Capitol Hill Series   |   Briefing Series   |   Special Forums   Unedited Transcript For a printable version of this transcript click here. Middle East Policy Council Forty-eighth in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S. Middle East Policy   "When We Meet with Syria, What Should We Say? What Should We Hope to Hear?"   Speakers: Theodore Kattouf President, CEO, Amideast Martha Neff Kessler Consultant, CIA (ret) Hisham Melhem Washington Bureau News Chief, Al Arabiya Murhaf Jouejati Professor, NESA, Center For Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Former Defense Intelligence Officer, Middle East Moderator/Discussant William A. Rugh Board Member, Middle East Policy Council Rayburn Building, Goldroom Washington, D.C. April 10, 2007 Transcript by: Federal News Service Washington, DC WILLIAM A. RUGH: Good morning. My name is Bill Rugh. I'm not Chas. Freeman, as you probably know. Chas. sends his regrets. He was detained by some personal business today, and sends you his best regards. You won't have his eloquence today but I'm sure from the panel you'll hear plenty of eloquent discussion and also from the floor. We have an excellent panel today. The topic is, when we meet with Syria, what should we say; what should we hope to hear. This is very timely. When the topic and title were chosen more than a month ago, Syria was certainly on a lot of minds, but it was not so much on the front pages as it is today. U.S. policy towards Syria has been an interesting topic of discussion in this town and around the world. Policy might be described as isolation and monologue, whereas other people are suggesting engagement and dialogue. President Bush signed the Syria accountability act. He withdrew Margaret Scobey, our ambassador in '05. The last high-level visit to Damascus by an administration official was I think in January '05 by Secretary Armitage. But today, as you know, from reading the newspapers, that approach has been challenged. The Baker-Hamilton report called for direct diplomacy on Iraq with Syria. Nancy Pelosi took a delegation from this building to Damascus last week. It included one Republican and other Republicans went before and after that, as you know. So there is a good deal of focus of attention on the question of the topic today: When we meet with Syria, what should we say; what should we hope to hear? There are lots of topics that the U.S. has put on the table: terrorism, infiltration across the border with Iraq, support for Hamas and Hezbollah, hostility to Israel, cooperation with Iran, and even the elections. The American spokesman of the U.S. Department of State said recently that there should be free and fair elections to allow monitors in Syria. So we are even talking about Syrian internal politics, not to mention the Hariri assassination and the aftermath of that. So there are many topics that are on the table. Mrs. Pelosi raised most of these issues and she even engaged in private shuttle diplomacy by bringing a message from Prime Minister Olmert. The panelists that we have today to discuss these and other topics are outstanding. They are all really experienced experts, and I'm delighted that you have today a gathering of such expertise. We are going to go in order of the program that you have. And there is bio I think on the back of the program, but let me just briefly mention a few outstanding items from the bios. Let me say that each of the panelists is going to focus primarily on one specific aspect of the Syria issue. The first speaker, Ambassador Kattouf, will talk about Syria-Iran relations primarily. The second speaker, Martha Kessler, will talk about Syria-Iraq relations. Hisham Melhem will talk about Syria-Lebanon. And Dr. Jouejati will talk about Syria-Israel, in particular, but of course they can talk about any of the subjects. And in the discussion I'm sure, they will not hesitate to discuss them all. Ambassador Kattouf, our first speaker, was a Foreign Service officer for 31 years. He served in Kuwait and Damascus, and then he went back to Damascus as deputy chief of mission, and then he went back again as ambassador to Syria. So he has a good deal of Syria experience. He was also DCM in Sana'a and Riyadh. He was also ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, and he served in Washington on several occasions at the Department of State. Since 2003, he has been president and CEO of AMIDEAST. Martha Kessler, who will talk primarily about Iraq, served in the CIA for 30 years. She had analytic and management positions in the Directorate of Intelligence and the National Intelligence Council focusing on the Middle East and South Asia. She was the author of numerous NIE on Middle East issues, and she has been acting National Intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia. She was a liaison to the U.S. peace negotiators throughout the Madrid peace conference process following the 1991 Gulf War, and she has also worked - she has also been affiliated with the National War College and the Brookings Institution, and she has been a consultant since her retirement with the CIA. Hisham Melhem, who is known to you probably from television appearances, if not in person, is a native of Lebanon who - he is the Washington bureau chief of al Arabiya Television, and the senior correspondent for An Nahar. He is also a correspondent for al Qabas in Kuwait, and a regular commentator on Monte Carlo, as well as in the U.S. Dr. Murhaf Jouejati is a native of Syria. He is a professor of Middle East studies at the National Defense University Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, and previously, he was at George Washington University as director of the Middle East Studies Department. He has been political advisor to the European Commission delegation in Syria. He has been with the UNDP working on Syria. He has been an advisor to the Syrian delegation to the Syrian-Israeli peace talks. I'm going to ask each of our panelists to speak first from the podium, for technical reasons. We are recording and filming this session. And then as soon as the four of them are finished, if any of them has a further comment on what the others have said, we'll give them a chance to do that, and we'll have then opening - a chance to open the floor to a discussion and your comments and questions. So without further ado, let me begin with Ambassador Kattouf focusing on Iran. Ted. THEODORE KATTOUF: Good morning. As Ambassador Rugh indicated, I've been asked to try to focus my remarks on the Syrian-Iranian relationship. It's - I think we all recognize that Syria's policies, and indeed, the principal issues in that part of the world are all interconnected, but I will do my best not to intrude on the areas that my colleagues are going to cover subsequently. I always think when one talks about regimes like Syria, it's always a good idea to state the obvious. And the obvious is that it's all about survival; it's all about regime survival, and that strategic decisions with regimes, such as the one in Damascus, are taken with that foremost in mind. Now, there are times maybe when the regime adopts policies, the Syrian regime adopts policies that we ask ourselves, why did they do that, because from our frame of reference, it does not seem to be advantageous. But I think you can trust that based on how they see the region and how they see the world, they do see these policies as serving the sustainability of the regime. There of course times when they grossly miscalculate. It was never lost on me when I was - the three times I served in Syria over a span of about 25 years, that the Syrians never, never established a U.S. studies center, or necessarily even a think tank worthy of the name. And had they done so, they might not have made some of the miscalculations we have seen them make. But information among regime members, senior regime members, tend to be word of mouth, one person's prejudices reinforcing another's. As for the relationship with Iran, I think any objective assessment would have to state that it has worked very well for both countries, and certainly for Syria over the last 25 years or more. In my opinion, this administration, the Bush administration, has no hope whatsoever of winning Syria away from Iran during its remaining time in office. There is just too much distrust on both sides for that to happen. Indeed, all during the Clinton years, all during the time when we had negotiations going on concerning Syrian-Israeli peace, Syria managed to balance its relations with Iran with its new relationships with the United States. When I say the gap is too wide, I mean, you have to keep in mind of course that this is an administration here in Washington that, after going into Iraq, did not hesitate to let people know through leaks and the like that perhaps Syria was next. It's not the kind of statements that tend to get you a lot of cooperation. Moreover, after Baghdad fell, the secretary of State - then-Secretary of State Colin Powell went out to Syria and virtually presented it with a long list of demands for regime behavior change presented by the administration with, frankly, almost nothing being offered in return. It was really an ultimatum, not negotiation, not dialogue. As is well known, President Bashar has said on a number of occasions that I run a state, not a charity, and so I think we can assume that when American power was at its zenith in May 2003, if Syria, with some trepidation, turned down U.S. demands, that it is much less likely to give in to any U.S. pressure now when, obviously, things are not going well in Iraq for the United States. On the other hand, of course, the United States holds Syria responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri, for aiding insurgents in Iraq who are fighting against U.S. and Coalition forces, and for just basically being a bad actor: supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and various groups that cause Israel problems and hinder U.S. policies in the region. My belief is that Syria will not make a break with Iran unless it gets almost iron-clad guarantees of what it can expect in its demands for severing that relationship and severing its relations with Hezbollah would be huge indeed. And there would be a price that this administration would not be willing to pay, and maybe even subsequent administrations will not be willing to pay. But I would say this about Syria: It's a regime with which you can deal. I'm in favor of engaging the Syrians in dialog, not because they're easy, not because they look you in the eye and tell you the truth, but because they can cause you a lot of problems if you ignore them, and they can help make those problems go away if you engage with them and you put something serious on the table in front of them. I would much prefer a regime like Syria, corrupt though it may be, to a hard-line Islamist ideological regime. And indeed, I believe that - again, I don't want to get too far afield from Iran, but I believe that the Israelis may have come to the same conclusion, otherwise, why did they not touch Syria this summer when they went after Hezbollah. After all, Syria's been supporting Hezbollah; Syria's been supplying Hezbollah with arms; Syria is the conduit that allows Iran to maintain the close relations with Hezbollah. But I think the prospect of an Islamist regime in Syria, or a failed state with al Qaeda and similar groups being able to operate there with impunity is a deterrent to Israel, at least when it comes to regime change, although I always allow for error, and any views I express might obviously prove wrong in the future. Now, what would you say to Syria if you were talking to them about their relations with Iran and these other organizations? Well, I think, first, you've got to give them a certain degree of respect. That doesn't mean that you offer them Lebanon; it doesn't mean that you offer to let them off the hook about the investigation, the U.N. investigation of the Hariri assassination, but you allow them to raise whatever they want to raise with you, and in turn, you insist that they deal with whatever you put on the table. It's called diplomacy, engagement. And I think it's necessary right now, particularly because the U.S. finds itself in very difficult circumstances. There are some vulnerabilities that could be exploited down the road if we are engaged with Syria. Syria has - the regime has almost always been dependent on external financial benefactors. In the '70s, they got the so-called confrontation-state payments from Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing states. In the '80s, Iran provided them with free oil until Syria, basically, found some modest oil supplies of its own. When Hafez al Assad made the strategic decision to back the U.S. campaign to drive Saddam Hussein's forces out of Kuwait, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Kuwaitis richly rewarded Hafez al Assad for that decision with billions of dollars. In the late '90s, when the Syrian economy was once again going south, the Syrians swallowed hard and made a