Ghada Hashem Talhami
Dr. Talhami is D.K. Pearsons Professor of Politics, emerita, at Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL. This paper was presented at the ninth conference of the International Center for Contemporary Middle Eastern Studies, University of Victoria, March 28, 2008.
It should come as no surprise that Islam informed various transformations of African-American movements before the rise of the Nation of Islam (NOI). Although it had quickly become the exclusive representative of African-American Islam, the NOI was the product of a decades-long chain of events. Islam played an enormous inspirational and ideological role in the evolution of a distinct African-American identity. This study will trace the spiritual, ideological and psychological antecedents of the NOI as a way of charting the course of Islamic expansion within the United States. This will be followed by an examination of the official response of U.S. security agencies to this movement and the application of similar methods to the Arab-American community following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The purpose of this analysis is to clarify American perceptions of the role of Islam in the life of various American communities, native as well as immigrant, in order to uncover a developing pattern of official behavior as a predictor of future trends. Islam's attraction as an identity emblem among various Afro-American groups was witnessed as early as 1913. In that year, Noble Drew Ali, a precursor of Elijah Muhammad, organized what he called the Canaanite Temple in Newark, New Jersey. The emphasis on Biblical and distinctive names signified a deep-seated desire to chart a separate identity from that of other faith groups. When a split occurred within the ranks of the Moorish community in 1916, one group took the name of the Moabite Temple (apparently named after an ancient reference to Morocco, although Moab was really a kingdom in Syria), the other called itself the Moorish Divine National Movement of North America, Inc. This group moved to Chicago in 1925 and established the Holy Temple of America. It attempted to provide a collective response to the travails besetting black migrants to northern states and the escalation of Afro-American deaths by lynching. What is significant here is Drew Ali's determination to fashion a new national identity around the rejection of a certain kind of imposed integration, which had failed to protect the rights of the minority. In his early publications, Drew Ali would repeat the common assertion among an increasing number within this community that Islam was the black man's original religion. This notion gained strength through the desire to seek a national identity linking them to a homeland other than the white-dominated United States. In this context, the term Moorish was encouraged, while appellations such as Negro, Ethiopian or colored were strongly discouraged. The home of the Moors was Morocco, stressed Drew Ali, claiming that it was they who brought Islam to the New World. He also stressed the value of industriousness and hard work, but did not live long enough to see the expansion of his community. He was assassinated in 1920.
The early attraction of Afro-Americans to a religion other than Christianity developed as a result of their bitter national experience 60 years following the abolition of slavery. A new identity was sought, and Drew Ali's Moorish religion allowed for borrowings from Garveyism and oriental philosophers.2 Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) was the first to propose a return-to-Africa movement through his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). He advocated a philosophy of separatism tinged with spiritualism. Among his young followers was Elijah Pool (Muhammad). Garvey also promoted the views of another influential member of UNIA, James Morris Webb, whose quest for a black spiritual revival inspired him in 1919 to write a book, A Black Man Will Be the Coming Universal King. Garvey reinforced this prediction by claiming that Africa will produce a black redeemer.3
But Garvey not only preached a message calling for the return to a united and liberated Africa; he was also inspired by Islam, the black man's original religion. The Garveyites' hymn for the president stated in its opening stanza:
Father of all Creation Allah Omnipotent Supreme O'er every nation God bless our President.
