration seems to be trying to use the same approaches -- that is, incrementalism, confidence-building measures, and a negotiating format not unlike what we have been using all along -- despite these very dramatic changes in the region: incredible escalation of violence and bloodshed in the Arab - the Palestinian/Israeli arena.

It is my personal feeling at this point that we are beyond - way beyond the point where we can conduct negotiations in that respect. I think confidence-building measures are almost an insult to those in the region who absolutely have lost homes, families; and to expect that somehow we can all sit down and reason together and go for long periods of time testing one another's trust levels is just, in my view, one of the more profound misunderstandings of people and how they experience what the peoples of this region have experienced. And I think that's true on both sides of the table, both Israel and the Palestinians.

I think we need to have a very thorough reexamination of how we want to approach Middle East peace; how to proceed with negotiations and whether we really can move forward using any of the sort of previous designs that we have used -- and used with no success, I might add - and therefore, they are tried and not true. (Chuckles.) So I think it's time to look at it again. In terms of Israel's position, I think there is no doubt in my mind that they have encouraged this notion of reshaping the region and pushing democracy. I think it's an ill-conceived notion; I would like to see them rethink that.

MR. FREEMAN: Ken, but before Ken I will just say that my reference to Israel pioneering the concept of preventive warfare was not a compliment. Ken?

MR. KATZMAN: Thank you. I agree with Martha that this is probably going to take new formulas. My personal view - and again, I don't follow the Israeli/Palestinian issue on a daily basis, but I have been to the region, you know, fairly frequently.

So, I mean, my conversations with the parties - my view is that I - you know, unless and until all the parties sort of agree to go back where they ended off in January 2001, I believe it was, and sort of agree that they're going to negotiate on the basis of what I believe the parties have told me was almost an agreement - very close to an agreement. And my view is that that will ultimately be dusted off and pick up from there, and likely that there could be the basis of a solution there. But I very much doubt that roadmaps and the Tenet plan, the Mitchell plan, and how many other envoys - I think we're on our fourth or fifth envoy right now, Zinni, Burns, now Wolf - I very much doubt that these are going to yield any real substance. I think there was something very close to an agreement, and I think if the parties were to revisit that, that probably could be the basis of moving forward.

MS. YAPHE: Just a few simple and quick points. This is not intended, or at least my remarks are not intended as Israel-bashing. The intention more is that the U.S. occupation of Iraq is not the same thing as Israel occupying territories that it had agreed to give up to the Palestinians and has failed to do so, and I think is still reluctant to.

That leads me to my second point, which is that yeah, when Israel - Israel has to deal with terrorism, but dealing with this simply by retaliatory and preemptive violence not only is not the answer, it's only bred more violence and more terror. And it seems to me that it feeds into - besides into those elements that really see this as a brilliant and easy way to disrupt and prevent both reconstituting the peace process and also will prevent having to come to any closure or make any concessions. And that plays into the - even those who one the surface give lip service to yes, we have got to get back to talk, but their actions belie their deeds.

And that's my final point, which is that I think Israel, like the Palestinians but in this case, Israel - (unintelligible) - look to your obligations. What did you promise? Good works are more than good words, which is I think what is needed.

MR. FREEMAN: Conway?

Q: Yes, Conway Ziegler from SAIC and the MEPC Advisory Board. First of all, I want to compliment all the panelists for being just - (chuckles) - really impressive this morning. I wanted to try and get some quick reaction from this august group on Joe Nye's (sp) article in Foreign Affairs in July/August, where he said that - he sort of ratcheted up from Martha's statement in terms of hard power has been demonstrated, but he said soft power is where it really is going to have to play out.

And it seemed that, in the hearings on the Hill here over the last few days, the issue has been, now that we have largely gone in unilaterally with a much smaller front, certainly, than in Gulf War I, how do you try and get the French, the Russians, the Koreans, the Japanese -- the people who actually have troops -- to help some of the six divisions or so that we have there now eventually start coming home, sometime before, you know, the end of the decade; and to help pay for what has been sort of estimated to be - right now, if we kept our troops there, I think we're saying it's running about three-and-a-half billion a month or it's something like 40 billion bucks a month right now -

MR. FREEMAN: A year.

Q: Forty billion a year. And in the reinvestment of the infrastructure - Saddam, when he was trying to save his neck in the last few months, he had gotten I think it was the Russians, the Chinese, and the French to offer 35 billion to start working on those oil fields. Right now, I don't see anyone with kind of large checkbooks, so I don't - with such a diverse and good group that can handle that, leave it to your judgments as to how you want to kick that one around. But how to unilateralize this - excuse me, how to multilateralize - (chuckles) - this and make this more of a cooperative venture?

