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| Volume XIV, Summer 2007, Number 2 |
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ABSTRACT
Threats and Threat Perceptions in the Persian Gulf Region
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| F. Gregory Gause, III |
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Dr. Gause is an associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont.
States act in the international arena on perceptions of threats (and perceptions of opportunities, but that is another subject). Sometimes those perceptions are correct; your perceived enemy really is out to get you. Sometimes those perceptions are wrong, but they can be wrong in one of two ways: 1) a state can underestimate the threats facing it, as Kuwait did in 1990, when its leadership did not believe that Saddam Hussein would occupy the entire country; and 2) a state can overestimate the hostility of a neighbor. Misperceptions of the first type are easy to identify, but historically rare. Misperceptions of the second type are not as dangerous as the first. They do not leave a state open to invasion and conquest, the ultimate worst-case scenario. Misperceptions of the second type are much more common. States tend to fear the worst about their neighbors. This kind of thinking is built into the anarchical structure of international politics. But this does not mean that threat overestimation is cost-free or benign. Overestimating the hostility of another state can contribute to hostility spirals that exacerbate regional tensions, waste resources and cause leaders to miss opportunities for cooperation. Hostility spirals might even lead to wars.
In the Persian Gulf region, threat perceptions are driven by two categories of threats. The first is power capabilities — the military strength of neighbors. If a state in your region is much more powerful than you are, you will see it as a potential threat and act to balance against it. This is classic balance-of-power politics. The second category is threats to the domestic security and stability of the ruling elite emanating from abroad. Regime elites in one state can fear that their rivals are trying to destabilize them not through military pressure and attack, but rather by encouraging domestic opponents of their regime to act against it. A ruling elite that fears for its own domestic security could see a neighbor’s meddling in its domestic politics as a weapon even more dangerous than that neighbor’s conventional military power.
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