In its 1922 convention, the Garveyite movement suggested that Islam be adopted as its official religion, since the majority of Africans were Muslims. Although Garvey did not accept this proposal, several of his followers compared him at one time to the Prophet Muhammad. In a hymn to Garvey, entitled "Sing of Garvey," he was described as the "Child of Allah." Thus, it seems likely that both Drew Ali and Elijah Muhammad received this Islamic influence through the Garvey movement.4
Elijah Muhammad's spiritual and political conversion to Islam clearly resulted from his involvement with earlier black-nationalist movements. He was obviously influenced by Garvey's exhortation to his followers not to seek guidance from white leaders, but to follow the guidance of black ones. Elijah Muhammad also learned from Drew Ali and the Moorish Temple that Christianity was not the black man's original faith. He adopted the need to emphasize economic independence and self-reliance from the Garveyite movement, which stressed industry, commerce and education in every one of its conventions. Marcus Garvey had been mistrustful of educated blacks who denied their own people. Elijah Muhammad carried this a step further by explicitly discrediting such middle-class black organizations as the National Urban League and the NAACP, neither of which took up the struggle of the poor and working classes.5 W.E.B. DuBois and the NAACP leaders were accused of being brainwashed by the white man's education. Thus, Elijah Muhammad wrote:
. . . He (the black intellectual) has been brainwashed more thoroughly than any of the rest of us, but he will ultimately have no choice other than to accept Islam. . . . They have stayed in the white man's schools too long, learning nothing of themselves, and they are fervid in their hopes that the white man is going to change and treat them like men instead of boys.6
More than Marcus Garvey and Drew Ali, Elijah easily appreciated the nexus of religion, economics, politics and racial justice. Thus, he was able to make of the NOI the highest stage of black nationalism in America.7 Elijah Muhammad regarded Islam in a completely different light than did other adherents of this religion. He advocated African-American Islam as a separate sect that God had sent to convert Afro-Americans.8 Given his deliberate emphasis on the distinctive features of this community, it was simply a matter of time before the NOI attracted suspicion from U.S. security agencies. Targeting this community through a long-standing program of surveillance, infiltration, provocation, and divisiveness, the FBI kept the organization constantly under a watchful eye. This harassment of the NOI was fraught with serious implications for the Arab-American and Muslim-American community at large. Added to this were the deliberate distortions purveyed by an unsympathetic press that emphasized the challenge to black-American Christianity posed by this faith. The rise of Malcolm X to NOI leadership later intensified the FBI's pursuit of the movement.
Surveillance of the NOI began early, predating FBI focus on the leadership of the civil-rights movement by decades. The issues arousing suspicion were constantly changing, although similar postures by later groups drew the FBI into the Afro-American community for similar reasons. As early as 1942, the Chicago residence of Elijah Muhammad was raided and several boxes of documents confiscated, yielding valuable information on the NOI. This information dated back to the disappearance of the movement's original founder, W. D. Fard Muhammad, who was known by his followers as the Lord King, or "God in human form." America was at war at the time, and the raid was motivated by the government's zeal in the pursuit of pro-Japanese agitators.
Elijah Muhammad was taken into custody and booked on charges of avoiding the draft. His group was seen as a fifth column, which opened him up to charges of sedition. In today's version of these events, Arabs and Muslims are picked up by security agencies and charged with violating immigration laws; in the 1940s, it was evading the draft. Today, immigrants are accused of secret ties to invisible centers of international terrorism with which the United States is at war, but then, agitators were accused more seriously of harboring ties to the Japanese. Fard Muhammad had already, in 1934, been accused of maintaining ties to a suspicious Japanese national known as Satohata Takahashi.9 The NOI fell under greater suspicion after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which they viewed in eschatological terms as the beginning of their deliverance. Anticipating the arrival of mysterious ships that would take them to Hawaii or the mother plane, an NOI minister in Milwaukee named Sultan Muhammad wrote to The Messenger:
The end of the enemy truly has come, and at this time they should (be) able to see it. All praise is due to Allah; it [Armageddon] truly has come, my Loving and most Faithful Apostle. Oh, how happy am I to see what I am Seeing! If I only could speak like I desire to speak. 10