rapprochement with Saddam Hussein, that allowed him to evade the oil embargoes placed there by the United Nations Security Council, and allowed Syria to get $28-a-barrel oil at $7, and then, put that $7 it paid in Syrian banks, and Saddam Hussein used that money to buy Syrian goods that almost nobody else would have bought. So Syria needs that kind of support, and right now, its oil reserves are lessening, and its production is going down. And at some point, it's going to find itself, again, in a financial crunch if it cannot locate other new, external sources of aid. Iran is not in a position, in my opinion, to be that major benefactor. Secondly, Syria and Iran, while wanting the U.S. to fail strategically in Iraq, don't want us to fail abysmally in Iraq because if we walk away - and we are going to have to withdraw - then Syria and Iran will be left, along with the other neighbors - Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan - with the aftermath. Syria, and of course Iran, have their own ethnic cleavages, their own religious groups in the country - they're multi-ethnic, multi-confessional - and if Iraq goes to full-blown civil war and what's - you know, massacres get even worse, maybe even turn into campaigns of genocide and the like, Syria and Iran will not escape unscathed. You have a minority group essentially controlling the main levers of power in Syria, and 70 percent of the country, at least, is Sunni Arab. So Syria has to take that into account. My belief is that Iran and Syria would like a situation analogous to what Lebanon was before Syrian troops were forced to withdraw; that is, a weak state, many factions, and Syria and Iran can play - can be the balancing wheel, and can play off one faction against another, control the violence, keep the state from breaking up, because you don't want Kurdish separatism - and there they'll have a lot of support from Turkey as well. And they can both probably do very well financially, as well, particularly Syria, if it has that kind of relationship with the various Iraqi factions. So I think there is some reason to engage with Syria, I think, particularly, if we want to get out of Iraq with some dignity, with a semblance of order in the country. The Baker-Hamilton Commission is right; we're going to need to engage with Syria, we're going to need to engage with Iran, and there are issues upon which we can engage without offering Syria things that are unacceptable to virtually all of us in this room. I'll stop there. MR. RUGH: Thank you very much. A silver picture, but hope from a professional diplomat who recommends engagement and sees some way of engaging - not only engaging the Syrians, but inducing them to some kind of a lessening of the tight link that Syria has with Iran. We now turn to Martha Kessler who's going to talk about the Iraqi situation. And obviously in all of these presentations, it's impossible to separate one bilateral relationship from another as you've just heard, but in the discussion, I'm sure, we'll bring them all together. Martha. MARTHA NEFF KESSLER: Thanks, Bill. Well, I would endorse Ted's very nice set up to this issue. And I would say that his description of Syria's role in the region, its relationship with Iran, and the role it's played with regard to the United States in Iraq are all issues that I share his views on and I will try not to repeat them. I would start out by saying that the Syrians have endorsed the Baker-Hamilton Commission and the recommendations that the United States and Iraq engage in a regional discussion with Syria and Iran in an effort to bring stability to Iraq. And although this has been greeted with considerable skepticism by many here in Washington, I don't think we need to debate them - I'm not going to debate the merits of it in my presentation now; we can certainly get to it in the Q & A, but I think it's somewhat less important now that there are some halting efforts to begin a regional dialogue. I think it's important to underscore, however, the assertion in the Commission's study that Syria is simply a fact you cannot ignore in the region; it is a reality that Syria has considerable influence with regard to Iraq and the region generally, and to ignore it is to simply put yourself at a considerable disadvantage. I would also contend that the policy of isolation simply has been proved not to work. I also believe it didn't work in the late 1970s or throughout the '80s when we also tried it and it has been the source of considerable problems that have affected our interests, so I certainly would applaud any efforts in the direction of engaging Syria. I think that it's useful also to point out that Syria's Foreign Minister Muallem, and its ambassador, Imad Moustapha, have both said that Syria favors engaging in these negotiations and that it is willing to do so without preconditions and that it does support stability, a point I think Ted made very clearly in terms of what is in Syria's ultimate interest with regard to Iraq. So what do we hope to gain from talking to Syria about Iraq? And I would point out at this point that I think my colleagues who will be discussing - Ted has already discussed Iran, and we'll be hearing about Lebanon and the peace process - that those are really the issues that are paramount when it comes to Syria. I'm going to go through a few points that I think are important with regard to Iraq, but I would say having Syria at the table is primarily important in terms of these other issues. So what do we expect to get from talking to Syria about Iraq and what would we be - what would they expect to get in exchange for cooperation? The issue that's first and foremost, at least on Washington's agenda, is the need to stop the flow of foreign fighters across the border. These are Arabs and Muslims that come from all over the world and constitute an important component within the fighting forces inside Iraq. There are really no reliable figures on just how many and what proportion of the fighting forces the foreign fighters constitute. And it certainly isn't clear how many of them are coming over the Syrian border. And this is an issue on which Washington and Damascus certainly do not agree. Syria almost certainly could do more, however, to staunch the flow, whatever that flow may be, but could almost certainly not stop it entirely. And that is an unrealistic expectation. Moreover, as the number of refugees, Iraqi refugees, pouring into Syria climbs - and the estimates now are that it's over a million. I heard Ambassador Moustapha put it at 1.3 million Iraqis in Syria now - managing the border becomes increasingly difficult. So I would expect in exchange for some greater effort on Syria's part, they will need greater help from us in managing that refugee flow and guarantees on resettlement. I think they might also realistically ask for help in terms of technical assistance and maybe even trilateral or joint border patrols. Another potentially productive goal, as I see it, would be to enlist Syria's help in negotiating with Iraqi elements of all stripes in an effort to kind of deflate the struggle. In addition to the longstanding ties Syria has familial and socially with groups inside Iraq, Damascus has a shared history between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath parties. While the relationship has been really deeply troubled at the leadership level, there have always been connections and linkages at lower levels. Syria is also develop - Syria did develop close economic ties, which I think Ted referred to, with the Saddam Hussein regime and has more recently developed relationships with the new Iraqi government, and has forged economic ties that could also yield assets that could be used in any kind of effort to reach out to components that are arrayed against us there. Finally, I would guess that within the Iraqi-based community that now lives in Syria that there certainly would be those who could help in negotiations with appropriate Syrian suasion in providing intelligence and negotiating help. So I think that whole realm of utilizing Syria to help establish the linkages that we're going to need to have with these people will be important. Another potential asset that Syria brings to the table is its relationship with Iran. While Syria is certainly the junior partner in that alliance, Damascus is closer to the Iranian leadership than any other government. Damascus and Tehran are likely to have loosely coordinated their approach to Washington and it is conceivable that Syria could be helpful in bringing Iran along. Certainly, of the two, Syria has far greater motivation to establish a decent working relationship with Washington and it could offer help on key issues that could conceivably be amenable to Syrian negotiations with Iran directly. Finally, I'd like to make a few points about Syria's view of the United States. Syria came to believe some time ago that Washington was not just trying to isolate it, but was intent on reshaping Syria just as it was intent upon reshaping Iraq. The regime believed that it was on a White House hit list, along with the Iranian regime. This conviction was a driving force behind a number of Syrian actions that constituted its defense against U.S. intentions. The list is long and complicated, and I'm not going to try to explain it now; if you want to ask about in Q&A, I'm happy to, but I believe it involved the Syrian withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, Assad's response to the investigation of the Hariri assassination, the protests against the current Lebanese government, and repeated efforts to open talks with the United States, and a softening of Syria's approach with regard to negotiating with Israel. This is to name a few, but not all, of the efforts to accommodate, assuage, and to warn Washington. But the most important factor in fending off a U.S. onslaught against Syria has been the quagmire the United States is in, in Iraq. To have any hope of gaining Syria's honest cooperation in an effort to stabilize the situation in Iraq, I think it will be necessary to seek some assurances that this administration has abandoned any efforts to challenge the Syrian regime or to remove its leadership a la Iraq. Without confidence on this score, Syria might proceed with regional talks but could not be counted on to take any risks or expend any capital to relieve U.S. forces from their burden in Iraq. They would see such action as endangering themselves, which may have been the reason they have been so unwilling to cooperate on the border up until now. MR. RUGH: Thank you very much, Martha, that was a nice review of the options and obstacles with respect to dealing with Syria on Iraq. And as we've seen from both of the presentations, all of the issues seem to be interrelated and there's multiplicity of issues. The next speaker will talk about the issue that Martha has just referred to as one of the major ones and it's a very complicated one but we have an expert, Hisham Melhem, to explain to us and help us walk through the myriad of complicated details of the Syria-Lebanon relationship. Hisham. HISHAM MELHEM: Thank you, Bill. Many of us here in Washington keep talking about Syria as if the events or the changes that occurred in the last seven years did not occur. People still talk about Syria as if the old man is still in charge in Damascus, Hafez al Assad. People still talk about Syria as if Syria maintained its major alliances in the Arab world, i.e., with Egypt and with Saudi Arabia. People still talk about Syria as if the old Soviet Union is still alive. Well, folks, that's not the case. Syria today is radically different from Syria in 1995 or 1996 or 1973 or 1980 or 1982. And while I'm an engagement kind of a guy, because - unless you don't believe in diplomacy, you don't believe in an engagement, but I do believe that just as engagement is important in principle, the context in which you engage, the timing of the engagement, the balance of power in the engagement is as important as the principle of engagement is. And I am for engaging Iran and I am for engaging Syria, as long as you tell them exactly what you expect from them, as long as you recognize their legitimate interests and don't exaggerate their illegitimate (?) interests or don't exaggerate their role. The only problem I have with the Baker-Hamilton recommendations is essentially the context - not necessarily - the context, not the content. There is a view in Washington that only if we engage Iran and Syria, our problems in the region can be resolved, mainly in Iraq. Engagement became chic; engagement became a panacea, and as if we did not engage or try to engage Iran before, as if we did not engage or try to engage Syria before. And in the past, those of us who watch Syria closely - and as someone who was born in Lebanon, it's a second nature for us to watch Syria closely whether we like it or not or whether we like its policies or not - engagement in the past did bear fruit when it was done with Hafez al Assad in a clear way without any kind of illusions