Capitol Hill Series   |   Briefing Series   |   Special Forums   Unedited Transcript For a printable version of this transcript, click here. Middle East Policy Council Thirty-sixth in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S. Middle East Policy   The Geneva Proposals for Peace: Still Viable?   Speakers: Ziad J. Asali President, American Task Force on Palestine Marshall Breger Professor, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America Milton Viorst Author, What Shall I Do With This People? Jews and the Fractious Politics of Judaism Philip C. Wilcox, Jr. President, Foundation for Middle East Peace Moderator/Discussant: Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. President, Middle East Policy Council 216 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. April 15, 2004 Transcript by: Federal News Service Washington, D.C. CHAS. W. FREEMAN: All right, ladies and gentlemen, could I ask you to take your seats please? And I think a combination of fine weather, tax day and the loss of hope in the peace process probably account for the relatively sparse turnout so far, but no doubt others are on the way. I think we should get started. I'm Chas. Freeman. It's my pleasure to welcome you here. I'm president of the Middle East Policy Council, a small struggling organization that does three things: we raise politically incorrect or untimely or neglected issues for public discussion; we take the discussions and we print them as the first item in Middle East Policy, our quarterly, which we're proud to say is the most often cited quarterly in the field; and finally, throughout the United States, so far in 43 states we have trained about 15,500 high school teachers in how to teach about Arab civilization and Islam and we reach about 1.2 million students a year, confusing them with a fact or two they otherwise would never encounter in the course of the American public educational curriculum. So that's what we do. We're here today to talk about an issue of remarkable timeliness and an issue of great seriousness. As of the beginning of this week, 872 Israelis and 2,845 Palestinians had died since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifida on September 29, 2000. To put this in perspective in proportion to population, 872 Israelis equates to roughly 41,000 Americans and 2,845 Palestinians equates to roughly 235,000 Americans. If the death of 3,000 Americans and others on September 11th was enough to give the United States the equivalent of a nervous breakdown, you can imagine what the impact on Israelis of those losses coming after the Holocaust might be and what the impact on the Palestinians of catastrophic deaths on that scale is. We've seen over the last several years a turn away from an effort to negotiate a peace and toward unilateralism on both sides. Yesterday we learned that Mr. Sharon, who had apparently been unwilling or unable to negotiate with the Palestinians, had decided instead to negotiate with George Bush and the United States. The problem, of course, is that the issues concerned are not within the power of the United States to dispose. That, it seems to me, is the fundamental issue, not the extent to which what has now been agreed between the president and the prime minister ignores international law or the opinions of the international community. I think most Arabs, unfortunately, will now be convinced that the United States is completely part of the problem and no longer part of the solution, and we will no doubt pay a price for that. I think this background - rather unexpected; probably welcome in Florida if not in the Middle East at large - makes today's discussion truly timely because the Geneva Accords, like the Oslo Accords on which they're built, were negotiated directly between Israelis and Palestinians with minimal foreign involvement. In this case, as in the case of the Oslo Accords, they had to turn to Europeans rather than to Americans to reach agreement, which is itself a sad commentary on the state of affairs. But unlike the Oslo agreements, the Geneva Accords actually define most elements of the final status, not just the process by which one would get there, and they thus meet a very important test of credibility, because I think after the experience of the Oslo Accords and Madrid, no one in the Middle East, Israeli or Palestinian, is prepared to buy a pig in a poke. Of course, as Jews and Muslims they wouldn't have bought a pig anyway, but the metaphor stands. Are the Geneva Accords the basis on which agreement between the parties might yet emerge once they have exhausted unilateralism and its possibilities? Are they proof, as some would argue, that negotiations in fact can succeed despite all the differences in bridging the gaps between the parties? Or are they now, as I think Mr. Sharon would argue and the leaders of Hamas would argue, irrelevant? This is the issue I hope we will explore today. And we have before us a very distinguished panel, and I think we haven't really discussed the order of presentation but I think, Ziad, I'll ask you to go first as you're first on the program. Ziad Asali is the president and founder of the American Task Force on Palestine, a longtime activist on Arab-American issues, and a member of the Chairman's Council of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee since 1982. He was president from 2001 to 2003. He's the author of a number of books on the issues at hand, and we're very pleased to have you here. I'll just introduce the other members of the panel briefly. You have on the back of the program, I hope, the full bios. Marshall Breger is a professor law at the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. He's been at the Heritage Foundation, and during the first Bush administration he served as the solicitor of the Department of Labor. During 1992, by presidential designation, he served concurrently as acting assistant secretary for Labor Management Standards. He has served on the U.N Human Rights Commission for the United States and has been a visiting professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He's a contributor to a number of journals, and himself, again, the author of a significant monograph, "Jerusalem's Holy Places and the Peace Process." And we're very happy to have you here, Mr. Breger. Milton Viorst probably needs no introduction to readers of the New Yorker, for whom he has written many things on the Middle East over the years. He's taught at Princeton University and been a reporter for a remarkable list of newspapers and journals. He's the author of several books, including one that is reviewed critically but basically favorably, I think, in the last issue of Middle East Policy, which is "What Shall I Do With This People? Jews and the Fractious Politics of Judaism." Milton, thanks for joining us. And finally, Phil Wilcox, who is president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace. Ambassador Wilcox was a colleague of mine in the Foreign Service for many years, served as consul general in Jerusalem among other things, and has been a voice of reason and sobriety on the issues in the Holy Land for many years. With these few remarks I would like to invite Ziad to come to the podium. I should add, for those who are unfamiliar with our proceedings, that the panelists will speak for about 10 minutes. If they get to 12 minutes I will haul them off the podium. So your time is to be carefully used. Please, Ziad. ZIAD ASALI: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador Freeman. I will try. Good morning everyone. The Hall of Justice in Geneva was packed with dignitaries, delegates, hardened peaceniks and guests from Palestine, Israel, the Arab world, Europe and the United States. The festive celebration with speeches, music and live performances, correctly and evenly divided between Israelis and Palestinians in joint appearances while a full court of world media was providing sympathetic attention -- an auspicious and promising occasion. That was the launching of the Geneva Accord, a document that Yossi Beilin described as "a virtual agreement" and Yasser Abed Rabbo hailed as "a triumph of peace and reason" as he held Yossi's hand high and called on an impressive array of stars to join them on the stage. That celebration was followed by a triumphant visit of the delegation to the United States with high profile political meetings and media coverage. As I recall these events of last December and witness the harsh realities of life grinding away hope and reason in Palestine and Israel, I must admit that I felt at the time that the term virtual was more appropriate than Yossi meant. It meant unreal and unrealistic. It was a premature celebration about what might be and not what is. The Geneva Accord agreement fleshes out the difficult details of the final status issues that all negotiators or framers of documents about peace have studiously avoided. Courageously and methodically it deals with the contentious issues and proposes solutions that reasonable, patriotic, experienced negotiators worked out with sufficient compromises achieved and red lines held or shifted to make the overall project achievable. In short, it's a reasonable document signed by reasonable people who care about lasting peace. It represents, by any survey or poll you read, the majority position of Israelis, Palestinians, Arabs, Europeans and Americans, and it's consistent with all the codified international agreements about the Palestine-Israel conflict. This, unfortunately, is not the full story. It leaves out crucial details -- details about the attitudes and relative power of the people opposed to it. It is my purpose to use the time allotted me today to explore this position, to explore this opposition, what it means and how we can deal with it. It is my contention that the conflict has been unresolved because its main ingredient has not been starkly defined and clearly pursued by its advocates. The Palestine-Israel conflict has always been one between those who accepted the reality and the finality of the outcome of the war of 1948 and those who never have and seem not to ever to be so inclined. The initial and clear demarcation between Israelis and Jews on the one hand and Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims on the other has defined this conflict in its early years. However, it gradually and imperceptibly shifted and can no more be neatly packaged as Palestinians versus Israelis, Arabs versus Jews, or Muslims against Christians. For the Palestinians, supported by the majority of Arabs and Muslims, 1948 was injustice personified in the establishment of Israel on 78 percent of the land of Palestine. They suffered a loss of land, country, position, dignity and power and a place of their own. Decades of life and political experience to redress this injustice has educated the majority to the need to accept a historic compromise for a state in the West Bank and Gaza with a capital in Jerusalem in exchange for accepting the permanent reality of the existence of the state of Israel. The people who oppose this compromise oppose Geneva. They may or may not have given their true reasons for their opposition. They wrapped it either with a religious, leftist, or nationalist rhetorical garb but they have, in essence, opposed a compromise, and hence its credible instrument, Geneva. This does not mean that there were no other reasons for Palestinian opposition. There were, and those reasons need to be talked about publicly and honestly. The right of return: the biggest club was wielded in public to put the Geneva advocates on the defensive and have them fend for themselves against charges of treason. Notwithstanding the detailed section of the finer points about refugees and their redefinition of the right of return that Geneva provided, the perception was created and it stuck, that the negotiators have given up that right. The reality is that there is a difference between the return and the possibility of return of several million Palestinians to Israel, which is not realistic, and the right - the mere right of the refugees to their possessions that they left in '48. Geneva tried to make that distinction implicitly. In the final analysis, Israel has to find the words to redress the grievances inflicted on the Palestinians in Dinakba (ph) in 1948, and these words given two generations after the fact will help make reconciliation and peace possible. These words should be part of the grand agreement of final peace. Another legitimate criticism of Geneva is that unauthorized parties negotiated this document in secret. No people have suffered more from lack of democracy and participation with so much at stake as the Palestinian people have. It is right, proper and unavoidable for the implementation of any agreement about their fate to have