Like any oppressed group, the NOI saw in a victorious Japan an imminent release from their oppression. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was moved to take a closer look at the NOI as rumors began to circulate about secret shipments of weapons from the Japanese to black nationalist groups. These reports by FBI field offices insisted that weapons were stockpiled in black neighborhoods of major American cities. Elijah Muhammad was also on the run at the time, changing residences and aliases with dizzying frequency in order to avoid the draft. He was finally caught, due to reports by moles in the local mosque who saw him enter the place of worship but could not testify to his departure. He was charged for failure to register for the draft. When large amounts of money were seized from members of the NOI days later, the FBI concluded that these came from mysterious Japanese sources. No effort was spared to link black dissidents, particularly the NOI, with secret Japanese agents in order to accuse them of conspiracy.11 In the process of gathering intelligence on communists and domestic fascists just before World War II, the FBI created a special category of "Negroes," who were lumped together with Germans, Italians and Japanese after Pearl Harbor.12
Additionally, the FBI will always be linked in the minds of Afro-Americans to surveillance, subversion and a peculiar way of enforcing civil-rights legislation. It would not be possible to comprehend the impact of the organized civil-rights movement in the 1960s without coming to grips with the nature of the FBI's role in pushing and interfering with its growth. Hoover, who apparently found multiple ways of neglecting the enforcement of civil-rights legislation and procrastinating in the pursuit of the obstacles to the realization of these laws, was primarily concerned with the communist threat within the United States. This may be in itself justifiable, were it not for the fact that he defined the communist threat broadly in order to include under this rubric anyone who fought for racial equality. This allowed him to spy on blacks and infiltrate their groups under the excuse of chasing communist infiltrators. The commitment to non-violence evinced by the civil-rights movement made no difference to Hoover and his men, who were present at every civil-rights demonstration or organized activity, no matter how peaceful. Malcolm X became a target of the FBI simply due to his rhetoric of violence, not his actions. Throughout the civil-rights period, the FBI established a record of pursuing communists and ordinary criminals, rather than racist enemies of the civil-rights movement itself.13
At times, Hoover regarded the NAACP with exceptional tolerance, but this did not last, especially after 1941, when the FBI created a COMINFIL (communist infiltration) case to investigate discrimination suits against the Navy by 15 Afro-American mess-hall attendants. While engaging in this sweep, the FBI maintained cooperative ties with some friendly elements within the NAACP. This organization continued to placate the intelligence agency in the hope of persuading its officials to appoint black FBI agents, a goal that was not achieved. Harmonious relations between the FBI and the civil-rights organization continued until the first years of the Eisenhower administration. Even during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when the latter succeeded in gaining the passage of an ambitious civil-rights bill, Hoover remained focused on seditious groups rather than on attacks on civil-rights figures by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK).
A more ambitious surveillance program targeted leading African-American activists such as Martin Luther King, Jr., of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Elijah Muhammad of the NOI and Maxwell Stanford of the Revolutionary Action Movement. The purpose of this large operation, which involved representatives of 41 FBI field offices, was "to prevent the . . . growth of militant black nationalist organizations."14 An FBI memo dated March 4, 1968, read: "An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real ‘Mau' in America, and the beginning of a true black revolution." It added that the FBI's objective was also to eliminate the possibility of an emergence of a "messiah" capable of galvanizing the black community. It even suggested that, had Malcolm X lived, he "might have been such a 'messiah'; he is the martyr of the movement today." It named Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad as the main aspirants to this role. The memo explained that "King would be a real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed ‘obedience' to white, liberal doctrines (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism . . . ."15
The prophecy of a black messiah, first circulated during the Garveyite movement, had finally drawn the FBI's gaze to Malcolm X. As he began to reflect the views of black nationalist militants and embrace the worldview of Pan-Africanism, his figure loomed larger than that of Elijah Muhammad across the stage of the civil-rights movement. Once his star began to rise, the FBI established a retrospective file on him, illuminating previously neglected facets of his life in the 1950s and 1960s. Malcolm's activities and rhetoric became more alarming once his break with Elijah led him to call for greater black political and economic autonomy through the development of racial pride and communal solidarity. Malcolm X and black nationalist activists were transforming the consciousness of the Afro-American community, demanding rights beyond what was specified in the Constitution.