or naïve assumptions. So I think the Americans should stop, you know, acting like innocents abroad and try to engage Iran and Syria in a meaningful way and without any illusions. Now, let me give you at the outset my conclusion because we don't have enough time. As far as Syria and Lebanon and the United States, Syria wants two things from the United States that the United States cannot and should not accept or give Syria. One is to render nil the tribunal, the international tribunal that is being formed to try those involved in the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his companions, and subsequently those who were assassinated after the assassination of Hariri, including two of my friends and my colleagues at An Nahar newspaper, Gibran Tueni and Samir Kassir. I don't have to tell you that most Lebanese probably would point the finger at Syria just as the evidence so far that Mehlis and Brammertz collected provide at least circumstantial evidence of Syrian involvement - I don't know at what level - in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. In fact, if you want to be blunt, I would argue that most of the high-profile political assassinations that occurred in Lebanon, since the Syrian entry - since Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976, were carried out by the Syrians; some were carried out by the Israelis and their friends. But most of the high-profile political assassinations from Kamal Jumblat to the mufti (?) of the republic, to probably two presidents all the way to Hariri and to Samir Kassir and to Gibran Tueni can be blamed at the Syrians and/or their surrogates in Lebanon. The other thing that the Syrians would like to see from the Americans - they want to see an American acquiescence in Syria's attempt at restoring, as much as possible, its previous influence, if not its previous hegemony over Lebanon. This is what the Assad regime wants at this stage. And sometimes the Syrians say that bluntly and sometimes they say it with some finesse. But these demands or concerns on the part of the Syrian regime are the immediate and urgent issues beyond probably the importance of regaining the Golan. Obviously the regime in Damascus, of course, will exaggerate Syria's influence in Iraq, but we all know , or we all should know, that Syria's influence in Iraq is nowhere close or comparable to the influence of that other regional influential, i.e., Iran in Iraq. Syrian influence in Iraq has been exaggerated. And if you talk to the American military, they will tell you that Syria's influence and even the role of the jihadists and those volunteers who cross the border is limited. America's biggest problem today in Iraq is the domestic Sunni insurgency and the Shi'ite challenge; it's not al Qaeda, notwithstanding the exaggerations in Washington and some other parts of the region about al Qaeda's influence in Iraq, and not the influence of those jihadists who come through the Syrian border. Maybe Syria's influence at one time was more - 2003 and 2004 when some high-level Ba'athi officials, Iraqi officials, fled to Syria and then the Syrians - as they did with Sabawi, Saddam Hussein's half-brother, when they delivered him to the Americans. But today, their influence in Iraq is very limited. And if you engage them on Iraq, the results will be practically extremely limited, if not nil. I would even argue that Syria's influence with the Palestinians also is limited, notwithstanding the fact that Khaled Mash'al lives in a nice apartment in Damascus. Syria cannot change Hamas' political posture even if they wanted to. Now, obviously the Syrians would like to talk about the Golan. And here I think the Bush Administration made a tremendous strategic blunder by ignoring the Arab-Israeli conflict for the last six years. And I think very few people in Washington would have a good argument defending this posture. Engaging Syria on the Golan, trying to revive the peace process, is not a reward - should not be seen as a reward to Bashar al Assad. Even if we detest policies, any attempt at reviving the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians or the Israelis and the Syrians and the Israelis and Lebanon should be pursued. I would argue, if you want to discuss it during the Q&A, that, at this stage, maybe Syria is not in a position to enter into that kind of tough, long-slug that is going to be the negotiations with the Israelis, or even if they enter into a peace agreement and sign the peace agreement, whether this weak regime which presides over a country with hollow, brittle institutions can deliver on the requirements of peace. There isn't a single working university in Damascus. There isn't a single modern hospital in Damascus. When Farouk al Sharaa had a heart attack, he was flown by helicopter to the American University's hospital in Beirut for a heart ailment. This is the country that Bashar al Assad is presiding over. But I think the Syrians are correct in saying we want to pursue peace, although I think Bashar is doing it as a tactical approach now and not really as a serious commitment, because he should know, with his own limited intelligence, that you have today in Israel the weakest Israeli government since 1948. What you have today in the region for people who are dreaming about reviving the peace process - and I would love to see the peace process revived - is an incredibly weak Israeli government, a weak Syrian government, and then the United States that is seen by many in the region as bogged down in Iraq, a United States that is much weaker today as a potential mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis. This is a different world than 1991 during the Madrid peace conference. Now, let me just try to put Syria in its current strategic environment. And that tells you why I have a problem with some analysis here in Washington about Syria. Syria's stature as a regional power shrunk considerably in the year 2000 with the demise of Hafez al Assad. Over 30 years, Hafez al Assad ruled Damascus and probably those 30 years were the longest reign of an Arab ruler in Damascus since the hey days of the Umayyad Dynasty. And Hafez al Assad gave Syria the kind of influence that was incommensurate with its economy, geography, and demography. By sheer guile, cunning and tactical dexterity that we haven't seen in the Arab world in modern days, Hafez al Assad turned a weak state into a regional player; he turned Syria, in the words of an astute Lebanese observer, as we say in Arabic - (speaks in Arabic) - from a play object or a play thing into a player. There's a nice pun, a play on words in Arabic here - (speaks in Arabic). He was cool, occasionally cruel, a practitioner of violence, when necessary, to preserve his interest, but never a practitioner of gratuitous violence, like Saddam, for instance. Hafez could have written the sequel to Machiavelli's "The Prince." And it was fun watching him for olds hands like me, I mean, and others. If you want to summarize Hafez's foreign policy, if you will, it should be that ceaseless quest for building alliances, grand or small, to check his real enemies, i.e., the Israelis; not to defeat them, but to check them. And hence, he worked very hard on establishing that special relationship between the two other regional powers that he needed, mostly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In 1973, he went to war with Israel, alongside Egypt, of course, and Saudi Arabia was their backers. And he worked very hard to maintain that triangular relationship. Assad must be turning in his grave watching his son squander these alliances and that kind of a legacy: alienating the Egyptians; calling the Saudis and Egyptians half men in that infamous speech that he gave recently; and, most importantly, for losing Lebanon, the country that gave Syria, under Hafez al Assad, that kind of regional influence that I spoke about. Syria today finds itself in that ironic and unenviable position where it has to rely not only on Iran but on a non-state actor like Hezbollah to maintain the little that was left of its regional influence. Hafez is rolling now; he's doing I don't know what in his grave. Now, a few words about Syria and Lebanon: This is really a truly unique relationship even by the peculiar standards of inter-Arab relations since the Second World War. I mean, you had border disputes between Saudi Arabia and Yemen; you had border disputes between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates at one time and Qatar; you had border or water disputes between Egypt and the Sudan; and then you had the two pairs of crazy relations, the Iraqi relationship with Kuwait and the Syrian relationship with Lebanon. And for most Lebanese, in many ways - you know, remember the old adage about Mexico and the United States: Poor Mexico; it's far away from God and so close to the United States - well, many Lebanese look the same way and, poor Lebanon because it's so close to Israel and to Syria. But it was a unique relationship. And the interesting thing about it is that the Lebanese and the Syrians have so much in common. I mean, for the Lebanese, whether they like it or not, the closest Arabs to them are the Syrians and the Palestinians, culturally, politically, historically. We eat basically the same food; we enjoy the same folklore music. And so the commonalities are incredible. In Lebanon - I mean, Lebanon's longer land border is with Syria; it's about 80 percent. Syria is Lebanon's gateway to the Arab East. In many ways, Lebanon cannot survive economically without Syria, or at least a good relationship with Syria or open relationship with Syria. In the 1950s and 1960s, Syria's influence in Lebanon was limited by Egypt's assertive leadership under Gamal Abdel Nasser. In the 1950s, if you want to elect a president in Lebanon, you have to have the acquiescence of the Egyptians in it. Things have changed with the emergence of Hafez al Assad in 1970, particularly since the entry of the Syrian forces to Lebanon in 1976. From 1976 to 2005, essentially Syria was the hegemon in Lebanon, was the decisionmaker in Lebanon. Lebanon lost what's left of its sovereignty and Assad, the old Assad; not the kid - the old Assad was brilliant in the way he penetrated tactically every Lebanese community. The old man has his own Sunnis, he has his own Shi'as, he has his own Druze, he has his own Palestinians; he has his own this and that. And he was brilliant at playing these communities against each other, maintaining an uneasy balance that safeguarded Syria's interest in Lebanon. In those days, the Syrians would look at Lebanon and see two camps: the collaborators and the enemies. Conversely, the Lebanese looked at Syria and half of the Lebanese saw in Syria the protector; the other half saw in Syria the tormentor. And this is an extremely unhealthy relationship. But that's what emerged in terms of attitudes. The only exception to the way the Syrians looked at these various Lebanese is Syria's relationship with Hezbollah because Hezbollah imposed itself as a major player and now as a partner to Syria because of its relationship to Iran, because of the plurality of the Shi'a in Lebanon, and because of the assertive leadership of Hezbollah, especially under Hassan Nasrallah today. But this was a very unhealthy relationship. Syria used Lebanon to enhance its political influence in the region and to strengthen its hand vis-à-vis Israel, whether in the case of war or in peace negotiations. Syria economically benefited tremendously from Lebanon. Lebanon was a place where Syria would send its surplus of labor; Lebanon was a market, and there was a great deal of smuggling. As we used to joke about in the old days, there was - you know, if you remember Adam Smith's invisible hand, there was a huge invisible hand between Syria and Lebanon; there was an underground economy as we call it, smuggling, you know, galore. And practically every Syrian official who served in Lebanon or was involved in Lebanon, particularly in the intelligence and the high-ranking political leadership, enriched themselves. Rifaat al Assad, lives like a king in Paris today thanks to the treasures of Lebanon. Now, obviously, Lebanon also benefited from Syria. There was a lot of - there was a flight of Syrian capital to Lebanese banks and so it was not really a one-way street, even economically, but definitely the Syrian leadership, the Syrian political class and economic class milked Lebanon with the collaboration, I should add and stress, of many, many Lebanese political leaders. I mean, the Syrians would not have enjoyed that kind of influence that they had in Lebanon without the collaboration of a large part of the political class in Lebanon. Now, let me end by saying that this strange, peculiar relationship can never be healthy or correct or friendly as it should be for the obvious historical, cultural, social reasons that I mentioned unless there is a change in Damascus, or unless there is a change in Lebanon. Only if you have a representative government in Syria - let's say a democratic government