the people vote on it. It is in this context, and even more so in the context of the impending withdrawal from Gaza, that Palestinian elections should be held soon. Elections with a referendum on the two-state solution would provide legitimate representatives authorized to make the decisions on behalf of Palestine. It is necessary to point out that Geneva Accord is not an official agreement but a framework for one to be negotiated between elected parties. A conflict this long, which has captured attention of billions of people all over the world cannot and should not be resolved without a public vote. A referendum would provide the ultimate validation of any agreement for the resolution of this conflict. On the other hand, the Israeli public perceived the people who negotiated the Geneva agreement as left-wing peaceniks. Some of them were branded as traitors and threatened by public officials with legal proceedings. The Israeli counterpart to the Palestinian rejections of the outcome of '48 was equipped with a much more formidable tool to fight with and to discredit Geneva by virtue of its hold on the reigns of government in Israel. Dreams of a greater Israel, at least including Judea and Samaria, the linguistic erasure of the occupation of West Bank and Gaza, dominated the thinking of the military political elite that ruled Israel. A military solution to them was not only possible but the only way to deal with Palestinians who understand nothing but force. A climate of fear generated by suicide bombings has driven the majority to support the strident policy of the occupation and its iron fist. However, life and political reality have gradually, but obviously not completely, tamed this policy. The withdrawal from Gaza, among other things, is an expression of the limits of military power. Holding on to the West Bank is an expression of the continuation of the idea that 1948 did not define the borders of the final conflict and negotiations by military and other means go on. These strident policies will, if continued, inevitably and predictably empower the religious extremists in Palestine. Palestinian advocates for peace, with a relentless occupier who offers no possibility of an independent state, will be braded as cowards and weaklings. The upsurge of Hamas and jihad in public polls in the recent years is a harbinger of things to come if present trends are not checked. This is a challenge to me for real political partners across the ethic, national and religious divide. It is their fault if they fail to seek each other and connect. The political reality at this time is that this is a conflict no more one between Israelis and Palestinians, Arabs and Jews, Christians and Muslims. It is rather between those who accept the presence of two viable states living in peace along each other and those who don't. Palestinians, Israelis, Arabs, Jews, Christians, Muslims are in each camp and those within each camp have much more in common with each other than they do with the tribal affiliates. The political opponents to peace on each side think that time is on their side and in the mean time they have exercised their veto power politically and by force to torpedo Geneva or any accord that will define the end of 1948. The will of the majority has been thwarted and that of an energetic, impassioned, suspicious and violent minority is on the other side. A viable unoccupied Palestine alongside Israel is the only prescription for peace. It is for this reason that we must keep the roadmap alive and quit making references to its early demise as we must exert all effort to generate political muscle behind the final status outlined by the Geneva Accord. Israel's withdrawal from Gaza can and should be made to fit in this grand vision. The challenges of all parties is to turn this into an opportunity to rebuild a new order in Gaza, one that will be the first solid step for the Palestinians to establish an independent, viable and democratic state. Israel, for that segment of it that wants security and peace, will have to define its risks on such a move and take them. The Palestinian majority must seize this opportunity to plan and build rather than to passively watch, complain and assign blame. The United States will be wise to find a way to deliver to the Palestinians tangible benefits to reclaim its credibility as it promises them an acceptable peace. Now more than ever, because of Iraq and the problem of international terrorism, the United States has to exert itself to avoid policies on Palestine that might provide succor to its committed enemies. Partners of peace on all sides must find each other and roll up their sleeves. The resolution of this defining issue of our time will take vision, courage and toil. Thank you. (Applause.) MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, Ziad. That was a very eloquent, powerful and succinct, if stark, vision of current realities, but I appreciate that you ended with a prescription for action. And we now turn to Marshall Breger. MARSHALL J. BREGER: Thank you. I'll tell you, I usually only - I stand and lecture in the classroom, so since this is a discussion I think I'll just sit and talk from here, with your permission. Look, I'm a kind of reluctant critic of Geneva. It's an important heuristic effort. It keeps hope alive. It's a kind of lantern out there that one can point to, but let's cut through to the reality: the public has already rejected it. Khalil Shikaki, the Palestinian pollster, recently told me that he polls: do you like the Geneva plan? He gets 20 percent. He tells people the same items but he doesn't call it Geneva plan; he calls it the Oman plan. He gets 42 percent. So already the term drags you down 22 percent in the Palestinian public and the Jaffe Center poll recently shows 76 percent of Israelis are against it. So I think the important question is to ask why, and I think there are a number of reasons. First, let's be blunt, it's a kind of top-down elitist project. Intellectuals, ministers out of government; it was done quietly, maybe it had to be but the result is it did not build a grassroots, a popular following. Furthermore, it's in a way over-intellectual. AB Yehoshua, who's a bit of a leftist, the great Israeli writer - has said recently, Yossi Beilin built this sort of clock. He knows just where every wheel will be placed in the peace clock and the unilateral pullout suddenly undoes all his work. I respect him. He has a worldview. He has a presence of mind. But there was something dogmatic in the way he steered the process. There was something overzealous in the way he wanted to take it to the very end, and I think the public picked up that perception. The process - the accord is based on trust, just like Oslo was and Oslo failed for many reasons but one was there is no trust. There was no trust and there's even less trust now. That's also reality and that's reflected in what the polls show. I think one of the most difficult aspects with the whole Geneva approach is that it is an integrated clock. It's a end of conflict, total deal and you're not going to get an end of conflict, total deal in a context where there's no trust. It's also unclear who the partners are and I think it's terrific that Yasser Abed Rabbo and other Palestinians are for it, but the Israeli public doesn't see strong support for it in the Palestinian community and the Palestinian community doesn't see strong support for it outside of a small group of the Israeli peace camp. So while I think it was important that the Geneva exercise was undertaken, I don't think we can look to it for very much hope in the future. What options do we have? We could wait -- wait for new players on the scene, wait for changed circumstances. There's a lot of cost in waiting, a lot of dead lives. Or we can do something unilateral. Now, I don't think - I would not have done what Sharon has done unilaterally but it's an understandable impulse, and I will say here, and perhaps again in a politically correct - politically incorrect context in this audience, that I don't think one should abandon all hope when one really looks at what the Sharon plan is and what the Sharon plan is doing. Of course, in a zero sum world Sharon's happy so the Palestinians have to be worse off, and of course it would be vice versa if the Palestinians were happy, but I think there are aspects to what is happening now that at least open some real possibilities. The first one, and it's the most important one, is that Sharon is going to have a primary in the Likud and he's going to now win that primary after he got all this stroking from Bush, and that's going to break one of the most important strengths of the settler community. Their biggest strength was their seemingly immutable faith that history is theirs, that the future was theirs, that time is in their direction. That not only gave the small number of zealots strength but it gave all of their supporters, even who were less intense belief that they were in some ways the Israeli pioneers come back. I think this will be over after the Likud primary. If the Likud votes to withdraw from territory they no longer could have that feeling and that opens up tremendous play in the Israeli body politic. Secondly, I think if you really read the exchange of letters - I mean, I know what the music is and I know how the orchestra fanfares were but if you read the notes again there's less there or more there than meets the eye. It's true that Bush said you should recognize the demographic realities in relation to the 1949 armistice line. Now, Sharon took that to say I can keep the major settlement blocs but Sharon didn't say - but Bush didn't say that and indeed demographic realities includes the demographic reality of Arab sectors and growing Arab sectors in parts of East Jerusalem. Also, the 1949 boundaries actually puts a whole range of areas into play that if you considered the green line, the '67 borders, were clearly not because there many areas near the border of Israel which are - in that '67 borders in '49 were considered no man's lands or within an armistice zone and were not clearly part or agreed as part of the boundary of Israel. So while there's tit there's also tat. I think you have to look here at the side letters, which haven't been written and I don't know what's in them, but I think the real interesting point will be how much settlement growth Bush allows in the side letters in the discussions of what they're going to be able to do in the West Bank under - to get Bush's approval. Now, there's also language in the right of return that is very difficult for the Palestinians but - and it takes away what they see as symbolically a major negotiating tool, but again if you're looking at reality, even the Geneva Accord and all the other proposals have really ended up at the end of the day with an arrangement which will put the bulk of the return in the Palestinian areas and it's not as fixed in the language - I can read it but you can read it too - as Sharon has taken it. Third point: I think as of now Sharon is a transitional figure. Either he's going to be indicted or he's going to win this primary and his government's going to fall and he's going to have to take in the Labor Party. Or he's going to take in the Labor Party and then his other - the government's going to continue to fall and there will be a kind of a Labor-Shinui government. Or he'll survive very weakened, not able to do very much. So we've opened up tremendous ferment and opportunity in Israeli politics. Whether the Labor Party, whether the peace camp will be able to do something about it, that's another story but that's not something you can expect Sharon to worry about. Now, it's absolutely clear that both Sharon and Bush dissed the Palestinians. I mean, they ignored them. They negotiated between themselves and they took away two big bargaining chips. Although again I say, in reality if you look at every negotiation, at the end of the day those chips were more chips of symbol than chips of substance to give away. And that's a big problem, but I believe that notwithstanding the impulse for this effort was unilateral, there's an appreciation that is going to require working with the Palestinians to actually pull it off. Obviously, working with the Palestinians from what Israelis and what Sharon would view as a position of greater strength, but in order to maintain a modicum of stability in Gaza, in order to maintain stability in the West Bank we're going to have to move now after this unilateralist impulse into a negotiated phase. I think a lot depends on how the Palestinians react to this and also a lot depends on the openings and ferment and potentialities now that are developing in the Israeli political process. So, all in all, I think Geneva was a great concept as an outlier, as something