Malcolm X's critique of the centrist elements within the civil-rights movement did not preclude his cooperation with its more radical wings. During the 1960s, Malcolm's and Elijah's cool reaction to Martin Luther King's emerging national status as a black leader raised alarm in the intelligence community. Malcolm's break with Elijah did not improve relations with Martin Luther King, although some cooperation resulted from a suggestion by the latter's aide that Malcolm assist in securing a UN declaration in support of the rights of Afro-Americans. Malcolm's call for a separatist solution and for a Pan-African solution based on his rejection of white values aroused a great deal of white concern. His break with Elijah after his return from a celebrated pilgrimage to Mecca in 1964 heightened, rather than dampened, FBI interest in his activities. It was not the Islamic focus of his activism that alarmed the bureau as much as the radical intensification of his racial rhetoric as evident in his new group, the Organization of Afro-American Unity. Not surprisingly, during the years just before he was killed, the direction of his work forced an inevitable merger with such secular and black-liberation groups as SNCC. Eventually, he toured Africa with officers of this organization who discovered that he had already made a strong impression on native advocates of Pan-Africanism. It was in Africa that he seriously began to discuss his plan of making the UN General Assembly look into U.S. violations of Afro-American rights.16 In his speech on African-American history before a 1965 meeting of his Organization of African-American Unity, Malcolm made his views on constitutional progress very clear:
Then in 1865, he (the white man) came up with a trick, pretending that he was fighting a civil war to set us free — which wasn't to set us free. He came up with another trick, that he was issuing an emancipation proclamation to set us free — which wasn't to set us free. And then he also pretended that he was putting some amendments to the Constitution to set us free — which wasn't to set us free. Later on, he came up with a Supreme Court decision which he said was to give us free access to better education .... And then last year he came up with a bill that he called also to give us more freedom — which also wasn't to do that.17
Constitutional gradualism was not for Malcolm, but neither was he willing during the latter transformation of his thought to adhere to the official version of race history in this country. Referring to one of the earliest heroes of black Americans, he wrote:
Not only Crispus Attucks, but many of us in America have died defending America. We defend our master. We're the most violent soldiers America has when she sends us to Korea or to the South Pacific or to Saigon, but when our mothers and our own property are being attacked we're nonviolent. Crispus Attucks laid down his life for America, but would he have laid down his life to stop the white man in America from enslaving black people?18
Official government institutions were alarmed by such a revolutionary re-reading of American history and call to black men not to allow the white man to dictate the pace of racial progress in this country. But when it came to another dissident group that diverged from the mainstream of political and racial transformation in this country, the FBI was much more tolerant. According to recently opened FBI files, this agency ran five counterintelligence programs (COINTELPRO) from 1956 to 1971 against what it perceived as the main sources of threat to the status quo. These targets included white hate groups such the KKK, as well as the New Left, which was made up of white and black organizations. In most instances involving open attacks by white hate groups on civil-rights workers, FBI agents watched passively while taking notes, claiming that the bureau's role in these matters prohibited direct intervention. The KKK, however, did not escape the FBI surveillance net. Pressure to force the creation of surveillance units targeting white hate groups apparently originated from the mainstream press, the White House and even the civil-rights movement itself. This resulted in a limited war or, at best, "a sideshow to the real war" against the black American community. The war against white groups turned out to be a limited and narrow effort in comparison to the larger campaign designed to destabilize and weaken the larger black dissident movement. KKK-related organizations, such as the White Citizens' Councils were not even brought under this surveillance effort. Only when such groups exhibited a propensity towards violence were they targeted by the Bureau. Their teachings and philosophy, unlike those of black nationalist groups, were not considered a source of danger or destabilization to the American mainstream. The FBI waged a long campaign to influence public opinion against black groups, but white hate groups were not considered sufficiently subversive to warrant a similar campaign. Only when the KKK and its related organizations engaged in violent activity was it subjected to a campaign designed to lead to vilification in the media.