and let's dream a little bit, or let's talk about a more perfect world - and even then, many Syrians probably will not - will find it very difficult for them to accept Lebanon as a separate sovereign entity. Bashar al Assad has yet to accept the fact that Lebanon is not a Syrian protectorate, that Lebanon is not a Syrian province. And there are some in the Syrian political culture, probably, who will not accept that. And, again, if you want to go back to the political culture that dominated Syria in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s, even probably until now with some people definitely - I mean, if you want to summarize the political culture with one word, that one word would be frustration. The Syrians always felt uncomfortable in their - what they see as their truncated state. Alexandretta was given to the Turks; Lebanon became independent; Palestine was given to the Zionists and Israel was established. So always the Syrians felt truncated - they live in a truncated state. And when Assad came, being the brilliant tactician that he is, he realized this and hence he began to work on this ceaseless, you know, quest to build alliances to compensate for Syria's inherent weaknesses. So even under Assad, Syria was inherently weak, but because of his personality, because of his alliances, he gave it that kind of influence that now his son totally, totally squandered. So when we talk today about engaging Syria, we should keep that in mind; we should keep that history in mind, the nature of that regime in mind, and do the engagement, but do it with open eyes and no illusions. And as far as Lebanon is concerned, let me tell you, many Lebanese are watching Washington carefully and very concerned because they see that aspect of naivety, if you will excuse me - because I admire Jim Baker and I love Lee Hamilton - but when you come up with 79 recommendations and tell the president of the United States, take it in toto or leave it, that's not an approach. There is no way under the sun that seven or nine of those 79 recommendations are going to be implemented. And for anybody who thinks that engaging Iran now after six years of that legacy between the Bush Administration and Iran, or engaging Syria after that kind of legacy that we heard from our two previous speakers, who thinks that things will change quickly and radically with a regime like the one in Damascus where there's absolutely no accountability, I mean, you know, you're engaging in dreams. And I think we should - you know, even when we talk about engagement, let's do it with open eyes and with no illusions. So I think I'll stop here. MR. RUGH: (Audio break, tape change, in progress) - turn of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon is non-negotiable from our point of view. Syria is weak, and yet our speaker, I think, still favors engagement. We have now to hear from Dr. Murhaf Jouejati, who is going to talk about Israel in general; the relations between Syria and Israel in general; and in particular, the Golan issue. And we'll see if he also votes for engagement. MURHAF JOUREJATI: Thank you very much, Ambassador Rugh. Ladies and gentlemen, forgive me for my cough. Mr. Melhem nearly choked me - as well - (scattered laughter) - he added to this in at least some of his remarks. I subscribe fully to the remarks of my first two colleagues and in large part subscribe to what Hisham said. Although, I have to tell you, the best school of corruption in the world happens to be in Lebanon, and the Syrian political elite were fast learners. (Laughter). At any rate, I think to sum up Syria's external action, I think two patterns of behavior are discernable. One, Syria torpedoes initiatives, and it brews regional instability when its interests are not taken into account. One case in point may be the May 13th agreement that Syria torpedoed between Lebanon and Israel. In fact, there are many cases in point of initiatives that Syria torpedoed when its interests were not taken into account. On the other hand, Syria is constructive when its interests are taken into account. A case in point, for example -and here Henry Kissinger called Syria as a stabilizing force in Lebanon when Syria controlled the Palestinian resistance in the south of Lebanon in the 1970s. Syria of course participated in the U.S.-led coalition of forces in the first Gulf War. Syria accepted the invitation to the Madrid conference, which led to the Middle East peace process, which itself led to Oslo and to a Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. These two patterns may seem contradictory, and they are. But I think Syria has been very, very consistent in that if we ask the question of, what does the regime in Damascus want? I think first and foremost - and I agree with Ambassador Kattouf - first and foremost is regime survival. But in the second place, it is to advance purely Syrian interests. And perhaps in the third place it is to advance the broader Arab interests, if such an interest exists. We know what regime survival means, but what about state interests? What are Syria's interests in the region? I think here, first and foremost for Syria is to regain its sovereignty over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The recovery of the Golan Heights - and this has been Syrian foreign policy since 1970 - the recovery of the Golan Heights is at the epicenter of Syria's foreign policy, and all else derives from that. The Golan, as you know, was occupied in 1967, but here not as a result of unprovoked Syrian fire from above onto the kibbutzim below as Israel would contend, but Syrian fire was provoked by Israeli encroachment into the DMZs, the demilitarized zones. This is not Murhaf Jouejati who says so; these are the observers of the U.N. Mixed Armistice Commission. These are Unz's (ph) officers, and these are also included in the memoirs of Israeli General Shlomo Gazit, who says, we Israelis have not always been lambs, and they Syrians have not always been wolves. And this was also confirmed in the writings of General Moshe Dayan. Hundred thousand Syrian refugees from the Golan Heights, and with their offspring today, they are over 550,000 refugees. The occupation of the Golan Heights is in violation of article two of the U.N. Charter, which talks of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. The continued occupation of the Golan Heights is in violation of U.S. Council 242. Now, some might argue, as Daniel Pipes does, and as Professor Marius Deeb does, some might argue that Syria is really not interested in the recovery of the Golan Heights. What it is interested in is not even peace, but in the process itself, because that process apparently legitimizes the Syrian regime. And this is based - this assumption is based on the domestic insecurity hypothesis, which posits that regimes that are domestically insecure are going to look for troubles elsewhere in order to divert attention away. Well, let's look at the regime of Hafez Assad. Yes, he had many problems. It's a minority regime. It was corrupt, abused power; was undemocratic. But, on the other hand, Hafez Assad did not invent the Arab-Israeli conflict. Two, he tried to recover the Golan Heights first by war in 1973, and he failed to do that. He then tried to recover it through peace, and this is what he meant when he said that peace was Syria's strategic option in that given the acute awareness of Israel's military superiority over any combination of Arab power, the only way to contain Israel in its 1967 boundaries was through peace. This is why he had pushed for the Madrid conference; accepted the invitation; went to the Middle East peace process; accepted a bilateral Syria-Israel track; recognized Israel's security interests on the Golan Heights. And we know from the talks at Shepherdstown in West Virginia, the last serious talks that took place between Syria and Israel, that Syria was ready to recognize Israel and to normalize relations with it, among other things. Hafez Assad did not explode the peace with Israel; Israel did. And this you shouldn't trust Murhaf Jouejati on that; read the Clinton memoirs. It was the Israeli Prime Minister Barak who apparently got cold feet and gave Syria an offer that was less than the offer Israel had given beforehand, which was a withdrawal to the June 4th lines. With regard to "Assad, Jr.," the domestic insecurity hypothesis might be more plausible because in addition to all the problems that Hafez Assad had, Bashar Assad has the same problems and then some. I believe he rules over a smaller social base. There is the emergence of a domestic opposition that he has to contend with. He and his persona are less credible than that of Hafez Assad. He is, rightly or wrongly, implicated in the Hariri assassination. So that is a whole lot of domestic insecurity, and so his desire to resume talks with Israel may or may not be, as Hisham said, tactical. Still, it is interesting that Bashar Assad, when he first came to power, did seek the resumption of talks with Israel, and this before the Hariri assassination. Syria endorsed the Arab Peace Plan that was advanced by then Crown Prince Abdullah before the Hariri assassination. In sum, Syria wants peace, not because Syria is John Lennon, but because it is in its national interest. Unfortunately, thus far, it has had not partner for peace. Israel is militarily superior; Israel has full U.S. backing. In fact, there are those - and this is reported in the media - there are those in the Bush administration that have weighed in on the debate in Israel on whether to resume talks with Syria or not - not in favor of resuming talks with Syria. And so, in an Israeli-mindset from a hawkish one, why should Syria give anything to - why should Israel give Syria anything at this point in time. And in terms of balance of power, Israel may be right. But peace with Syria, i.e., the return of the Golan to Syrian sovereignty, I think provides a far better security guarantee to Israel in that peace with Syria would isolate Iran. Peace between Syria and Israel would isolate Hezbollah, which would give Lebanon some breathing space. Peace between Israel and Syria isolates Hamas. If my assumptions are right, it is the resumption of talks that lead to the return of the Golan Heights that will make Syria more cooperative. It is not sanctioned; it is not isolation. This approach has not worked. A more cooperative Syria, in turn, would advance both the U.S. and Israeli interests. Conversely, an uncooperative Syria, one that brews regional instability, threatens these interests. Therefore, I believe the U.S. must take Syrian interests into account. The Golan Heights must be part and parcel of an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While President Bush's vision of a two-state solution living side by side is good, but it is not sufficient if it excludes the Golan Heights. Addressing Syrian grievances, namely the end of Israeli occupation of the Golan is the key to constructive Syrian behavior. This, as Hisham says, is not appeasement; it is doing the right thing. Having said that, when the U.S. talks to Syria, I stress here that it should continue talking about domestic politics and it should continue urging for free and fair elections. Thank you. MR. RUGH: Thank you very much. We've had four excellent presentations. Let me, before we open the floor to your questions and comments, make a few comments of my own, taking the chair's prerogative to do so. And I'd like to invite the four panelists to make any comments they wish to make before we open the floor, and of course, after. The panelists can, if the table microphones are working, and if John and Ann (sp) agree, remain seated. Let me just raise a couple of issues or further comment on a couple of issues that have already been raised. The question of economic incentives in dealing with Syria: Ambassador Kattouf talked about Syria's financial dependence on others and the oil question. Do economic incentives work with Syria? Maybe they do. I recall that when I was at the American Embassy in Damascus more than 20 years ago, the U.S. Congress cut off economic assistance to President Hafez al Assad's regime expecting him to change his behavior, and he pretended not even to notice, and it had apparently no effect. Now, that's withdrawal of an economic carrot. Maybe there are other ways to influence the Syrian regime through economic incentives, and perhaps the panelists and others may have some comment on that because economic leverage, if it works, is certainly worth trying. A second issue: Martha talked about the fighters crossing the border, and said there are different estimates as to the numbers. I've seen one comment by a U.S. official that 90 percent of the foreign fighters come across the Syrian border. The question is why is Syria allowing that? Why is it in Syria's interest to continue to do that? How does it affect Syria's influence in Iraq and in the region? On the question that Hisham raised comparing Haffa al Assad with Bashar in terms of formation of alliances, I don't disagree