to have there to think about. I think people who thought it was going to succeed were fooling themselves and I believe that the withdrawal from Gaza and the small withdrawal from the West Bank - whatever Sharon plans is going to be a beginning. You know there's a cunning logic to history - not only Hegel teaches us but I think reality - that the man maybe did the most to actually implement the settler movement is going to be the person, whether he understands it or not, who is going to take the actions that are going to begin to have it wither away. Thank you very much. (Applause.) MR. FREEMAN: Thank you. I appreciate that you, like Ziad, in effect urge us not to write off hope for peace, or a settlement of these issues, but rather to build on the realities, or the opportunities, that a withdrawal from Gaza may present. There is a certain dilemma that you point to. I noticed, Marshall, that you said that because there is no trust you cannot define the end state - you cannot define the end of the conflict or the final status. But I think if you were to speak to Palestinians you would find that culturally what they require is a definition of final status in order to proceed with the process. And so there's a dilemma. On the one hand you can't define it because there is no trust; on the other hand, because there is no trust you can't leave it unsettled and have a process. And I don't know how we square this circle. Ziad suggested that it was time on the Palestinian side - and you referred to the Israeli electoral process; it was time for a reaffirmation of leadership, some electoral process that would empower people to discuss what they do not now feel entitled to discuss, and that may be part of the solution. However, I come to the final - it's ironic: probably a year ago we gathered to discuss the question of whether a unilateral withdrawal was the only viable approach for Israel and peace in this region, and rather to my surprise, all four panelists - we thought we had selected some people who would argue for a unilateral withdrawal - all four panelists argued against it, for very cogent reasons: that without Palestinian agreement there can be no resolution of this issue and it will simply continue in one form or another. That's what I heard you say at the end, and I think that conclusion remains valid, notwithstanding whatever it was that was agreed to yesterday. And as you've indicated, there's a lot of fine print that has yet to be written. Milton, may I ask you know to give us your views? You may sit if you wish or stand. MILTON VIORST: That puts me in a dilemma. MR. FREEMAN: You have to make a choice. MR. VIORST: (Chuckles.) All right. I came rather late to this panel so you'll be tolerant, I hope, if I'm a little disorganized, to say nothing of having awakened this morning to this new, rather sensational change in - or perhaps not a change, maybe just carrying the course along in the direction of which it's been going since this administration has come into power, but it almost - well, it makes the Geneva Accord - which I agree with Marshall was never a central aspect in the peacemaking process - into something even more academic. But let me just make a few points and then wander around as I make some others. I think it's important to notice the difference between the two negotiating teams of the Geneva Accord. The Israeli negotiating team was composed of peaceniks who were totally on the outside. They had nothing - they had no relationship with the Israeli government at all and were opponents of the Israeli government. The Palestinian negotiating team, on the other hand, was very closely associated with the Palestinian Authority, with Arafat. Now, Arafat very carefully detached himself from the conclusions while saying a few very nice things, but indicated very much that this was not the word of the Palestinian authority. Nonetheless, it was a group that was within the Palestinian establishment, and I think there was an effort made to convey the idea, if not all of the details, that this was an agreement with which the Palestinians - the Palestinian Authority felt rather comfortable. I just want to cite a couple of points, largely to come to the same conclusion that Marshall does, which I think is the crucial conclusion about democracy. It's not that the Geneva Accord is spectacularly different from what President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon said in their exchange of letters this morning. They were remarkably alike in that all sides have agreed that the likelihood of 4 million, or whatever number we finally agree upon, Palestinians will never return to Israel proper. They will return, if they choose to return at all, to the new Palestinian state, and the fact that President Bush and Sharon have said that in itself is not terribly significant. Perhaps the one difference is that the Clinton plan, or the Clinton plans that were developed over the course of the years of negotiation - unfortunately, we can see in retrospect, negotiations which were tardy in terms of the eight years that Clinton served as well as, perhaps more important, interrupted by a few little blips in the Clinton administration. So they never really got to put their shoulder to many of these ideas in the sense that it would have taken to develop them fully. But the fact is that the Clinton plan did have a concept of compensation for the Palestinians, of which the United States would be the central element in terms of money but also that we were going to take the leadership in making sure that Palestinians - and we don't know clearly what might have been agreed upon. Whether they returned or went elsewhere would get some money for what they lost in terms of property and suffering and anything else. That is totally absent from what President Bush has talked about with Sharon. And another notion which was very central to the Geneva Accord, the idea that somehow - and this was unspecified, but somehow any settlements that were turned over to Israel would receive equal territorial compensation. The Palestinians would receive equal territorial compensation in land which is now Israel's. It's unclear where that land might have been. Chances are it would have been out in the Negev and it would have been desert. But most important of all, it would have availed the Palestinians some sense of self-respect: they got something from the negotiations; somebody wasn't slapping down some conclusion upon them, which of course is what we're getting in the Sharon-Bush exchange. I think we've forgotten a lot of things, among which was that Geneva was somehow more or less conducted within the context of the Saudi plan. We don't hear very much talk about it because it was peremptorily dismissed by President Bush and the administration, but the Saudis did make very clear that they would recognize Israel and change from a war footing to a peacetime footing with the Israelis if there was a peace agreement with the Palestinians. And I emphasize the word peace agreement, not a peace imposition. And then the Saudis proceeded to bring this to the Arab League in Lebanon, and lo and behold it was approved - their plan was approved by the Arab League unanimously; not without some considerable grumbling, but it was approved. Now, we don't know how that would have played out but it was an element in the peacemaking process that this government, our government chose totally to ignore. We heard nothing of it. I think it's worth also recalling - I'm surprised it hasn't been mentioned so far - that among the luminaries who were at the signing of the Geneva Accord was Secretary of State Powell, and it did say something about there being an element within our government that understands the folly on which we have embarked, but Secretary Powell, I need not tell you, seems like the odd man out in this government, not only on the question of Israeli-Palestinian relations but also on the whole question of Iraq. We might go back to thinking about what happened under President Carter and with the Sadat-Begin negotiations, after Sadat came to Jerusalem in 1977 and Sadat made the fine statement that he would not make a peace agreement without taking Palestinian interests into account. Lo and behold, at Camp David under President Carter the Palestinians got forgotten, which probably was no surprise, but what was I think most important of all was the Palestinians being outraged by the presumption of the Egyptians to speak for them. And now, of course, that's exactly what's happening today. We're at a point where two powers, the United States and Israel, are presuming to determine the fate of the Palestinians. To use the word that Chas. used a couple of minutes ago, that's the denial of democracy to the Palestinians, the very cause that we presume to be fighting for in Iraq -- at least so we are told by our president. Sure, Sharon is happy with the exchange of letters that took place. The New York Times has a rather extended story this morning about how this is a function of American politics. Of course it's a function of Israeli politics too. It's designed to save Israel - designed to save Sharon within the context of Israeli politics. He's in a lot of trouble with a possible indictment and the rest. And I wonder, as I have often wondered, what the president thinks he is achieving, because one of the bizarre things that has happened, I think, is that he has done something within the context of the war on terror that no president - I think we all agree that it's very likely, since we are attempting to reach some sort of a rapprochement with the Islamic world - something that no president chose to do during the Cold War when it made some strategic sense at least to issue the kind of statement that was issued this morning on the part of the United States to ally us unilaterally and unequivocally with Israel. I mean, it would have made a lot of sense in challenging the Soviet Union at the time and challenging Arab states which were our declared enemy, so to speak, because Syria and Egypt were allies, at that point, of the Soviet Union. Well, we didn't chose to do it then and we're choosing to do it now -- kind of one of the paradoxes of this administration. Let me just say one word, because I've got my two-minute warning, and that is I am one of the few people who has been arguing rather consistently that we can't understand the Bush administration unless we understand the president's devotion to religious doctrines having to do with the Middle East in general and with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. I've written about it to some degree. It's something that's very difficult for most of us to grasp because most of us, including myself, are secular people. We find it hard to understand the influence of religion among politicians today, but I think that President Bush, if this is not the only brick that stands in the foundational wall of his thinking, it certainly is one of the major ones. The religious school to which he belongs of born-again Christians certainly holds that it is important for the Jews to hold power in Israel, and I think the president, at least there is a major segment of his mind that shares that view. And I say this almost by default because what he did today and what he has been doing over the - which is really only a continuation of a policy that he has followed since the very beginning of his administration three and some years ago, but I say it almost by default because it just doesn't seem to be in the national interests of the United States. We are fighting this war on terror. We are seeking to ingratiate ourselves with the Islamic world. We are doing our best to show that we are even-handed in dealing with the Middle East conflict, and yet what he seems to be doing is igniting more and more bombs himself in terms of dealing with the very people whose support we need in order to end the war on terrorism. So I leave it at that. I have spent most of my adult life trying to figure out the sources of American policy in the Middle East and I'm probably as confused now as I was at the beginning, and I think we have to keep looking for some explanation of this because it is so far removed from what I think will be useful to the interests of the United States. Thank you. (Applause.) MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, Milton. We did impose very late on Milton to join us, but I think we made a very wise choice, and that very cogent statement is a product of years of reflection by Milton, and I think we're all the better for it. I particularly appreciated his closing remarks because they're about precisely what concerns me the most. I think one should be at least as careful - perhaps more careful in the enemies one chooses as the friends that one chooses, and we seem to be