The FBI constantly generated media reports designed to discredit the leftist movement and its ideas. The Chicago FBI field office, for instance, in 1969 distributed something entitled Into the Streets: A Handbook for Revolting Kids. This targeted students in order to turn them away from such groups as Students for Democratic Society (SDS). An FBI publication called Armageddon News was printed by its Indianapolis office to counteract the appeal of the SDS and militant minority groups to American youth. The KKK and its allied groups, however, were generally viewed as patriotic and not too distant from the ideology of mainstream America, especially since they were supporters of the Vietnam War and generally not mistrustful of the FBI. Just as the FBI worked assiduously to prevent the rise of a united black nationalist movement, it also did its utmost to foreclose the possibility of a white leftist and black militant alliance. The most dangerous configuration in the Bureau's view was the brief joint front uniting the SDS and the Black Panther Party, which emerged in 1969 and collapsed soon thereafter. 20
Following the assassination of Malcolm X in 1965, the focus of the FBI's suspicions became the rising star in the NOI, Louis Farrakhan. He, too, quickly became the man commonly slandered in the media, largely because he upheld separatist principles under the banner of Islam more vocally than anyone else before him. In 1993, he stated at the African/African-American Summit in Libreville, Gabon, that black Americans would like to create their own state on African soil, while at the same time enjoying dual citizenship. Farrakhan would also repeat his romantic view of Garvey, whom he had never met, as the early unifier of black people.21 His rhetoric was so powerful and uncompromising that, in the 1990s, he was openly demonized in the white press. An editor of the liberal Nation, Adolph Reed, Jr., wrote on January 21, 1991: "Repudiation of Farrakhan has become a litmus test imposed by white opinion makers for black participation in mainstream politics, and many blacks perceive the test as a humiliating power play."22
The immigrant Arab and Muslim minority, by contrast, continued to labor under the mistaken impression that, as long as it was not distinguishable racially, it would escape the fate of Afro-American Muslims, who combined race and faith as markers of distinctiveness and separation. Immigrant Muslims, it turned out, were not only distinguishable but also stigmatized by their religious difference. In their own view and in keeping with their own faith, American Muslims do not recognize differences among their own members according to race, ethnicity or language. But the system in the United States has always defined them as a minority based on religious, political, ethnic or racial cleavages. Recent studies have suggested distinguishing between voluntary immigrants, such as Middle Eastern and Asian Muslims, and involuntary Muslims, such as black Muslims. Clearly, the ultimate goal of the first is assimilation through the acquisition of citizenship status; to the second, it is separation in order to preserve minority identification. Elijah Muhammad viewed white Muslims as less than complete Muslims and prevented their inclusion in the NOI. This organization forged its identity in response to rejection from the ranks of full American citizens. This was not the case of the voluntary immigrant.23
While experiencing a strengthened group consciousness since the 1970s, evinced by the rise of Arab-American organizations on the local and national levels, negative images and stereotypes in the mainstream media attempted to link the Arab and Muslim community to the forces of militant Islam. The objective of assimilation, therefore, became increasingly tangled with forces originating outside of their new country of settlement. Despite their high level of proficiency in English (the 1990 census figures reporting as much as 83 percent competency for Muslims, including native-born Arab-Americans and immigrants), the exclusion of this group from the mainstream was complicated by other factors. Arab-Americans also have higher educational attainments than other Americans. Whereas 40 percent of native-born Arab-Americans and 43 percent of foreign-born Arab-American men had a college or professional degree, this is true of only 20 percent of American males. Arab women with similar degrees amounted to 35 percent within the native-born group, while only 21 percent of all U.S. women held such degrees. In addition, around 56 percent of Arab-Americans are home-owners. All of these factors combined provide easy access to top professional and managerial positions. This by itself is a guarantee of the break down of barriers to assimilation.24
This community, which aspired to full political, if not social, assimilation was subjected to shocking reminders of its fragile position in the American ethnoracial cosmos soon after September 11, 2001. Reduced overnight to the status of a foreign community with a nationality identified as "Muslim," these Arab and Asian-Americans suffered an immediate and irreversible loss of status. They were the object of violent attacks on their places of worship by relentless groups with a mob mentality, while local and state authorities subjected them to racial profiling, instances of intolerance, and blatant acts of discrimination. The U.S. government, particularly the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) and Department of Homeland Security, which now encompasses the FBI, has launched an extensive campaign of harassment and control against the Muslim-American community. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) issued a report in April, 2002, indicating that 60,000 individuals suffered from official acts of discrimination, interrogation, arrests, imprisonment and raids.