that Bashar is less adept at regional politics than his father was - that's certainly the case - but it seems that Bashar al Assad certainly has a strong strategic alliance with Iran, and, as Ted noted, that probably cannot be broken any time soon without paying a very high price. But it is an alliance that he has maintained, that his father established, and also, there are some connections between Damascus and Riyadh. The recent Arab summit saw King Abdullah praising Bashar and supporting Bashar in Iraq. At least, it got lip service. I concede that Hezbollah is a small player in the region and not a major alliance partner, but maybe Bashar does have other options. Finally, what is the role of Syria in the connection between Iran, on the one hand, and Hamas and Hezbollah, on the other? The United States is concerned about the Iranian support for and sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah. Do these connections go through Damascus? I understand Hisham doubts that that is a very important connection, even though Mash'al sits in Damascus. But to what extent is Syria a problem because of the continuing activity of Hezbollah and Hamas? If any of the panelists would like to comment on any of these issues - oh; I'm told by management that the microphones at the table don't work very well and the panelists should come to the podium if they want to be heard. So who would like to comment? Ted, why don't you go first? MR. KATTOUF: I want to be very brief because I think there should be time to ask questions from the floor. I am glad that Ambassador Rugh picked up on my remark about Syria's financial vulnerability. I certainly wasn't suggesting that we pile on more U.S. unilateral sanctions on top of the ones that have been in place. Some have been in place since 1979 when Syria was sanctioned for being a state sponsor of terror, and I think that was maybe the proximate cause of it losing its USAID grants. And then of course the president implemented some of the actions from the Syrian, what, the Lebanese - I can never remember - a long name - the Lebanese Liberation Act - the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Liberation Act. But we do have carrots to offer. We have actually been effective in stymieing Syria from applying to the WTO, which I've never quite understood because WTO membership would actually require Syria to reform its economy. It would take an incredible number of years for Syria to comply, if it complied at all. So you know, we have many - there are many times along the way when we could stop the process if we were dissatisfied. But even before the Hariri assassination, we blocked the WTO application of Syria. But we've also been successful in getting the Europeans not to grant Syria certain economic concessions under the Barcelona process that involved a number of Mediterranean countries. And in fact, I think Syria is the only Mediterranean attendee of the conference that doesn't have such concessions. And actually, that too would have forced Syria to do some reforms. It's not all that clear to me that it would have benefited Syria; it might have benefited the Europeans more. But we are - but because we have put on these sanctions, we are in a position to offer Syrians certain carrots, and I think they are going to need, down the road, some financial aid. I mean, yeah, you can stay in power, as Saddam showed, even when your people are reduced to abject penury, but it means that Bashar will have to become a brute at home, and I'm not sure that he's temperamentally suited to that. The only other thing I would say, I don't disagree completely at all with Hisham when he said that, you know, Bashar obviously is not his father. I've said many times myself that Hafez al Assad made the regime, but the regime made Bashar al Assad. But for - yes, Bashar's mistakes are rather obvious. But yet my recent visits to Damascus show me that the Syrians are feeling quite confident right now. In fact, I've actually cautioned one senior official to not confuse being lucky with being good because they have benefited from even worse mistakes at times that this administration has made. But, nevertheless, I can tell you in Damascus they're not sitting there wringing their hands and incessantly worrying; they think they're in a pretty strong position. MR. RUGH:Martha? MS. KESSLER: Well, I agree with Ted, that positive incentives economically are most likely to work with Syria. And one of the things that has impressed me over the 30 years of not only watching Syria but watching other countries in the region, is how grossly we underestimate their willingness to take economic hardship if it's a matter a principle. And I think this certainly applies to Syria. So I do not think the sticks work very well at all. I, too, take the point that Bashar Assad is not his father. Sons never are, and they certainly are not in their 30s what their fathers were in their 60s and 70s. And what Assad, Jr. has had to face simply couldn't have been conceived by his father during the tutorial. So we went way off the script of anything he had been prepared for. And so I think our standards for judging how effectively he's been able to manage Syria during his short period in power should take into consideration those issues. My understanding of his domestic situation now is that it has stabilized, which obviously is the most important thing. Getting his internal house in order is number-one priority, and doing that at the same time dealing with the regional crisis of enormous proportions strikes me as an accomplishment. Survival is not generally thought to be what one aims for, but in these circumstances, I think it's quite surprising. So I agree that he's made some terrible blunders, but I would say if you want to make a comparison, you've got to look at what happened in the early years of his father's regime and there were stumbles there as well. The interesting question that Bill has raised about Syria's relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah and whether dealing with Syria will really make any appreciable difference with regard to those two, I tend to think that that has to be dealt - that those issues have to be dealt with in the context of Iran. If, failing that, I think that dealing with Syria certainly could make a difference in terms of the muscle with which Hezbollah acts in the region. There isn't any question that Syria has been a conduit for the re-supply of Hezbollah, and its endorsement has been important to the flexibility of that group. With regard to Hamas, I think it's much less clear. But I've always believed that for a true Israeli peace to be negotiated, Syria must be included, as been remarked on by Professor Jouejati, and that to do so immediately limits the ability of groups that are opposed to peace to operate. I think this was true in the early '70s when Henry Kissinger started to negotiate a peace agreement, throughout the Carter years, and throughout the Clinton years. To ignore Syria was to ignore a major strategic aspect of this problem. And the salami-piece-meal-confidence-building approach was almost doomed when you have a party sitting on the sidelines that had a virtual veto power. It just never made sense to me then, it certainly doesn't make sense to me now. So I think Syria's assets in Hamas are not nearly those that it has in Hezbollah, but nevertheless, this is an important checkmate to the ability of Hamas to operate. MR. RUGH: Thank you. Hisham? MR. MELHEM: I don't want to belabor the son and father relationship, but both Hafez and Bashar, when they took over, they were relatively young. Three years into his reign, Hafez Assad went to war. A year or two later, he found himself negotiating with the likes of Henry Kissinger. Even when he was young, Hafez was different than his son. So I would like to think that Bashar Assad represents a glaring example of the pitfalls of political inheritance. If you can avoid it, don't do it. And I will always blame Hafez for committing the biggest blunder in his life when he decided to bequeath his realm to his son. Anyway, in his last years he made some stark mistakes, obviously, even for a brilliant tactician like Hafez. When he, for instance, did not see the rising rapprochement between Turkey and Israel and he allowed the Ocalan case to humiliate him publicly when the Turks said, you get rid of Ocalan or else we'll send the troops across the borders. And uncharacteristically he bowed down and he did it. Anyway, Iran and Syria: This is one of the longest-enduring fixture of modern Middle Eastern history, that kind of relationship. It is not based on love; it's not based on ideology; it based on pure pleasure, which means, I mean, basic interests. But the interesting thing - when Hafez began to nurture this relationship, Syria at that time in 1979, particularly in 1980, when Saddam, the bully, invaded Iran - Iran became more dependent on Syria than vice versa. It was Syria in 1979 and 1980 in the driver's seat. Today, let me assure you, many Syrians, many Syrians resent the fact that their country is moving in the political orbit of Iran and not the other way around. And many of them don't like it, even those who, when they do their own cold-blooded calculus about this relationship and the need to maintain it - and obviously I can see why they would maintain it - they are not comfortable with it because it is alienating many Arabs; it is alienating their traditional Arab alliances. And as I said, today Syria is the junior partner and not Iran. And you have a bunch of people in Iran who wrote the book on political cunning. And they have a strategy. And in fact there is no Arab strategy vis-à-vis Iran, but that's another issue. So you know, Bill Rugh is correct that that relationship exists, but it is making more and more Syrians with each passing day more uncomfortable with this relationship. Now, I think Bill raised the issue of, I think, the Syrian involvement with the allowing the jihadists to go to Iraq. I still believe that people exaggerate the role and the lethality and the nastiness of the foreign jihadists who went to Iraq through Syrian borders, although there are other jihadists who are going to Iraq through other borders. So I fail to see the tangible benefits that the Syrians could give the Americans if they engaged them on Iraq. Now, on Lebanon and Palestine, slightly different, but I still have questions about Bashar's ability to deliver. We can, I mean, as Murhaf said, and I fully agree - I mean, I used to watch and, you know, sometimes would - being fascinated by Assad's - the old Assad's political dexterity in the way he would engage the Americans. I mean, the old man never burned his bridges with the Americans, never cut the Muawiya (ph) thread - those of you who know anything about the history of Syria - between him and the Americans - never insulted an American president; I mean, never engaged in gratuitous verbal, venomous rhetoric against the United States. I mean, the old man was extremely rational in his dealings - even allowed Amine Gemayel, the president of Lebanon at one time, who cursed him publicly when Amine Gemayel found himself bereft of American support when the Americans did their own famous re-deployment in 1983 following the bombing of the Marine barracks - and Hafez Assad with open arms received Amine Gemayel in Damascus god knows how many times because he got what his wanted. For him, it's like a mafia boss - it's nothing personal; it's business. And it worked. The son has nothing. I mean, I don't know if there are any genes from Hafez to Bashar. You have to scratch your head to think in the last seven years of one thing he did that positive for his own country, forget the region; forget being positive about the whole region. Nothing. When Hafez was around, we knew that there was a Allawi core to the regime, but there was a Sunni façade. You had Hek Macheb (ph); you had Abdul ali-Habdan (ph); you had all these people. In terms of security, security apparatus, security intelligence and all that, and of course, there's Alawi core. We knew that. Now that veneer, that façade is gone, and now we have a family, a dynasty - a lousy one at that - where you have the Makhlouf branch of the family is milking the country economically, and the Assad family controlling the country politically. It's the president, his younger brother, his sister, his brother-in-law. My god, Tony Soprano will feel at home in Damascus - (scattered laughter) - and yet you get people here who are seriously talking about this regime as if it can deliver, and in serious ways, the way the old man used to deliver. That's my problem with this. I'm not saying don't engage; Engage. And Murhaf is absolutely correct - the brilliance of Hafez was that his willingness and his courage to swim against the tide. In 1976 he entered Lebanon, and I remember as a young man I demonstrated against the Syrian entry into Lebanon in New York. I was in New York and we had Aler Hamou (ph), Edward Sayid (ph), and Hisham Sharab (ph) and all these people. Later