choosing some quite dangerous enemies at the moment. I have one observation to make on the right of return, which all three panelists so far have spoken to, and it is a theory that I put out to be refuted, and that is that the right of return has never been about Palestinians going back to Jaffa, or Haifa as it's now known, or other places in Israel proper, and it has always been about symbolic recognition that a wrong was done to the Palestinians in 1948. And in that sense, the right of return is much like - or the need to address this is much like -- the need that Sadat recognized, when he went to Jerusalem, to recognize the suffering and the trauma that the Jewish people had gone through, which resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel. I think the Palestinians are calling for similar recognition of their suffering in a context where unfortunately there seems to be a contest to see who can suffer the most, and most painfully. With that conjecture, let me ask Phil Wilcox to come to the podium and close the panel, and then we will turn to a discussion, comments, questions. And I'd ask those of you who want to make comments or questions to give me a signal. I'll note you down and try to call you to the microphone in the order that I see. PHILIP WILCOX: Thank you, Chas. Good morning, everybody. The day after President Bush's endorsement of Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan it's pretty clear that the Geneva Accord is moribund and that it can't be resurrected until Bush and Sharon leave office or are still singing in unison. Sharon's intention to withdraw from Gaza is surely welcome it itself, but his unilateral approach is rejection of negotiations and his expressed willingness to evacuate only four small West Bank settlements, plus the massive separation barrier, which he was building, which is creating serious new facts on the ground out of steel and concrete, I think reveal a deeper and more dangerous overall strategy. Sharon says the barrier is temporary, but it more likely defines his vision of an eventual Palestinian state: a truncated series of noncontiguous enclaves and about half the West Bank that could not possibly become a viable Palestinian state. Two days ago Sharon seemed to confirm this by pledging that five - the major five big settlement blocks that are currently protected by the line of the wall, as it has been built and as it is planned, would be preserved. Sharon justifies his unilateralism by the claim that there is no Palestinian partner, but I think his real strategy is to avoid negotiations which would confront him with a need to address Palestinian claims. Sharon has a history of unilateralism, and true to form, he wants to do it his way. By endorsing Sharon's unilateral approach, Bush implicitly and, judging from former comments, explicitly supports Sharon's claim that there can be no negotiations until the Palestinians first stamp out terrorism. Now, I know very few people who really believe that Arafat or any other Palestinian leader will have the political or operational wherewithal to stop the violence without a political process that turns Palestinian public opinion against violence by promising an end to the occupation. Bush described Sharon's plan as historic and courageous - a historic, courageous move toward peace, but if Sharon's past is a guide, it looks to me more like a victor's peace that can only reinforce the cynicism and despair and rebellion of the Palestinians. Bush still clings to the roadmap, it's true, but contemplates negotiations and a series of reciprocal obligations: to be sure, an end to Palestinian terrorism but also a settlement freeze, an evacuation of outposts, and an Israeli military pullback. Now, Sharon has ignored Israel's roadmap obligation and Bush seems to have acquiesced. Bush also accommodated Sharon by his startling declaration that the '49 armistice line is no longer realistic because of new realities on the ground and by calling for a resettlement of refugees in the new state of Palestine. Now, adopting these positions, to be sure, reflect reality -- such conclusions will be the part of any ultimate peace agreement - but there's still a major departure from American policy, which has always held that such major issues must be resolved in the process of negotiations. Now, these are gifts to Sharon. Surely they'll boost his political position at home, but they certainly don't advance American interests. Now, the current Israeli and American policy leaves little room - no room whatsoever for a different approach like the Geneva Accords, but if, as likely, these current positions give way to reality, somehow an approach along the lines of Geneva will have to be revised. Now, how can this be done? Today Israelis are not prepared to abandon the occupied territories and withdraw from settlements or take down the wall unless they can be assured that peace is possible, that they will be secure and that they can protect a Jewish state. Terrorism has so thoroughly frightened the Israelis that they're deeply skeptical about peace. Nor will Palestinians turn against violence or abandon the right of return -- which I think is primarily a bargaining lever - without a realistic hope of liberation and a genuine state of their own. Now, Sharon's unilateral plan and Washington's warm support for this I'm afraid will only deepen Palestinian despair and weaken what remains of the secular, pragmatic Palestinian leadership. This impasse cannot be broken, and certainly violence will remain the default choice of both sides unless somehow real hope for peace is restored. And this is going to require a new vision of the future, spelled out in compelling details that meets the basic needs of both societies: for Israel, peace and security in a Jewish state; for Palestinians, freedom and a genuine sovereign state of their own. Sharon's plan offers neither. It threatens the very concept of two states, and such an outcome is vital to preserve Israel as a Jewish democratic state and to bring justice to the Palestinians. In contrast, Geneva offers a vision of hope. It addresses and proposes solutions to all the tough problems. Moreover, it's an Israeli-Palestinian product. Polls show that both sides support the elements of Geneva yet they reject the accord itself. The authors had hoped that it would galvanize politics and create a kind of groundswell that would oblige their leaders to adopt it or step aside. This has not happened. Indeed, the initiative has been waning, and not it seems, as I said, moribund. Well, there is an alternative scenario, certainly not now but in the future. Somehow there might be a radical new American initiative to resume negotiations aimed at a peace along the lines of the Geneva Accord -- we would probably call it something else - backed up by the appointment of a powerful American envoy. An American plan like this, if it were pursued with skill and determination and empathy to both sides, would probably mobilize, over time, Palestinian and Israeli majorities in support of it, and if such support indeed could be mobilized, in the end this would oblige Arafat and Sharon, or their successors, to accept it or to yield to new leadership. Now, the U.S., it couldn't impose such a solution, no more than Sharon can impose a unilateral solution. It could only happen with the full support of both communities - a commitment by both communities to negotiation defined by an outcome that spells out clearly, as Geneva does, a vision of the future. Such a destination is necessary or negotiations are likely to founder again, as they have in the past when peace processes were just processes without a defined endgame. If this doesn't happen, I fear that both Israel and Palestine are going to further descend into more violence and chaos, and I know that both communities are desperate for a way out. The Geneva Accords offers this. It's the culmination of 10 years of public, official, and private negotiation. It's fair and balanced and it's hard to imagine that there can be any other ultimate solution that brings a lasting peace. But it's still a distant vision, and until enlightened leaders emerge in Israel and in Palestine, or until the United States reverses its course and commits its full moral and political authority to such a real solution, I see little hope that this tragic conflict is going to end. So I'll end by saying, yes, the Geneva Accord is dead for now, but long live the Geneva Accord. (Applause.) MR. FREEMAN: Thank you very much. I think there is something approaching a consensus in the panel that unilateralism by Israel is not a viable long-term solution, and in fact, one has to raise the question of how Israel is to become part of the Middle East if it continues to ignore not only the views of Palestinians but of other neighbors and to proceed unilaterally. Can the structures of peace that were built through negotiation earlier - the Camp David Accords, the peace with Jordan - survive unilateralism. Those accords envisaged progress between Israelis and Palestinians. That was the explicitly stated sine qua non of those agreements, and of course, such an agreement between Palestinians and Israelis was the trigger for the Saudi plan which the Arab League, as Milton noted, after grumbling, endorsed. The Saudi plan, as far as I know, is still on the table. One wonders how long it will remain there if there is not a peace process. So I think there are serious issues here, but I think everyone, in one way or another, while noting that the Geneva Accords themselves are very likely of little relevance to the current situation, or perhaps of no relevance, nevertheless stand as a symbol of hope for some future resumption of dialogue and accommodation between Israelis and Palestinians, and that in itself is no mean achievement, even if, as many pointed out, the Israeli partners in this process are not at the center of Israeli politics, whereas the Palestinians may be somewhat closer to the center of Palestinian politics. So with these few remarks I invite those present to raise whatever points you wish to raise. Ma'am? Could you identify yourself at the microphone? Q: Yes, my name is Joan Drake. I'm from Washington, D.C. I have three very quick points. I'd be delighted to hear some comments. One, the passage of time: how significant is it? As the panel has noted, the length of this process - I mean, we're looking 1948 to 2004 basically. Secondly, in regard to the Cold War stance that this administration seems to be speaking from, is it the case that this president is being advised by the wrong people and that he's being advised to do something that is no longer relevant in today's world? And thirdly, how much arrogance can the rest of the world absorb from positions taken by the United States and Israel? We seem, in the presentation of last night, to be in a situation where we've gone much further than I could ever imagine could be realistic or reasonable in today's world. MR. FREEMAN: Well, I think you're touching on quite a number of the issues that Milton spoke to. And, Milton, I'd invite you to respond first. Perhaps others will wish to do the same. MR. VIORST: Well, I think I indicated my position on the second two points. The passage of time is one of great despair. Needless to say, we all thought at least by the time Yitzhak Rabin was elected prime minister that we were on the way, by virtue of some inevitable process - and I emphasize the delusion of the word inevitable, or ineluctable if you want to use something even a little fancier -- and it got turned around. If I may be permitted to do so, this review of my book that's in the current issue of Middle East Policy -- I am usually wildly denounced by people as a crazy peacenik leftist or something of that sort, and in this review I am denounced as somebody who is living in an unreal world where I think a two-state solution actually might work. And the author of this review is a very distinguished professor, who I must say wrote with considerable critical wisdom. I didn't like very word of it but it was critical wisdom. He said, listen, we've already lost, those of us who felt that there was once the prospect for a democratic Palestine and a democratic Israel living side by side. Forget it kids; it's over. And I tend to think that, alas, maybe it is over. Certainly President Bush has nailed the final nail on the coffin. Now, whether this can rise again, I don't know. I'm feeling very despairing about this process. I think it's important to note that the Democratic candidate - the presumed Democratic candidate has not said anything terribly critical about the exchange of letters, Sharon and Bush. That may be quite understandable, but I think it's important to note, as the papers all did, that this was, once again, an extremely radical