The media followed this with a steady campaign of vilification of all things Arab, in disregard of the large presence of 1.5 million Christians within this community. All distinctions among Arabs, Muslims and Islamists were erased, not only by extremist ideologues like Daniel Pipes, but also by the general American public. Some wrote that Muslims should be provided a strong incentive to leave. Among some segments of the Arab-American community, nothing the federal government did surprised them. In their view, September 11 built on previous decades of harassment and discrimination. After the June War of 1967, for instance, the FBI carried out an extensive campaign of surveillance targeting Arab-Americans as part of "Operation Boulder." It interviewed Arabs and amassed profiles of its community leaders. A sensational case in 1987 involved seven Palestinians and a Kenyan national, the so-called "Los Angeles Eight." They were accused of belonging to an extremist Palestinian organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Rumors of detention camps being prepared by the INS and the FBI to inter Arab-Americans circulated widely. Anti-Communist laws were increasingly replaced by anti-Arab laws, and after September 11 by anti-Muslim laws. Even before September 11, Arabs were excluded from political campaigns, community-based organizations, and important boards of directors and various foundations. In short, Arabs were marginalized long before September 11, despite their apparent assimilation. The attacks of September 11 finally revealed the broad outline of a repressive campaign that acted as a dragnet to catch and expel dangerous elements. More than 1,200 Arab-American citizens and non-citizens were detained. The Justice Department interviewed more than 5,000 members of this community for visa violations, the number being later augmented by an additional 3,000. In January 2002, the INS tracked and threatened close to 6,000 Arab-American males with deportation. All aliens were required to report any change of address immediately to the INS.25
Whether anticipated or not, this massive campaign of targeting all Arab-Americans as Muslims calls into question the possibility of the existence of an inherent but hidden anti-Islamic agenda in the United States. Many questions must be answered, including whether the anger of U.S. officials toward Arabs and Muslims dates back to campaigns against black Muslims and their African-American allies who were viewed as dangerous and revolutionary as far back as the 1930s. When does a foreign faith become dangerous to the community at large, and what is the extent of U.S. official tolerance towards religious activism, even when this same activism poses no threat to the practice of other religions? Finally, how far must Arab-Americans go in their assimilative efforts before dampening the official zeal for suppressing movements outside the American mainstream? Are there any lessons to be learned from the experience of Afro-American organizational life over decades of the civil-rights struggle and activities that utilized the rhetoric of Third World activism?
2 Amber M. Bolden, "The Evolution of the Nation of Islam," Senior Thesis, Lake Forest College, 1996, pp. 6, 22.
3 Karl Evanzz, The Messiah: The Rise and Fall of Elijah Muhammad (Pantheon Books, 1999), pp. 36, 57-60.
4 Adib Rashad, The History of Islam and Black Nationalism in the Americas (Writers' Inc., 1985), pp. 59-66.
5 Bolden, pp. 17-18, 22-23.
6 Ibid., p. 35.
7 Rashad, p. 71.
8 Bolden, p. 32.
9 Evanzz, pp. 4-8, 111.
10 Ibid., pp. 134, 541, n3.
11 Ibid., pp. 134-5, 137, 141.
12 Kenneth O'Reilly, edited by David Gallen, Black Americans: The FBI Files (Carroll and Graf Publishers, Inc., 1994), p. 13.
13 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
14 Ibid., pp. 18-20, 23, 31-34, 48-49.
15 Clayborne Carson, edited by David Gallen, Malcolm X: The FBI Files (Graf Publishers, Inc., 1991), p. 17.
16 Ibid., pp. 18, 21-5, 32, 37, 40.
17 Malcolm X on Afro-American History (Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1970), pp. 37-38.
18 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
19 David Cunningham, "Understanding State Responses to Left- Versus Right-Wing Threats: The FBI Repression of the New Left and the Ku Klux Klan," Social Science History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall, 2003), pp. 327-28, 331-32, 342-43, 349.
20 Ibid., pp. 350, 353, 356.
21 Steven Barboza, American Jihad: Islam after Malcolm X (Doubleday, 1994), pp. 140-41, 148.
22 Quoted in: "Farrakhanitis," The Nation (February 28, 1994), pp. 19-20.
23 Naif H. Al-Romi, "Muslims as a Minority in the United States," International Journal of Educational Research, Vol. 33 (2000), pp. 631-63.
24 Andrzej Kulczycki and Arun Peter Lobo, "Deepening the Melting Pot: Arab-Americans at the Turn of the Century," The Middle East Journal , Vol. 55, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), pp. 459, 463-65.
25 Louise Cainkar, "No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion after September 11," Middle East Report, No. 224 (Fall, 2002), pp. 23-28.