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| Briefing Series |
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Policy Brief #10
From a March 7, 2003 Congressional Staff briefing on "U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Future Frameworks for Gulf Security," jointly sponsored by: The Atlantic Council of the United States, The Middle East Institute, The Middle East Policy Council, and The Stanley Foundation
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| U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Unilateral U.S. Sanctions |
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This policy brief is based on presentations and discussions at the 13th in a series of jointly sponsored off-the-record congressional staff briefings on "U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf." The views and opinions expressed in this policy brief do not necessarily represent those of the sponsoring organizations. For a printable, pdf version of the brief, click here.
Following war with Iraq, the entire Gulf region will face new challenges. The United States will arguably be in a stronger position to advance a new security agenda than it was following the 1991 Gulf War. At the same time, it faces the possibility of stronger resistance in the region, particularly in response to the anticipated US military presence in post-war Iraq. The size and shape of the US military presence maintained in the region after the war will be an important determinant of the future. This policy brief examines how the United States can contribute to Gulf security and stability through bilateral and multilateral efforts and through both official and Track II initiatives.
I. Objectives and Challenges for Regional Stability
To promote regional security, the two main priorities of the United States should be:
building support among the different groups within Iraq for a foreign policy built around a positive Iraqi role within the region; and
dealing with the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program which the United States and others allege Iran is pursuing in tandem with its three-decade-old nuclear power program.1
Other important priorities should include promoting economic stability in the region and renewing efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Promoting security is a particular challenge in a region that has for many years been characterized by instability. There have been eight wars in the Middle East in the last ten years. Furthermore, experts note that of the major proliferators of biological and chemical weapons in the world, five are found in the region.2 And lastly, the Gulf is located next to South Asia, a region with a dangerous nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India. These realities, because they are both enduring and a threat to world peace, necessitate US efforts to promote stability.
A large US military presence in post-war Iraq will contribute to regional stability in the sense that it will ease fears of aggression by Iraq against its neighbors. But it also has the potential to destabilize the domestic political situations of those same neighboring countries where the populations (and many of the governments) fear US hegemony and the possible permanence of the US military presence in the Gulf. The United States should be prepared to address these fears and concerns. The type of presence which the United States maintains in the region will in large measure determine whether US troops will be seen as occupiers or as liberators.
United Nations (UN) Resolution 687 stated that disarming Iraq was a step toward making the region a Weapons of Mass Destruction-free zone. In order to reach this latter long-term goal, additional steps are necessary that require new approaches. First, there is a need to develop networks of security expertise among analysts and officials in the region. Second, consensus will be required around security goals (as well as principles and norms) that are shared by all the states and relevant actors within the region, whatever their different national interests may be. Third, and in order to foster achievement of the first two goals, all the major actors in the region, including the government of Iran, will need to be engaged in a dialogue about security.
In furthering these goals, US policy can play an important catalytic role. Track II initiatives can also be useful in filling the vacuums where official dialogue does not take place. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are in a position to create and support opportunities for dialogue that might not otherwise exist. They, along with many multinational corporations, often have a positive presence on the ground in countries whose populations are otherwise skeptical of US agencies or agents. The long-term commitment of such organizations and companies to regional security, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance, regardless of ongoing conflict, has allowed important relationships to develop.3 The unofficial networks of expertise and personal connections created by NGO activities constitute important building blocks for future regional security frameworks.
II. Regional Stability and Iraq
A principal goal of the US-led war against Iraq is to eliminate its WMD and long-range missiles to ensure that Iraq no longer poses a threat to its neighbors and the world. A long-term strategy should focus on confirming Iraq's disarmament. This might include multinational inspectors, including representatives from neighboring states.
While confirming Iraq's disarmament, high priority should also be placed on engaging and integrating Iraq regionally and internationally. At the multilateral level, efforts could be made to involve Iraq in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) and other cooperative security structures.4 Additionally, NGOs already working on Track II cooperative security relations in the region could expand their initiatives to include Iraq. NGO projects can aid in the identification of threats and concerns shared by all countries in the region. If Iraq is included in different multilateral processes and programs, it will have a greater incentive to commit to a more stable environment.
At the bilateral level, the US-Iraqi relationship will be key to fostering regional security. It is very important that the postwar US presence is not perceived as an occupation. To this end, the United States could promote a cooperative defense initiative among Gulf States vis-à-vis Iraq. This could include programs that share information regarding WMD and the military force posture of states in the region. Above all, any rearming of Iraq must demonstrably be for the purpose of defending Iraq's security after the war - it should not constitute a capability to coerce or threaten other states in the region.