on, as a Lebanese, I found myself with the Syrian camps when they were trying to undermine the May 17th agreement because I, as a Lebanese or someone who was born in Lebanon, did not want to see Lebanon in the political orbit of Israel. It was difficult to be 100-percent against Hafez or 100-percent with Hafez. And he was correct in 1980 not to support Iraq in Saddam's crazy war against Iran. And he was correct in going to Madrid. And he was correct in 1991 when he saw that there is a huge Desert Storm going to hit the region, and he felt that I should be like a palm tree - to go with it. If I stand up against it, it will break me. And he was brilliant, and he collected the money afterwards. He was a great bazaari (ph) merchant in that sense too, in addition to being - you know. None of this you find with the little kid in Damascus. So I mean, you know, seriously, I mean one has to be a little bit realistic. Syria's strategic environment has changed a lot. They can still have some influence in Lebanon. They still have some politicians in Lebanon who cannot maintain their influence unless they work with the Syrians. I'm not talking about Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a different category. And they still have some influence in Lebanon. If the United States engages Syria, it should say as it engages Iran, we would respect your legitimate interest, economic and otherwise, in Lebanon, but you have to treat Lebanon as a sovereign state. If I have to engage Iran today, I will go to the Iranians and I say, look; you want two things from us we cannot give you. We should not acquiesce in your nuclear program if it has any military application. And we should not acquiesce in your attempts to be the hegemon in the Gulf. But next, we will tell you, we respect your interests in the Gulf. You are a major power; we should treat you as a major power. You are the inheritors of a great Persian culture for four- or five thousand-year history. We can help you to develop a nuclear peaceful program, and we would recognize your interest. I would say the same thing to the Syrians. And as I said, you know, reviving the peace process is not a reward for Hafez. And if I were a Syrian I would demand every inch of the Golan. The problem also for the little kid in Damascus - he cannot accept anything that his father rejected, and that's part of the dilemma here too, also. But I think the Bush administration made a lot of mistakes in this regard in ignoring, dismissing the peace process because they wanted to dismiss everything and anything that was associated with Bill Clinton. And they used to make fun about Bill Clinton's obsession with the peace process. And, yes, Bill Clinton did not push enough; yes, Bush senior did not push enough; and yet W also did not push enough. And I think Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book is correct when he said these three leaders did not do enough to revive the Arab-Israeli conflict, to push both sides when they have to, to achieve peace because peace, it's good for the Israelis, for the Palestinians, and the Syrians, and the Lebanese. Everybody. It's not good only for Bashar. And let's challenge Bashar. If he can deliver on the requirements of peace to have an open society, to deal openly with a state like Israel that has much stronger institutions, and then let's see how the Syrian society will react. And I believe firmly that if you allow the - if you unleash the Syrians, they will do tremendous work. Look at their communities all over the world. This is the country that has two of the most important Arab cities, Aleppo and Damascus. And under Bashar today, Syria is a minor player. They may benefit from other people's blunders, including the American administration, but given the fact that there's no leadership in the Arab world - Iraq is in flames, Egypt marginalized itself, the Saudis are trying on their own to at least come up with some sort of a strategy. Maybe Bashar looks somewhat different, you know. But objectively speaking, when you measure the indices that you have to use when you measure real power, be it economic, military, social, cohesion, you name it, most of it doesn't exist in today's Syria. There isn't a single institution that functions well. MR. : Security services. MR. MELHEM: Including the security services. (Laughter). MR. JOUEJATI: Boy, I knew the Lebanese were angry. I didn't know how angry they are. (Laughter.) At any rate, very, very - MR. MELHEM: Just passionate. It's brotherly love. (Laughter.) MR. JOUEJATI: Very briefly, isn't it mind boggling that, you know, we ask of Syria to open up and we arrest its application of the WTO, which would force it to open? And isn't it mind-boggling that we would pressure the E.U. to do the same to postpone its association agreement with Syria, an association agreement of Syria that would have required the opening and the openness of many different aspects of the Syrian economy and of society. There were civil society clauses; there are human rights clauses. And so by pressuring the E.U. we have denied the Syrian people the ability to get to where they want to get. This is one. On the question of Syria and Iran, I believe it is the most enduring alliance in the Middle East, certainly. Under Hafez al Assad it was, I think, a partnership of equals. And when there was the peace talks with Israel, Hafez al Assad kept his distance from Iran and he told Iran, this is in my interests. Now it is more - it looks more like a patron-client relationship in which Syria is more dependent. But still, here I refer you to a recent interview that Bashar al Assad made; I don't remember with which media outlet. He was asked about Iranian President Ahmadinejad's remarks on the destruction of Israel, or something to that effect. And Bashar al Assad replied, we want to make peace with Israel, not to make war. So there is a fissure in the Syrian-Iranian relationship that might be exploited if, of course, Syria has a reason to leave that Syrian-Iranian alliance, which brings me to the last point about Syria and radical groups. Again, when the peace talks were going well, at the time Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam - and this is not a secret, it was in the media - he had gathered leaders of Palestinian guerilla organizations in Damascus and told them to go look for a job, to go open farms somewhere because the business of resistance was over. And so if Syria had cause to do this again as a result of its seeing a light at the end of the tunnel in terms of its recovery of the Golan, the same may be done again. MR. RUGH: Thank you very much. I see lots of hands raised. I'll try to get to you all, but let's start with Gene Bird. The floor mike isn't working, so please project. Q: I'm Gene Bird from the Council for the National Interest - (inaudible) - organization. I think it's fascinating that we're here in the Rayburn Building, and yet the panel hasn't mentioned a single word about the Pelosi mission, which featured of course Tom Lantos, a European Zionist, chief Zionist up here, really, and Nick Rahall, which is Arab-American, and Ellison, the first Muslim. How does the panel look upon the Pelosi mission? Is it too early to comment? Or are you free to make some comments on this? MR. RUGH: Ted? MR. KATTOUF: It strikes me that the Democrats having come out for a withdrawal at some point in 2008 of U.S. troops are taking another page from the playbook of the Hamilton - or of the Baker-Hamilton Commission - which is, that, okay, that if you're going to get out, there needs to be an important diplomatic component to what you're trying to do. And of course the panel recommended engaging Syria and Iran both multi-laterally and bi-laterally as part of the effort to stabilize Iraq and allow for an orderly U.S. departure and an Iraq that at least had a chance to keep the violence down and to stay a unified country. I think Speaker Pelosi was wise in who she took with her. It's hard to get better cover than Tom Lantos. Nobody would ever, ever accuse Tom Lantos of being weak on the issues that the administration cares about vis-à-vis Syria, be it Lebanon, be it support for groups that have engaged in terrorism, Hezbollah, and the like. I've sat in on meetings - I sat in on a meeting with Tom Lantos and President Bashar while I was still ambassador. I suspect that Tom Lantos would not have been in the room is he was leading the delegation. He would not have gotten the appointment with Bashar. I think, however, Nancy Pelosi, you know, she gave him the entrée he might not have been able to get again on his own. And he gave her the top cover to protect her from criticism. MR. RUGH: Yes, ma'am? Q: This is for Professor Jouejati. Would the achievement of the Golan Heights put their regime's number-one priority of regime survival at risk? They didn't have the excuse to use the emergency law to ensure the security - (inaudible). MR. JOUEJATI: Two things in there may be contradictory. If the regime gets back the Golan, it would be very, very popular. But another reason to get back the Golan, other than it is Syrian, for civil society, for the man on the street, is that it would deny the regime the justification for the continued imposition of martial law. And this is what I want. MR. RUGH: Across the aisle. The gentleman in the third row. Yes, sir? Q: My name is - (inaudible). I'm Syrian. I want to ask the panel, when you talk about Syria, you give it, like, a - (inaudible) - role, and so on, but that's interpreted inside Syria. And from the opposition group that you are giving it a cover - they are giving it a line more to survive or more green light, or a cover, as they call it. That's what I don't understand in Washington - always they insist that Syria's okay, but don't look at its suppression of its people or anything. Like, you - (inaudible) - for example - (inaudible) - but I don't understand why Syria always looks as an asset in the regional area. If you took at Iraq - I mean, if you take Iraq, Syria are not for supplying the foreign fighter; they are infiltrating Syria in spite of the Syrian regime. We don't want - (inaudible) - the intervention. I mean, they sent an ambassador there, so there is a lot of things the Syrian misread from what - the Syrian people. MR. RUGH: Are you directing the question at any - you don't have an administration representative here. Who would like to take that on? Yes, go ahead. Question. Yes, go ahead. MR. JOUEJATI: I think I understand what the question is, and I don't think you'll find anybody in the Bush administration that will find Syria an asset in the Middle East. And what you are saying is that by engaging the Syrian regime, you are giving it a legitimacy, therefore prolonging its life. But look, I think there is a real fear in the United States, and certainly in the Israeli neighbor of Syria that who is going to be after the Assad regime? Is there going to be chaos on the northern border of Israel? Is it going to be the Muslim brotherhood that is in charge of Syria? And so there are all these unknowns, I think, that would limit either the Bush administration push against the Syrian regime, or even an Israeli one. MR. RUGH: Yes, gentleman in the third row. Q: Jeff Steinberg (ph) - (inaudible) - magazine. One of the factors that really only came peripherally into the discussion up until this point, but which seems to me to be particularly important is the increasing role that Saudi Arabia is playing in a number of major diplomatic initiatives. And I can see that this carries, sort of, complications from a Syrian standpoint given, well, how do you factor in other things. And I wonder if the panelists as a whole could comment on how they see the Saudi role in this whole - (inaudible) - obviously very complex situation in the region. MR. RUGH: Hisham? MR. MELHEM: Obviously, the recent diplomatic moves by the Saudis were not seen in a positive light by the Syrian leadership. The Saudi leadership believes that Syria was involved in the assassination of Hariri. Obviously, there are personal relationships between the Hariri family and the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, but there's also political alliances. And the Saudis are not comfortable with the close relationship between Bashar and the Iranians. The Saudis feel that they have to stand up to Iran's influence in the region, and that explained in part why they worked on the Mecca agreement between Hamas and Fatah and the Palestinian authority. And that explains in part what they are trying to do in Lebanon to diffuse the crisis, and without allowing the situation in Lebanon to degenerate into civil strife. There is very real concern about that. And obviously the Saudis were very angry at Bashar when he called them, as well as other Arab leaders, as half men. There is an Arab expression in which - it was very insulting to use. So if you are in Bashar's position in Damascus, you shouldn't be comfortable with these Saudi moves in the region because they are directly or indirectly aimed at you, or they are seeking to limit