departure on the part of this administration, and I don't know if it can be undone. Yes, the passage of time has been costly. Some premises that we began with, which was this had to be gradually done and we couldn't specify the end game, and so on and so on, because only by leaving it a little vague will we get cooperation, and the fact is it was the other way around. Every time we came to a crossroads in this long process, there were people who are determined to wreck it, wreck the process, and in time they succeeded, and they have certainly succeeded now, where there is no peace process at all. Thank you. MR. FREEMAN: If I may, I don't think it's fair or accurate to accuse the administration of taking a Cold War stance. The Cold War was characterized by a large measure of American deference to foreign opinion. It was conducted with allies whom we consulted before we acted, and it involved championing the rule of law against the lawless aggression of the Soviet bloc. I wouldn't say that the administration's position vis-à-vis the opinion of humankind, alliances, or the rule of law internationally has much resemblance to those earlier stands. Marshall. MR. BREGER: The passage of time is a major point. I'm not sure if the Palestinians over time have gotten used to being occupied, but certainly Israelis got used to being occupiers. That's one of the great tragedies of the three no's of Khartoum in 1967b where the Arab League basically refused to deal after the '67 war. It gave a chance for people to get used to being - at least for the Israelis - to get comfortable with occupation. But I think the passage of time has a lot of results. It's created the demographic quote, unquote "crisis" where the Israelis are now starting to recognize, from a demographic point of view, that they may not be a Jewish majority between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, and I think that as much as anything else is impelling Sharon to undertake withdrawal from Gaza. It's also created the demographic realities that President Bush alludes to in his letter of settlements within the West Bank, which as facts on the ground are a result of passage of time. So I think there's no doubt that passage of time has made this entire - resolving this entire problem much more difficult and problematic. I won't speak to the Cold War point. I don't know much about those things. And I don't know if I would quite use the word arrogance, although I could understand the impulse behind it in referring to the Bush and Sharon agreement. I mean, it depends upon who's using the term. I have to be very frank: when you're the world's only superpower, using your word the world's going to give you - defer a great deal to your "arrogance" -- and quote, unquote. So I think, to some extent, geopolitics reflects how the U.S. is operating - maybe not deferring because it's not the Cold War, and that's a reality that has to be taken into account also. MR. FREEMAN: Ziad. MR. ASALI: I think what has happened the last couple of days is that both Bush and Sharon have actually punted. There is no finishing this game at this point in time. Nobody expects realistically that this package is the final package that will bring about peace. So this is deferring peace for the future. And what is happening is that the people who are opposed to peace at this point in time - the people who are opposed to the Geneva Accord, the solution that gives us the final historic compromise, are betting exactly on the future. On Israel, the people who want to hold on to the land of historic Israel, Eretz Yisrael, for religious or other reasons, think that it is a very bad thing for them to have a deal now because it will mean precisely a two-state solution where they will have to cede the land. On the other hand, the Palestinians - and what more importantly has not been discussed actually in this context, is that people who actually support the Palestinians in their historic quest - and in this instance it has to be spelled out - the Islamic rejectionist will not want a peace solution at this point in time and are betting on the future precisely for that. They think in the long run - and when the long run comes about here we're talking about 100 years, and that's what is used quite often, 100 years. In 100 years the Islamists think that they will throw Israel out. So the question is between these visionary people, with their ideological religious mix of things, think that in the final analysis things will work out their way or not. It is precisely the challenge for us, those of us who suffer less from these historical delusions and religious-held ideas, to find a solution at this time for this generation that cannot but be a two-state solution with whatever is spelled out in Geneva as the final outcome. The problem with this is that we do not really have the political force to bring this about. No one does. No one in authority does, for sure. MR. FREEMAN: Marshall, you had another comment before we turned to Phil? MR. VIORST: Well, I just want to be clear. It may be ironic, but I have to perhaps disagree with my colleague. At least on the Israeli side, the groups that oppose a two-state solution are the groups that are radically opposed to the Bush-Sharon exchange of letters, who are opposed to the Gaza withdrawal, because they recognize that after this Likud primary, which is going to be held in a month, which Bush (sic) is most likely to win because of - MR. FREEMAN: Sharon. MR. VIORST: Sharon is most likely to win, sorry - because of this gift, as Phil put it, from Bush, the dream of Eretz Yisrael ha-Shlema, a greater Israel, is broken. It's simply then a question of bargaining, of handling of the details, and the devil is in the details. But it's a major kind of existential change in the political realities. So the people who are against the two-state solution are the people who are against the unilateral Gaza withdrawal as envisioned by Sharon, for that reason. MR. FREEMAN: Phil. MR. WILCOX: The passage of time is critical, and that the window for a compromise that would create two states is growing smaller. As one drives through the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as I did last month, the physical changes on the ground that Sharon and the settlement movement have wrought, and the wall, are simply breathtaking. And it's conceivable that at some stage, watching this progress, the Palestinian public opinion will revert to the old demand for one state: a bi-national, secular, democratic state in Palestine. I am not at all sure that the Palestinians will persist forever in pressing for a state of their own in the West Bank in Gaza and a capital in East Jerusalem if there isn't a restoration of hope that that is possible. The facts on the ground offer vivid evidence that it is less and less possible. As for what motivates American policy, our politicians, the president included, have long pledged our lasting, steadfast support for the well-being and security of the state of Israel. If we are indeed committed to Israel's security, we should not indulge them in self-destructive policies. We should embrace them and their fundamental needs and rights for a democratic Jewish state of their own, but we should look for different allies in Israel. It's a volatile country. There is a silent majority there which wants peace. Those people are our allies. It is not Sharon and those who are pursuing a policy which is very adverse to Israeli interests and American interests, and needless to say, Palestinian interests. MR. FREEMAN: I want to, before we come to the next comment or question, go back to your point about the passage of time, which all have reflected upon. In a sense, this issue began as an existential question in what is now the territory of Israel proper, and it continued to be an existential issue, as people mentioned, certainly through 1967 and up to 1973. What happened after the war for Kuwait and the Madrid process, however, took this question and made it a non-existential question. And in fact, Palestinians and Israelis, I think, during that time - and certainly the Arab world as the Abdullah - Saudi plan shows - came to accept the existence of the state of Israel and not to question it. What Ziad is saying about Islamic extremists is very telling in that regard. Just as Jewish extremists now seek, in effect, a one-state solution, the Islamic extremists see the same thing on their side. I don't think they have a vision, Phil, any longer, of a democratic, secular state in the land of Israel. And their model is not a hundred years. It is the Christian reconquest of Spain, which took 800 years and which resulted in 1492 in the unthinkable: the expulsion of that brilliant civilization, both its Muslim and Jewish components, and the Diaspora of both from Spain throughout the entire European and Mediterranean region. So both sides are indeed playing games with time, and the extremists on both sides have rather apocalyptic visions of how the passage of time might benefit their vision, which has no room for the other side. Sir? MR. ASALI: May I just say that the other model for that period of time would be the Crusades. That's what they're talking about, the hundred or 200 years. MR. FREEMAN: Sure. MR. BREGER: As long as the model is not the Reconquista - MR. FREEMAN: (Laughs.) MR. BREGER: -- and they create the return of Andalus, you see. MR. FREEMAN: Well, that's another matter. Q: Mustafa Malik is my name. I'm a journalist here. First, my take on this agreement is that I think that it is a kind of fig leaf over a reality that Sharon doesn't want to tell Israelis, which is that for the first time he admits that he has to withdraw. And I think it is the second Arab guerilla group's victory over Israel. The first was from Lebanon when the Lebanese guerillas, Hezbollah threw them out. (Unintelligible) - I remember. I have a question for that -- that he was sent out by Barak saying that if he becomes stronger he will be a thorn on the side of Arafat. And the, quote, "the extremists" I think willy-nilly they are gaining ground. Question is - I have one question which is what Chas. Freeman said. I'm worried about - I'm not worried, I'm very curious about Jordan now, because the Israelis -- for a long time Begin thought that Jordan is Palestine and 60 percent of Jordanians weren't Palestinians. I talked with them; their intellectuals saying that, well, this is a planted regime from what is now Saudi Arabia. It serves always foreign interests -- Israeli, American. Before, it served British interests. Palestinians want it for the strategic depth, and I think they decided in Camp David with Abdullah and Arafat decided not to take it, that they cannot deal with the rebels -- make a final settlement with the Israelis in this generation. So my question is, what does the future -- we are all sure it cannot be done -- changes of reality does, that if we democratize, say, Jordan or Palestinians overthrow him - it's a very artificial regime; it can go any time. And now I saw the other day, that - (unintelligible) - was in Baghdad. That is not going to be a secular democracy. So how do you envision future, next generation if it deals with - how do you see it is coming? Of course, I mean wishful thinking will not do anything. It will be - reality will decide, and if we, the United States, goes out of Iraq because of guerilla pressure, how does one generation from now -- that it will be resolved? Thank you. MR. FREEMAN: I'd like to ask Ziad to start with this because I think there are basically two questions. The first is, is the Sharon withdrawal from Gaza going to be interpreted in the region as a victory of terrorism or terrorist tactics against the state of Israel? And second, what is the connection between that withdrawal and the pressure that the United States occupation in Iraq is now under in the eyes of people in the region? I thought those were the two questions. Q: Yes. MR. FREEMAN: And that, in turn, raises issues more broadly about stability in the region, including that of the state of Jordan. Ziad, if you would. MR. ASALI: Certainly, there are those who will want to claim that the withdrawal from Gaza is based on the Lebanese model with the fight of Hezbollah and now the Hamas folks and the others have successfully made life very difficult for Israel and Sharon is declaring victory and cutting out of Gaza. This is one interpretation and one spin, which may or may not succeed depending on how it actually will unfold over the next several months and how the other forces that are equally anxious to reclaim the difference space, a secular democratic new order in Gaza, as a promise for the emerging Palestinian state will position themselves vis-à-vis Israel and with the United States also. The other question on Iraq, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Iraqi