MR. FREEMAN: Who wants to start?

MS. KESSLER: Well, I will just make one point, which I think is sort of overwhelming. We so clearly did not take into account possible allies in the beginning, that there isn't any question that, in order to bring them on board now, we're going to have to give up a lot. We're going to have to give up a lot in terms of the - whatever economic benefits flow from the rebuilding; in terms of decision-making and sharing, and sharing in that with allies; and that I think is just basically the bottom line. We're just going to have to give up a lot of the authority that we have over this situation and our obvious - in -- for accruing the economic benefits of development. We're going to have to share it, and I'm not even sure that will work. But that's the only thing I can think of.

MR. FREEMAN: Ken?

MR. KATZMAN: Yeah, just very briefly, yeah. There have been some commitments. I think it was in the papers the other day that the U.S. is talking with about 30 countries to make some contributions of troops. Again, I think there is a tremendous reluctance to contribute troops on the part of other donors because, again, these other donors were not leading this charge to go into Iraq, and now to ask them to come in is a little bit difficult. But I think eventually they will come in, and I think that's going to be the beginning of what I think is going to be a U.S. transition from trying itself to determine the character of the future Iraqi government to allowing the Iraqi people to determine the character of their successor government. The U.S. is going to give up -- in exchange for these troops coming in, the U.S. will pull out some troops and the U.S. will lose some leverage over the character of the new Iraqi government.

MR. FREEMAN: (Inaudible.)

MS. YAPHE: I would turn this around. Oh, I'm sorry.

MR. FREEMAN: No, okay.

MS. YAPHE: There are three questions, I think, that have to be asked, Conway, to this question, because I don't see us giving up much power authority and I don't see us letting in foreign troops to take over when we bring our boys and girls home; not going to happen. But given the building that we're in - (chuckles) - and the shadow cast here by the Capitol, I think you need to ask three questions.

Who is going to make the decisions? For example, in oil contracts: will the Iraqis even now, or if they were going to go to OPEC, or in anything coming up, will they be allowed to make the decisions as to do we honor the contracts made - signed under this - under Saddam's government, so that the Russians, the French, and everyone else can, you know, can have that? Or do these all have to be renegotiated because it's a totally new government and the new government is not responsible for honoring or keeping those old contracts, which might be to their disadvantage? They should be maybe renegotiated.

What's the role of the U.S. political advisor? I have seen a quote recently in - I forget where, one of the economic or financial journals - that if the U.S. were to allow an Iraqi team to go to OPEC as part of the annual meetings or whatever the upcoming discussions are, they would not be able to make - to finalize or make any agreements, especially international ones, you know, to deal with any - without the approval of the American advisor, that retired oil company executive. Now, that's an important distinction, I think.

Finally, the question that we have to ask is how are contracts being handed out now? And again, this gets to the -- where are we sitting? Is there not insistence by us, just as there was in 1991, if we had liberated Kuwait, we saved Saudi Arabia, we have now liberated Iraq, our blood was spilled, we were on the line. Therefore, isn't it the only fair thing that we - that Americans get those contracts - (chuckles) - that Americans have the benefits? I'm not saying that's right, I'm saying that's what I hear; and if that standard is going to be applied, then I think we are in trouble.

MR. FREEMAN: Omar?

MR. TASPINAR: Switching from unilateralism to multilateralism may not be so easy. There is a price to pay for unilateralism. Europeans, if you are a European -- if you are French, for instance, now you may react negatively to the idea of the U.S. asking for NATO troops or U.N. troops now, after the invasion, because one way of legitimizing unilateralism was: they will follow after victory, the Europeans would follow after victory. Victory has been achieved, now they will follow.

Well, they want to basically not set a precedent. They want to say no, we were not with you with this invasion and now you're asking us to contribute, but there is a price to pay. Multilateralism has to be a standard from the very beginning. You cannot basically have a unilateral invasion and then say, guys, please step in now, we need you. In that sense, I can understand European reluctance and, in many ways, how this will play with Turkey. Turkey is willing to contribute, but -- simply it's not feasible in the north, maybe in the south.

But again, there is a feasibility problem, and I think it's simply not easy to switch from a unilateral paradigm to a multilateral paradigm without paying a high price. The Bosnia model would be nice, Afghanistan would be nice; but in all these issues, there was a multilateral façade at what has been done, whereas now, you have the Australians, the Brits, the Poles, and the Americans, and it may be hard to get the French and the Germans on board, even financially.