Syria's influence in Lebanon or maybe even Syria's influence in the Palestinian territories, and also to provide some sort of an Arab alternative to how Arabs should deal with Iran. I don't know if there is anything to be said about the Wahhabi element. I don't see a Wahhabi element, unless you're talking about the Sunni-Shi'a rift in the region. Obviously, the smart people, whether they are in Iran or in Syria or in Saudi Arabia, should be horrified by the potential of a deepening rift between the Sunni communities and the Shi'a communities, where the two communities live side by side. And I'm talking here about Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and of course Iraq. And given the fact that most Arabs now get their news from television and every Arab watches al Jazeera and al Arabia, and this and that, and see the blood-letting in Iraq and see the sectarian rhetoric getting out of hand, this is deepening the tension in Lebanon; it's creating tension in Iraq - I mean in Kuwait and other places, Bahrain - where you have these two communities living - and I think also the Syrians, given the fact that the Alawis are an offshoot of Shi'a Islam. So that's the only thing I could see in what the Saudis are trying to do. I don't think the Saudis would like to see a Shi'a-Sunni rift. And I think the smart people in Iran don't want to see that. And I could see many Iranians in the political hierarchy cringing when Ahmadinejad makes his stupid remarks and when they see this growing uneasiness on the part of many Arab Sunnis about the growing role of Iran. And I can tell, you many Arabs now look at Lebanon and see that if the Lebanese government falls, this will not be seen as a victory for Hezbollah, or even by extension, for Iran; it will be seen as a Sunni defeat. I mean, this is the sad reality of politics in the Arab world today. And I think there are people who are concerned about these awful, negative trends in the Arab world. And that's why what is lacking in the Arab debate about Iraq, for instance, is where is the Arab responsibility to deal with Iraq? I mean, it's always easy to complain about the American blunders in Iraq, and you know, you could write a whole book about them, or books. But there is no Arab - Arabs rarely ask the question, what is our role here? And is it in our interest to see Iraq degenerating into full-fledged civil war that will have tremendous ramification for the region, given the, again, the Sunni-Shi'a fault lines. MR. RUGH: I would only add that the landscape has certainly changed when you look at the role of the Saudis, who in the past have been very reticent to take any leadership position in diplomacy and now they are convening a conference to bring the Palestinian factions together and they are very active, whereas the Egyptians, for example, who in the past used to have a major leadership role, and Hafez al Assad had a leadership role, both are quiescent. So the landscape has changed, not even to mention what happened in Iraq with a change of leadership in that respect. Yes, ma'am? Q: (Inaudible) - I appreciate your tendency to refer to diplomacy and engagement in Syria, and we're a very small - (audio break, tape change) - could you please tell me what kind of incentives would you give the Syrian regime and government to convince them that having a national tribunals tri-pillars is in their interest, and that they should let this happen so the - (inaudible) - in Lebanon can - (inaudible) - especially because - (inaudible) - peace demonstrations and the impasse in the economy - (inaudible). What type of - (inaudible) - would you give them? MR. RUGH: I'm not sure the question was heard in the back. Let me try to summarize it. The question relates to the tribunal that has been proposed to look into the question of the Hariri assassination and the fact that demonstrations have been held in Beirut to block the holding of parliamentary sessions to authorize the tribunal. And the question is, what kind of incentives could be offered to Syria to persuade Syria to encourage its friends in Lebanon to allow for a tribunal? Hisham, do you have a response to that? Or anybody? MR. MELHEM: Murhaf can - MR. JOUEJATI: No, Hisham is the expert on this one. (Laughter.) MR. MELHEM: Look, I really - MR. KATTOUF: Can I make a quick comment on this? MR. MELHEM: Sure, go ahead. MR. KATTOUF: I think, Amal (ph), you know the answer to this one that you asked. I said at that beginning of my talk that it's all about regime survival. This is an existential question for the regime. If the assassination of Rafik Hariri and his associates reaches up to the senior levels of the Syrian regime, as some people suspect it does, then there is no way that President Bashar al-Assad can acquiesce in a tribunal that could demand that he allow people close to him to be transported to the Hague or wherever to stand trial for this. So he's going to - what he's doing right now, as you well know, is waiting for Chirac to be replaced by another - a new French president and hopes that he can cut a deal with maybe the next French president who will not have the ties that President Chirac had with the late Rafik Hariri, which were very, very close. And he's also waiting for this administration to leave. He's learned one thing from his father, Hisham. He's learned how to sit on a position. You don't give him enough credit. (Laughter.) MR. MELHEM: No, no, I don't think Bashar can or will cooperate on the international tribunal for the obvious reasons that Ted mentioned. (Off mike.) That's why I think the United States and the French - and I agree, Bashar is waiting for Blair to go and Chirac to go, and this administration to become truly a lame duck administration to try to stop the tribunal. That's why I think the United States and the French and the Brits should go to chapter seven and have the tribunal, whether those who are sitting in doubt on Beirut like it or not. I mean, I really don't see a compromise here. MR. RUGH: Sorry, let's go to the back of the room on the side there. Q: Alan Brown with the Canadian Embassy. (Inaudible) - Bashar is so worried about this regime's survival in the context of the Hariri mission, and I don't know how fair it would be at the end of the - (inaudible) - that the fingers would be pointed directly at him. But he is so concerned about that, isn't that a - isn't the (permission ?) a wonderful bargaining tool to be used to negotiate on a whole host of other issues that are of concerned - his support for Hezbollah - (inaudible) - and so on. Couldn't that be used as a bargaining tool, perhaps, to negotiate with the Bashar regime to get - (inaudible)? MR. RUGH: Could I ask you to explain in what sense? What sense a bargaining tool? Q: Well, if somehow in the international community you had some others - the French - (inaudible) - come up with a deal to President Bashar - it's exchanging the - (inaudible) - for other things the - (inaudible). MR. MELHEM: In return for what, though. I'm missing the point. I mean, are you saying - (inaudible) - tribunal, let's give him a tribunal and then see what we can get from them? Q: Exactly. MR. MELHEM: You try to tell that to the Lebanese. MR. RUGH: Ted, do you have any - MR. KATTOUF: No, I mean, you're saying there's some Lebanese who would support that kind of a deal - MR. MELHEM: Of course. MR. KATTOUF: - including business people - MR. MELHEM: I'm not sure - MR. KATTOUF: Who are afraid of Syria closing the border and not being able to trade - MR. MELHEM: Well as long as - (inaudible) - the Syrians are going (east ?) and seeing that Iraq is not only their only neighbor to the east, they have the United States as an Arab neighbor, too. And that's one reason, by the way, the last time - (inaudible) - because the Americans told them, you play with the Lebanese more than we play with the Iraqi border. You play rough sometimes. MR. RUGH: Yes, ma'am? Q: I'm Michelle Stippert, also from Executive Intelligence Review. It's recently been said that the administration here has a reverse Midas touch; it's not taking the golden opportunities that are there. And I don't know as much about Damascus or Beirut, but I know Washington, and I'd like to make a couple of observations and have some questions about the relationship between intelligence and policy. First of all, do the panelists think, given that Hamas and Hezbollah have achieved these positions through democratic elections, that it's time to adjust this question of just declaring them terrorists, and look at that whole situation? And I'm particularly concerned about the plight of the Palestinian people in Gaza with this administration's refusal to recognize a - (inaudible) - government or deal with it. Secondly, the question of the Syria Accountability Act itself. That was passed - I covered it for my magazine at the time. It was passed in a frenzy of disinformation, exaggerations from players like former Ambassador John Bolton, et cetera. And I examined closely allegations about WMD, that Saddam Hussein's WMD was in Syria, et cetera. This did not hold water, ultimately, though Cheney wouldn't agree with me. Yet it is a law which has passed. And the assessment, finally, about Syria that I heard from Washington did not come true. They said Syria would never leave Lebanon. They did leave Lebanon. They said that President Assad would not cooperate with the U.N. investigation. They did cooperate with the U.N. investigation, and there's a lot of ambiguities in the latest Brammertz report, which doesn't make it so clear to me that there wasn't motives in Lebanon, also in the other direction. That it said in the Brammertz report that Rafik Hariri was interested in reconciliation. Last thing, General Aoun in Lebanon, when he was here in Washington when he was out of power, my goodness, he sounded like the most anti-Syrian person in the whole world. And yet, on his return to Lebanon, he changed his views, and shouldn't the Americans, perhaps, be listening to his reasoning now a little bit more? So those are the ambiguities that I think need to be said on the record, because in Congress, in the White House things are much too black and white, and I don't think Syria has been given the credit for the compromise that it's made. MR. JOUEJATI: Just on the Syria Accountability Act element of your question, I personally was asked to testify at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which I said that I didn't think it would have much effect on Syria, nor on the regime, and that by increasing pressure, Washington was going to throw Damascus into the lap of Iran. At that point Senator Biden nearly beat me up, and I am still traumatized to this day. (Laughter). So you're absolutely right about the Syria Accountability Act. MS. KESSLER: Well, I would just make two points in regard to your observations, which I think are very interesting. First, I don't think you can understand what has been done with regard to Syria in the last several years outside of the context of a belief among many in this administration that this regime has to go. And so much of what has been undertaken with regard to Lebanon and the Accountability Act has been setting the stage for a raison d'etre for getting rid of this regime in Damascus. I can't analyze it any other way. There's just - as you say, there's so many contradictory and seemingly irrational aspects to this with regard to truth on the ground and allegation that it has to be understood in that context. So I think that's the larger scene in which I would see this. The second point is a little less clear. I think the whole hypocrisy that goes with promoting democracy in Iraq and then not recognizing a democratically elected country is hurting us enormously in the region. There are a whole set of issues that have stimulated an image of U.S. foreign policy as being enormously hypocritical. I think it is the major stimulant to the worst aspects of sort of a militant Islam, and it gives credibility to some of our worst enemies. And your point that this ought to be re-thought is, in my view, absolutely apparent. MR. RUGH: Gentleman in the blue. Q: Yes, my name is Omar Sheikhmous, I'm chief of the Kurdish Service of Voice of America. I understand very well the - first of all, I'd like to thank all the panelists for a very sober - (inaudible) - presentation. I appreciate it very much. One is that both regimes are very much anxious about their survival, and engagement with these two regimes in influencing them either to reduce or limit their capabilities in the - (inaudible) - in the region is quite understandable. But then there's the aspect of influencing them to cooperate with the United States and the coalition forces is a little bit (more maddening ?). If you take the lessons of Eastern Europe, Central Europe under the communist regimes, you could cooperate on certain issues, but you cannot cooperate on the strategic ends that they have. And here, as I see it - (inaudible) - as far as cooperation in achieving their aims, which is to reduce or eliminate U.S. influence in the region. How would