III. Regional Stability and Iran
Were the United States to continue efforts to reduce Iran's threat to Iraq and other Gulf states through traditional counter/nonproliferation efforts, the question would arise as to whether an increased US military and economic presence in the region would dissuade Iran from pursuing WMD, or conversely, whether it would drive Iran to accelerate its alleged weapons program. At present, Iran perceives a threat in the growing US military presence at its borders. US forces are currently based in Afghanistan, Bahrain Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen and elsewhere in Central Asia.5 Iran is also sensing increasing isolation. According to many experts, Iran is experiencing a pivotal political year. It is difficult to predict the outcome of the many on-going internal political battles. However, changes in Iran's domestic political situation may have only a minimal impact on its conduct of foreign and security policy given the internal Iranian consensus on the threats to the country's security and on its response options (such as the alleged development of WMD).
Iran's role in any future regional security framework is critical. Iran and North Korea could eventually gravitate towards each other, especially given their present status as pariahs in the view of US foreign policy.6 Proliferation on the part of either or both countries has the potential to be seriously destabilizing.
This said, the nature of Iran's geo-strategic environment is helpful in understanding its alleged desire to pursue a policy of WMD development. In particular, the existence of unresolved issues between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, alongside a possible long-term US military occupation in Iraq provide arguments for those in Iran who advocate accelerated plans to develop a nuclear weapons option. Such arguments are reinforced by fear that the United States has designs to force regime change in Tehran. Therefore, priority should be placed on engaging in dialogue with Iran.
Countries in the Gulf should involve Iran in multilateral frameworks, especially those that promote specific confidence-building measures. International agencies could engage Iran by encouraging increased transparency regarding any undeclared nuclear facilities, or by accepting Iran's offer of inspections "anytime, anywhere."7 As a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran could be encouraged to allow greater monitoring of its dual-use chemical facilities and programs. In order to alleviate fears of possible US/Iraqi border incursions, international monitors could be placed on the Iraq-Iran border. Involving Iran in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, particularly with UN humanitarian relief agencies that work with Afghan refugees is an example of a cooperative initiative that could help mitigate Iran's sense of isolation.
At the bilateral level, the United States should be mindful of the threats Iran perceives to its security, especially following the war with Iraq and in view of the likely long-term US presence in the region. In addition to reassessing its current sanctions under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) - given the measure's questionable effectiveness - US strategy should focus on making the bilateral relationship more predictable through the creation of consistent expectations of each side's role in regional security. The United States could make it clear that its intentions are not to impose WMD disarmament by force, but rather to encourage countries to abide by the WMD-related agreements to which they are parties, which should simultaneously make regional and bilateral relationships more predictable.
More predictable relationships are desirable as they allow for improved political relations, which ultimately lead to greater security for both sides. Predictability in the US-Iranian bilateral relationship can be attained in a number of ways. First, the United States could calm Iran's fears through declaratory policies, i.e. by stating that Iraq will not become a staging ground for incursions into Iran. It could also give Iran the negative security assurance that there will be no US attacks on a country that neither possesses nor seeks to possess WMD. Second, the United States could seek to establish functional security relationships, for example increasing contacts between the US and Iranian armed forces. Although normalization is not likely to occur in the near future, functional contacts can diminish the prospects for armed conflict.
Any future framework for regional security must address Iran's growing concern with the security threats it senses around its borders. Otherwise, it is doubtful that Iran will become committed to meaningful regional cooperation on nonproliferation or other vital issues.
IV. New Challenges Ahead
The increasing US presence in the Gulf gives the United States new opportunities to contribute to a regional security agenda. With regard to Iran and Iraq, US policy should focus both on disarmament and engagement. Engagement can take the form of improving bilateral relations through confidence building measures, multilateral efforts involving other Gulf countries and relevant international organizations, or Track II initiatives developed and supported by NGOs and other private-sector actors. Region-wide, efforts should be made to build consensus around key security concerns, especially regarding WMD and terrorism. In sum, it is important to understand the differences among various actors in the Gulf but to act on the commonalities.
The presence of US troops in the region will represent a significant factor in defining the role the United States plays in future security frameworks. This increased presence can play a positive role in Iraqi reconstruction, and, if skillfully managed, can help maintain international pressure to halt Iran's alleged WMD programs without provoking armed conflict. Within Iraq, the US military will be in contact with the civilian population, and it might even be responsible for mediating ethnic conflicts. However, the United States must be prepared for anti-US sentiment in response to its high degree of visibility, even if this presence is successfully used for aims that are largely viewed as constructive. The global media, and in particular Arab-based satellite television services such as Al Jazeera, will continue to scrutinize all US activity in the region. Thus, while US involvement in the Gulf is crucial, all efforts should be made to ensure that US policies and actions are not perceived as narrowly self-serving, but are rather focused primarily on the widely shared goals of promoting growth and stability in the region.
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