MR. FREEMAN: If I may, Judith, you asked a lot of questions about contracts and how they're being awarded or not being awarded. And I think the more relevant question is: who is going to pay? And my own view is that, in Iraq, the United States faces a fundamental problem: we broke it, we're going to pay for it. Why do I say that? I think the GDP of Iraq is probably around 35 billion, probably less than the state of Rhode Island. If, after $6 billion of investment a year from now, Iraq gets back to two-and-a-half million barrels per day of oil, it will net $15 billion annually. Let's say Iraq also exports other things, Mesopotamian antiquities among them, dates. And let's say that, therefore, the government - that the total oil revenue - total oil revenue plus other revenue available to the government is, what, 18 billion annually, under these ideal circumstances, a year from now? Against that, the expenditures are 20 (billion) to 40 billion for occupation.

No one should be under any illusion that Warsaw is going to pay for Polish troops in Iraq. You and I are going to pay, or Kuwait perhaps. Twenty (billion) to 40 billion for the occupation, 20 (billion) to 30 billion for reconstruction, 20 billion or so for debt payments, $398 billion in debt and reparations - to be written down, to be sure, but some to be paid. That comes to around 80 billion against an $18 billion income. How is that gap going to be made up? I think this is the sort of question that Congressional Budget Office ought to start studying - (audio break, tape change) -- line of people standing outside the shop saying, oh, don't worry, sir, we'll pick up the tab. That is not the tone we set on the way into Iraq and, as I think Omer said, unilateralism turns out to have a cost.

Sir?

Q: (Name unintelligible.) I'm a consulting economist and professor of economics. I would like to first ask my questions before I forgetting what were they, and then I will make a comment, short comment. I would appreciate your comments on the recent Iranian situation and basically Iranian role. And with relation to Iraq, too, we did not hear your viewpoint on that due the short time.

And then my second question is for Mr. Katzman. I appreciate your articulate analysis all the time. Don't you think that your emphasis on the Iranian nuclear program basically is resonating the neo-cons' attitude and approach toward the recent - basically towards the U.S. policy - current U.S. policy towards Iran?

Now, just a short comment of - I came back from Iran about three weeks ago, and Iran is on the radar screen, as we all agreed, and the respected panelists argued, I think, that if the Iranian question is resolved, then 40 percent of the Iraqi problem would be resolved, too, mainly addressing the question of the Shiites in Iraq. If there is a democracy in Iran, then all those questions in the Middle East with regards to the spread of fundamentalist Islam would be mostly resolved. Therefore, we've got to pay very much attention to how delicate U.S. policy is currently, and will be, and what the consequences are going to be for the decisions that we are making at this time with regards to Iran.

And what surprises me is that I would like to ask the audience, how many of you are aware of the fact that there has been a letter signed by 130 members of the Iranian Majlis representatives, very critical and sharply criticizing Khomeini, the Supreme Leader? How many of you are aware of the fact that there are currently representatives of the Iranian - aside from President Khatami - they are very much more critical and radical in their approach to the establishment of a gradual growth of democracy in Iran? How many of you are aware of the fact that the Iranian radio and TV are broadcasting live Majlis debates on the floor every day? How many of you are aware of the level of dialogue and engagement, political engagement in Iran?

Now, do we have to sharpen up - the U.S. have to sharpen up its rhetoric against Iran on the basis of nuclear program or no? Let that be resolved on a multilateral, peaceful, through other agencies and platform and environment, and sharpen up her difference with Iran on the basis of human rights, on the basis of pursuit of democratic rights, on the basis of creation of civil society. That's the choice. And if we make that choice wrongly we are going to pay for it. We are talking about the creation of democracy in the Middle East. There is a democracy -- there is a democracy which is evolving. Support it instead of preemptive attack by Israel or others, and a threat of attack of nuclear energy. This will play in the hands of the very hardliners that you are trying to remove.

Thank you very much.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you for the very informative comment. Again, U.S.-Iranian relations and Iran are a subject that we address from time to time. In fact, Ken Katzman, who I would like to respond, along with Judith -- very briefly because we are now at the end of our time; the young lady hasn't even asked her question and I'm afraid we're going to have to end it here - I think we do address these questions from time to time, and I welcome your reposing them and stating them so clearly in terms of a policy decision for the United States, since it's clear that the administration, as Ken and Judith both remarked, is moving toward some sort of redefinition of our approach to Iran.