you think about that? And then, I would agree with Hisham, actually, that one should go in to this engagement with very open eyes, that there are certain limitations on what sort of allegiance we can make with them, and on what issues. And just to - (inaudible) - as well, the resentment in Syria vis-à-vis the influence of Iran on Syrian politics. I interviewed Abdul ali-Habdan when he left Syria and arrived in Paris and joined the opposition. One of the first factors that he mentioned for jumping ship and joining the opposition was exactly the influence that Iran is having over Syria, and Syria's foreign politics, although he was one of the original architects of the cooperation - (inaudible). MR. RUGH: Who would like to? MR. MELHEM: I agree. (Laughter.) MR. RUGH: No further comment? Thank you. Yes, ma'am? Q: My question is for Mrs. Kessler. You commented that honest cooperation with this regime is going to require our administration's assurances that - (inaudible) - and I was just wondering what kinds of assurances you think would be satisfactory to this regime? MR. RUGH: Did you hear that in the back? The question is directed at Martha Kessler about the question of regime change, that assurances to Syria that we do not intend regime change could be made. The question is how do we do that and what kind of assurances? MS. KESSLER: Well, the honest answer from me is I'm not sure what form those assurances would take, and I am even less hopeful that they would be given because to do so is sort of to acknowledge that, in fact, that was the agenda. However, I think that there is in the context - and this issue, by the way, was more or less directly taken on in an interview with Foreign Minister Muallim, who said the security of Syria has to be taken into account in any kind of engagement. I think that the best we could hope for, if this kind of dialogue were to be undertaken any time soon within the lifetime of this administration, would have to be a gradual confidence building that this was not the case. It would also, really, involve running out the clock. So I didn't have in mind explicit assurances. I don't think that's possible; it would be just Syria's measure of how safe it is with regard to U.S. intentions. Q: Do you think it's too late for this administration? MS. KESSLER: I really am not certain of that. It all depends, I think, and if I were to be asked to give a timetable, I think that the feeling is that if this surge strategy has not produced some publicly acknowledged or accepted results by the summertime, then we're going to have to change strategies. So we're talking about late summer or early fall, of perhaps trying a diplomatic gambit, in which case, that's not necessarily too late, I don't think. It will be - we will have to measure on a gradual basis how forthcoming the Syrians would be and how honest they would be in making commitments. Actions are going to speak a lot louder than anything else with regard to that. MR. RUGH: We're coming close to the end of the time, but I see the gentleman here hasn't had a chance to ask a question. Sir? Q: How are you doing? My name is - (inaudible). I work in Congressman Abercrombie's office. I had a question about - earlier, Ms. Kessler, you mentioned about how there's been a million refugees in Syria. And I was wondering if anyone was thinking about the long-term implications of having these large immigrant populations in these other states and how they're going to be handled. I'm thinking a little bit about Black October and Jordan. I'm thinking a little bit about the Great Lakes region in terms of the effects of having refugee camps established internationally - whether or not you grant citizenship or whether you establish permanent refugee camps. What sort of effects are they having on regional (shifts ?) in the relations? MR. RUGH: You're talking about Iraqis or Palestinians as well? Q: I'm talking about - primarily I'm talking about Iraqis. The reason why I brought up Jordan was because this is another example of, you have a long-term refuge population and there is a strong record (?) showing that refuge populations have a strong propensity to - (inaudible) - when they are turned into a small - (inaudible) - they are not allowed to integrate with the large political community. So I'm wondering if there are any thoughts about those - (inaudible) - problems. MR. RUGH: Okay, in case you didn't hear in the back, the question is about refugees, primarily Iraqi refuges, of which there are many currently in Jordan because of the Iraqi situation. The question is, over the long term, do refuges have a potential for a - to be a destabilization factor, and what does the panel think about the refuge issue? Martha? MS. KESSLER: Well, I'm glad you asked the question because I raised this issue in my presentation. I think it's one of the really serious long-term problems, in addition to history telling us, both in Jordan and in Lebanon, that refugee populations can have an enormous impact on political behaviors, intentions. I see it as an extraordinary problem, and the great hope is that those 1 million, 300,000 refugees inside Syria would be resettled relatively quickly once stability is established, but that is very optimistic. Syria has done reasonably well in integrating its Palestinian refuge population into a - reasonably into its social fabric. Whether it can manage that many Iraqi refugees is an entirely different question, and almost certainly will need international assistance in doing so, as with Jordan. Over the long term, I think that it almost certainly would have consequences for the stability and the character of the regime, particularly since, in the cases of Palestinians, where there was not a state entity at that - at the point they moved into Syria to identify with, in the case of Iraq, they will. And if they remain in Syria and Jordan as a dissonant, very unhappy refugee population, I think the prospects for enduring stability in Iraq are really very dim. So I think you have put your finger on one of the very serious consequences of this conflict. MR. RUGH: Ted. MR. KATTOUF: At the risk of, again, stating the obvious, you know, I'm struck by the fact - how little credit that Syria gets for having accepted all of these refugees, whether it's 800,000, whether it's 1.3 million; they have kept the borders open. Hisham said, well, if they close the border to Lebanon, you know, the U.S. would close the border to Iraq. Syrians might say, go ahead; then you deal with the refugees; you figure out what to do with all of the people who are going to come to the border and aren't going to be able to get entry to Syria. But I think, as Martha said, the Syrians, having lived in Syria three different times, I know for a fact that the Palestinians are far better integrated than people would be led to believe by this idea that everybody is being kept in camps and kept from working and all - not true. Palestinians own businesses; they are part of the fabric of life; they are - the one time, the big camp Yarmuk has basically become just a neighborhood of Damascus. And, you know, if Syria was a more favored state, you would be seeing, you know, featured articles about their humanitarian gestures to Iraqis because you're quite right; accepting this number of refugees can be destabilizing, particularly for an impoverished country, and particularly since some of these refugees are bringing their own, you know, religious baggage with them in terms of the tensions that exist today in Iraq. MR. MELHEM: Just real quick - (inaudible) - when I talk about closing the border with Syria, I was talking about for economic exchange. MR. KATTOUF: (Inaudible, cross talk). MR. MELHEM: Movement is good but not for people. Obviously the Syrians have a very good record in treating refugees, be they Armenians, as the first-wave non-Arabs at least - (inaudible) - and - MR. KATTOUF: Lebanese. MR. MELHEM: And they should take credit for allowing taking in the Iraqis. And I think the administration was late in recognizing this and sending - (inaudible) - to Damascus. I think the Syrians should be supported in this endeavor. I don't think citizenship, refugee citizenship is in the cards. They cannot - (inaudible) - they will have tremendous, you know, demographic and political hit back on Syrian society and politics. I don't know how many Iraqis did, but the I think the United States has a moral, as well as political, maybe even legal responsibility to have - to have the Jordanian government or the Syrian government. This has nothing to do with the political difference between - (inaudible) - and the jihadist and all of that because there is an American responsibility. I mean, if it had not been for the invasion and the war and the occupation, you will not have a 800 or a million Iraqi refugees. In this sense, I think that the situation was late in recognize this, and I think the Syrians deserve understanding and support from the United States, in particular, and Europeans to deal with this mounting problems because recently we have seen that there were tension, and this is bound to be a tension in a small economy like Syria, and a small country like Syria. I have no disagreement with you. I was talking about the borders closing and the borders - MR. KATTOUF: My point is you couldn't do one without the other. MR. MELHEM: Well - MR. KATTOUF: Look, I don't have a problem with the U.S. suggesting - I don't want to see the border with Lebanon closed by Syria. Don't misunderstand my remarks, but I'm just being a bit ironic that if they try to do it for economic reasons, I'm sure the Syrians would say, okay, it's closed - MR. MELHEM: The Syrians always play the games - (inaudible) - they don't close the Iraqi pipeline in the old days. They agreed to close the Jordanian border. They agreed to close the Syrian border. Just again, they play it. What I'm saying is if they want to be rough, you have to be rough, that is all. MR. RUGH: On that pragmatic note, we're at the end of a - do you have a quick question. Q: A quick question yes. Speaking of playing rough, it's really difficult - I have a question about the ability - (inaudible) - to negotiate with Syria - (inaudible) - talk about a lot of stuff to deliver. What about our own - our administration now in terms of dealing with the Syrian influence in - (inaudible) - perhaps too late - (inaudible). MR. RUGH: Is it too late, Ted? Q: Or, you know, listening to people in taking to heart your thoughts and analysis. MR. KATTOUF: They didn't listen to me when I was in the government; I doubt they will - (laughter) - listen to me now. (Laughter.) It's not too late to talk to the Syrians; it's just that - you know, I'm not - what I was trying to really say in my talk is - I think we are all saying the same thing really; we shouldn't have allusions. I agree with Hisham. The Syrians at this point aren't going to give us this much. They figured, we have seen this administration; we don't like this administration; if they want to engage, sure, we'll engage, but maybe we can get a better deal from the next administration; in fact, we are almost sure we can better deal from the next administration, whoever it is, Republican or Democrat, so why give these guys very much. But they see the advantage of engagement themselves because they are hoping it will shield them from some of the sanctions and other policies that we have promoted in their isolations. By the way, they are not isolated. I was in Damascus in the beginning of March. You had the Belgian foreign minister; you had the German minister of interior; you had the Iraqi vice president, the Sunni vice president over there. You know, that - and there were others as well that were delegated. Trust me, they are not as isolated as some people would have you believe they are. But the Syrians right now are going to ask for a much higher price than they would have asked three or four years ago if we had dealt with them, but then we thought we could have it all, and there was no need to give them anything. MR. RUGH: We have come to the end of an interesting discussion. The premise of the discussion has been, when we meet with Syria. And I think it's fair to say all of the panelists support engagement rather than isolation. But they have pointed out very nicely in various ways, on various issues - and there are many issues - the difficulty of moving forward with engagement. So I would say that the conclusion might be - there are many conclusions, but one conclusion might be, yes, we should engage, but don't come to the negotiating table with any illusions, as Ted has emphasized, but work hard and focus on what we want to say, and also listen carefully. Please join me in thanking this panel for a very nice presentation. (Applause.) (END) Middle East Policy Council 1730 M Street NW, Suite 512 Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 296-6767  -  Fax: (202) 296-5791 info@mepc.org HOME  |  JOURNAL  |  FORUMS  |  WORKSHOPS  |  RESOURCES  |  ABOUT  |  WHAT'S NEW   All Rights Reserved - 2002 - Middle East Policy Council