question is impacted strongly by anything that's Palestinian. Palestine, for the Arab and Muslim masses out there, is a question that's very much like the Holocaust is to the Jews all over the world. This is something that's quite often ignored and neglected and people deflect the centrality of the Palestinian problem from analyzing anything that has to do with Israel, with the Middle East. That is a mistake. I think the Iraqi people, even in their present misery, et cetera, et cetera are extremely motivated by this question of Palestine, and the question is, will these secular democratic forces win or will the religious and non-compromising forces win in their - that will be impacted greatly on what's happening in Palestine. On the Jordan question, there is an interesting scenario that is being very, very kind of talked about low key, which is, okay, Gaza, in one form or another, will fall under the domain of Egypt like it used to prior to '67. Jordan, with the new barrier that is being built, will have a closer affiliation with whatever is left of the West Bank, and in time the Palestinians might decide that there is no viable solution for them, and after the noise that they will make, presumably somebody thinks or wishes that they will look to Jordan to join forces as a state of Palestine, a state of Jordan with a federal government. That is, I think, much more in the wishful thinking domain. I do not believe that the Palestinian state can be avoided in the future, that is viable, if people are serious about peace. MR. FREEMAN: Phil, would you like to comment, and then Milton? MR. WILCOX: I'd like to take issue with the speaker's comment that Jordan is an artificial entity. One could argue that most of the postcolonial states in the Middle East are artificial entities, but they have, in varied degrees, become permanent entities. Jordan especially has displayed a level of statecraft, pragmatism and concern toward its own people. It is, in my view, one of the more successful of the states of the modern Arab Middle East. The old Likud view that Jordan is Palestine I always thought was a dangerous fantasy. To invite a much larger Palestinian state on its eastern border that would maintain irredentist claims I always thought was a strategic folly from the Israeli point of view. I don't think the Palestinians want to become part of Jordan as surely the Kingdom of Jordan is not going to welcome a much larger and potentially destabilizing cohort of Palestinians. MR. FREEMAN: Milton and then Marshall. MR. VIORST: The question is, is this an Israeli retreat? And the answer is, I think it is an Israeli retreat. I don't think the issue is so much giving up the territory, which is very important -- and I join with those who applaud withdrawing from Gaza. The question is, how is it done? What purpose does it serve? And that's why I'm a little bit bewildered by why Sharon is doing this because if it were done by negotiations, presumably he could elicit from the Palestinians some sort of guarantees on security or whatever he's interested in. I think it's curious. So I think that this is a grievous mistake in - not in withdrawing from Gaza but in the way the retreat is taken, and the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world will see it as they saw the withdraw from Lebanon as a triumph of terrorism or armed struggle or whatever you choose to call it. And I think we have to be - we have to recall how much this looks a lot like what Sharon did by going into Lebanon in 1982. Unwilling to deal with the Palestinians as people, as a government, as a political force, he thought he was going to be able to go in there and impose his will by military force and he failed. And he is doing this now in Gaza and is getting the support from a president who thinks that the only problems are solved - at least the contemporary problems of the Middle east are solved are by military force, that politics and negotiation are not a relevant consideration. Forgive me if I say that 20 years I wrote something about - one of the problems with the Israelis is that when things are going calmly, when the region is not in a state of turmoil, there was a sense on the part of the government, which was, why should we negotiate? Everything's fine, there's no problems now. And then as soon as the intifadah's began what we got was, hey, wow, we can't afford to reward terrorism. It shows that terrorism will triumph. But in fact, I think in the case both of Gaza and of Lebanon, terrorism has triumphed and the president, in effect, is recognizing that notwithstanding the fact that the consuming vision, the obsession of this administration, is terrorism and the rejection of any kind of political solution of the problems that are obvious, at least obvious probably to most of the people in this room. So I think that this is opening the door to increased instability in the region and I think we're probably going to see that over the course of the next few years. MR. FREEMAN: Marshall. MR. BREGER: Well, I don't know if it's correct that the proposed withdrawal from Gaza is a result of the armed struggle or not, but I would certainly say you'd be wise not to say it too loud because in the kind of zero sum world that we live in if it is - I repeat what I said before - if it's something that's a victory for the Palestinians, it's going to be a defeat for the Israelis and therefore they're not going to want to do it. I think there's no doubt that it's a combination of the fact that the Israeli public, while in one sense resolute is also despairing and is looking for some way out of the present impasse. Also, this demographic reality, which I referred to, which while it's existed for many years, only in the last six months to a year have the Israeli polity become really aware of it and sensitive to it. On the question of Jordan, I agree with Phil that this Jordan as Palestine is a fiction and nonstarter, but I also think that 50 years from now, or 50 years from whenever there will be a Palestine, however, "viable," quote and unquote, the country is going to start out being - I mean, even if it has all of the land that was in the West Bank from '67, in 50 years along it's going to be in some kind of economic, some kind of confederal relationship with some state, and I have to assume that after the recent experience it's not going to be Israel. So I would have to imagine that after the flush of independence there would be a relationship developed with Jordan that would get closer over time, a confederal relationship to be sure, maybe an economic relationship. MR. FREEMAN: Milton, one more word and then - MR. VIORST: Yeah, Marshall said his concern was 50 years from now whether there'll be a Palestine, and my concern is whether there will be an Israel. I think there are - I can't remember what the most recent demography is but there is something like 250 million Palestinians and there are - MR. FREEMAN: Arabs. MR. VIORST: Excuse me, Arabs, and there are 4.5 or 5 million Israelis, and that is a serious problem. There is no strategic depth that the Israelis enjoy particularly, besides the United States, but the Palestinians have this huge strategic depth behind them, and this will not end simply by a proclamation on the part of the president and Sharon. I think that what is done unilaterally and by declaration is far different from what is done by negotiation with the adversaries in which some mutual reconciliation is reached, however unhappy both sides might be over the outcome. And I think that is the serious mistake that we are involved in now. The imposition of an agreement, that even if it's good, the fact is that it requires no acknowledgement on the part of the other side of its virtues so that they can dwell totally, only on its deficiencies and I think that's what we have. The Palestinians may get Gaza back and there'll be very happy about this but the fact is that's not going to dispose them any more favorably to the Israelis because that was not part of the package because there was no package. MR. FREEMAN: So, in effect, we come back to the security dilemma that intelligent Israelis have always recognized, which is that it's better to make peace when you're strong than to wait until you're under pressure, and I note in this regard that even the Roman Empire, which was vastly larger and more powerful than Israel, after applying Caligula's foreign policy of let them hate us as long as they fear us was ultimately overwhelmed by tribal elements on its borders. Q: Jeff Steinberg, Executive Intelligence Review. I'd like to make a worst-case brief observation and then pose a best-case question to all of the panelists. The long experience that we've all had probably following Ariel Sharon's long career of activities that often border on war crimes - I couldn't help concerning myself, particularly after I saw one news report a few days ago that the Gaza withdrawal is not scheduled to begin until a year from now. And I don't know what the details were that were worked out on timing but I consider this very important because the Bush/Sharon summit was a very strong kind of reinforcement of the common war on terrorism, and I could envision Sharon coming back, seeing Bush's vulnerability and weakness, and taking it as a mandate to carry out a rather brutal assassination campaign and other actions all under the guise of making Gaza safe for the withdrawal up to, and perhaps including, the elimination of Arafat. So that's the worst-case observation. Taking the other extreme and seeing the events of yesterday as a sign of weakness and vulnerability, Sharon facing indictment, revolts within the Likud, Bush facing a much more serious reelection challenge than expected. What kinds of actions can be taken now by other players on the world stage to judo this situation in the best possible direction assuming that Sharon does go forward with a speedy pullout? I raise the issue of the economic dimension, which I think was the tragic factor that was underutilized when we had the Oslo Accord's momentum, and also Bush's vulnerability on Iraq perhaps opens up greater leverage for Europe, Russia, other Arab players to finally decide that this is a superpower with feet of clay and therefore maybe vulnerable to a lot more international pressure. So I'd like to get an idea of what kinds of things could and should be done to push this in the most happy outcome. MR. FREEMAN: So you are saying, in a sense, that if the withdrawal from Gaza is a retreat, in classic military terms it will be covered by a savage assault before the retreat is actually done or the redeployment is done, and you're asking a very nasty question of what linkages the rest of the world might impose given the problems we have in Iraq. And I'm delighted that there are panelists to respond to both questions and I don't have to. Who would like to start? MR. VIORST: I'll start. MR. FREEMAN: You'll start, Milton, okay. MR. VIORST: I'm glad you asked that question. I was in Berlin a few weeks ago and I was surprised to be invited to talk to a group of high level German - not top level but high level officials and journalists and what we talked about was why there were no countervailing forces within the world, most notably the EU, which is pulling itself together in so many ways, money and banking and this, that and the other thing but yet, in terms of international politics, they are still negligible. Europe is still negligible, certainly on the Middle East, and the kind of thing that came up in the course of this - and I was rather surprised because I don't usually talk to Europeans or even with them in this kind of organized way - and as far as the EU is concerned there are three forces: Germany - for all practical purposes, Germany, France and England. And we know about Tony Blair. He has made a strategic decision on behalf of his country that he will follow the United States and President Bush no matter what the magnitude of the disaster and he is still there. The Germans were quite willing to acknowledge, I think - I was surprised that they have their hands tied by the fact that they're Germans. I mean, listen, Germany is out there. It's got a rather lousy history in terms of dealing with Jews and so they regard themselves as having - they regard their own history as having cancelled them out as a force in dealing with the Middle East. The former German chargé -- and I don't even remember his name so I'm not even - I won't ask not to reveal who this was because I can't remember who he was, but he was the former German chargé in the embassy in Israel. And he said in the course of this conversation that the day or in the days when the Geneva Accords - we're getting back to the Geneva Accords and now the subject of our conversation today - at the time of