Ken.

MR. KATZMAN: I mean, I'm just sort of reflecting what I see being discussed in the administration. I mean, you know, being CRS I take no position on what should or should not happen. It's just my analysis is that having gone to war to overthrow Saddam Hussein for weapons of mass destruction that were not so clear - we didn't know quite what he had or did not have - it seems to me to take a step of some sort of a surgical military action against Iran on sites that are well defined and well known is something the administration is certainly considering, is what I've heard. I'm not saying that that's their first option, I'm not saying that's the only option, I'm just saying my understanding is that it is an option that is under discussion. Whether it comes to fruition, who knows?

But, you know, this is a serious problem. We fought an entire war over weapons of mass destruction, ostensibly anyway -- that was the public justification anyway, and so I think the administration is very serious about weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the hands of Iran. I mean, I don't think that's any question. I mean, I think one could reasonably say to Iran, look, Saddam is not there, he's not a nuclear threat to you; the Taliban are no longer there, we took care of them also. Why are you, Iran -- why must you have a nuclear weapon now? Why be so provocative now that these threats have been resolved in your neighborhood? I think that's a legitimate question to ask Iran.

MR. FREEMAN: Judith.

MS. YAPHE: Briefly, I think Ken reads the neo-cons correctly, but I want to put my remarks from a regional point of view, and I'm delighted you gave me a chance because it was on my mind and I didn't have a chance to mention this earlier. Yeah, I think the Iranians thanked us for getting rid of Saddam -- terrific. Was it positive neutralism, is the way they - you know, we will not get involved. But I think their great concern is a long-term U.S. military presence -- we're there, we won't get out -- and that's something that they're extremely uncomfortable with. Now, I do think the Iranians way of looking at dealing with it is to try to find a way to negotiate out of it, but that's another issue. So I tend to favor talks and negotiations.

But the issue here, just to keep it to our topic for today, I think - and here I disagree with Ken - I think we've overestimated - and I think the Iranians may be overestimating once again their influence on Iraq, on Iraq's Shi'a and on the Iraqi-Shi'a support for an Islamic republic in Iraq like Iran. Mohammed Bakr Hakim speaks out of both sides; he says both things - yes, of course we recognize Iraq is not Iran and we want a democratic state -- and he'll also say we want an Islamic republic.

I think we've underestimated at the same time the Iraqi Shi'as. They may take the money and support, that's fine, but their willingness to take orders or to reflect Iran's policies and positions in any government they would found or support I think are as unlikely to happen as a government that the United States would put in would adhere to U.S. policies.

Listen, the Iran-Iraq war and Shi'a-Iraqis seeing themselves as Arabs and Iraqis was not an anomaly nor an illusion. They hated Saddam in this state - his version of the state, but they supported the government, the state of Iraq. They hated Saddam's government, excuse me, but they saw themselves as Arabs. The Iranians see them as Arabs, too, and I think we both know that the pejoratives involved - these are not two cultures that are comfortable with each other, have been too long engaged antagonistically and there is not a sign of - going to be immediate trust because you've got a Shi'a government. The histories of their conversion is different, their practices are different, their institutions are different, and a question I wish somebody would help me, the answer - I know the question but not the answer - what will be the impact on Iran, on the religious institution, and on the legitimacy that the clerical regime of Khomeini sees - we're the leader of the world's Muslims and the Shi'a.

If -- as we're seeing, I think, happening -- many clerics are going back to Najaf, Karbala, will now go back to it former third or fourth position as the center of Shi'a learning as Najaf resumes its place. This is, what, the Jerusalem for the Shi'a in a sense? How does that impact, first of all, on the religious institution and the clerics? Does that have any impact on the government? Basically there is, I think - I hear this from Iranians and Iraqis - the distrust, which goes beyond a religious - it didn't work in the 1980s and I don't see why we assume this is going to all of a sudden work as Iraq, if and when it votes, that the tide is on the side of a Shi'a Islamic republic.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you. We have run out of time. I apologize to the three people who were so patiently waiting to make a comment or ask a question. We just can't get to you today. Come back for the next session.

I would like to thank both the audience and the panel for doing what we hope we are able to do in these sessions, namely to illuminate questions that ought to be considered by policymakers but often are neglected, and to bring out issues that require further thought. We don't try to provide a definitive answer to any question, but we try to help ensure that the questions are not ignored. And I think the panel today deserves a special thanks for really an outstanding illumination of the issues. And I'd like to ask you to join me. Thank you.

(Applause.)

(END)