the Geneva Accords, Germany was absolutely thrilled and they issued a series of positive statements saying yes, how pleased they were and this opened up a door for the resolution of some problems. And he said within 24 hours they began getting instructions - not instructions, that's the wrong word - advisories from the Israeli Foreign Ministry saying, hey, come on guys, cool it. We have some serious concerns about the Geneva Accords and we would rather that you Germans did not promote them, and so they said listen, we had a little consultation and we stopped promoting them. That leaves France in Europe and the French in many ways have done a commendable job but they're alone and they're not very strong acting by themselves within the context of today's international world. If there are others around - Russia, we know that Russia is still too busy licking its wound to exert - from its own transformation a dozen years so that it has no kind of genuine force to exert any influence, even if it wanted to, in this area. And as far as the other countries of Europe or the rest of the world are concerned, I can't imagine we can look to anybody with much confidence. And it is strange because we are not just the single superpower in the universe, stronger than any country in history except perhaps the Roman Empire, and yet all of the rest of the world that might possibly provide us with at least a certain amount of restraint and guidance is for their own separate reasons - so it's not just that we're so strong but they're so weak. So, I can't believe that there is a lot of prospect out there for persuading us to change our course. MR. ASALI: A few things here. I think Mr. Viorst has canvassed the European picture pretty well and the only thing I want to add to it is that watching Europe over the past several decades one senses clearly the shift in sentiment in the public - the public's sentiment towards a much more sympathetic view of the Palestinians and understanding their issues. Adding international terrorism now as a central issue for our time, I think there will be a stronger understanding of the role that this issue has in generating sympathy for people who would be causing international problems. The thing is that I want to add to this, what can be done outside Europe - Europe, I agree, is still not exactly powerful and will not dictate. There are still three major players. Two of them played yesterday and one of them was left without a ball, but these three have to also undergo some changes. I think we have to watch for the elections in Palestine that I mentioned and I think there is no peace possible without a Palestinian authorized entity. The other is elections in this country and I think this is something that is also tied up with the Iraqi issue and understanding some more what is happening, and at least this issue will need to be part of the discussion during the elections. The third change will be within Israel, and I think somebody's already referred to the troubles of Mr. Sharon where further things will take place. On Iraq, it is clear that Iraq is a problem and will remain to be a problem for the several months to come and it was in that sense a little bit strange that the president of the United States would ignore, if I may say - not ignore, downplay the sensibilities of the Arab Islamic world as he deals with an issue where he needs to have a more sympathetic hearing to get a better resolution on Iraq. I think that issue will continue. MR. FREEMAN: Marshall? MR. BREGER: Well, I think if your hope is that the rest of the world will influence the U.S., I think you're whistling - on this point you're whistling Dixie. I have to adopt Milton Viorst's view as regards the EU, although I would say that so far as Britain, Britain has actually tried to use its close relationship on Iraq to try to actually influence the U.S. on the Arab-Israeli conflict and it hasn't gotten anywhere, which I think is the best - the clearest sign that Europe doesn't have much purchase on this issue. About the Arabs influencing, I'll leave it to the experts on Araby here to comment, but I don't see much of a sign of it. The influence on the U.S. is going to be, in reality, on the details. For example, what is going to be included in the side letters related to what can happen in the settlements in the interim or until there is, in Sharon's view or in the Israeli view, a Palestinian negotiating partner. How much they can grow, how much they can develop, and also on economic arrangements where Europe could and the Arab world could become involved. I think that those may have a significant influence on the details of the present approach but I don't think you're going to change the present approach because of Europe or the Arab world. MR. FREEMAN: I think, if I may, make a comment on Iraq. There are in fact increasingly unpleasant parallels between the dilemmas that the Israelis face in relation to the Palestinians and those we face with the Iraqis. Not only do the occupations increasingly resemble each other physically and on the television sets and before public opinion in the region, but our problem in Iraq has paralleled that that several of the panelists spoke of in reaching out for a regime with which to negotiate. In attempting to accomplish regime change we accomplished regime removal without change. We did not impose a new regime and as we sought to remove the regime we inadvertently destroyed the Iraqi state. So that Iraq, like the West Bank, is now in many respects a zone of anarchy under foreign occupation, and that is the problem that we confront as we approach June 30. And here there is a further parallel. We propose to transfer something called sovereignty to a group of Iraqis yet to be identified clearly but sovereignty has, as one of its main attributes, a monopoly over the use of force in the territory where it applies but we're not transferring that to the Iraqis. General Abizaid will remain in control of the use of force in Iraq and will not presumably be taking his orders from Ahmed Shalabi or whoever it is who emerges as the head of the Iraqi civilian authority. So, many of the same problems of not having anyone with whom you can make peace, with which Ziad began his remarks, apply in Iraq. I want to make a comment, since Marshall raised the issue and no one else addressed it, on the Arab world and Arab reaction to these developments. The principal issue increasingly in domestic politics throughout the Arab world is the identification of governments with the United States while the people are adamantly opposed to American policies and unsympathetic to our views of the issue of the Palestinians and Israel. The statements that were made yesterday will confirm, in the minds of people in the region, that the United States is now completely identified with Mr. Sharon and his government, and they're likely to raise the number of - the percentages of opposition to Arab governments by people on this issue from the 92 or 3 percent level to the 97 or 98 percent level. Thus, this potentially creates a huge crisis or an exacerbation of an existing crisis in U.S. relations with Arab governments - which are already struggling against widespread popular opposition - to find a basis for maintaining a cooperative relationship with the United States. How this comes out is, of course, uncertain because Arab governments have shown an ability over the years to ignore their own public opinion and to - or to pacify it by slight of hand. That may in fact get them through this but I think we should note the aggravation of the existing strain in our relationships in the region and within the region between peoples and their governments that this is likely to produce. And sir? Q: My name is Tharlet el Badissy (ph) with Al Jazzera TV. I would like to point to your parallel that you just said about the situation in Iraq and in Palestine and even the physical appearances on television and point out that - MR. FREEMAN: I had Al Jazeera in mind, of course. Q: -- point out that that one of the byproducts or benefits of the situation in Iraq has been mentioned to take out some kind of threat to Israel, and I'm intrigued by the scenarios that I heard about the 50 years scenario, 10 to 20 years from now. What would a successful American effort in Iraq do to the future of the state of Israel? Would there be some sort of competition between the interests of the U.S. and Israel over the wealth and resources of the Arab world or would that relationship actually intensify between these two countries to divide the pie? MR. WILCOX: I don't foresee U.S.-Israeli competition over the benefits of a transformed Iraq. The vast - the great benefit to Israel is that the defeat of Saddam Hussein removes a potential large adversary to the state of Israel. That's not to say that a comparable regime might emerge in the future if things do not go well for the Iraqis and the Americans and if the impasse continues in Israel and Palestine. I think there's a tendency to see these two conflicts as intimately related. They're very different conflicts. The solution in one is not going to solve the other as some of our political leadership had expected. They each have their own internal dynamic, but certainly American interests in the war against terrorism are deeply linked to change and peace in Israel and Palestine, and as we attempt to gain support from the public and from the governments in the Arab and Muslim world, we'll have great difficulty doing that unless we can demonstrate a more credible policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. MR. BREGER: Well, I mean no offense but I think you're proposing a bit of a conspiracy theory, that there's some kind of conscious or unconscious proposal of Israel and the U.S. to divide up the spoils of Iraq. I just don't think that's the case. It is true that if there is a stable Iraq and they will probably be - and if there is a move to a more Middle East there'll be greater trade between Israel and the Arab countries. Already, it's a kind of little secret that there's a significant amount of trade, which people don't talk about, going through third parties or changing the bills of lading, and there's no doubt that will increase significantly because it's mutually beneficial, both Israel and to the Arab countries. But that would require regional stability and part of regional stability would be some movement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. MR. FREEMAN: Ziad? MR. ASALI: I think Israel and many of its friends in the United States has been perceived to have been a very strong supporter of the change of regime in Iraq and being actively involved with the changes that are taking place in Iraq, including normalization of economic relations, travel restrictions, et cetera, et cetera. For a nation that has been for decades attuned and thinks in terms of Israel as an enemy of the Iraqi people and the Arab people, this adds to the list of complications for the United States to acquire that sense of antagonism that the people of Iraq have. And the longer this thing goes on in a hostile and violent manner, you would expect that Israel also will be tied in with this antagonism that the United States is facing. So this is on the one hand. On the other hand, moving the ball forward on the Palestinian issue, in general, in a credible way - I want to use your word - will absolutely be a factor in having the United States being perceived more benignly by both Iraqis and the Palestinian people and the Arab people in general. So this is one chip that could possibly help out with the resolution of the Iraqi problem. MR. FREEMAN: Let me also make a comment. I think - I for one accept the sincerity of those who advised the president. Earlier, Ms. Drake asked whether the president was not misadvised by people; I believe he has been misadvised people who sincerely had their own views of the region and the agenda that they wished to impose there, and they were sincerely concerned, in the case of Iraq, both about weapons of mass destruction and about Saddam Hussein's regime and what he might do. I think those concerns were misplaced to a considerable extent but they were real. Having said that, I think the architects of the Iraq invasion had other agendas. Some of them argued that Iraq, once subdued, would be a stepping stone to strategic pressure on other states in the region, including Iran which many Israelis, frankly, would have preferred the United States to attack rather than Iraq. But one saw this evidenced immediately after the occupation of Baghdad by all sorts of statements later, not followed up, against Syria, Iran and so forth - and Saudi Arabia as well. Then, I think there was the issue that Phil referred to, namely, in effect, eliminating Iraq as a strategic contender or possible enemy of Israel was seen as a great plus. This was a big gamble because we now do not know whether that is going to be the result of the occupation or whether Iraq may emerge as the catalyst for a widened Jihadi struggle against the United States and our friends. In fact, within Iraq, I believe Shi'a forces are now making common cause with Hezbollah and Sunni forces with Hamas and both with al Qaeda - even secular nationalists are now working with al Qaeda, which is a group of religious fanatics, in ways which link the struggle against Israel with the struggle against the United States in new and very dangerous and disadvantageous ways. So we don't know whether Iraq will be eliminated as an enemy or whether it will be a catalyst for a wider grouping of enemies and this is a matter of concern. Finally, I think those who advocated the invasion of Iraq were people who believed sincerely in the theory that democracies don't attack democracies. Therefore, if you could somehow democratize Iraq, since Israel is a democracy - at least for its Jewish population - then Iraq would somehow have so much in common with Israel that it would no longer be a military threat. I've always been very dubious about this theory, which I don't think withstands scrutiny and it reminds me of the theories that we've seen before: that Christians don't fight Christians and Muslims don't fight Muslims, Arabs don't fight Arabs, Communists don't fight Communists and so forth and so on, all of which have been unfortunately proven wrong. So, I was very dubious about this even if it were possible somehow to impose democracy on Iraq, which I think the evidence is beginning to suggest is not possible but there is a growing linkage between the issues. It's really a result of the adventure in Iraq rather than a cause of it though, in my view. There may be disagreement on the panel and I invite anyone who wishes to disagree to do so. MR. VIORST: Let me just point out that when Yitzhak Rabin became prime minister - and Yitzhak Rabin was not a saintly man but he was a man who could learn and he did learn, and he started out as a very dedicated hawk and, I think, ended his life not as a dove but certainly as an extremely cautious dove or perhaps a more reasonable hawk, but somewhere in that area as he tried to make peace. But he did say something in his inaugural address which I have always remembered and I'm sorry I don't have it - I can't recall it verbatim but he did say something to the effect that the times have changed for the Jews. We are no longer a beleaguered people. We are not - we are now accepted by much of the world and recognized and we no longer can conduct ourselves as if we are in a state of besiegement as we were for many hundreds, even thousands of years. And so I think it's important that we reach out for the world in precisely the kind of way that Ambassador Freeman was talking about, and indeed, in those few brief halcyon moments of the Rabin peacemaking years, Israel not only made peace with Jordan but had, as I recall, diplomatic or at least commercial representation in much of the Arab world, not all of the Arab world but in much of the Arab world. But, I think after Rabin's death gradually Israel reverted back to the point it did begin to think of itself as besieged, and that is precisely what the position of Sharon and, I feel, unfortunately encouraged by the president who feels that all of these people hate Jews, hate Israel, have to be handled militarily and so on. And that the notion that somehow Iraq and the Arab world can become - can live harmoniously with Israel is a snare and a delusion, and I think that's the position we are in now, that those few - that brief moment, that brief sunshiny moment when things were going well and everybody felt that inevitably they would continue to go well was turned around completely and we are back where we started. And the prospect of an Arab world that has - conducts itself psychologically as well as diplomatically as if Israel, if not a beloved at least a tolerable presence in our midst, recedes further and further from the reality. MR. FREEMAN: I think it's fair to say, wouldn't you agree, Milton, that the Israelis have been aided in coming to this unfortunate conclusion by the 872 deaths they have suffered -- MR. VIORST: Of course. MR. FREEMAN: -- over the last two and a half years. MR. VIORST: No question that when I say that it is receded further back because of the mutual animosity, the strategy of mutual murder that both sides have adopted. MR. BREGER: Well, it's not the gravamen of this discussion but I feel constrained to just comment on one point. I don't think it's really fair to say that Israel is a democracy only for the Jews. The Israeli Arabs have civil and political rights. They have tremendous social discrimination. They have tremendous cultural issues - MR. FREEMAN: I accept your point. MR. BREGER: And I just want to underscore that point. We have greater experts than I in the audience about the Arabs in Israel and they may want to comment. MR. ASALI: But it's not a full democracy for those Arabs - MR. BREGER: It's not a full democracy for the Jews either. I can give you a speech on that. MR. ASALI: Yeah, that's right. That's right. No, but we don't need speeches about that, but, in general, and if I may so really and truly I don't think there are clean hands about this issue anywhere and everybody's guilty and when does history start? When does our list of grievances begin? And how you killed us and we killed you and this is precisely the kind of dialogue which cannot be sustained if we are serious about peace. I think those people who are interested in peace should absolutely try and think more of the future than they do of the past. Learn from the past but in order to build a future - and this is where we have a huge problem. One of the problems of what's happening in this issue about the withdrawal from Gaza alone and the discussions that have been taking place excluding the Palestinians is that it plays to the deepest fears of the Palestinians. The deepest fears of the Palestinians is that they will end up without a state. The deepest fears of the Israelis now without - with an interlude of Rabin is that they're going to draw - throw us into the sea. We have to deal with the deepest fears of both people and tell them no, no, no, no; we want you to stay in Israel and we want to have Palestinian (sovereignty ?). This is the challenge for people who are in charge and people who are not in charge in this world, is to establish muscle behind this reassuring vision and make it happen. And I think the question of Iraq just kind of chimes in with all this mess and we are not going - the president referred in his discussion a couple of days ago to - he made a statement. He said Iraq is linked to the Middle East. I take it to mean that Iraq is linked to Palestine-Israel. Yes, it is linked and it is the challenge for all of us to find a way out. MR. FREEMAN: Sir? Q: My name is Amjad Araf (ph) from the Syrian Embassy. If we put aside Mr. Bush - (unintelligible) - in your opinion, why do you think he ignores this administration, ignores its role of being evenhanded state and play its honest role to move the Syrian and Lebanese track in the peace process because they are concerned? And, in your opinion, do you think that the justification of the war is related to the demographic factor and it's not related to the psychological factor? How do you accept the demographic factor and neglect the psychological factors which are related to both people of Israel and Palestine? Thank you. MR. FREEMAN: With regard to the so-called fence? Yes. Milton, do you want to try or Phil? MR. WILCOX: Well, I think there are many factors that influence American policy toward the Israel-Palestine conflict, toward the larger Middle East but let me mention one which I think is striking. I think we underestimate the positive influence and leadership that we can deploy. We tend to think of the people of that region as somehow unruly, fanatic, backward. They're not; they're human beings. They're not all that different from us. Many of them admire American institutions, the United States. They don't like our policies, but we have enormous potential for moving public opinion in those countries in the right way, and none of those countries are going to move in the direction that we hope they'll move in, including the Israelis and the Palestinians, unless public opinion supports this. I think we need to address the people in the region more directly. We have seen in the past that both the public opinion in Israel and Palestine is very volatile, that it can change for the worst; it can change for the good. It has certainly changed for the worst in part because of relentless cynical propaganda and mythology but we've also seen it change in the better. For example, in the early '90s when a Likud government, which opposed a good faith, plausible, attractive American peace initiative, was voted out of office by the Israel public. So let's think of the public dimension of this. Peace is not going to come through secret diplomacy. It's going to come, as Ziad said, through reassurance and empathy to all of the protagonists -- that we're with them, we're for peace, and that we have a proposal that's going to rescue them. MR. FREEMAN: Marshall? MR. BREGER: Well, your comment or question about the Syrian situation is a very good one. It's one I've thought about a lot. I mean, it is the case, I think Itamar Rabinovich has written on this and very well, and I think it's clear that the times when the Syrians were quite interested, the Israelis were pulled back and didn't show much interest. And then the Israelis were quite interested, the Syrians didn't grasp the ring, and there is no doubt that in many ways it's easier to come to an agreement with Syria than with the Palestinians. So I have to say it's always been a question mark for me of why there hasn't been more progress in that area. It's certainly true that at some times there've been occasions when Israeli governments have thought that they can move forward with Syria and come to an agreement, quote, unquote, "at the expense of the Palestinians." So it's a bit of a mystery why there has not been more progress in that area. MR. VIORST: Yeah, let me just say briefly, after many, many decades of looking this whole thing over what I have concluded, not happily, is that we have here two peoples both of them with seriously scarred psyches and understandably. Would one expect anything different from the Jewish people after the Crusades and the Inquisition and the Holocaust? And would one expect anything dramatically different from the Arabs after years of what they regard as domination and humiliation by the West? And so, I think what we have here is two peoples whose capacity for wise political judgment is seriously impaired, and what's happening now is that the scars are getting deeper and raw and rawer. And if it was - and if what Abba Eban said with regard to the other side can be applied to both, it's not farfetched to say neither side has missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity and I think that's where we are. MR. FREEMAN: In that vein, I think the one clear conclusion that I would draw on this issue is that the administration's initial position when it came in or its analysis, which was that the United States could not be more in favor of peace than the parties to the dispute which sounded plausible was disastrous. And we should learn never to substitute the judgment of the parties for our own on matters where our interests are at stake, as they are in this, and we should not have defaulted on the peace process as we did in 2001. That has brought many, many serious consequences. So there is a lesson here to be learned which doesn't entirely answer your question but which, I think is relevant. We have come really to the end of the time in what has been a lively discussion, I think, very illuminating. I'm not sure that we have resurrected the Geneva Accord but we certainly have demonstrated the complexity of the issues - MR. BREGER: We haven't interred it either. MR. FREEMAN: We have not interred it, and as everyone said, it remains there, if not in letter, in spirit, as an inspiration for future negotiators to use in what I think everyone agreed is the only plausible way of resolving these issues, which is by agreement and not by unilateral acts, even if unilateral acts should be taken advantage of to build for the future. So I thank you all very much. I thank the panel and I thank those of you in the audience who came inside on such a lovely spring day and didn't pay your taxes yet. Now you have time to do it. Thank you very much. (Applause.) (END)

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